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ABSTRACT
COERCIVE CONSENSUS: JEWISH FEDERATIONS, ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, AND
THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN PRO-ISRAEL POLITICS

Matthew Berkman
Ian S. Lustick
Scholars tend to identify the 1960s and early 1970s as a period of pro-Israel ideological
consensus in the American Jewish community. That consensus began to break down
following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, slowly giving way to a more conflictual intraJewish debate over Israel. Yet apart from references to the emotional impact of the SixDay War of 1967, the literature on American Jews and Israel offers no explanation for the
onset of the so-called “consensus” period. This dissertation asks: how did a total
identification with Israel come to characterize every major national Jewish organizations
during that brief but highly consequential period? The development of a national system
of Jewish philanthropic federations, I argue, was central to the institution-building and
network-formation processes that underwrote the post-1967 “consensus.” First
established at the turn of the twentieth century to streamline the raising and distribution
of funds for Jewish charitable organizations at the municipal level, federations gradually
assumed responsibility for a range of local communal functions, including political
representation. Conceptualizing American Jewish politics on the model of a Bourdieusian
“field,” my dissertation explores the consequences of the federation as an institutional
form for the distribution of economic resources, and thus power relations, in what I call
the “American Jewish ethnopolitical field.” Wielding their monopoly control over Jewish
philanthropic resources, federations imposed discipline on the national Jewish political
organizations, forcing ideological adversaries to coordinate their public affairs activities
under federation auspices. By the Six-Day War, this process had yielded a nationally
centralized Jewish political framework—the National Community Relations Advisory
Council (NCRAC)—capable of orchestrating mass mobilizations across the country and
policing internal dissent through the coordinated application of economic and symbolic
sanctions. The consolidation of pro-Israel identity at the level of national organizations
was thus the effect of an institutional project constructed through the strategic
deployment of economic coercion—a “coercive consensus.” While existing accounts of
American pro-Israel politics tend to foreground the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee, I demonstrate the centrality of federations and their political auxiliaries to
pro-Israel advocacy during much of the second half of the twentieth century.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Institutions, Ethnicity, and the Field of American Jewish Politics
“The market of politics is doubtless one of the least free markets that exist.”
- Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power
Two Jews, One Opinion: The Construction of Pro-Israel “Consensus”
On a crisp April afternoon in 2018, hedge-fund billionaire Michael Steinhardt
pulled up in front of the Ziegfeld Ballroom in midtown Manhattan, where the Birthright
Israel Foundation was holding its annual gala fundraiser. Widely considered the
preeminent Jewish identity-building initiative of the twenty-first century, Birthright was
established in 1999 by Steinhardt and fellow billionaire philanthropist Charles Bronfman,
heir to the Seagram’s liquor fortune. In the two decades since, the program has organized
more than 650,000 free, ten-day trips to Israel for Jews between the ages of 18 and 26—
an experience designed to heighten their emotional attachments to Judaism and the
Jewish state. Now, at its 18th annual gala, Birthright was set to bestow its “Guardian of
the Jewish Future” award upon the program’s most generous patron, the casino magnatecum-Republican Party financier Sheldon Adelson.1 But as Steinhardt emerged from his
luxury vehicle that day, the septuagenarian encountered something that disturbed him.
Gathered outside the Ziegfeld were more than a hundred protesters—later identified by
Steinhardt as “left-wing, stupid young Jews”—chanting “Boycott Birthright that’s our
plan! No free trips on stolen land!” under the watchful eye of NYPD officers. “I passed
this group of protesters behind a barrier and it was clear these were young Jews,”
Steinhardt told the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz. “They were screeching something and I
gave them the finger, and that was that.” Captured on video by the protest’s organizers,
1

Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), Steinhardt’s gesture caused a brief stir on the Internet and
in Jewish media circles. In the aftermath, JVP seized on one of the billionaire’s remarks
to the press: “I find it really peculiar that so many Jews are supporting BDS,” he said,
referring to the Palestinian-led campaign for boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS)
against Israel. “I don’t really understand it, but that’s my age catching up with me, I
guess.”2
For Jewish advocates of BDS, including JVP, Steinhardt’s remark affirmed the
movement’s growing popularity, as well as the generational character of recent intraJewish conflicts. That American Jews have lately entered into sharp public contestation
around Israel is far from an original observation. Since the 1990s, scholars and journalists
have chronicled the progressive breakdown of institutionalized norms that once limited
Jewish dissent on Israel, and the concomitant rise of successive, Jewishly-identified
political organizations advocating heterodox positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict.3
Explanations for the emergence of dissident Jewish perspectives include both long-term
political developments in the Middle East and changes in the attitudes, experiences, and
demographic composition of the American Jewish population. Today, what appears to be
a growing number of Jewish young adults are joining movements aimed at challenging
the entrenched “pro-Israelism” of the American Jewish communal establishment. As
political scientist Dov Waxman notes in his recent, wide-ranging treatment of the subject,
“The consensus about Israel that prevailed within the American Jewish community in the
1960s and 1970s has long since disappeared. Instead, there is now a rancorous and
divisive debate pitting left against right, critics against defenders of Israeli government
policies, Jews against Jews.”4 It is clear, then, that something has broken down—that
2

coherence has given way to disorder. But what exactly was that “something”? How, in
the first place, did a “consensus” come to prevail over the historically disputatious realm
of American Jewish politics? What combination of social, economic, and political forces
coalesced to engender that hegemonic moment? And how might a systematic analysis of
those forces inform our understanding of both contemporary Jewish politics and the
politics of U.S. “ethnic groups” more generally?
To answer these questions requires an inquiry into the historical development of
American Jewish political institutions, both separately and in their relations with one
another. Steinhardt’s encounter with JVP is significant not only for the way it dramatizes
the acrimony of current intra-Jewish “debates” about Israel, but more importantly for
how it reflects the structural features of contemporary Jewish politics I hope to explain.
Confrontation between a billionaire philanthropist and a throng of left-wing activists
outside a Birthright fundraiser speaks to both continuities and ruptures with the past.
Since the foundations of the Jewish communal structure were first laid at the turn of the
century, dissidents have couched their grievances against the “Jewish establishment” in
critiques of plutocratic dominance and demands for communal democracy. Such were the
claims leveled in the early decades of the twentieth century by immigrant Zionists and
Yiddish-speaking radicals against the German-Jewish elite of the American Jewish
Committee (AJC) and New York’s Federation for the Support of Jewish Philanthropic
Societies.5 Some fifty years later, similar demands rang out amidst student protests at the
1969 meeting of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in Boston. On that
occasion, youth activists assailed the undemocratic governance structures of the Jewish
philanthropic federations—by then the financial engines of a nationally-integrated Jewish
3

communal superstructure—and demanded, in the words of one protester, that they “no
longer be run by a few generous men or the patrons of particular projects,” but that
“rabbis, people involved in Jewish education, students, and concerned Jews should
participate on all levels of decision-making and allocations.”6 From the start, “money”
versus “the people” has been a persistent, structuring antagonism of American Jewish
politics.
But if confrontations with plutocracy have carried forward to the present, the
substantive demands of contemporary dissidents differ markedly from those of the past.
Until the 1970s, the communal superstructure (and its antecedents) was controlled by
“assimilationists” who shunned expressions of Jewish political and cultural nationalism,
in turn prompting challengers to demand increased financial support of Jewish
particularist causes. Since that time, the institutionalization of a “survivalist” paradigm
centered on biopolitical management, Jewish education, and veneration of Israel has
effectively flipped the script.7 Today’s counterhegemonic challengers are Jewish
universalists calling for an end to pro-Israelism as the normative ideology of the
organized Jewish community. In this context, Birthright has emerged as a popular site of
contestation.8 Dissidents perceive the multimillion-dollar initiative as a vehicle of rightwing indoctrination, while proponents regard it, in Steinhardt’s formulation, as a
“nonpolitical enterprise.”9 Financed largely by conservative mega-donors like Steinhardt
and Adelson with assistance from Jewish federations and the Israeli government,
Birthright has come to represent the outsized role of a few extraordinarily wealthy
individuals in shaping the Jewish communal agenda. According to a major study of
Jewish philanthropic giving published in 2018, the Jewish nonprofit sector is more
4

dependent on a small handful of mega-donors today than at any point in living memory.10
“The Jewish community is becoming even less of a representative democracy than it ever
was,” observes Jack Wertheimer, the study’s author. “Jewish organizations are going to
be far more beholden to a smaller number of donors. [The] consensus-driven approach to
Jewish communal life is endangered by that because these larger donors want what they
want.”11
References to the decline of an American Jewish “consensus”—whether
nostalgic, like Wertheimer’s, or merely descriptive, like Waxman’s—appear to
contrapose today’s bitter conflicts and inequalities with what we might imagine to be the
more egalitarian and politically harmonious Jewish community of the 1960s and 1970s.
Certainly, as Michael E. Staub demonstrates in Torn at the Roots, this was not the case
with respect to questions of race and liberalism, which divided American Jews
throughout the postwar period.12 On Israel, however, a notable degree of uniformity does
appear to have prevailed between 1967 and 1973. This period of less than a decade—
when every major American Jewish organization proclaimed essentially identical views
on Israel, and all institutionalized opposition had effectively dissipated—was, as
Waxman notes, “the aberration, rather than the rule.”13 In the 1940s and 1950s, the
American Jewish political landscape reflected a wide variety of perspectives on Zionism
and Israel, from fervent support to inveterate opposition. That institutional pluralism
disappeared in the 1960s and began to reemerge—slowly—after the 1973 Yom Kippur
War. In rhetoric and ideology, however, the Israel-related oppositional movements of the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s had far more in common with the post-1967 communal
mainstream than they did with the Jewish anti-Zionists of an earlier era. Only in the
5

second decade of the twenty-first century did American Jewish discourse on Israel begin
to approximate its previous level of diversity. The period of pro-Israel “consensus,” then,
is notable not only for its singularity but for the extraordinary tenacity of the norms it
helped institutionalize.
This dissertation seeks to explain the origins of the pro-Israel “consensus,” the
strength of its political aftereffects, and, in so doing, the structural roots of contemporary
American Jewish politics. While the literature offers robust analyses of more recent
communal dynamics, the material and institutional foundations of the “consensus” period
have never been adequately studied. Attempts to explain the rise of hegemonic proIsraelism instead tend to invoke a widely-shared folk narrative of spontaneous
psychological metamorphosis during the Six-Day War of 1967. In his seminal study of
American Jewish institutions, political scientist Daniel Elazar offers a paradigmatic
telling:
In the nineteen years between 1948 and 1967 there… developed a certain
estrangement between American Jewry and Israel… The Six-Day War changed
all that. Confronted with the possibility of the destruction of Israel, American
Jews suddenly discovered the depths of their feeling, commitment, concern, and
dependence upon the survival of the Jewish state for their own well-being.
Suddenly Israel was catapulted into the very center of concern. All talk of a
separate American Judaism evaporated when it became apparent that what was
holding the vast majority of American Jews to Jewish identity was, in great
measure, a common concern for Israel.14
This tale of unmediated emotional transformation recurs throughout historical and social
scientific accounts of the period. “Having been largely absent from the consciousness of
most American Jews up until 1967, Israel suddenly consumed the thoughts and feelings
of American Jewry,” declares Waxman. “More than any other event in Israeli history, the
6

Six-Day War of June 1967 transformed the American Jewish relationship with Israel.”15
As tensions in the Middle East escalated, “Jewish concern billowed up so passionately
and spontaneously that it rapidly outpaced communal efforts to impose structure or
guidance,” writes Howard Sachar.16 According to Hasia Diner, “This intense support for
Israel helped shape the contours of American Jewish life in the decades following 1967.
The roller-coaster of seemingly imminent destruction followed by the joy of victory and
salvation left its mark on American Jews and their cultural practices.”17 “In American
Jews’ relationship to Israel, the Six Day War was the immediate and most important
cause of a new closeness,” explains Peter Novick. “The fears of a renewed Holocaust on
the eve of that war left their mark on American Jewish consciousness,” catalyzing a
“permanent reorientation in the agenda of organized American Jewry.”18
While scholars also credit broader American cultural and political trends with
reinforcing the alleged psychological impact of the war, the causal arrow in this narrative
runs directly from popular exuberance to institutional transformation. References to
American Jewish “estrangement” from Israel in the period leading up to 1967 establish
the necessary contrast that renders such claims plausible. According to Waxman, “After
the initial euphoria that American Jews, like Jews everywhere, felt when the Jewish state
was born, American Jewish excitement and enthusiasm for Israel soon died down and
was followed by a long period of indifference.”19 But the evidence for this assertion is
flimsy, and the authorities invoked to support it actually attest to the opposite conclusion.
Citing sociologist Marshall Sklare’s seminal “Lakeville” study of a suburban Jewish
community in the 1950s, Waxman claims that Sklare “revealed how surprisingly little
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Israel figured in American Jewish life.”20 Yet, consider Howard Sachar’s very different
interpretation of Sklare:
[Sklare] revealed an almost visceral identification with the Zionist republic.
Israel had immeasurably enhanced Jewish security and status in the United
States, so the [Lakeville] inquiry revealed. With each passing year, commitment
to Israel’s growth and welfare would become the emotional and ideological
focus of Jewish communal life.
In fact, Sachar’s reading appears closer to reality. While Sklare’s investigation found that
Israel played a relatively minor role in the institutional life of the community, it also
revealed that “a large majority [90 percent] of Lakeville Jews are pro-Israel in feeling,”
that “almost all… respondents approve of raising money” for Israel, and that “63 percent
approve of influencing American foreign policy in favor of Israel.”21 Contra Waxman,
Jonathan Woocher describes 1948 in much the same language that others use to describe
1967: “The combination of anxiety and exhilaration which attended the rebirth of a
Jewish state overwhelmed all but the most recalcitrant anti-Zionists. Israel became not
only a focus for fundraising, but a source of prideful identification for virtually all of
American Jewry.”22 After the Six-Day War, Sklare returned to “Lakeville” (a pseudonym
for Highland Park, Illinois) to conduct a brief follow-up survey, in which he discovered
practically no change from previous, and already robust, levels of support for Israel.23
However, what does appear to have expanded in the intervening period was the role of
Chicago’s Jewish federation in directing suburban mobilization for Israel (something that
went unmentioned in the original study). This reality—one of consistent pro-Israel
sentiment coupled with escalating levels of Jewish institutional involvement with Israel
after the Six-Day War—undermines the narrative of spontaneous psychological
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conversion and calls for an alternative explanation for the “Israelization” of American
Jewish institutions after 1967.
As Lawrence Grossman observed more than twenty years ago, “not only is there
no scholarly study of [the post-1967] change but we even lack accounts of how the
transformation occurred within individual American Jewish organizations.”24 With the
exception of Grossman’s own monograph, his assessment is as true today as it was then.
The folk narrative of 1967 remains deeply embedded in the popular and scholarly
imagination, not least because of the role it plays in sustaining mythologies of primordial
Jewish attachment to Israel. As the above-quoted passage from Elazar illustrates,
communal insider-scholars of an earlier generation not infrequently portrayed American
Jewry’s “spontaneous” reaction to the 1967 war as an inner authenticity made manifest.
“How does one explain this eruption of feeling?” asked historian Melvin I. Urofsky,
author of a much-cited history of American Zionism. “Emotions of such magnitude are
not created in a matter of days or weeks… The Six Day War did not manufacture this
sentiment, but awakened it.”25 The eminent rabbi-scholar Arthur Hertzberg described the
sudden rebirth of “inactive” Jews who “had within them some kind of Jewish
involvement, dormant but powerful, which came out in a moment of crisis and moved
them to radical action.”26 In the absence of a corrective, primordialist characterizations
continue to inflect contemporary scholarship on American Jewry and Israel. “All too
often,” Waxman observes, “American Jewish support for Israel is simply assumed, rather
than explained, as if supporting Israel was somehow intrinsic or essential to being
Jewish.”27 Yet in accounting for the tenacity of pro-Israel attachments, Waxman draws
heavily on cultural and psychological reifications, identifying “familism, fear,
9

functionality, faith, and fantasy” as the “five pillars of pro-Israelism.” Thus does he
inform us that “a deep sense of victimhood and an abiding fear of persecution… is a
continual source of anxiety for American Jews, and a constant motivation behind their
support for Israel.”28 The latter, he declares, is “an act of charity, driven by feelings of
kinship, not by ideological beliefs or political sentiments,”29 and it endures mostly for the
way it “serves [Jews’] psychological, emotional, and spiritual needs.”30
In order to move beyond the assumption that “supporting Israel [is] somehow
intrinsic or essential to being Jewish,” the emotional and intellectual dispositions of
American Jews must be conceived as variable, not static, and approached as things to be
explained, rather than as explanations in themselves. A primary aim of this dissertation is
to offer an account of American Jewish politics that deliberately avoids psycho-cultural
shorthand and other conceptual framings that elide the internal heterogeneity of groups
and/or naturalize the political processes through which the appearance of ideological
uniformity is achieved. To that end, I reorient our focus from “Jews”—a category that
even seasoned demographers have difficulty circumscribing—to Jewishly-identified
organizations, and examine the institutional processes through which they undergo
ideological and programmatic transformations over time. This approach has several
advantages. First, it brings us directly into contact with the realm of politics, which is
contested not by individuals but by formal organizations (parties, interest groups, social
movement organizations, etc.). The views of individuals are politically relevant only to
the extent that they influence or are reflected in the behavior of organizations, and there is
no reason to assume that fluctuations in public opinion affect institutional priorities in
any direct or unmediated fashion. Second, it allows for a more complex analysis of the
10

relationship between “identities”—shared understandings of what group membership
entails—and institutions. Not only do institutions rely on identities to mobilize human
and financial resources, they also actively seek to shape them, both by elaborating
positive mechanisms of ideological formation and by working to circumscribe the range
of available alternatives. Their ability to do so is in turn limited by the identity-shaping
activities of other institutions or broader institutional complexes (such as the state), which
possess priorities and operational logics of their own. New shared identities can emerge
from the conjuncture of competing or discordant institutional complexes, spawning social
movements that attempt to institutionalize themselves and/or work to modify the
priorities of existing organizations. It is only by examining the inner-workings of
institutions and their relations with one another that we can trace these processes at work.
Undertaking this type of analysis requires access to a theoretical vocabulary free
of the ideologically-laden terminology that suffuses much existing scholarship on
American Jewish politics. The word “consensus,” for example, lends itself to the type of
distorting frame we should wish to avoid. “Consensus” evokes the sort of reasoned
deliberation and unanimous, voluntary agreement that one rarely encounters outside of
small group settings, much less among a geographically dispersed and sociologically
heterogeneous population of millions. Likewise with the phrase “the American Jewish
community,” whose undertones of solidarity, authenticity, and organic unity mask the
more conflictual realities we hope to investigate. As Adolph Reed, Jr. writes,
The idea of community is a mystification... and an anti-democratic one at that.
All social units are comprised of discrete individuals whose perspectives and
interests and alliances differ, and every unit’s members are bound together
through a combination of negotiation and coercion. The less attention is paid to
cultivating and protecting the sphere of negotiation, the more the balance shifts
11

to coercion. The rhetoric of community is impatient with the former, and its
myth of authenticity rationalizes the latter.31
While today’s Jewish officialdom espouse a communitarian philosophy at odds with
Reed’s analysis32, a version of the above view was championed in the 1940s by the
American Jewish Committee. Against coordinated efforts to subordinate the Committee’s
programmatic autonomy to some putative collective interest, the AJC’s non-Zionist
leadership argued (at least behind closed doors) that the very notion of an American
Jewish “community” was an oppressive construct, deployed by enemies of free thought
and open debate. Eventually, however, the organization was made to conform to the will
of its communal adversaries—and not by way of negotiation. As the AJC learned, if
ideological heterogeneity is a permanent condition of human populations, the same does
not necessarily hold at the level of institutions. Hegemonic projects—from antiCommunism in postwar America to pro-Israelism in the Jewish political sphere—operate
principally at the level of institutions, and invariably entail the coercion, exclusion,
delegitimization, or (where state power is involved) physical elimination of organized
alternatives.
As I demonstrate, no small amount of coercion underwrote the establishment of
the American Jewish pro-Israel “consensus” in the years leading up to the Six-Day War.
That coercion was in large part economic, but it also involved the application of what
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls “symbolic power”—the ability to shape belief in the
legitimacy of an established order, and to achieve through rhetorical and affective
mobilization what cannot be achieved through physical or economic coercion.33 Below, I
turn to Bourdieu and the historical institutionalist tradition to assemble an analytic toolkit
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with which to theorize the construction of institutional power in the U.S. civil sphere.
Attempts to theorize the dynamics of American Jewish institutions have been few and far
between, and those that exist tend to efface the role of power in the construction and
maintenance of communal norms. Most influential has been Elazar’s conceptualization of
the “American Jewish polity,” which he describes as “a voluntary political order that
functions authoritatively for those who acknowledge their connection with it but that does
not seek a monopoly on the loyalties of its members.”34 The polity, he writes, illustrates
“the possibilities of governing without sovereignty and the mobilization of collective
energy with an absolute minimum of coercion.”35 Given the voluntary character of
participation in American Jewish organizations, “persuasion rather than compulsion and
influence rather than power are the tools available for making decisions and
implementing policies.”36 Echoing Elazar’s view, Jack Wertheimer argues that the major
twentieth-century Jewish communal institutions “operated mainly as coordinating bodies,
with no powers of coercion over their constituents, [yet] managed to forge an
unprecedented level of cooperation, largely because there was a strong consensus about
the communal agenda.”37 Woocher, whose 1986 study Sacred Survival comes closest to
accurately describing some of the institutional processes analyzed in this dissertation,
also understates the role of compulsion and overemphasizes the voluntary resolution of
ideological differences among solidarity-minded elites.
This dissertation, then, is a corrective to voluntarist accounts of American Jewish
politics during the “consensus” period and earlier. Drawing on hundreds of reports,
memoranda, meeting minutes, and other internal documents from a range of
organizations over more than eighty years, I offer a material history of Jewish
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institutional power in the twentieth century. The specific vehicle of that power was a
centralized, national Jewish public affairs infrastructure that arose on the eve of the SixDay War. It was the end result of a decades-long process of institutional development
sparked by mass migration and rooted in the Jewish population’s overlapping class,
ideological, and sub-ethnic cleavages. That process brought into existence a countrywide
network of municipally-based political advocacy organizations known as Jewish
Community Relations Councils (JCRCs) and unified them under the aegis of a national
umbrella body, the National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC).
Propelling these dynamics was a financial engine comprised of Jewish philanthropic
federations, established in the early decades of the twentieth century to coordinate local
fundraising for Jewish charitable causes. As the root structure of organized American
Jewry, the federation system receives special attention in the chapters that follow. For
reasons I explain, the federations and their national body, the Council of Jewish
Federations and Welfare Funds (CJF), set out in the 1930s to centralize and consolidate
the conduct of Jewish public affairs activity, then known as “community relations.”
Opposed to this effort were the national Jewish political agencies, including the AJC and
the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith (ADL). To overcome their resistance, the
CJF wielded threats of financial sanctions and established its own political auxiliaries, the
JCRCs, to monopolize Jewish representation at the local level. By the 1950s, the essential
components of an integrated national-local machinery—a community relations dynamo—
had coalesced. By 1965, all lingering opposition to communal centralization had been
vanquished.
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The emergence of the community relations dynamo, forged through acts of
financial compulsion, enabled the application of collective power in two separate
domains. First, it furnished a mechanism through which Jewish organizations could
jointly enact the excommunication of ideological adversaries. During the 1950s,
opponents of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism (ACJ) worked through
NCRAC to stigmatize and isolate the ACJ from the rest of the organized Jewish
community. In addition, by tethering the finances of the national Jewish political agencies
to the federations, the overarching process of centralization linked the institutional
fortunes of those groups to the perceived pleasure or displeasure of the communal
majority. As I demonstrate, under such conditions, ongoing efforts to delegitimize the
ACJ created material disincentives for the American Jewish Committee, the organization
closest to the ACJ ideologically, to express its oppositional “non-Zionist” viewpoint, in
effect further muting organized alternatives to the emerging pro-Israel hegemony. The
construction of the post-1967 “consensus” thus depended on the prior existence and
monopoly power of the recently-consolidated communal infrastructure. By the time of
the Six-Day War, opposition to pro-Israelism had already been severely depleted, and
new mechanisms for amplifying and channeling public sentiment had moved into place.
Second, with the establishment and fortification of NCRAC and the JCRC
network, the federations laid the basic institutional foundations for grassroots pro-Israel
advocacy for most of the remainder of the twentieth century. While studies of the proIsrael lobby tend to focus on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), I
demonstrate that for decades following the creation of Israel, AIPAC was a minor but
centrally-located cog in a much larger political apparatus. From the 1950s through the
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mid-1970s, AIPAC struggled to make ends meet and ran what by any standard was a
modest political operation. During that period, it tapped the federations for political
contacts and relied heavily on NCRAC and its affiliated JCRCs to organize the Jewish
grassroots. The extraordinary popular mobilizations of 1967 and 1973 (and others before
and after) owed largely to the existence of the community relations dynamo. At its base
were dense capillary networks of local Jewish membership organizations—fraternal
lodges, women’s groups, synagogue auxiliaries, community centers, and others—whose
concerted action on Israel’s behalf was coordinated by the municipal or regional JCRC
under the national direction of NCRAC. The NCRAC-JCRC network not only mobilized
pressure on elected officials and local community leaders, it also functioned as a conduit
for information about the Arab-Israeli conflict, disseminating literature and newsreel
footage, orchestrating pro-Israel rallies and celebrations, securing Israel-friendly
coverage in local media outlets, and organizing public lectures by ideologically-aligned
circuit speakers. It was only in the 1980s, under the influence of a changing U.S. political
economy, that AIPAC grew in size, power, and autonomy, and the influence and
cohesion of the community relations dynamo began to dissipate.
Reconstructing this history thus sheds light on both the pro-Israel lobby and on
the way American Jews came to exercise a modicum of power over themselves. Even as
communal conflict over Israel witnessed a resurgence in the late 1970s and 1980s, the
community relations dynamo continued to facilitate the exclusion of dissenters, albeit
with waning efficacy as time went on. In an ironic twist, the same long-term institutional
developments that enabled the collective exclusion of internal adversaries also
underwrote the most democratic period in the history of American Jewish politics. As in
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the broader U.S. political sphere, where the purging of Communists (real and imagined)
coincided with an unprecedented levelling of economic and political power, the
formation of NCRAC ushered in a period of grassroots participation and local input into
national Jewish affairs unlike any before or after. In both cases, the emergence of a more
egalitarian order was premised on the construction of a narrow political “consensus.”
Coercion, to use Reed’s language, set the stage for negotiation within prescribed
ideological parameters. While the Jewish establishment never shed its essentially
plutocratic character, compared to the elite-dominated Jewish politics of the early
twentieth century, the power of the wealthy to shape the Jewish political arena declined
appreciably in the postwar decades as federation professionals turned their momentary
leverage to the task of communal democratization. Since the 1970s, the slow erosion of
pro-Israel hegemony has paralleled the explosive growth of wealth and income inequality
that empowered today’s communal mega-donors. In addition, rates of grassroots
participation in Jewish organizations have plummeted, further diminishing their
representative claims. As I aim to make clear, these relationships are not incidental, but
structural. By focusing on the financial engines of twentieth-century Jewish institutional
life—the philanthropic federations—we gain leverage on the structural aspects of
American Jewish politics and better position ourselves to explore the broader connections
between ethnicity, liberal democracy, and the dynamics of the U.S. and global political
economy.

Relevant Literature
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This dissertation builds on a number of scholarly literatures spanning the fields of
political science, sociology, history, and Jewish studies. As should already be clear, it
makes a direct contribution to scholarship on the political relationships between
American Jews and Israel—a literature that encompasses both conventional works of
American Jewish history and more social science-oriented accounts of conflict and
change within the Jewish political arena. The first category includes monographs by
Menahem Kaufman, Zvi Ganin, Natan Aridan, and Thomas Kolsky, among others, which
explore the political interventions and diverse ideological orientations of American
Jewish organizations in the decades immediately before and after the establishment of
Israel.38 While furnishing critical insights into early twentieth century debates between
Zionists, non-Zionists, and anti-Zionists over the compatibility of Jewish nationalism and
American citizenship, the elite focus of these studies precludes an examination of
contemporaneous developments at the grassroots level. Nor do they systematically
explore the financial and institutional constraints that shaped Jewish organizational
decision-making during this period. Works in the second category include the above-cited
accounts of post-1973 conflict over Israel by Waxman, Ofira Seliktar, Neil Rubin, and
Steven T. Rosenthal, which narrate more recent events in the history of Israel-diaspora
relations and identify relevant trends in Jewish demography and public opinion. Rich in
data, these studies fall short of providing an overarching theoretical framework through
which to relate American Jewish politics to other ethnopolitical projects in the U.S. and
elsewhere. In imparting such a frame, I hope to foster comparative research into
ethnopolitical institution-building and development, as well as to enhance our
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understanding of both the earlier and more recent periods in American Jewish political
history by highlighting the long-term institutional processes that connect them.
In addition to shifting the focus and frame of previous research, I also offer a
wealth of new empirical data on the inner workings of major Jewish organizations that
augment and occasionally modify the work of American Jewish historians. Apart from
the literature already mentioned, this dissertation presents original findings relevant to
historical scholarship on American Jewish legal and political advocacy (beyond Israel),39
philanthropy and mutual aid,40 anti-Semitism,41 and “Black-Jewish relations.”42 Under
the rubric of Jewish studies but distinct from conventional historiography are the writings
of communal insider-scholars like Elazar, Woocher, and Wertheimer on Jewish
institutional development.43 Intimately familiar with the institutions they chronicle, these
scholars offer some of the most fluent explorations of Jewish communal dynamics
available. While this dissertation draws heavily on their work, it also challenges the
voluntarist and primordialist assumptions embedded therein. In providing a materialist
analytic frame and detailed body of supporting evidence, I aim to counterbalance the
idealist cast of much Jewish communal research. Beyond what we might characterize as
the “institutionalist” work of Elazar, Woocher, and Wertheimer—perhaps a minority
tendency in the broader universe of Jewish insider-scholarship—this category also
includes studies of Jewish public opinion and behavior by establishment-linked
demographers like Steven M. Cohen and Theodore Sasson.44 In subsequent chapters, I
sketch out the long-term historical backdrop required to make sense of the ideological
and institutional projects in which these communal functionaries (and their behavioral
“snapshots” of American Jewry) participate.
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Another site of intervention, if somewhat indirectly, is the literature on the role of
Israel advocacy organizations in shaping U.S. policy in the Middle East. Since the 1970s,
scholars45, journalists46, and policy elites47 have debated the extent of that influence and
the conditions under which it becomes more or less effective. In the field of political
science, the question has been approached from a range of methodological standpoints—
quantitative analysis, process tracing, structured comparisons—and while scholars differ
on some of the conditioning variables, a broad consensus holds that pro-Israel interest
groups do shape or constrain U.S. foreign policy in significant ways. As one mainstream
textbook on U.S. interest group politics notes, “By virtually all assessments, the Jewish
lobby or the Israel lobby is the most influential ethnic lobby today.”48 That, of course, is a
comparative judgment, and scholarly appraisals of “the lobby’s” absolute level of
influence fall along a spectrum. At one end sit maximalists like John Mearsheimer and
Stephen Walt, who attribute a high degree of autonomous influence to a broadly defined
Israel lobby; at the other end are scholars like Jonathan Rynhold, who frames the
influence of pro-Israel interest groups as a byproduct of U.S. cultural and religious
norms.49 While this dissertation takes for granted that American Jewish institutions exert
some meaningful influence on Congress and the President, its findings are germane to the
Israel lobby scholarship in several respects. Most importantly, it provides a corrective to
the literature’s lopsided focus on AIPAC and the post-1980 period to the exclusion of
earlier, more integrated communal advocacy efforts. No scholarly account of the Israel
lobby, for example, has devoted more than a passing reference to NCRAC and the
federation system, despite what I demonstrate to have been their central role in
orchestrating mass, grassroots pro-Israel mobilization for more than a quarter of a
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century, and in providing crucial support to AIPAC as it established its early networks
and reputation.
Even as some scholars have noted the ideological pluralization of Israel advocacy
in recent decades, none have adequately probed the long-term political and economic
dynamics driving these transformations.50 Doing so would require a reconceptualization
of the Israel lobby as a dynamic organism with changing power endowments,
institutional characteristics, and social constituencies. Critiques of Mearsheimer and
Walt’s The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy fault the esteemed international
relations scholars for their catchall conceptualization of “the lobby,” which is said to
include both formal advocacy groups like AIPAC and sitting government officials,
thereby blurring the boundary lines between dependent and independent variables.51 In
short, while most other scholars define the lobby too narrowly, focusing exclusively on
AIPAC, Mearsheimer and Walt err in the opposite direction, albeit in combination with
the same post-1980 temporal focus of previous studies. This dissertation avoids the
Scylla and Charybdis of minimalist and maximalist definitions—and moves beyond mere
gestures at ideological fragmentation—by offering what I believe is the more descriptive
and predictive model of American Jewish politics as a Bourdieusian “field” couched
within the broader field of U.S. Israel advocacy. As I describe in greater detail below, a
field-theoretic model attends to the enduring structural features of American Jewish
politics while enabling a mapping of the field’s shifting power arrangements and internal
conflicts over time. Perhaps more radically, it resolves the concerns raised by
Mearsheimer and Walt’s overbroad conceptualization of the Israel lobby by dispensing
altogether with a methodological framework that assumes the independence of the U.S.
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political echelon from the various agencies jostling to influence it. Instead, it reconceives
them as tethered to one another by political-economic forces that influence resource and
power distributions in multiple fields simultaneously, and replaces the search for
marginal causal effects with a more dialectical (and, I believe, realistic) conception of
power.
Beyond offering a detailed case study of American Jewish organizations, this
dissertation contributes to a broader political science institutionalist literature on
ethnicity. Social scientific approaches to ethnic politics far exceed institutionalism, and
characterizing them in full is beyond the scope of this literature review. However, a brief
excursus into sociological theories of ethnicity is necessary to ground the remainder of
this section. What is ethnicity? Social scientists have offered various, ontologically
divergent answers to this question. One set of theories, loosely grouped as
“primordialist,” frame ethnicity as a type of in-group identification that is natural, stable,
and enduring, and which is rooted (depending on the particular view) in biological or
imagined kinship relationships52 and/or some shared constellation of myth, symbol,
history, and culture.53 A second school of thought, known as “constructivism,” disputes
the high degree of fixity that primordialists ascribe to ethnic identities and cultures.
Constructivists instead emphasize the fluid character of ethnicity and the situational and
instrumental ways in which social actors inhabit and deploy ethnic identities.54 I adopt an
avowedly constructivist approach, albeit one that follows sociologist Andreas Wimmer in
recognizing how ethnic boundaries can vary widely in the degree of “social closure” they
produce, rendering certain identities more salient and durable than others.55 I also follow
Wimmer in subsuming the categories of “race” and “nation” under the broader rubric of
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ethnicity. Scholars of American racial politics have correctly pointed out that popular and
scholarly usages of the term ethnicity to denote something fundamentally “cultural” have
had the effect of reinforcing scientifically discredited biological conceptions of race,
while usages that envision American society as a patchwork of harmoniously coexisting
“ethnic groups” mask the political forces that reproduce material inequalities along racial
lines.56 As Wimmer argues, conceiving race as a subcategory of ethnicity need not entail
inattention to power differentials in the construction and maintenance of racial
boundaries. Emphasizing the fundamentally constructed character of both categories and
reconceiving the difference between them as one of degree rather than kind helps
overcome mythologies of biological race and better accounts for the historically shifting
boundaries between racialized and “ethnicized” groups.57 In addition, it facilitates
comparisons between boundary-making enterprises that are foreclosed when race and
ethnicity are imagined as incommensurable phenomena.
Above all, I adopt a constructivist framework because it best explains my
empirical data, which indicate the historic diversity of American Jewish self-conceptions
and their responsiveness to changing institutional and political conditions. In challenging
the common-sense primordialism that infuses much scholarship on American Jewry, I
heed Rogers Brubaker’s critique of what he calls “groupism,” or “the tendency to take
discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups
as basic constituents of social life.”58 To surmount this tendency, Brubaker urges a focus
not on groups (whether ethnic, racial, or otherwise) but on “groupness”—an (inter)subjective experience or socio-cognitive event whose content, intensity, and duration
varies across time and space. On this view, group consciousness and the political
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mobilization it facilitates respond (or fail to respond, as context would have it) to the
“group-making” activities of “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs”—actors who specialize in
spinning, invoking, and institutionalizing reified conceptions of ethnic identity in service
of some political project. Scholars of ethnicity, Brubaker warns, must avoid uncritically
adopting the reifications of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, and instead analyze ethnicity “in
terms practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames,
organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events.”59
Following his advice, I trace the origins and development of some of the “organizational
routines” and “institutional forms” that have shaped the content of American Jewish
“groupness” in the twentieth century. To be clear, this dissertation is chiefly addressed to
the construction of ideological hegemony at the level of institutions, and to the
development of a physical and bureaucratic infrastructure for ethnopolitical mobilization.
However, while not purporting to offer anything close to a systematic analysis of
American Jewish identity, it highlights the dual role of the federation system as both a
grassroots mobilizer and a vehicle of political identity-formation. Wimmer identifies a
variety of mechanisms that foster the construction of ethnic boundaries, including
discourse and symbols, discrimination, and political mobilization. The institutional
complex I examine in subsequent chapters makes use of all three.
Much early comparative politics work on ethnicity utilized a primordialist lens
and stressed the negative effects of ethnic diversity on democracy, public goods
provision, economic growth, and other desired outcomes, mostly in the developing
world.60 More recently, however, constructivists have attempted to refocus the debate on
how state institutions shape the political expression of ethnic identities. The constructivist
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turn in ethnic politics was influenced by earlier studies of nationalism that pinpointed the
role of emerging capitalist states and technologies in fostering the spread of national
consciousness, of which Benedict Anderson’s account of nations as “imagined
communities” is perhaps the most well-known.61 Scholars working in this tradition have
underscored the agency of colonial states in rendering previously inert ethnic categories
politically salient, or in stimulating the development of entirely new identities.62 Others
have argued that many of the deleterious impacts attributed to ethnic diversity per se in
fact arise from the structure of the political arena. For example, scholars like Robert
Bates, Daniel Posner, and Kanchan Chandra have explored the way electoral systems
offer material incentives for political entrepreneurs to mobilize populations along ethnic
rather than class, regional, gender, or ideological lines, or along certain ethnic lines rather
than others.63 Another strand of the literature highlights the link between violent ethnic
conflict and the state’s institutionalization of ethnic categories.64 Unsurprisingly, race
rather than “ethnicity” predominates in the subfield of American politics, including its
institutionalist tradition, American Political Development (APD). Rogers Smith and
Desmond King point to the constitutive role of competing “institutional orders,” or
coalitions of state institutions and other political actors seeking to secure governing
power, in the formation, maintenance, and transformation of U.S. racial hierarchies.65 On
their view, American politics has been shaped in critical ways by the conflict and
accommodation of two “racial orders”—one “white supremacist,” the other “egalitarian
transformative.” APD scholars like Anthony Marx and Robert Lieberman situate the U.S.
in a broader comparative context but focus similarly on the racializing consequences of
political coalitions and the institutional arrangements they produce.66 As in the
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comparative subfield, institutionalist accounts of American racial politics tend to
foreground the state as the primary producer and enforcer of racial boundaries, whether
through census categories67, naturalization law68, immigration restriction69, welfare state
policy70, labor regulations71, or mass incarceration.72
The question of how non-state actors construct ethnopolitical boundaries,
however, has received far less attention from political science than from other disciplines.
Recent historical scholarship on “whiteness,” for instance, explores the way inhabitants
of previously racialized categories, including Jews, utilized spatial and discursive
strategies to expand the boundaries of the “white” majority.73 Relatedly, scholars of the
“new suburban history” trace the bottom-up processes of racial boundary-making
undertaken by white suburbanites in their grassroots counter-mobilizations against state
desegregation efforts in the 1960s and 1970s.74 Anthropologists and sociologists have
devoted considerable attention to institutional sites of ethnic and national identityformation like tourism75, summer camps76, archaeological parks77, marketing78,
medicine79, genealogy services80, and philanthropy.81 Economic sociology, meanwhile,
considers how labor markets, patterns of immigrant settlement, and social discrimination
engender reactive solidarity in the form of ethnic networks, neighborhoods, and
organizations intended to facilitate the provision of social goods.82 A separate line of
sociological research, later integrated with the study of “contentious politics” in political
science, sought to explain the emergence of the Black freedom struggle by examining
how social movements leverage existing institutions, mobilize financial resources, and
exploit openings in the “political opportunity structure.”83 In their pathbreaking study,
Racial Formation in the United States, sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant
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assembled these strands into an overarching constructivist theory of “racial projects” as
they operate at the level of the state, civil society, and everyday life.84 Below, I draw on
both Racial Formation and on Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond’s more recent
work of theoretical synthesis, The Racial Order, which melds Omi and Winant’s insights
with decades of additional sociological research on race and ethnicity.85
Political science, by contrast, has largely neglected the role of non-state actors and
institutions as active agents of ethnopolitical mobilization and boundary-making. The
exception that proves this rule is the small body of comparative scholarship on U.S.
“ethnic lobbies.” Scholars like Trevor Rubenzer and David and Rachel Paul have
attempted to explain cross-sectional variation in the political influence of American
ethnic and racial groups by extracting common explanatory variables from case studies of
ethnopolitical activism and employing statistical models to assess their salience.86 This
literature tends to reduce dynamic and highly contingent processes of institutional
genesis, transformation, and decline to dummy variables like “organizational strength”
(the presence or absence of a dedicated lobby organization), “political unity” (the absence
of intra-ethnic competition), and “strategic convergence” (the alignment of “ethnic
interests” with those of the state). While gesturing at what I consider key attributes of
successful ethnopolitical projects, the quantitative approach violates its own assumptions
of statistical independence and obscures the triadic relationship between institutional
form, ideological content, and political power that I attempt to elucidate in this
dissertation. As suggested by the rough description of American Jewish politics offered
above, what ethnic lobby scholars call “political unity” is not unrelated to the “strength”
of dominant institutions, while “strategic convergence” requires a unitary articulation of
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ethnic interests that itself presupposes the absence of significant organized challengers,
and so forth. In other words, many of the key independent variables of the comparative
“ethnic lobby” literature are causally interrelated and reflect an overarching
developmental process that can only be approached historically. Moreover, by identifying
the “ethnic group” as the unit of analysis while artificially limiting the empirical
investigation to specific lobby organizations, the quantitative literature embeds
primordialist assumptions in the research design, flattens internal heterogeneity, and
precludes an investigation of the power conflicts that yield more or less cohesive
coalitions of ethnopolitical actors. In the next section, I propose an alternative approach
to the study of U.S. ethnic politics that integrates sociological theory with the analytic
repertoire of the historical institutionalist tradition.

Theoretical Apparatus
Whereas the quantitative “ethnic lobby” literature aims to identify a set of
universal conditions under which ethnic groups exert political influence, the framework
adopted in this dissertation enables comparisons between ethnopolitical fields in which
coalitions of actors and institutions representing different ethnopolitical projects compete
with one another for dominance. In what follows, I define these terms and lay out the
theoretical apparatus that guides the remainder of this dissertation. Let me begin with the
concept of an “ethnopolitical project,” which I model on Omi and Winant’s concept of
the “racial project.” Racial projects, on their view, are “efforts to shape the ways in which
human identities and social structures are racially signified,” and encompass both
discursive and institutional components.87 As such, they are “simultaneously an
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interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an
effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular
racial lines.”88 It is the ongoing clash of competing racial projects that ultimately yields
“the enormous complex of relationships and identities that is labeled race.”89 The
enduring racialization of the American political economy, despite the transformation of
racial understandings that occurred during the period of Civil Rights struggle, is a
byproduct of the foundational link between racial slavery and U.S. capital formation and
political development. State and state-structured market institutions continue to play a
central role in the reproduction of racial meanings and hierarchies. By contrast, what I
call ethnopolitical projects exist within and in relationship to the broader process of U.S.
racial formation but are reproduced primarily by non-state institutions. While
ethnopolitical projects are shaped indirectly by legal and economic arrangements, which
set the overall parameters within which their constituent institutions operate, the
constellations of spatial, cultural, and class differentiations that ethnopolitical projects
attempt to imbue with political significance are not reproduced, as it were,
“automatically” by the political and economic order.
This distinction has several implications. First, it means that ethnopolitical
projects originate differently than racial projects. While racial projects emerge in direct
response to the structuring and signifying practices of the state (or to attempted
modifications thereof), ethnopolitical projects are either imported by way of immigration
from places where state-sponsored racialization is differently configured, or constitute
responses to or transfigurations of earlier imported projects. For example, American
Zionism as an ethnopolitical project was introduced by immigrants from Russia, where
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Jews were subject to racialization by the Tsarist state. In turn, the Jewish anti-nationalist
project represented by Reform Judaism between 1885 and the early 1930s was a response
to the appearance of Zionism, which threatened, in the eyes of anti-nationalists, to
racialize American Jewry. Second, the absence of an “automatic,” structural reproduction
of ethnic differentiation means that, in the context of broader racial formation processes,
ethnopolitical projects rely heavily on self-created social and educational mechanisms—
from schools and summer camps to residential enclaves and informal prohibitions on
exogamy—to sustain the basic forms of identification on which they depend. The
persistence of an American Jewish panic over intermarriage despite decades of sustained
investment in Jewish identity-building programs illustrates the ever-looming “threat” that
de-identification poses to ethnopolitical entrepreneurs; the effective disappearance of a
once-robust Irish-American ethnopolitics is another case in point. Finally, while racial
projects operate across every social domain, ethnopolitical projects are more limited in
scope. Efforts by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs to reshape identities and resource
distributions target the private sphere first and impinge only in circumscribed (though at
times highly significant) ways on the public domain. The hypothetically fluid distinction
between the mainly-public and mainly-private reproduction of difference is, on my view,
exactly what distinguishes racialization from ethnicization, and what makes the former so
much more tenacious.
Differences notwithstanding, I maintain that racial and ethnopolitical projects
abide by comparable logics and can be analyzed using the same set of conceptual tools.
This dissertation privileges two discrete levels of analysis: the institution and the “field.”
As mentioned above, ethnopolitical projects are carried out (on the main) by coalitions of
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ethnopolitical institutions. Douglas North famously defined institutions as “humanly
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction,” and which
can range from informal norms to complex bureaucracies.90 In our case, the institutions
of interest are formal ethnopolitical organizations that engage in a range of
representational, distributional, and advocacy activities to the end of shaping the political
meanings of ethnic identities and mobilizing individuals on the basis of those meanings.
A number of social science “institutionalisms” have emerged in recent decades to explore
the way institutions structure the political arena. In political science, an early attempt at
institutional analysis was ventured by rational choice institutionalists, who theorized that
utility-maximizing individuals select institutions on the basis of exogenously given
preferences, and that institutions, in turn, impart stability to political life by limiting the
number of outlets for subsequent preference-satisfying behavior.91 The rational choice
approach was largely agent- and interest-based and paid little attention to contextual
factors. Addressing its shortcomings—particularly its conception of institutions as
functional equilibria derived from the interaction of rational actors—scholars working in
the historical institutionalist (HI) tradition focused instead on the way “temporal
processes and events” (in other words, history) influence the origin and development of
political institutions.92 Specifically, HI scholars consider how institutional characteristics
tend to reflect the distribution of power and resources at the time of their emergence; how
institutions shape preferences in addition to being shaped by them; and how institutions
can produce long-term consequences at variance with the interests and original intentions
of their architects. Most importantly, HI scholars have elaborated a rich conceptual
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vocabulary for describing mechanisms of institutional change that operate on different
temporal scales.93
In subsequent chapters, I draw on the HI repertoire to frame my discussion of the
origins and development of American Jewish institutions. The linked concepts of “critical
junctures” and “path dependence” are particularly useful for making sense of the most
distinctive attributes of the American Jewish communal structure. Giovanni Capoccia
defines critical junctures as “situations of uncertainty in which decisions of important
actors are causally decisive for the selection of one path of institutional development over
other possible paths.”94 As a mechanism intended to explain institutional genesis and/or
change, critical junctures represent the structural crises during which old rules-of-thegame are loosened or disrupted in a way that enables well-positioned actors to make new,
long-lasting, and highly consequential modifications. Path dependence, relatedly,
describes a situation in which future events are guided along a particular and difficult-toreverse trajectory by the rules established at a critical juncture. Chapters 2 and 3 identify
the period of mass Eastern European immigration that occurred between 1880 and 1920
as a critical juncture, a pivot-point in American Jewish history that catalyzed the
development of a novel institutional form—the Jewish philanthropic federation. From
this single innovation two path-dependent trajectories resulted. At the municipal level,
the centralization of Jewish charitable fundraising endowed federation bureaucrats with
extraordinary financial powers, enabling the gradual expansion of their authority over
local Jewish community life. At the national level, the proliferation of federations and the
similar local power struggles in which they found themselves engaged fostered the
development of an umbrella body that consolidated and further amplified federation
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power. That power was then deployed to bring about the centralization of American
Jewish ethnopolitical activity on a national scale.
To describe the unfolding of these long-term, path-dependent processes, I draw on
the mechanisms of institutional change that Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney call
“layering” and “conversion.”95 Layering is the enactment of incremental modifications or
additions to institutions that gradually transform their overall impact on political
behavior, while conversion occurs when changes in the external environment prompt a
strategic reinterpretation of existing rules in a way that has lasting consequences for an
institution’s goals, functions, or purposes. As I show in Chapter 2, the fiscal imperative to
reduce competition, minimize wasteful expenditure, and maximize financial intake drove
the New York federation to elaborate a series of rule-changes and new bureaucratic
appendages that, over time, vastly expanded the scope of its regulatory activities. In the
late 1960s, as changes in the spatial and demographic composition of New York’s Jewish
population began to undermine the federation’s fiscal model, its leadership reinterpreted a
commitment to Jewish social and economic welfare as a commitment to Jewish cultural
survival—a process of conversion that stabilized the federation financially and eventually
brought Israel to the forefront of its programmatic agenda. While addressing different
components of the community relations dynamo, Chapters 3 through 5 identify similar
processes of layering and conversion that occurred in response to both institutionalreproductive imperatives and exogenous political shocks. Chapter 6 draws on the work of
APD scholar Robert Lieberman to reinterpret the narrative of post-1973 Jewish
communal fragmentation through an HI lens. Like Smith and King, Lieberman conceives
the political arena as structured by multiple, overlapping “ideational and institutional
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orders.” When these orders become misaligned and clash with one another, they generate
discontinuities between political actors’ expectations and opportunities—what Lieberman
calls “friction.” The result “is not that old orders are jettisoned but that elements of them
are recombined and reconfigured into a new set of political patterns that is recognizably
new and yet retains some continuity with the old ones.”96 I argue that we can
conceptualize the growth of liberal-Zionist organizations after 1973 in exactly these
terms: as the outcome of intensifying structural friction between the liberal and Jewishethnonationalist orders that would operate concurrently on large sectors of American
Jewry from the late 1960s onward.
But if HI furnishes important theoretical insights into the genesis and
development of American Jewish institutions, it falls short of providing a vocabulary
through which to conceptualize the relationships between those institutions, and for
describing the structure of the overall arena in which they operate. For scholars working
in the HI and APD traditions, the political coalitions that feature as primary protagonists
compete for governing power over the polity writ large. The ultimate stakes of the contest
are clear: control over the distribution of material resources and over the status
hierarchies inscribed by law and policy. When it comes to what I call ethnopolitical
projects, however, the arena of competition is not coterminous with the polity, nor are the
spoils of victory identical with those of traditional power contests. Like other (though not
all) instances of U.S. ethnic politics, American Jewish politics is a nested game that
abides by a quasi-autonomous logic and whose outcomes exert only second-order effects
on the polity. Political scientists concerned with those effects—and they have indeed
been significant—have taken the shortcut of reducing ethnopolitical projects to the
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particular organizations most proximate and clearly articulated to the polity’s governing
institutions (e.g., AIPAC, in the case of the Israel/Jewish lobby). Doing so yields
structurally comparable units of analysis—discrete lobby organizations—but carries all
of the conceptual limitations identified above.
The difficulties posed by the heterogeneity of the analytic objects currently
classified as “ethnic lobbies” are not easily overcome. On one hand, providing for
comparison without eliding complexity requires a more capacious unit of analysis. On the
other hand, increased complexity may fundamentally alter the structural logic of the unit
in ways that render comparison difficult or impossible. For example, an “ethnic lobby”
consisting (in reality, not by analytic fiat) of a single advocacy organization faces a very
different set of challenges, incentives, and opportunities than an “ethnic lobby”
comprised of dozens or hundreds of separate organizations of various ideological stripes.
Rather than attempting to square this circle, I concede that units of differential
complexity require different frames of analysis. While the HI toolkit is sufficient for
analyzing and comparing low-complexity ethnopolitical projects, I turn to the work of
Pierre Bourdieu for assistance in analyzing the structural logic of more complex,
internally differentiated, and ideologically heterogeneous ethnopolitical “fields.”
David Swartz describes Bourdieu’s “field” concept as comprising “arenas of
production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status, and
the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize
these different kinds of capital.”97 Fields are not “real” spaces or networks of concrete
entities, but rather schematic configurations of structural positions whose significance
derives from their relation to one another, rather than from the empirical characteristics of
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the actors or institutions that may inhabit them from moment to moment.98 Positions in a
field are defined exclusively by their endowment with different types and volumes of
capital, which are unevenly distributed, resulting in relationships of domination and
subordination. According to Swartz, “the struggle for position in fields opposes those
who are able to exercise some degree of monopoly power over the definition and
distribution of capital and others who attempt to usurp the advantages.”99 The former
constitute upholders of orthodoxy in a field, while the latter represent the forces of
heterodoxy. Which concrete actors play which role is, again, entirely a function of capital
distributions. While Bourdieu privileges the economic, his conception of capital
encompasses an almost infinite variety of field-specific resources, frequently of a
symbolic nature.100 For instance, he famously applied his conceptual scheme to the
French literary and artistic fields, where struggles were said to center on artistic capital in
the form of public recognition.101 Certain types of capital are convertible into others, as
when economic capital is used to finance a political campaign (political capital) or pay
for a master’s degree (cultural capital), or when former politicians leverage their political
capital to secure high-paying employment (economic capital) or university lectureships
and honorary degrees (cultural capital). Because of the greater convertibility of economic
and political capital, the economic and political fields constitute what Bourdieu calls the
“field of power,” which structures all other fields to one degree or another.102 Fields are
thus related to each other in a hierarchical fashion and bear “homologous” resemblances,
even as the structuring effects of a superordinate field (including the field of power) are
mediated by the quasi-autonomous logics that define the subordinate fields nested within
it.103
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It is Bourdieu’s capacious understanding of field-specific capitals that makes his
scheme appropriate to the analysis of ethnopolitical projects, whose constituent
institutions compete over legitimacy in ethnic political representation—a type of
symbolic capital I call ethnic representational capital. The primary object of analysis in
this dissertation is what I call the American Jewish ethnopolitical field, a somewhat
arduous descriptor whose three adjectives are nonetheless each necessary to properly
circumscribe the field in question. One might analyze a separate but slightly more
encompassing American Jewish field in which actors struggle not over legitimacy in
political representation but over the right to define Jewishness per se within the
parameters imposed by the American political, economic, and cultural fields. Equally,
one might analyze an even broader Jewish field that encompasses all national Jewish
fields as well as transnational movements and institutions. Yet, importantly, the “Jewish
capital” that comprises the stakes of these latter two cultural fields has only limited
currency in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. For example, while haredi (“ultraOrthodox”) Jewish institutions are maximally endowed with Jewish capital, their low
economic capital, their minority status within the American Jewish population, and their
lack of social connections with the non-Orthodox majority means they would have
difficulty translating their Jewish capital into Jewish representational capital. On the other
hand, it is a known and sometimes effective tactic of groups that inhabit a “dominated”
position in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field to deploy Jewish capital in an
attempt to enhance their symbolic legitimacy (for instance, when an Israel-critical group
integrates Jewish ritual into their meetings or political performances). The broader point
is merely that the American Jewish ethnopolitical field is, as Bourdieu would say,
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“relatively autonomous” of these superordinate fields and operates according to an
idiosyncratic logic of its own. That logic is “Jewish and democratic,” reflecting the
tensions between the several superordinate fields that encompass it (the Jewish fields, but
also, and to a greater extent, the “stronger” American political and economic fields—the
field of power). It is for this reason that, e.g., opinion polling has come to play such a
prominent role in establishing or diminishing claims on American Jewish representational
capital, and why calls for communal “democratization” have long been a mainstay of
counterhegemonic discourse.
The question of how the post-1967 pro-Israel “consensus” came to prevail in the
American Jewish ethnopolitical field can be phrased in more general terms: through what
mechanisms did an alliance of institutional actors in the dominant (high-capital) sector of
the field—that is, a “dominant coalition” dedicated to a particular ethnopolitical project—
achieve lasting hegemony? By “hegemony” I mean a near-total monopoly over the field’s
unique species of capital (Jewish representational capital). As a form of symbolic capital,
Jewish representational capital is produced through a range of symbolizing practices,
including spectacles (ceremonies, conferences, summits), publishing (official statements,
community newspapers, digital communications), broadcasting (radio, TV, online
streaming), and in-person communication (personal networks, club meetings, door-todoor canvasing). To monopolize any ethnic representational capital thus requires a
sustained and comprehensive symbolizing effort, which in turn can only be achieved with
economic capital. It is for this reason that Bourdieu refers to actors with high levels of
economic (and political) capital as “the dominant fraction of the dominant class.” Also
included in the dominant class but comprising its “dominated fraction” are actors that
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possess relatively low levels of economic capital but high levels of cultural capital
(credentials) and/or social capital (network connections), which under certain conditions
are convertible to economic capital. Such actors can join and reinforce the power of a
dominant coalition, or they can align with dominated actors in an attempt to split field
dominants into warring camps, thereby undermining the monopoly power of the old
coalition. However, it is impossible (by definition) to displace a dominant coalition and
establish a new one on a different ideological basis without control of the field’s
economic capital (and thus its symbolizing mechanisms).
Bourdieu ascribes a set of “invariant laws” or “universal mechanisms” to fields,
some of which I have already enumerated.104 For our purposes, perhaps the most
important feature of the field form is the way it circumscribes the range of behaviors and
discursive strategies available to contestants. As a condition of entry, both dominant and
subordinate actors, regardless of their particular viewpoint, must “buy in” to a field by
tacitly accepting what Bourdieu calls its doxa—a basic agreement that the stakes of the
field (i.e., its unique species of capital) are worth struggling over, and a common
commitment to preserving the field itself.105 Doxa is related to a broader set of governing
principles that give definition to a field’s specific capital form, what Bourdieu calls the
field’s “principles of vision and division,” or its nomos.106 A field’s nomos emerges from
the historical conditions that generate the field and constitute the boundaries of what can
be legitimately articulated within it. For instance, actors in the American Jewish
ethnopolitical field cannot espouse an explicit philosophy of Jewish assimilation through
intermarriage and conversion to Christianity and hope to command legitimacy in the
field. To do so would be tantamount to advocating the dissolution of the field and the
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total devaluation of Jewish representational capital. In addition, field contestants struggle
not only to accumulate greater volumes of representational capital but, more importantly,
to use their monopoly power to impose a particular interpretations of the nomos of the
field, in effect setting the criteria by which something is recognized as legitimate
representational capital.107
While all fields are historically contingent configurations of forces and subject to
drastic change or dissolution given radically disruptive events, under more stable
conditions the nomos of a field enjoys a certain underlying continuity. At a minimum, for
instance, the nomos of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field requires participants to
recognize a distinction between Jews and non-Jews (the “principle of vision and
division”) and to claim to represent the political interests of Jews, however construed.
Thus do even the most heterodox challengers articulate their objectives in relation to the
field’s underlying nomos, as, for example, in the mission statement of JVP, which begins
“Jewish Voice for Peace opposes anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim, and anti-Arab bigotry and
oppression.”108 Since the 2016 presidential election, which brought conservative proIsrael forces into objective alignment with the explicitly anti-Semitic “alt-right,” JVP has
attempted to seize the mantle of “anti-anti-Semitism,” publishing a collection of essays
on the subject and framing its adversaries in the field as enablers of an insurgent neoNazism.109 This approach reflects one of the three primary field strategies that Bourdieu
identifies—in particular, the strategy of “subversion,” in which marginal challengers seek
to strip field dominants of their legitimacy to define the nomos of the field. Dominants,
by contrast, pursue strategies of “conservation,” while newcomers less hostilely disposed
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to the status quo pursue strategies of “succession” aimed at securing access to dominant
positions.
As with the constructivist theories of ethnicity described above, I adopt a fieldtheoretic framework for the simple reason that it best explains the historical patterns I
encountered in the archive. Bourdieu’s relational mode of analysis—one in which the
social significance of objects and practices derives not from their essential character but
from their location in a contested field of power—is not only consistent with a
constructivist ontology but provides a set of tools for mapping out processes of ethnic and
racial formation. In The Racial Order, Emirbayer and Desmond draw on Bourdieu to
conceptualize the broader racial field in which the American Jewish ethnopolitical field is
nested. They write:
A relational perspective shifts attention… from concrete and hierarchically
arranged races to ‘epistemic’ races—that is, to races understood as positions in
various racial fields. Just as ‘real classes’ do not exist but have to be constructed
through theoretical and practical action, so too ‘real races’ do not exist but had
to be invented by European colonizers and then reinvented by the racially
dominated themselves… What exists are not races but racial fields, including the
American racial field itself, in which the very existence of races—and of
racism—is a matter of intense debate and struggle.110
The field-theoretic approach likewise shifts our attention from “Jews” to power relations
between institutional representatives of competing Jewish ethnopolitical projects. What’s
more, combining Bourdieu with the historical institutionalist repertoire equips us to
connect the internal development of numerous individual organizations with the
constraints imposed by their ongoing, structured relations with one another. Just as one
cannot understand the behavior of a commercial firm independently of the rules of the
marketplace in which it operates and the strategies of competing firms, so too with
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American Jewish organizations, whose internal dynamics are tethered to an external
struggle for legitimation. Yet, as an analytic paradigm, fields differ from markets in an
important respect: the legitimation struggles that play out in cultural fields are not
reducible to material forces. While Bourdieu accords a privileged status to the economic
field, his conviction that power in modern, highly differentiated capitalist societies is
exercised largely through hegemonic symbol systems means that symbolic producers—
educators, intellectuals, artists, etc.—enjoy a measure of autonomous influence.
With this in mind, I offer a materialist analysis of American Jewish politics that
attempts to take seriously the “relative autonomy” of the symbolic. My approach begins
from the premise that ethnopolitical organizations operating in the U.S. legal and
economic environment require stable access to financial resources derived primarily
(though not exclusively) from private, voluntary contributions, and that the need to secure
those resources under competitive conditions constitutes an overriding institutional
imperative that shapes both practical decision-making and organizational ideology. This
understanding reflects some of the foundational assumptions of the “resource
mobilization” perspective on social movement formation, whose early proponents
conceived the emergence of organized political challenges by excluded groups as a
function of newly available financial inputs, typically furnished by elites.111 In his study
of the Civil Rights movement, Douglas McAdam draws on elements of the resource
mobilization paradigm but underscores the dangers, as well as the benefits, of elite
patronage:
the initial availability of external support frequently dissuades insurgents of the
need to develop a strong grass-roots structure as a protection against the
uncertainty of elite support. There is nothing inherently wrong with externally
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supported insurgency provided that the interests of the movement organization
and funding source remain compatible. However, should the interests of the
funding source be threatened by the actions of insurgents, then the latter, in light
of the dependence that has developed, faces the likelihood of extinction should
support be withdrawn.112
Contra elite-centered models, McAdam emphasizes the role of preexisting “indigenous
organizational networks” in providing social movements with members, leadership,
communications, and solidary incentives for participation.113 While this dissertation deals
with a combination of formal interest groups and social movement organizations, as well
as institutions that meld the qualities of both, McAdam’s observations about the
importance of grassroots networks and the vulnerabilities of financial dependence are
central to my analysis.
I argue that the structures and strategies through which American Jewish
organizations mobilize financial resources exert a significant influence on their political
behavior. More often than not, he who pays the piper calls the tune. But the relationship
between economic and ethnic representational capital is less straightforward than the
cliché would have it. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the German-Jewish
upper and middle classes, represented by the American Jewish Committee and B’nai
B’rith, respectively, dominated the inchoate American Jewish ethnopolitical field by
virtue of their superior endowments of economic, social, and political capital, which they
converted into Jewish representational capital through various symbolizing practices.
Bourdieu refers to symbolic forms of capital as “denied” capital—that is, as economic
capital disguised so as to conceal, and thus legitimize, the underlying class, ideological,
or personal interests involved in its possession.114 Swartz notes that, for Bourdieu,
“philanthropy and the nonprofit sector functions to legitimate particular economic
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interests by converting them into forms of symbolic recognition for the collective
good.”115 Along with an array of other AJC practices and productions, the reputations of
many prominent AJC leaders as titans of American Jewish philanthropy symbolically
legitimated their claims to ethnopolitical representation by superimposing a veneer of
communal beneficence and disinterested objectivity onto the class perspective that guided
their advocacy efforts. Things began to change, however, once Jewish philanthropy was
consolidated into local federations at the behest of AJC-linked economic elites
themselves—a process that imbued the federations with the accumulated symbolic capital
of the philanthropist class. Over time, and in a process I describe in Chapter 3, the
federations developed a set of independent interests and powers, which they deployed to
discipline the original field dominants (the AJC and B’nai B’rith’s Anti-Defamation
League) and force them into a broader coalition. The federations’ powers were economic,
but their ultimate source was the symbolic authority that enabled them to claim a
legitimate monopoly over local Jewish philanthropic giving.
Where American Jewry is concerned, no symbol system has been more powerful
than the constellation of images and narratives linking the Nazi Holocaust with the
creation and survival of the State of Israel. Yet those symbols and their cultural meanings
did not arise spontaneously from the conjuncture of historical events. Rather, a process of
rearticulation and institutionalization was required before they could become objects of
capital exchange and conversion in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. Omi and
Winant define rearticulation as “a practice of discursive reorganization or reinterpretation
of ideological themes and interests already present in subjects’ consciousness, such that
these elements obtain new meanings or coherence.”116 While this dissertation is not a
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work of cultural history—and in fact addresses cultural production only briefly in the
final chapter, and only insofar as federations were concerned—it acknowledges the
indispensable role of symbolic producers in forging the heroic, “Americanized” image of
Israel that emerged during the postwar period. Scholars like Emily Alice Katz, Michelle
Mart, Melani McAlister, and Amy Kaplan have extensively documented the infusion of
U.S. political, religious, and historical motifs into cultural representations of the Jewish
state prior to 1967.117 According to Katz, “American Jewry’s increasingly muscular
political attachments to Israel beginning in the late 1960s were premised on the culture
work of the preceding two decades.”118 I endorse Katz’s argument and attempt to trace
the processes of institutionalization through which this image of Israel was further
rearticulated in relation to domestic anti-Semitism and integrated into the agenda of the
Jewish community relations agencies. The real political significance of the Six-Day War,
I argue, resides less in the expressions of pro-Israelism it occasioned than in the way it
valorized (in the economic sense of the word) images of Israel and the Holocaust as
forms of economically convertible symbolic capital by linking them directly to the mass
mobilization of financial and human resources for the federation system. As noted above,
that mobilization was premised as much on the prior expansion of federation
infrastructure as it was on the process of symbolic rearticulation. My objective in this
dissertation is exactly to demonstrate how the material and the symbolic mediate one
another.
In the chapters that follow, I adopt certain metaphors employed by my historical
actors—federation bureaucrats, for the most part—to describe the type of organizational
structures they believed they were building. Among the most prominent is the image of
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the machine. By appropriating this metaphor, I attempt to draw attention to the temporal
dimensions of ethnopolitical projects—machines take time to construct and are subject to
eventual malfunction and breakdown—as well as the overriding dependence of
ethnopolitical organizations on an unbroken stream of “fuel” inputs (human and financial
resources). I use the phrase “the community relations dynamo” to capture the way an
interlocking, hierarchical, and functionally differentiated network of Jewish
ethnopolitical organizations briefly coalesced to generate an unprecedented torrent of
political energy before slowly breaking apart over the last quarter of the twentieth
century. The post-1967 “consensus” was a structural effect of this apparatus, whose
construction and disintegration I trace in detail. At the same time, I acknowledge that
mechanical imagery carries connotations of uniformity and structural integration that
obscure the relational aspects of American Jewish politics. My hope is that by
supplementing the metaphor of the machine with the Bourdieusian language of fields, we
might better understand how momentarily stable configurations emerge from the ongoing
clash of antagonistic forces.

Conclusion and Chapter Overview
Shortly after the 1980 presidential election, the incoming Reagan administration
urged Cuban-American businessman and former Bay of Pigs militant Jorge Mas Canosa
to familiarize himself with the structure and tactics of what was then, as now, the gold
standard of foreign policy lobbies: the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC). With the assistance of AIPAC staffers and associates, Mas Canosa went on to
establish the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), a sophisticated anti-Castro
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lobby that built support for Reagan’s Latin America policy in Congress and continued to
shape U.S.-Cuba relations in a right-wing direction for close to twenty years.119 CANF is
far from the only ethnic lobby to consciously model itself on AIPAC. In the hope of
replicating the achievements of the organized Jewish community, Greek-, Armenian-,
Indian-, and Arab-American organizations have all reportedly done the same.120 Yet, the
Cuban lobby’s institutional model proved highly unstable in the long run. Following the
death of Mas Canosa in 1997, the organization experienced a rapid decline, its financial
assets “withering” as major donors fled to the newly-formed Cuban Liberty Council.121
Forced to shutter its Washington offices, CANF subsequently softened its positions and
abandoned hardball lobbying in favor of educational and humanitarian initiatives. In the
twenty years since, the breakaway Cuban Liberty Council appears to have folded, leaving
behind only a PAC that, as of 2016, has lost its monopoly on economic capital in the
field.122 The once formidable Cuban lobby, in other words, is today a shadow of its
former self.
To date, no ethnic lobby has approached the level of sustained, transgenerational
political mobilization and investment achieved by the pro-Israelist coalition of the
American Jewish ethnopolitical field. As described above, existing scholarship fails to
adequately explain variation in the strength and durability of ethnic lobbies. By focusing
exclusively on Washington-based lobbying organizations, political scientists have trained
their analytic sights on the tip of the ethnopolitical iceberg, excluding all that lies beneath
the surface. Where lobbying organizations possess similar formal characteristics—as in
the case of AIPAC and CANF—existing literature looks to demographic variables like
income, population size, and geographic concentration to explain residual differences in
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political influence. In this dissertation, I propose an alternative explanation premised on
the understanding that simple demographic “advantages” do not automatically translate
into political influence, nor are they entirely independent of institutional patrimony. What
accounts for the extraordinary strength and durability of the pro-Israel lobby in the
twentieth century, I argue, was not the size, location, or affluence of the American Jewish
population—though these may have been necessary preconditions—but the existence of a
networked substructure of institutions that functioned, inter alia, to mobilize and educate
the Jewish grassroots, sustain ethnic identification, counteract centrifugal tendencies
towards residential de-concentration, and facilitate economic mobility. The elementary
unit of that substructure was the Jewish philanthropic federation—an institutional form
that developed at a particular historical conjuncture and evolved both internally and
relationally as time progressed. This developmental process, I contend, must be
sufficiently analyzed before we can construct a proper comparative model of
ethnopolitical advocacy.
I begin that analysis in the next chapter by exploring the long-term development
of a single Jewish federation—what is today the UJA-Federation of New York. My
objective is to illustrate the way fiscal imperatives unique to the federation form drove a
process of institutional expansion, both geographically and with respect to the scope of
federation prerogatives. In addition, I examine how a convergence of fiscal crises,
counterhegemonic challenges, and symbolic valorization worked to dislodge the New
York federation’s entrenched “assimilationist” ideological orientation. Shifting to a
macrohistorical perspective in Chapter 3, I trace the genesis and consolidation of the
American Jewish ethnopolitical field writ large. Following the mass migration of Eastern
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European Jews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, antagonistic political
factions characterized by overlapping class, ideological, and sub-ethnic cleavages entered
into sustained public contestation over Jewish representative legitimacy. The early field
was contested by institutional actors endowed with different volumes of economic and
social capital in different combinations. As I demonstrate, the development of the
federation system resulted in a concentration of the field’s economic capital, empowering
federation professionals to impose discipline on their institutional competitors. The result,
by the mid-1940s, was a well-defined and structurally integrated dominant coalition that
briefly retained the ideological dispositions of the “non-Zionist” upper class.
After the creation of Israel in 1948, however, what had formerly been a
subordinate interpretation of the nomos of the field—Jewish nationalism—was integrated
into the ethnopolitical project of the dominant coalition. In Chapter 4, I trace the
processes of layering and conversion through which this change was institutionalized
between 1948 and 1956, with special attention to the way superordinate fields
constrained the political choices of Jewish organizations. By the time of the Six-Day War
in 1967, the pro-Israelist coalition had already deployed its accumulated symbolic
resources to fatally weaken the field’s primary counterhegemonic challenger, the
American Council for Judaism. As I describe in Chapter 5, the ensuing decade was a
period of relatively unchallenged strength for the dominant coalition during which
frequent international crises stimulated additional institution-building and mass
mobilization. AIPAC, I demonstrate, played only a subsidiary role during this golden age
of pro-Israel politics. Finally, in Chapter 6, I examine how changes in the U.S. economic
field during the last quarter of the twentieth century catalyzed homologous capital
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redistributions in the Jewish field, intersecting with political dynamics abroad to boost
AIPAC’s power while simultaneously engendering the more fragmented and conflictual
Jewish field we encounter today. In my conclusion, I consider how my account of the
American Jewish ethnopolitical field might inform the study of other U.S. ethnopolitical
fields and what implications such a comparative analysis might carry for the future of
U.S.-Israel relations.
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Chapter 2
Core Technology
The Origins and Transformation of the Jewish Federation of New York
Introduction
The Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York (hereafter simply
“Federation”1) was incorporated by the New York state legislature on April 27, 1917.
Established at a moment of acute social crisis, Federation was the outcome of elite
negotiation aimed at mitigating resource competition among Jewish charitable
organizations in New York City. Modeled on Jewish federations in elsewhere—by 1917
federations already existed in twenty-four U.S. cities—the new institution consisted in
essence of an extraction and distribution mechanism: a centralized fundraising
bureaucracy and a committee empowered to equitably allocate collected funds to a
network of affiliated agencies. As I describe below, Federation underwent a striking
metamorphosis during its seventy years as an independent organization. In that time, it
vastly expanded its powers and geographic reach, elaborated new bureaucratic
appendages, and fundamentally reoriented its relationship to Jewish identity and Israel.
Mirroring broader trends in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field, Federation pivoted
in the 1970s from a politics of liberal “assimilationism” to one of ethnic “survivalism.”
My central argument in this chapter is that Federation’s structural and ideological
transformations were driven chiefly by efforts to streamline financial intake, buffer
against economic uncertainty, and surmount endemic fiscal crises—in other words, to

1

In using the term Federation without the definite article, I follow the precedent of both
scholars and Federation officials.
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safeguard what sociologist J.D. Thompson would call the “core technology” of the
federation model: its fundraising and distribution mechanism.1
In 1986, Federation’s institutional expansion culminated in a formal merger with
the United Jewish Appeal (UJA), an umbrella organization that raises money for overseas
Jewry, particularly in Israel. Today, the UJA-Federation of New York describes itself as
the “largest local philanthropy in the world,” raising upwards of $200 million annually
and holding more than $1 billion in permanent assets as of 2016. Although the UJA was
established with the assistance of Federation personnel in the 1930s, the two
organizations remained separate for more than fifty years for reasons largely specific to
New York City. In most other Jewish communities, federations and local UJA chapters
merged in the 1950s and 1960s.2 Similarly, while most other communities had
established federation-backed Jewish Community Relations Councils (JCRC) by the
1950s, New York’s JCRC did not receive Federation sponsorship until 1974. Only in the
demographic epicenter of American Jewry was the consolidation of domestic, overseas,
and public affairs functions achieved so late into the century. That tardiness reflected the
unusually high level of ideological animosity between Zionists and anti-Zionists in New
York City during the first half of the twentieth century. At the time, a numerically small
but financially significant segment of Federation’s donor pool was adamantly opposed to
contributing to the Zionist-linked UJA, making any proposed merger a fiscal liability.
This early strategic avoidance of Zionism was subsequently institutionalized as an
informal norm against “ideological” activity of any kind, ensuring Federation’s
prolonged separation from “politics.”
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The history of the New York federation, then, is in certain ways exceptional—an
outlier among federations. On the other hand, the process of institutional expansion I
trace below appears to have mirrored the general developmental trajectory followed by
other federations. According to Daniel Elazar,
The development of the federations can be seen as passing through three
stages… In the first stage the federations were leagues of individual operating
agencies for joint fundraising… In the second stage the federation structures
were tightened… and [they] began to assume a role in allocating funds based on
some overall planning… In the third stage, they become federations with
important community-planning functions.3
New York is thus both typical and idiosyncratic, a fact that enhances the analytic
leverage we derive from an investigation of its internal dynamics. Unearthing the causes
of Federation’s delayed entry into local politics and Israel advocacy draws our attention
to the point at which the symbolic and the material intersect. We see how ideological
conflicts present when an institution is formed can crystalize into norms or codified rules
that impact its mode of material reproduction. Yet, when an institution’s survival is later
jeopardized by the persistence of an outmoded rule or norm, an ensuing crisis may
catalyze institutional reform and ideological transformation. Towards the end of this
chapter, I describe the process through which Federation’s liberal-assimilationist
paradigm was dislodged and replaced with the survivalist paradigm that prevails today.
Once again, we discover that Federation’s survivalist turn was inextricably bound up with
efforts to protect its fundraising and distribution mechanism.
By the late 1960s, Federation’s original, social service-oriented model of
financial-institutional reproduction had begun to break down under the impact of
demographic change, economic stagnation, and government retrenchment. Facing
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unprecedented budget deficits and saddled with a network of expensive and increasingly
obsolete service institutions, Federation was primed to adopt a new overall model to
sustain its core technology. In the early 1970s, the contours of that model coalesced
around two sets of actors, both products of the embourgeoisement of New York Jewry.
On the “supply” side was an emerging cadre of megadonors whose primary
preoccupation was Jewish education, and on the “demand” side were new protest
movements pushing Federation to support Jewish identity projects. The nexus of these
forces swept away the fossilized ideological patterns obstructing merger with the UJA
and catalyzed the transformation of Federation into a purveyor of what is known today as
“Jewish peoplehood.”4 In addition, it enacted a fusion between the annual campaign and
what one former UJA-Federation CEO called the “Israel at Risk” fundraising paradigm,
which “fostered the explosive growth of the Federation system” nationwide in the period
after 1967.5 Along with that linkage came a process of ideological diffusion and
interpretation between Federation personnel and the Israeli government. Despite its
quirks, then, New York’s federation moved along the same path-dependent trajectory as
federated communities elsewhere, propelled by institutional imperatives unique to the
federation form. The ultimate outcome was an ethnic instrumentality of impressive scope,
authority, and resilience—one that, in combination with its sister federations, decisively
shaped the course of American Jewish politics.

Jewish Federations and Their Functions: Then and Now
The federated model of Jewish communal fundraising was first adopted in Boston in
1895 and spread to scores of American cities over the next several decades. While at one
58

point there were as many as 230 Jewish federations in North America, a process of
consolidation has since reduced that figure to 147 as of 2018. For over eighty years,
federations have performed a variety of politically significant functions, both individually
and collectively. In 1932, a national Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds
(CJF) was established to coordinate the activities of constituent federations and guide
community planning efforts through research into best practices and demographic trends.6
Today, that umbrella body is called the Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA), and
its policy advocacy arm, established in 1944 as the National Community Relations Advisory
Council (NCRAC), is now known as the Jewish Council for Public Affairs. NCRAC’s
pivotal role in facilitating grassroots pro-Israel mobilization for much of the second half of
the twentieth century is the focus of subsequent chapters. In addition, federations served as
financial conduits for the major national Jewish political agencies—the American Jewish
Committee (AJC), the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League of
B’nai B’rith, among others—helping to sustain their operations as they built their
reputations and cultivated alternative sources of funding. As detailed in the next chapter, the
federation system leveraged its economic power over these agencies to advance its vision of
a centralized Jewish political advocacy field. Although full centralization was never
achieved, the federations managed to bring the major agencies into a cooperative framework
under the aegis of NCRAC, which established unified policy positions and coordinated
grassroots mobilization through its affiliated network of JCRCs. While Israel became a
central preoccupation after 1967, the NCRAC-federation apparatus advocated a wide range
of mostly liberal causes at home and abroad.
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Although it no longer performs the directive role it once did, the federation system
remains a key player in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field, particularly when it comes
to Israel. In 2010, for instance, the JFNA established the Israel Action Network (IAN) to
“counter assaults made on Israel’s legitimacy.”7 According to its website, in addition to
providing training and resources to activists across the country, the IAN’s
“accomplishments” include “defeating” a boycott of Israeli products at the Park Slope Food
Coop in Brooklyn, lobbying against anti-Israel divestment initiatives by U.S. church groups,
and “neutralizing” a student-run BDS conference at the University of Pennsylvania.8 More
routinely, federations organize delegations to Israel for state and local politicians and
directly lobby their state legislatures. Since 2014, for instance, federations in Illinois,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, California, Virginia, Tennessee, and elsewhere
have worked with state legislators to advance bills that condemn and/or penalize individuals
or organizations found to have endorsed the BDS movement. In New Jersey, to take just one
example, a majority of the state legislators who sponsored anti-BDS bills during the 20142015 legislative session had recently participated in a “study mission” to Israel sponsored by
the New Jersey State Association of Jewish Federations. Federations also facilitate
emergency mobilizations, such as the nationwide solidarity rallies that occurred during
Israel’s 2014 war with Hamas. In New York, Senator Chuck Schumer and Congressman
Eliot Engel addressed a crowd of 15,000 at a rally organized by the UJA-Federation, which
coordinated bus transports of protesters from regional Jewish summer camps and
synagogues.9 Similar federation-sponsored demonstrations took place in Miami, Los
Angeles, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and elsewhere.
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It is one of the basic arguments of this dissertation that the federations’ ability to
perform these various political roles derived from their original and most elementary
function: conducting annual, centralized fundraising campaigns for the principal Jewish
charities in their areas of operation. The initial establishment of federations entailed a
voluntary transfer of authority over “Jewish” philanthropic capital—in both its economic
and symbolic sense—from individual philanthropists to a self-governing bureaucracy, which
in turn meant the consolidation of potentially enormous powers in the hands of its
professional staff and Board of Trustees. As we shall see, those powers remained merely
“potential” to the extent that federations were constitutionally constrained in their ability to
strategically invest or withhold collected funds as they saw fit. For example, the founding
Trustees of the New York federation—comprising representatives of both the donor and
(institutional) beneficiary class—established early bylaw prohibitions against the accrual of
a permanent financial endowment, which they feared would enable Federation to wield
power above and beyond its core fundraising and distribution authorities. The major
metropolitan charitable agencies and Jewish hospitals were particularly concerned to
prevent Federation from meddling in their internal affairs or, worse, demanding the
dissolution of entire institutions on the grounds of inefficiency, duplication, or politics.
However, once Federation was secure in its symbolic position as legitimate monopolyholder—a position reinforced by the economic capital of its Board members, who could
discipline philanthropic competitors by threatening to withhold their largesse—it quickly
developed a set of institutional interests and prerogatives independent of its beneficiary
agencies.
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Federation beneficiaries, for their part, came to depend on the financial advantages
of membership—and not only because they had dismantled their own fundraising
bureaucracies. While never achieving the status of a total financier, federations guaranteed a
predictable base allocation around which recipients could conduct long-range planning and
an underlying support structure in the event of emergencies. The economies of scale made
possible by the existence of a single, centralized fundraising and distribution apparatus
yielded enormous returns, as the New York federation’s early experience testifies.
Federation’s inaugural campaign in 1916 netted almost double what constituent agencies
had raised independently in 1915. Federations also conducted supplemental fundraising
drives to help agencies expand their physical infrastructure, and provided loan guarantees
that ensured easy access to credit. Over the years, Federation officials boasted of the
additional “leverage” that agencies derived from each Federation dollar they received. One
committee report noted that “each dollar of contributions to Federation ‘buys’ more than
$10 worth of leverage dollars for our agencies.”10 Federation allocations could serve as
collateral for bank loans or provide a basis for computing foundation or government
matching grants. During a 1972 capital expansion drive, it was advertised that the $218
million campaign goal would “enable the participating agencies to receive almost a half
billion dollars in matching Government funds.”11 In addition, Federation engaged in bulk
purchasing, exploiting economies of scale to supply constituent agencies with goods and
services at greatly reduced rates. Once the bylaws prohibiting financial endowments were
repealed, it also began offering short-term, no-interest loans from its pool of permanent
assets, effectively serving as an in-house bank that financed agency repairs, improvements,
and other small projects.
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Thus, as an institutional technology, the federation model made possible far greater
investments than would otherwise have been thinkable. At the same time, the benefits of
membership and the risks inherent in a potential federation collapse helped override agency
objections to increased federation responsibilities, which (at least in the case of New York)
were most often justified in the name of efficiency. Propelled by recurrent crises, this
positive and self-reinforcing dynamic yielded a powerful planning apparatus and a
sprawling communal infrastructure that would later be repurposed to advance Jewish
survivalist and pro-Israel agendas. Naturally, that dynamic was contingent on the particular
constellation of sociodemographic, technological, and political-economic facts that
prevailed at mid-century. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, the transformation of those
parameters from the 1970s onward undermined the economic power of the federations and
significantly diminished their grassroots capacities. According to Elazar, during their
heyday in the late 1960s, “federations and their constituent agencies controlled about 75
percent of the public expenditure of the American Jewish community... After 1982 these
percentages began to change. [In 1995] it seems that federations’ share is down to closer to
50 percent and perhaps even less.”12 Inflation-adjusted contributions to the federation
system have stagnated in recent decades as Jewish philanthropic dollars increasingly flow
into private family foundations. Nonetheless, best estimates suggest that federations still
control a significant plurality of all Jewish communal resources. A 2014 investigation by the
Forward noted that, out of the $26 billion in total Jewish philanthropic assets documented in
IRS filings that year, “communal grant makers [i.e., federations] have $11.6 billion in net
assets, 43% of the network’s total. They also control a huge portion of the flow of donated
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cash.”13 According to JFNA, as of 2018, its 147 affiliated federations and 300 “network
communities” collectively raise more than $2 billion annually.
As in the past, federations continue to finance an array of cultural, recreational,
educational, medical, and social services largely but not exclusively for the benefit of local
Jewish communities. They also contribute substantially to organizations like the Jewish
Agency for Israel and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which fund
services and resettlement projects for Jews overseas. Since the beginning of the survivalist
turn in the late 1960s, however, the preponderance of new federation investment has been
directed to the realm of Jewish identity-formation. In an attempt to reverse the looming tide
of intermarriage and assimilation prophesied by Jewish communal demographers,
federations have financed a universe of programs designed to heighten participants’
commitment to “Jewish peoplehood,” including day schools, summer camps, university
Hillel centers, and “Israel experience” programs like Birthright. As discussed at greater
length in Chapter 6, the conception of Jewish identity advanced by the federation identity
apparatus is closely bound up with the State of Israel. A large body of quasi-sociological
communal research finds that federation-backed activities like Jewish education, camping,
youth groups, and Israel trips all increase participants’ self-reported sense of “emotional
attachment to Israel,” which in turn is conceptualized by federation-linked demographers as
a core component of Jewish identity.14 As mass producers of Jewish identity so defined,
federations have accordingly become mass producers of pro-Israel political commitment. In
cities across the country, federations have reacted to the recent surge in Jewish dissent by
issuing explicit prohibitions on forms of political speech critical of Israel.15 The resulting
pattern of top-down censorship by federations and their affiliated agencies has only
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intensified dissent, however, spawning new protest movements aimed at pressuring the
establishment to moderate or abandon its regulatory activity. In sum, while federations have
seen a decline in their financial and mobilizing power since the 1970s, they remain active
and highly influential participants in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field.

Predecessors and Origins of the New York Federation
The expansive mandate of the contemporary UJA-Federation of New York would
be unrecognizable—indeed, alarming—to the founding generation of Federation trustees.
The original Federation was constitutionally constrained to perform a single task—that of
fundraising and distribution. This deliberate constraint reflected the negotiated conditions
of Federation’s establishment. From the point of view of its architects, the purpose of the
federated structure was to reduce fundraising competition in a city that, by 1915, had
more than three thousand separate Jewish agencies vying for voluntary contributions. In
1909, eight years before Federation was incorporated, an initial attempt to federate the
largest and most competitive of the city’s Jewish charitable organizations collapsed over
the persistent problem of agency autonomy. According to an internal history
commissioned on Federation’s fiftieth anniversary, the heads of major New York Jewish
institutions raised their concerns with Felix Warburg, Federation’s eventual founder and
first president. “Why,” they asked, “should we place ourselves in a subordinate position
when we are operating successfully with all the member support we need? Why should
we accept a central agency which might interfere with our independence?”16 This early
effort unraveled and the federation concept was tabled until a few years later, when mass
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Jewish immigration from eastern Europe had pushed social-service distribution to a crisis
point.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, New York’s Jewish
population increased by almost a million people.17 The 1918–19 edition of the American
Jewish Year Book records an increase of more than 600,000 Jews in New York during the
brief period between 1910, just after the initial attempt to federate was defeated, and
1918, the year after Federation was finally instituted.18 In 1900, conditions on the Lower
East Side of Manhattan—where more than 250,000 Jewish immigrants of mostly eastern
European origin were concentrated in four city wards—were already squalid and
congested. According to one historian, citing an 1895 New York Times report, “sections
of the Lower East Side were more densely populated than the most crowded areas of
Bombay or Prague, and immigration had not yet reached its peak.”19 With private
charities underequipped to accommodate this influx (and the modern welfare state still
decades away), downtown Jewish immigrants resorted to self-organization: Jewish social
and economic life in lower Manhattan at the turn of the century was structured by
thousands of landsmanshaftn, or hometown associations of immigrants hailing from the
same villages or cities in eastern Europe. The landsmanshaftn, with about 400,000
members by the late 1930s, were vehicles for mutual aid, recreation, religious activity,
and Zionist and socialist politics. Through an umbrella group of landsmanshaftn known
as the Federation of Jewish Organizations (separate from the Federation studied here), the
downtown Jewish community projected antagonism and demands for communal
democracy at the established uptown group of German Jews represented by the affluent
elites of the AJC.
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Confrontation between the two camps over matters of style and substance gave
way to accommodation with the formation in 1908 of the New York Kehillah, a shortlived effort to unify New York Jewry under one organizational tent and establish a
democratic basis for Jewish community. Spearheaded by Judah Magnes, the Kehillah
spawned several professional community-planning bureaus—most notably the Bureau of
Jewish Education—that foreshadowed (and in some cases were integrated into)
Federation’s functional committees. By 1917, mounting financial strain prompted
Magnes to reorganize the Kehillah, detaching its donor-funded bureaus from the elected
assembly and thus bringing an end to the momentary fusion of big money and communal
democracy that the Kehillah represented.20 In its life of just over a decade, the Kehillah
never garnered the full support of New York’s ideologically fractious Jewish community.
As one historian put it,
it was impossible under American conditions of voluntarism to compel
dissenters to participate in the larger community. Thus many Orthodox Jews
wondered why they should allow Reform rabbis like Judah Magnes to regulate
their affairs, and most radicals refused to take part in a body based on the
concept of Jewish unity above class interests.21
The social and political crises occasioned by World War I catalyzed the dissolution of the
Kehillah and the birth of its successor organization, Federation. With the Jewish
communities of Eastern Europe thrown into wartime chaos, a more complete
interfactional collaboration to provide humanitarian aid emerged in the form of the
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). Bringing the AJC together with
New York–based representatives of the Socialists, Zionists, and Orthodox for the purpose
of joint emergency fundraising, the JDC provided a model for elite-based overseas
fundraising and distribution that Federation would soon come to employ domestically.
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Indeed, there was such continuity of leadership linking the Kehillah to the JDC
and the JDC to Federation that one can speak of an organic process of institutional
experimentation and evolution in which the democratic component demanded by the
popular organizations of the Lower East Side ultimately proved incompatible with the
financial solvency that only the uptown German powerbrokers could provide.
Fundraising and other wartime activities by the JDC siphoned energy and resources from
the Kehillah, and political controversies tore at its cohesion. Detached from its
professional bureaus and reduced to a debating club, it faded out of existence by 1922. In
light of the failure of the Kehillah’s democratic experiment, writes Deborah Dash Moore,
“Federation supporters proposed to develop a deferential community based on wealth.”22
Moore understands the rise of Federation as a deliberate effort on the part of affluent
uptowners to reconstitute the idea of a communal umbrella organization without the
element of democratic control. “[D]espite the disclaimers of any larger intent than that of
efficiently raising funds for affiliated societies, even the name of the new organization
belied broader ambitions” to create a governing structure for New York Jewry dominated
by economic elites.23 But whatever ambitions individual Federation leaders may have
harbored, Moore neglects to consider the way Federation’s founders knowingly erected
barriers to obstruct its assumption of greater communal power.
In the sections that follow, I demonstrate that the growth of Federation into an
overarching political and communal planning agency was neither intended nor
preordained, and I trace the contingency-driven process through which its initial
structural fetters were cast off. Moreover, I argue that Federation circumvented the
problems of political fractiousness that sunk the Kehillah by framing its activities as
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strictly “non-ideological” and avoiding most political and sectarian interventions for
nearly 50 years. By the early 1970s, when it underwent an epochal ideological
transformation and began engaging with Zionism and other “controversial” issues,
Federation’s material power structure was already in place, having incubated for most of
the century behind the veneer of philanthropic neutrality.

Institutional Evolution
By the outbreak of World War I, escalating strain on Jewish relief agencies in New
York and Europe eclipsed prior misgivings about institutional autonomy. As Federation’s
internal historian notes:
The war in Europe had inundated New York City with humanity and the
existing agencies were reeling under an avalanche of requests for jobs, places to
live, medical aid, food, clothing, help of all kinds from immigrants arriving to
make a new home for themselves in America. And leaders in the community
were publicly expressing alarm at the abominable conditions existing in the New
York situation. Thus, the arguments for a New York federation took on a new
relevancy and urgency.24
In addition to local conditions, a series of political, economic, and legal developments at
the state and national levels had laid the groundwork for the emergence of nonprofit
corporations of unprecedented scope and power. With New York’s 1893 Tilden Act, state
governments began to remove upper limits on the size of the assets a charitable
corporation could hold. The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
legalized the federal income tax in 1913, was followed a few years later by the first
charitable tax deductions. As a result of lobbying by local chambers of commerce,
subsequent revenue laws provided tax exemptions to corporations for charitable gifts, and
the New Deal’s steep inheritance tax incentivized the creation of charitable trusts as tax
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shelters. By the postwar period, these intersecting developments had substantially
reduced the costs of giving and launched a new age of mass philanthropy, reflected in the
emergence of megafoundations like Ford and Carnegie and in the growth of the
community-chest movement (today the United Way). The first federations of Jewish
charities—Boston in 1895, Cincinnati in 1896, and Chicago in 1900—were pioneers in
the field of coordinated local fundraising, predating the nonsectarian chest movement by
more than a decade. Influenced by the Progressive Era’s “scientific” approach to social
problems, both the chest and federation movements sought to harness modern technology
and managerial expertise to the end of greater efficiency in voluntary social provision.25
New York launched a preliminary federated campaign in 1916. By the end of the
year, approximately $1.5 million had been received from new Federation subscribers—
nearly double the combined intake of the beneficiary societies the previous year. Federation
was thus instituted on a permanent basis beginning with the 1917 fiscal year.
Notwithstanding its demonstrated efficiency, Federation’s incorporation process with the
New York legislature faced objections from the eastern European sector. One popular
Yiddish journalist lodged a complaint against Federation with New York public officials.
By bestowing political sanction on Federation, she argued, the state was enabling the
uptowners to coercively dismantle East Side institutions. An umbrella group of downtown
organizations calling itself the Council of Jewish Institutions of New York emerged to
provide “mutual protection” against Federation.26 But the downtowners’ fear abated as it
became evident that Federation wielded no extraordinary powers to interfere with
nonaffiliated societies. Unlike the AJC, Federation made no claims to political
representation, enabling it to insulate itself for decades from the demands of various
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contentious actors on New York’s Jewish political scene. Yet a fear remained within
Federation, on the part of its larger affiliated agencies, that it would develop independent
interests, centralize power, and encroach on their prerogatives. As a hedge against this
eventuality, the founding trustees codified the principle of agency autonomy into
Federation’s bylaws: “the Board of Trustees shall not interfere with the management of any
beneficiary society.”27 The Board, moreover, was to be numerically dominated by
representatives of the agencies (who commanded two-thirds of the votes and selected the
remaining at-large trustees), an arrangement intended to give their interests more sway.
Additionally, in what was later to prove a significant encumbrance, the original bylaws
prohibited the collection of bequests in order to prevent the accumulation of excessive
financial power.
These safeguards would gradually be loosened or overturned in the course of
Federation’s institutional evolution. Over its first three decades, Federation’s eight
original standing committees were progressively augmented and the powers of the Board
of Trustees concurrently expanded. By the early 1960s, the number of standing
committees, each overseeing a discrete field of operations, had risen to 18, and a series of
auxiliary corporations had been established to effect economies and provide consolidated
services for the expanding body of beneficiary agencies.28 At the same time, the Board’s
involvement with technical policy making receded as the work of the standing
committees became more specialized and differentiated. Restrictions on capital
accumulation were discarded. The net assets of the contemporary UJA-Federation,
approximately $1.2 billion in 2014, represent about eight and a half times its annual
campaign intake and allocation—a fiscal buffer and source of influence the founders
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never envisioned. And whereas the original Federation mostly avoided politics, its
purview has long since expanded to encompass pro-Israel advocacy and other issues that
would have been deemed ruinously controversial at an earlier point in Federation’s life.
Although organized philanthropy has begun to attract increased scholarly
attention, little has been written about the New York Federation in particular or federated
Jewish philanthropy in general.29 The most detailed study of the New York federation’s
long-term trends is an extensive 1979 article by sociologist Charles Liebman published in
the American Jewish Year Book.30 Like the present chapter, Liebman offers an
explanation for Federation’s ideological and programmatic transition from
assimilationism to survivalism at the end of the 1960s. Though he notes developments in
government policy and the changing sociodemographics of New York City, he zeroes in
on the evolving personal attitudes and priorities of Federation’s leadership. Surveying
successive generations of Federation trustees, he finds heightened levels of Jewish
literacy and ethnic solidarity among the younger cohort, leading him to locate
Federation’s survivalist turn at the intersection of this renewed Jewish commitment and a
broader set of attitudinal-cultural shifts among American Jews purportedly catalyzed by
the Six Day War and the rise of black nationalism. In short, Liebman contends that
Federation’s orientation changed because the beliefs and values of its governing elite
changed along with the rest of American Jewry.
My examination of Federation records, including minutes of the Board of
Trustees and Executive Committee and numerous committee reports, publications,
correspondence, and financial documents, reveals a more complicated picture. In what
follows, I attempt to move beyond a description of Federation’s cultural and ideological
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transition points to explore the way internal financial dynamics drove Federation’s highlevel decision making, including, ultimately, its survivalist turn. The latter, I argue, is
most fruitfully understood with reference to a broader dynamic of expansion through
fiscal crisis that propelled the entire institutional history of the New York Federation until
1986. As one Federation director put it,
In the sharpest analysis the functions of Federation, historically and factually,
are two—one, the solicitation of money and the other the distribution to the
beneficiary societies of the money collected… All the work of this Board, and
all the other problems of Federation with which this Board has had to cope are
incidental with one or the other of [these] two main Federation functions.31
According to Thompson, complex organizations cope with environmental uncertainty by
establishing buffering mechanisms to smooth input and output transactions. As I will
demonstrate, Federation’s early decades were characterized by recurrent financial
uncertainty. Its trustees and staff responded by pushing for the release of bylaw constraints
that impeded the establishment of buffer mechanisms. On the input side, these mechanisms
included the accumulation of a permanent endowment fund to hedge against fluctuations in
the business cycle. On the output side, they included means for effecting economies in
Federation agencies, for instance by eliminating duplicative activities and coordinating the
joint purchasing of supplies and services. Finally, Federation elites were perennially
concerned with limiting or managing fundraising competition. As large numbers of Jews
moved from Manhattan into suburban Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties,
Federation expanded its physical reach in an attempt to preempt the development of
alternative fundraising appeals in those localities. Consequential decisions regarding Israel
and Federation’s disposition towards other political matters were driven largely by a
concern with fundraising—in particular with defending Federation’s extractive machinery
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against the threat of its more ideological competitors. By the late 1960s, however, linkages
to a burdensome health and medical complex had rendered Federation’s distribution
mechanism otiose, setting the stage for a series of contentious episodes by emergent actors
that catalyzed new and enduring institutional modifications.
Shifting the focus of analysis from leadership characteristics to organizational
imperatives, institutional change, and contentious politics enables us to investigate how and
under what conditions cultural trends or the personal inclinations of a leadership cohort are
instantiated in self-reproducing institutions. When cultural shifts coincide with lasting
institutional modifications, the former are often retroactively interpreted as having caused
the latter. By examining the explicit logic of institutional decision-makers, we can
circumvent this “selection bias” and identify the mechanisms that translate opinion trends
into enduring patterns of institutionalization at certain points in time but not at others. By
drawing on historical institutionalist concepts, I hope to make sense of the way formidable
organizations like Federation can accumulate power “accidentally” through a contingent
evolutionary process. They also provide a useful framework for clarifying the relative
significance of “structure” and “agency” in driving institutional change at particular
historical junctures.

Expansion Through Buffering: The Federation’s First Three Decades
The process I trace in this and the following section spans the period from
Federation’s founding until its formal merger with the United Jewish Appeal of Greater
New York in 1986. That merger represented the consummation of the crisis-driven
expansion that typified Federation through most of its existence as an independent
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organization. The crises in question were fiscal, a combination of increasing institutional
membership (the number of Federation agencies increased from two dozen in 1916 to
more than 130 by the 1980s) and expanding agency budgets driven by rising salary
demands and technological innovations in the medical field straining Federation’s annual
fundraising capacities to their limit. These stressors were further compounded by
resurgent competition for Jewish philanthropic dollars and—beginning in the 1970s—
rising inflation and debilitating government budget cuts. To cope, Federation
progressively rolled back most of the antiexpansionary safeguards that had been
constitutionally enshrined by its founders and elaborated a series of input-output buffers
that drastically widened the scope of its institutional infrastructure.
Until the onset of the Great Depression, total annual allocations to Federation’s
constituent agencies ballooned at a staggering rate, increasing by around $2 million over
just seven years. The increase in allocations (as would be the case throughout Federation
history) was a function of agency demand, which Federation’s fundraisers then struggled
to meet on a yearly basis. At the same time, surpluses were not substantial enough to
guarantee peace of mind, and even if they had been, initial Federation bylaws capped the
total amount of permissible reserve funds at $1 million. Board minutes from the first
decade reflect a recurrent sense of fiscal emergency. This was due in part to the fact that
Federation—because of a fluke of timing the year it was established—became locked in a
cycle of allocating funds on the basis of anticipated income from future drives rather than
income already collected. At the beginning of each fiscal year, agencies submitted budget
requests that were invariably larger in aggregate than they had been the year before, and
with few exceptions the Distribution Committee (DC)—Federation’s most influential
75

body, responsible for allocating collected funds—endorsed an increase. The result was a
yearly scramble not only to collect on unpaid subscriptions but also to seek out new
sources of revenue lest Federation default on its obligations to the agencies. A second
design flaw underpinning Federation’s recurrent anticipated (if not actual) deficit
spending, and thus driving its expansion, was the perennial absence of agency
accountability when it came to participation in Federation’s fundraising drive. In 1924,
past Federation president Arthur Lehman warned that unless every trustee assumed
personal responsibility for fundraising, “the collapse of the Federation seem[s]
imminent.”32 Occasional committees were appointed to devise new ways of pressuring
agency trustees into pulling their weight. Having sloughed off their in-house fundraising
organs, agencies were in thrall to Federation for sustenance, yet unwilling to commit
resources to the collective effort.33
The original Federation blueprint called for a “board of delegates, representing the
constituent societies, whose function would be the raising of moneys for Federation.”34
But this body never materialized. Instead, Warburg repurposed the bureaucracy of
volunteer solicitors he had assembled for the JDC’s wartime emergency drive. The
inaugural Plan of Canvass included the compilation of a list of 50 separate trades with
names of potential “trade captains” for each, as well as five to six thousand Jewish
shopkeepers doing business in the city: “A military structure was evolved. Felix Warburg
became the General. Under him were the Colonels (Trade Chairmen), and under them
were Captains and Lieutenants.”35 By 1921, this apparatus was formalized as the
Business Men’s Council (BMC), a quasi-independent agency with paid staff whose top
leadership echelon was a direct feeder into Federation’s presidency. The BMC steadily
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expanded the scope of its canvassing in response to growing agency demands, and in so
doing forged the elite and grassroots connections that would tie Federation to Jewish civil
society and economic life in New York. The number of separate trades the BMC
canvassed rocketed from 50 in 1916 to 164 by the 1942 campaign season.36 To the
original trades organization was added a boroughs organization to harvest donations from
neighborhood institutions like community centers and synagogues, in addition to a
division devoted to canvassing labor unions and fraternal lodges. Finally, scores of
women’s auxiliary societies were solicited on Federation’s behalf by the women’s
division. The involvement of the women’s division in systematic on-the-ground
canvassing by electoral district was first recommended in 1926 at a special meeting of the
BMC convened “to solve in its larger aspects the Federation problem of moneyraising.”37 The DC had imposed its first across-the-board cut on agency allocations that
year, and new fundraising methods were exigent. By 1942, 90 women’s teams had been
organized, bringing in around 15 percent of Federation’s total revenue.
The chairman of the 1943 BMC may only have been exaggerating somewhat
when he called New York’s Federation “at once the greatest fund-raising organisation in
the world, and the poorest organisation—dollarwise.”38 His comment referred to the
relatively diminutive asset base of Federation some 25 years after its formation. At the
time, Federation’s total reserves were $3 million, more than half of which had been added
over the previous three years as the result of a major bequest. As the chair noted, this
amount was enough to sustain the beneficiary agencies for a mere five months. Exactly a
decade later, when Federation’s annual budget exceeded $14 million, total accessible
reserves stood at $9.3 million—an amount that longtime executive vice president Joseph
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Willen called “a pathetically small amount for an operation as large as Federation’s.”39
Yet a tedious process of crisis-driven constitutional amendment was necessary to lay the
foundation for even these limited sums. As mentioned, prior to 1921 Federation was
prohibited from accepting bequests. During a debate over whether to discard that
prohibition, one Mount Sinai trustee spoke in opposition:
Federation was originally formed as a collecting and distributing agency. It is
inevitable that these functions should be extended by reason of the system of
distribution adopted, but there should be a limit to such extension... To allow the
accumulation of a large trust fund would give too much power to a comparatively
small group.
As it frequently would, this objection, typically registered by the larger institutions, lost
out to another rationale, on which the majority of Federation-dependent agencies were
agreed: “Emergencies constantly arise... [and] Federation has no reserve to meet [them].
It has no capital funds from which to borrow and replace.”40 The motion to accept
bequests was approved, but it was not until the recession year of 1925 that Federation
could lawfully transfer them to a reserve fund. Active solicitation of bequests—key to
building a permanent endowment—was disallowed until 1947. Beyond financial
insecurity, it was also the increasing availability of large bequests that catalyzed a series
of debates about Federation’s asset cap, which was raised several times and eventually
dropped altogether.
Buffering on the input side began in the early 1920s, but it took a catastrophe on
the order of the Great Depression to catalyze serious action on output-end buffers.
Federation first incurred an unliquidated deficit in 1930. At the January 1931 board
meeting, a trustee raised an issue that would later fall under the rubric of communal
planning: “when economy was of prime importance, it would be to the advantage of
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Federation to look into... [whether] considerable sums might be saved through the
elimination of institutions whose work has become obsolete, or through the
amalgamation of those societies whose activities overlap.”41 Compulsory disaffiliation
from Federation was rare. The first recorded instance was in 1943, when a Harlem
community house called Federation Settlement was removed from the rolls due to
changing demographics in the neighborhood. But from the Depression onward, the Board
assumed increasing responsibility for recommending agency mergers and disaffiliations
on an advisory basis, and the DC began wielding the power of the purse to signal
priorities and shape a communal agenda based on commissioned research into the needs
of Jewish New Yorkers.
The first systematic survey of New York Jewish charity and its deficiencies,
conducted by the Bureau of Jewish Social Research, was released on the eve of the 1929
stock-market crash. Among its major recommendations was a merger of the New York
Federation—which at the time operated only in Manhattan and the Bronx—with its smaller
Brooklyn counterpart. The Jewish population of Brooklyn was rapidly expanding, but
because a preponderance of the city’s wealthy Jews were clustered in Manhattan, the
financial capacity of the Brooklyn federation to cope with new demand was inadequate. A
committee set up to consider the survey issued its first report on October 28, 1929, four days
after Black Tuesday. “It was very clearly indicated by the survey that ultimately the Jewish
philanthropic problem of New York would have to be handled as an entity,” the report
noted. Extraction and distribution could no longer be considered without regard for the total
ecosystem of Jewish charity: “A merger of the two Federations should result in substantial
economies in administration and fund raising costs.”42 As it happened, the merger was
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called off after it was revealed that the Brooklyn federation owned several highly leveraged
properties that would have saddled the New York Federation with an impossible debt
burden. The merger was finally effected in 1943, when fiscal considerations once again
weighed in favor of consolidation.
Beyond Brooklyn, the fiscal emergency of the Depression years prompted an
extraordinary application of Federation pressure on inefficient or outmoded agencies to
disband or consolidate, making mincemeat of the vaunted autonomy principle. In October
1931, the DC issued an extraordinary resolution calling on affiliated agencies, “in view of
existing economic conditions,” to examine their operations and ensure “that every
activity not absolutely vital and essential to its work shall be eliminated.” In addition, it
instructed the survey committee to report on which agency activities could be “fairly
eliminated or curtailed without serious impairment of the good of the community.43 At
the November meeting, it was announced that the Hebrew Technical School for Girls was
engaged in duplicative activities. An expert inquiry had found that similar work was
being performed by the New York City public school system, and the Hebrew Technical
School was accordingly disbanded through voluntary consultation. Several other agencies
also agreed to shutter or amalgamate with larger organizations: Surprise Lake Camp, a
Federation mainstay in the recreational field, canceled its winter camp, and the Friendly
Home of the Hebrew Orphan Asylum, the Columbia Religious and Industrial School, and
an institution called The Settlement were all likewise eliminated from Federation’s
payroll.
As the Depression deepened, calls for more drastic restructuring were heard at the
highest levels. The DC’s 1932 budget cuts (for the following year) were the most severe
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in Federation’s history. That year, unusually, the DC returned a minority report. Given
the failure of a number of organizations to voluntarily disaffiliate at Federation’s
suggestion, the report lambasted business-as-usual budgeting: “it would seem
unreasonable to continue the same procedure in the hope that somehow the development
of more effective and more economical programs will occur spontaneously.”44 The
Report called for immediate changes to the bylaws enabling Federation “to eliminate the
institutions which have outlived their usefulness.” At a special board meeting later that
month, several past Federation presidents and longtime executive Solomon Lowenstein
endorsed the basic thrust of the minority report. The bylaw committee was tasked with
drawing up practical recommendations. In January 1933 it returned a report calling for
the “adoption of a new constitution and bylaws for the Federation which would give it
[the] power of community planning in addition to the authority to raise and disburse the
funds.”45
Though the called-for constitutional overhaul never occurred, Federation did
establish a series of committees that ultimately consolidated into the Communal Planning
Committee (CPC). Second only to the DC in influence, the CPC was charged with
studying and issuing recommendations on “the need for the undertaking of new functions
whether by existing or newly created agencies” and “the exclusion of any Beneficiary
Society from Federation”—tasks Federation would pursue with vigor as its fundraising
capacity was threatened by new realities arising from Jewish class mobility and
suburbanization.46 Like most of Federation’s organizational infrastructure, the CPC was a
product of efforts to surmount endemic financial insecurity through buffering. As we
have seen, the formidable apparatus that Federation’s early leadership bequeathed to
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future generations was not a consciously architected undertaking. Rather, it emerged
from a series of improvised additions and modifications—what historical institutionalists
would call a process of layering and conversion—implemented in response to unforeseen
environmental threats. In the remaining sections, I examine a second, multifaceted, and
highly consequential aspect of Federation’s effort to safeguard its core technology:
competition control and preemption. In addition to institutional expansion of the type
discussed above, the attempt to manage competition drove both geographical and
political-ideological expansion. Although these two vectors of growth were intertwined,
feeding on similar underlying sociodemographic changes, I examine them separately to
tease out the mechanics of how Federation translated shifting external parameters into
new policy and infrastructure.

“The Federation Menorah Follows the Jewish Population”: Competition, Crisis,
and Geographical Expansion
By the 1930s most of the hundreds of thousands of Jews who flooded the Lower
East Side of Manhattan between 1881 and 1924 had evacuated the overcrowded
tenements in search of more commodious accommodations in the outer boroughs. By
1975, a little under a quarter of New York Jews had relocated to the affluent suburbs of
Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties.47 Federation’s executive vice president,
Joseph Willen, reflected on the changing demographics in 1953: “[W]e must seriously
consider,” he said, “that the wealthy Jews no longer live in Manhattan. From the point of
view of money raising, this indicates a thoroughly new kind of organization.”48 In fact,
the geographical shift mirrored a concurrent shift in the occupational and class structure
of Federation’s donor base. With the Depression recovery underway, the BMC took stock
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of “the changed sources of our income, from families of great wealth and long
endowment, to men of high income, charitable impulses, but relatively little capital.”49
By the mid-1940s, the preponderance of Federation income was no longer derived from
bankers and stockbrokers but from the soft-goods and consumer-goods industries.50 In
addition, old fortunes had been decimated, and the historically high tax burdens
underwriting New Deal state expansion now precluded new ones from accruing at the
same time that they grew the middle class and incentivized tax-deductible charitable
giving.51 By the 1970s, Federation’s director of community services could report that “the
middle class population in a sense comprises the largest group of those our agencies
serve.”52
The changing class structure of American Jewry in general and New York Jewry
in particular had noteworthy implications for Jewish identity and politics. Historians,
pundits, and social scientists have extensively cataloged the mid-century cultural
gyrations of American Jews, generative as they were of new political and analytic
paradigms, from ethnic pluralism and neoconservatism to the increased visibility of the
Holocaust in American life.53 But in order to fully appreciate the impact of shifting class
relations and cultural sensibilities on Jewish communal life, we need to examine the way
these changes were mediated by preexisting institutions and, through that mediation,
translated into new social and political forms. In this section, I trace how fiscal
imperatives linked to the population movement of the Jewish middle class motivated
Federation’s geographical expansion, thus illustrating one specific mechanism through
which the changing class structure of New York Jewry was transformed into a material
infrastructure.
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Jewish population movement was on Federation’s radar from the time the merger
with Brooklyn was first debated. The Brooklyn organization was absorbed in 1943,
effectively solving the problem of interborough redistribution created by the
misalignment of wealth and population. But no sooner was the Brooklyn-bound exodus
of Federation’s low-income beneficiaries addressed than another exodus began, this time
affecting its upper-middle-class donor base. Eli Lederhendler describes the demographic
trends as follows:
Jewish population in the city [i.e., the five boroughs] declined rather steeply
from 1957 to 1970, showing a loss of almost 900,000, or about 42 percent. Some
(though clearly not all) of this decline may be accounted for by a shift from the
city to the three suburban counties of Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk, where
Jewish population rose during those years from 465,000 to 770,000.54
As early as 1954, a Federation-commissioned report from the Survey Institute of New
York alerted the Board to these trends.55 Significantly, the main purpose of the study was
not to assess demographics but to evaluate Federation’s fundraising methods. One trustee
summarized its basic thrust: “We will have to give more attention to these suburban
Jewish givers and we will have to devise new techniques. It is a perfectly safe prediction
that this decentralization [of population] forecasts higher costs for Federation as time
goes on.”56 The “costs,” he explained, were the investments Federation would have to
make to “organize innumerable communities” in order to recapture its newly mobile
donor base. The primary instrumentality for executing that project would be the CPC.
Although New York’s first Young Men’s Hebrew Association (YMHA) predated
Federation by about 40 years, the YMHA model emerged under Federation as the favored
neighborhood-based alternative to the inner-city synagogue. For the mostly religionaverse first generation of Federation elites, the YMHA transcended New York’s myriad
84

(Jewish) sectarian divisions and offered an inclusive ethnic space from which to
administer Federation’s various Americanization and economic-uplift programs. Beyond
the essential service functions involved, financing new YMHAs—later called Jewish
Community Centers (JCCs)—allowed Federation to lay claim to the loyalties, and thus
the donations, of a neighborhood’s Jewish population. In 1948, Federation laid out a plan
(only partially implemented) to invest $8 million in the erection of 13 new JCCs across
the city. The chair of the CPC later enunciated “the principle that every area with at least
25,000 Jewish residents requires or is entitled to a center.”57 As the class composition of
New York Jewry changed, the benefits of JCCs were rearticulated to accommodate
middle-class sensibilities, emphasizing recreation and Jewish identity formation over
Americanization and human services. Thus when it came to expanding Federation’s reach
beyond the five boroughs, the JCC was a natural choice of outpost atop which to raise the
Federation flag. Or as one CPC chair quipped, “Reversing an axiom of diplomacy, ‘the
flag follows trade’—the Federation Menorah follows the Jewish population.”58
Preempting competition from spontaneous Jewish self-organization in the suburbs
was among the chief justifications for Federation’s geographical expansion in the postwar
decades. Soon after receiving the Survey Institute report described above, the CPC drew
up plans for a Federation movement into Mount Vernon, then the largest Jewish suburb
in Westchester County. “For some months,” the CPC chair noted, the committee “had
been discussing the ‘out of the city movement’ to the suburban areas” and in that light
recommended the admission of the independently organized Mount Vernon YMHA to
Federation’s payroll. “Its Board constitutes the leadership in the Jewish community in the
Mt. Vernon area,” he said, and “there was growing talk of the need for Jewish Welfare
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Funds. It [is], therefore, essential that Federation be represented on the local level in
communities such as Mt. Vernon” to ensure “the much desired effect of helping to
forestall the possibility of the development of [an independent] Jewish Welfare Fund.”
The formal CPC report was even more explicit:
[T]here is a decided middle and upper income Jewish population movement to
Westchester County as well as to other suburban areas... Unless [their]
institutions become part of the overall Federation family, it is likely that the
financial strength and leadership will be deployed exclusively to local, or
perhaps even to new county-wide organizations, which would cause incalculable
harm and loss of financial support to all existing Federation institutions.59
This was not an anomalous rationale, especially when it came to contemplating major
Federation investments in physical facilities outside the five boroughs. A 1970
presentation on contemplated building projects on Long Island was dominated by fiscal
considerations: “[The] fund-raising potential of Federation in Nassau cannot be
developed without concrete evidence of wide-ranging Federation services in Nassau... If
the New York Jewish community, the basis of Federation’s support, moves into Nassau,
and into Westchester, at anywhere near the expected rate, then Federation’s financial
basis is alarmingly threatened.”60 Similarly, when the West Suffolk YMHA submitted a
$4.5 million request to finance the purchase of a former junior-high-school campus, they
foregrounded the project’s fundraising implications: “We feel that if the West Suffolk Y
purchased the Green Meadows Junior High School, it... would offer Federation a more
visible presence in Suffolk which would result in raising participation considerably in the
[Federation annual] appeal in Suffolk.”61
At the same time, Federation moved to bring its proliferating community centers
under hierarchical control. In 1956, the CPC proposed a $6 million campaign for new
86

community centers. The yearly maintenance costs of the proposed centers stood to place
a significant recurring burden on Federation’s budget. To offset the costs, the CPC report
called for Federation to create a central board with extraordinary powers to liquidate
existing community centers in transitional neighborhoods and relocate their resources to
JCCs in emerging Jewish population centers. The internal debate over what became the
Associated YM-YWHA’s of Greater New York would prefigure a much fiercer debate
some years later regarding Federation’s overarching policy toward constituent agencies
located in neighborhoods that had become less Jewish (and more African American and
Puerto Rican) over time. The JCC proposal faced stiff opposition from the Board’s oldline Reform assimilationists, who likened the specifically Jewish community centers to
southern racial segregation. One longtime trustee, Benjamin Buttenwieser, accused the
CPC of “indulging in a sort of sociological ‘apartheid.’” Nonetheless, the proposal was
approved, and the new Associated YM-YWHA’s was created with a mandate to “own the
properties of all the [Jewish Community] Centers with the right to transfer title of any
specific property” in the event of a center’s demographic obsolescence and reallocate the
proceeds to “the development and construction of a new community center in a different
area.”62
Expansion and “flexibilization” of JCCs were not the only mechanisms
Federation elaborated to track the decentralizing Jewish population of greater New York
and solder it back into a unified community of giving. Another mechanism was the
Religious Affairs Department (RAD), created in 1952, and its offshoot, the Commission
on Synagogue Relations (CSR). A 1956 report of the CPC subcommittee on JCCs
identified “the all-inclusive synagogue-center” as Federation’s chief competitor for the
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donations of New York Jewry.63 Insofar as synagogue-centers provided many of the same
amenities as JCCs and commanded the resources of Jewish suburbanites, their
proliferation threatened to exacerbate Federation’s fiscal crisis.64 The RAD was created
to effect links with individual synagogues and execute “a continuous program of
education stressing... that Federation does in fact represent the total Jewish community”
and that “the entire community must recognize the basic values and inherent virtues of
the work of Federation.” A 1957 RAD report identified “opening synagogues for fundraising” as among the department’s basic functions.”65 The CSR was subsequently spun
off to “create a synthesis between synagogue and Federation leadership” by means of a
speakers bureau, seminars for rabbis on Jewish social work, and regular luncheons and an
annual assembly where Federation staff and synagogue personnel could exchange views.
By 1982 the CSR reported “the involvement of 300 synagogues throughout the
metropolitan area”—another broad expansion of Federation’s institutional and
geographic scope.66
Of course, fiscal imperatives were not the only justifications offered for the
expansions described above. Concerns with Jewish identity formation and the essential
service requirements of new communities were also articulated, and the relative
significance of these various rationales is not always evident. However, Federation’s
expansion in the 1950s and 1960s must be viewed in light of its endemic financial
insecurity, bordering on crisis, which persisted in spite of the economic boom of the
postwar period. Limited buffering may have kept Federation afloat through the
Depression years, but the basic institutional separation between fundraising and fund
spending—and the norm of autonomy that militated against a complete Federation
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takeover of beneficiary agencies—meant that the Board could exert only limited control
over operating costs. Salaries and expenditures on new medical technologies constituted
the bulk of the annual increases in agency requests. Federation incurred regular deficits
throughout the 1950s—$141,000 in 1952, $733,000 in 1953, and $1.3 million in 1954—
all of them liquidated using bequests and reserve funds, thus inhibiting the accumulation
of Federation’s endowment. As dire as it was, Federation’s own financial position
occluded a deeper crisis in the constituent agencies themselves, most of which received
only a portion of their operating revenue from Federation. “Since 1921,” reported the DC
in 1956, “there has been only one year out of the 34 in which, if one takes all the societies
as a whole, there has been a surplus... In every other year, there was a deficit... the largest
being somewhat over $2,000,000 in 1954–1955.”67 At the same time, donations were not
meeting demand. Against a Jewish population of 1–2 million, the number of New
Yorkers giving to Federation remained practically stagnant during Federation’s first half
century: 80,000 items received in 1966 as compared to 70,000 in 1917. Federation’s total
income from donations and other sources in 1953–54 was $13.4 million, which in 1970
dollars is about $19.5 million; its 1969–70 income was $20.5 million. That represents an
inflation-adjusted increase in annual donations of only $1 million in 15 years. Over the
same period, Federation’s annual expenditures increased by $2.6 million in inflationadjusted dollars—outstripping intake by more than 150 percent. Consequently, schemes
to extract additional contributions from trustees and the public were regular features of
Federation board meetings during the postwar decades.
One major factor preventing Federation’s total collapse in those years was the
growth of city, state, and federal government spending on health and human services.
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Having entrenched itself—materially, through its expansive infrastructure, but also in the
psychology of Jewish New Yorkers—on the basis of its role in executing crucial welfare
functions, Federation was well positioned by the 1950s to channel this wave of
government spending into its pool of fungible assets. According to Liebman, between
1921 and 1946, the proportion of total agency budgets supplied by Federation’s annual
allocation remained constant, at around 43 percent. From there it began to decline: “By
1951, the percentage was 30 per cent; by 1961, 17 per cent; and by 1971, 5 per cent.”68
This radical drop-off mostly reflects the astronomical surge of government funding for
medical care in particular. By 1981, when the Reagan administration began to
systematically roll back spending on welfare programs, Federation agencies were
receiving $579 million in government funding. This income stabilized Federation for a
time but also created dependencies that would prove catastrophic during the later period
of urban crisis and neoliberal retrenchment, ultimately catalyzing Federation’s merger
with the UJA. The boom in postwar social spending also affected the attitude of
Federation’s upper-middle-class donor base toward privately funded programs for the
poor. “In the last twenty years we have been engulfed by a welfare [tax] burden,” wrote
Federation president George Heyman in 1971. He reported “a fast-growing reluctance on
the part of the [Jewish] community to accept a broad obligation in the general field of
welfare to the detriment of Jewish causes.”69 Heyman was channeling the cultural
backlash of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Jewish popular opinion began to exhibit
a rejection of liberal universalism and a turn toward a more insular Jewish identity
politics. The particular set of mechanisms that conspired to translate this trend into a
concrete pattern of institutionalization is the subject of the next two sections.
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Federation’s Norm of Political Neutrality
For almost 60 years, Federation scrupulously avoided intervention in the political
controversies that divided American Jewry, in particular the question of Zionism. By the
early 1970s, however, a drastic transformation was beginning to affect Federation’s
identity and priorities. By the 1980s, it could be accurately described as a Zionist
organization with a strong survivalist orientation and activist approach. What accounts
for timing and rapidity of Federation’s identitarian turn? Answering this question requires
an examination of the factors underpinning the initial continuity and durability of
Federation’s “non-ideological” character in the decades prior to its metamorphosis.
Despite regular fluctuations in the mainstream popularity of the Zionist movement, a
combination of institutional inertia and core fundraising imperatives ensured that
Federation remained “above politics” long after the establishment of Israel and the
normalization of Jewish nationalism in the American public sphere.
Historians have documented the non-Zionist orientation of early Reform Judaism
and of much of New York’s German Jewish upper class prior to World War II. So too
have they chronicled attempts by insurgent Zionists, mostly of eastern European
background, to contest the dominance of the AJC over communal affairs and national
representation.70 In 1922, Zionist organizations invited Federation to participate in a
democratic congress intended to select Jewish representation at the Paris peace
conference. According to meeting minutes, the invitation was read aloud to the Board of
Trustees and declined without debate or recorded explanation.71 Twenty years later,
Federation was once again asked to participate in a nationwide democratic body, the
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American Jewish Conference. It was at this conference, initiated in January 1943, that
Zionist leader Abba Hillel Silver mobilized a cross section of American Jewry in support
of the establishment of a “Jewish commonwealth” in the Holy Land. Once again,
Federation declined to attend. After some deliberation, the Board unanimously approved
a resolution stating, “As Federation is limited in its interests to philanthropic activities in
New York and does not participate in activities relating to other problems, it begs to state
that it cannot take part in the election organization of the American Jewish
Conference.”72
By most accounts, American Jewish enthusiasm for Zionism and Israel waxed and
waned during the first half of the twentieth century, peaking at points of international
crisis and declining when security threats to overseas Jewry appeared to diminish.
Abraham Duker glossed the dynamic this way:
Until World War I, Zionism in the United States was a small movement of
immigrants... It rose to mass movement during World War I under the
leadership of the Brandeis group and because of the wartime exigencies. It
declined in the inter-war period because of the movement to the suburbs,
expansion of Jewish home ownership in the cities, the notion that the Jewish
problem could be solved by relief and reconstruction, the split within the Zionist
movement, and the depression of 1929. It rose again during World War II
because of the Hitler danger and the failure of rescue. Again, it declined
following the establishment of the State of Israel both because of ideological and
tactical difficulties as well as social changes within the Jewish community.73
Yet until the 1970s, the programming, advocacy, and fundraising strategy of the New
York Federation eschewed any engagement with these waves of popular enthusiasm.
Unlike other federations, New York maintained a strict institutional separation between
domestic and overseas operations until 1973, when it agreed to a joint fundraising drive
with the UJA. The UJA was created in 1939 through a consolidation of the United
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Palestine Appeal (UPA), the official Zionist fundraising organ, and the JDC, itself an
earlier amalgamation of organizations providing relief and development aid to European
Jewry. The story of the UJA’s creation, in which the New York Federation played an
important role, is illustrative of Federation’s calculations when it came to collaboration
with Zionist groups in the first half of the twentieth century.74
Following the Kristallnacht pogrom of November 1938, the League of Nations
established a committee to address the German Jewish refugee flood. The league
subsequently made contact with American Jewish organizations in an attempt to
coordinate a national fundraising campaign on behalf of resettlement efforts in the United
States. At their board meeting on December 15, Federation trustees entertained the idea
of participating in a one-time joint emergency drive alongside the JDC and UPA by
providing the bulk of the campaign’s fundraising staff and directorship. Joseph Willen,
then head of the BMC, offered the decisive argument in favor of collaboration:
“Federation has a large effective money-raising machinery which has been built up over a
period of twenty years,” said Willen.
By refusing to participate in the joint drive as proposed... Federation would in
effect be asking the overseas group to build up its own records and machinery at
a cost of about $300,000 to $350,000 to compete with its own group, and the
community will then be supporting two large well organized, effective moneyraising machines, one for local appeals, and one for overseas work, both
working in competition with each other, and both appealing to the same
groups.75
This would pose a “very grave danger... and a much greater loss to Federation, and would
result in greater chaos than the plan suggested by the Committee.” Other prominent
figures seconded Willen’s rationale, and the Board ultimately approved the joint drive
over objections that it would cut into Federation’s bottom line and harm local service
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agencies.76 As an outcome of this process, the JDC and UPA merged to form the United
Jewish Appeal.
A year later, with the plight of German Jewry undiminished, the question of a
second joint drive—and the specter of permanent collaboration—was brought before
Federation. Willen again offered the decisive argument, this time against Federation
participation:
Since Zionists are a part of UJA [a merger] would mean that Federation would
be precipitated into the midst of highly controversial issues. While there is a
certain amount of disagreement in the community as to the relative necessity of
supporting hospitals, etc., these discussions do not generate passions. They do
not involve individual’s (sic) fundamental philosophy of life. The Federation
“package” is accepted. The package of Federation-overseas-Zionism has
nowhere near similar acceptance. Since no one can ever apologize for a partner
in a joint fund-raising enterprise, this would make it necessary to become the
strongest advocate of Palestine ideology, since this is the weakest link..77
The true nature of the controversy presented by Zionism was elucidated in a circulated
memo authored by Willen and Lowenstein, which noted that “a small, but influential
minority [of Federation donors] would doubly resent being forced to give to an effort
which includes Palestinian objectives.”78 The merged campaign was voted down, though
Federation agreed to allow some of its fundraising personnel to take a leave of absence to
assist the UJA in its 1940 emergency drive.
This ideological antagonism between certain anti-Zionist trustees and donors, on
the one hand, and the Zionist organizations on the other, led Federation fundraisers to
keep their distance from the UJA and from Zionist projects in general. A few years later,
in 1942, the brewing conflict between Zionists and anti-Zionists within the upper
echelons of American Jewry exploded into open confrontation with the formation of the
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American Council for Judaism (ACJ), established by a group of rabbis and laymen in
protest of the Reform movement’s official endorsement of political and military Zionism.
With several Federation trustees among its leading lights, the ACJ reaffirmed the
programmatic antinationalism of classical Reform Judaism and posed a formidable but
ultimately losing political challenge to the establishment’s growing embrace of ethnic
statehood as a solution to the crisis of European Jewry.79 The drama of this moment
likely reinforced fundraisers’ sense of Zionism as a third rail threatening to fragment
Federation’s donor base and thereby extended the shelf life of Federation’s norm of
ideological neutrality somewhat beyond its natural expiration date.
As it turned out, Willen was mistaken in his calculation that by temporarily
loaning Federation’s fundraising personnel to the UJA, the Board would preempt the
development of a unified overseas competitor. The UJA’s annual campaign thrived
amidst the wartime emergency situation and the subsequent escalation of conflict in
Palestine. By 1954—a time when the political situation in Israel had stabilized—the
Survey Institute report on fundraising found that Federation’s “receipts per Jewish person
are improving, but... still far below UJA—about $37 per 1,000 Jewish persons for
Federation, and about $69 per 1,000 Jewish persons for UJA.”80 In 1944, the BMC
organized the Committee on Multiplicity of Campaigns to investigate the surge of
competing Jewish appeals that had inundated New York City. The BMC noted a
“growing clamor on the part of workers in the trades against the multiplicity of
campaigns” that were making demands on them. That clamor had “taken the form of
threatening to form in their respective industries trade chests which would have one or
possibly two drives a year, to include all causes, local, national, overseas and patriotic.”
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In other words, Federation was being threatened with obsolescence by way of the selforganization of its donor base. As a solution, the committee recommended consolidating
all domestic Jewish causes under Federation’s auspices. Yet the notion of merging with
the UJA was never seriously contemplated. Rather, the BMC warned Federation not to
“become involved with political ideologies or overseas questions... [I]t should maintain
its attitude of standing above and apart from the battle, so that all Jews, whether Zionist
or non-Zionist... [feel] welcome under Federation’s banner.”81
As a result of this disposition, Federation experienced a shock to its 1947–48
campaign. In November 1947, following the adoption of the United Nations partition
plan, intercommunal warfare broke out in Palestine. In May 1948, David Ben-Gurion
declared Israel’s independence and interstate war commenced, ending with the defeat of
the Arab armies and the creation of the Palestinian refugee crisis. The impact on
Federation was primarily psychological. Fundraising intake in 1948 was about $400,000
in excess of the previous year’s campaign. Nonetheless, Victor Riesenfeld, head of the
BMC’s operation for 1947, reported that
the UJA campaign had a very profound effect on us. We found that many people
gave their all to the UJA, nothing to us; others, feeling that a historic moment
had arrived for the Jews in Palestine, decreased their subscriptions from
previous years. We found this in some entire industries and we felt that
psychologically it would be a great blunder if we tried to tamper with it.
Riesenfeld recommended a “large public relations program with adequate financial
backing” because “we are in a struggle, a great struggle to capture the minds of people”
in the face of the UJA’s “highly emotional appeal.” A resolution was adopted calling for
affiliated societies to publicize their association with Federation and to stress its
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communal paramountcy. Federation’s public-relations department was authorized to
intensify its propaganda activities.82
The stress on Federation from UJA competition continued over the next decade,
which as I described earlier was characterized by a rising sense of financial alarm. Boardmeeting minutes from the period reflect a keen awareness by Federation staff and trustees
that Federation’s “non-ideological” orientation had now come to represent a fiscal
liability. At his retirement, Willen, reflecting on his decades of service, reminded the
trustees of
the price we pay for separation [from UJA]. It is reflected in our overhead. It is
reflected in the highly competitive communal picture that now confronts you...
Federation could, if it wishes, consider the cost of separation a luxury that can
no longer be afforded and contemplate a merger with the U.J.A. now. [Yet] I
know of no person that advocates such a merger.83
Indeed, the commitment to maintaining a distance from politics extended beyond the
question of cooperation with the UJA. In 1966, the independently established JCRC of
New York applied to Federation for financial support. Members of the JCRC, whose role
was to express a consensus Jewish viewpoint on New York political affairs, included the
AJC, the American Jewish Congress, Hadassah, the Jewish Labor Committee, the
rabbinical bodies of the three major Jewish denominations, and other nationally
prominent groups. Federation rejected the application, citing the recommendation of the
CPC:
It is the opinion of the [CPC] that it would be harmful, divisive and disruptive if
Federation were to inject itself, as Federation, into a situation which is bound to
be tense on many occasions, and which is certain to have questions raised on
which there will be deep disagreement, not only among the agencies involved,
but also among the members of the Federation Board of Trustees.84
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Without Federation’s support, the JCRC withered.

The Structural Origins of Federation’s Ideological Transformation
As we have seen, popular Jewish enthusiasm for Zionism and Israel, however
intense, did not spontaneously translate into modifications in Federation’s basic
orientation prior to 1970. The norm of ideological neutrality was not abandoned under
fiscal and competitive pressures so long as alternative mechanisms were available to
alleviate those pressures (namely, the buffering mechanisms described above). Liebman
correctly notes that Federation’s reorientation “would not have succeeded ten years
earlier” and that “[c]onditions in 1969 made Federation policy ripe for change, partly due
to... changes in government funding and demography” and partly due to the identitarian
turn and political reaction of the late 1960s.85 However, he stops short of theorizing a
coherent relationship between political and social parameters, emergent cultural norms,
and the personal agency of Federation elites (not to mention the outside activists whose
catalytic role I describe below). In order to understand the precise mechanism at work,
we need to identify how structural transformations created and empowered new actors,
how those actors exerted pressure on the Federation as an institution, and how it
happened that Federation was uniquely vulnerable to pressure at the moment it was
targeted. In what follows I pursue the argument that Federation’s survivalist turn was a
product of two intersecting dynamics: the growing obsolescence of Federation’s medical
and social-services-oriented distribution apparatus and insurgent attacks on Federation by
a set of newly mobilized protest actors. These actors—left-wing students, yeshiva
principals, and right-wing militants—demanded that Federation adopt a new core
98

technology at exactly the moment that Federation elites were deeply ambivalent about the
way forward from obsolescence.
The change in Federation’s priorities beginning around 1970 is apparent from its
allocations data. In 1960, medical and geriatric centers accounted for 43.8 percent of
Federation’s total spending on beneficiary agencies; by 1980 that figure had declined to
18.4 percent and continued its descent into the 1990s. Over the same period, the portion
of Federation dollars going to community centers almost doubled, from 16.4 percent to
30.3 percent. So too did the allotment for Jewish education, although the allocations data
understates the increase as it excludes the multimillion-dollar Jewish Education
Endowment Fund created in the late 1970s. Funding for Jewish camps also increased,
while the share going to human services remained steady, though diminished from its
historic high at Federation’s inception. The new functional field of community
development came into existence in the 1980s, as contingent subventions for the New
York JCRC and a sprawling network of neighborhood community councils, representing
about 1 percent of total allocations, were made permanent. After refusing to subvent the
JCRC in 1966 on the grounds of maintaining Federation’s ideological neutrality, the
Board reversed course in 1974, citing “a new set of circumstances.”86 The reinvigorated
JCRC, now properly funded, went to work on “problems of synagogue desecration and
anti-semitism, and the Arab boycott,” in addition to planning Israel’s thirtieth-anniversary
celebration and lobbying for a Jewish heritage week in New York public schools.87 In
1975, Federation approved a $20,000 subvention to the national JCRC’s Middle East
Special Fund, an elaborate pro-Israel media campaign intended to counteract “the vast
expenditure of Arab funds in this country for purposes of public relations.”88 By 1982,
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Federation’s chief executive was unveiling programs like Teens for Israel, an intensive
Jewish education program that culminated in a summer tour of the Holy Land.
To understand the etiology of this transformation, we need to turn our attention to
Federation’s core technology. When Federation was established, a full 80 percent of its
allocations went to medical care and human services for the poor and working class. That
hospital care represented Federation’s single largest expense was the product of a
particular historical legacy. During the nineteenth century, pervasive anti-Jewish
discrimination and Christian missionary activity in church-run medical facilities
motivated the construction of Jewish hospitals in cities with significant Jewish
populations.89 At the turn of the century, New York’s major Jewish hospitals, Mount
Sinai and Beth Israel, continued to serve indigent Jews free of charge and derived most of
their income from private benefactors. As major competitors in the field of Jewish
charitable solicitation, these and other medical facilities naturally became Federation
beneficiaries after 1917. In financial terms, the magnitude of their activities dwarfed
other Federation agencies.
Had Federation come into existence after the development of the modern welfare
state, it is conceivable that we would not have seen the subsequent pattern of
disproportionate capital investment in the medical field. Federation’s provision of annual
maintenance funds—basic operating expenses—to its constituent agencies was just one
aspect of its core extraction and distribution technology. A second aspect, particularly
relevant to Federation’s medical complex, was raising money for capital expansion,
repairs, and improvements to facilities and technology—a task undertaken through its
semiregular building-fund campaigns. Supplemental to the maintenance campaign,
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building-fund drives occurred periodically, spanned multiple years, and specifically
targeted megadonors who had already fulfilled their annual obligations to Federation.
Building-fund records illustrate the degree to which medical and related services were
privileged. A cumulative summary of the 1945 and 1949 building-fund campaigns as of
September 1953 shows that, of the $15.6 million distributed, $10.4 million, or 66 percent,
went to hospitals and social services.90 If we include care of the aged and infirm, the
proportion increases to 82 percent. The decade-long City of Life building fund was
initiated in 1961 and ultimately raised over $150 million for three hundred separate
capital projects requested by the agencies and approved by the CPC. Hospitals received
the vast majority of the proceeds. Two years into the City of Life fund, disbursements to
hospitals and medical care constituted 84 percent of the total.91
Conditions at Federation’s birth thus created a path-dependent pattern of
investment in new and improved medical facilities, which in turn compounded yearly
maintenance costs for this particularly expensive field. Put differently, historical legacies
created and reinforced a fusion of Federation’s distribution technology with an evergrowing medical apparatus that was difficult to downsize. Over time, however, a
contradiction began to surface between Federation’s massive expenditures on health and
human services and its basic bylaw mandate to collect and distribute funds “primarily for
the benefit of the Jews of the City of New York.” As described earlier, the class
composition and spatial distribution of Jewish New York had undergone dramatic
changes by the 1950s. Neighborhoods in which millions of dollars had been invested in
Jewish facilities had since become predominantly non-Jewish. In his 1957 retirement
speech, Willen foreshadowed the difficulties that would arise from this transformation:
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As night follows morning, we know that when Jews leave a neighborhood, they
are replaced by Italians, Negroes and Puerto Ricans... Now if you cannot move
the institutions, and Lord knows you cannot move big hospitals, the Jewish
community and our institutions shall inherit the Negro and Puerto Rican
problem... Our hospitals, for instance, have Jewish Boards, Jewish doctors,
sitting on top of a caseload of Negro and Puerto Rican ward and O.P.D. patients.
This is socially not good.92
The growth of government funding for hospitals and casework agencies helped facilitate
the racial integration of Jewish institutions, as receipt of government money was
conditioned on nondiscriminatory intake policies. As an emeritus member of the Board,
Willen reflected some years later on the glaring functional and spatial mismatch between
Federation’s service institutions and the needs of the Jewish population: “Unless there is
a deep change in structure,” he said, “Federation will continue to vote budgets as they
have been voted in the last few years, using up 100 percent of legacies and dipping into
reserves. The crisis of Maintenance”—what he called its “written-in obsolescence”—“[is]
the most fundamental problem confronting Federation.”93
These trends finally came to a head in 1968 when the CPC released a highly
consequential report entitled “Goals and Purposes of the Federation Jewish
Philanthropies.” As Liebman notes, the report bore the mark of the assimilationist camp
within Federation—an outlook whose overall influence on the culture of American Jews
had been on the wane for some time. It diagnosed the fundamental problem facing
Federation’s core technology and located its roots in the sociodemographic changes
mentioned earlier:
Jews in New York, through succeeding generations, have become Americanborn, well educated and economically sufficient... With the migration of Jews
from old and established Jewish neighborhoods to new and suburban
communities, a number of Jewish institutions have been relocated or created
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anew. Federation has, in the main (except in some hospitals), operated on the
assumption that its services and facilities should follow the Jewish population.94
Rather than extending this logic to its unhappy conclusion—the liquidation of crucial
medical and social-service agencies operating in African American and Hispanic
neighborhoods—the report recommended eliminating the bylaw mandate to primarily
serve the Jewish population. The authors called for Federation to continue operating in
predominantly non-Jewish communities on the basis of the Jewish principle of tsedakah
(charity) and stipulated that beneficiary agencies servicing majority non-Jewish clientele
could remain affiliated as long as they were seen as serving the “total community
interest.” Most alarmingly to some survivalists, the report recommended non-Jewish
representation on agency boards, an apparent concession to African American
community-control initiatives.
The Board of Trustees debate over the CPC report spanned almost a year, and the
report continued to stir up controversy throughout its multiple revisions and
resubmissions. Backlash began even before the formal debate commenced. In 1968, the
annual maintenance campaign preemptively integrated the report’s basic ethos into its
public relations materials. Campaign chair Robert Bernard reported the resulting “fear
and trepidation felt [by fundraising staffers] in espousing” the “theme of the Campaign…
which details Federation’s obligation to the total community.”95 Some months earlier,
Bernard had been publicly denounced by a New York rabbinical association for
suggesting to the New York Times that Federation intended “significantly to broaden and
expand specific services for non-Jews” and “do everything possible to meet urban crisis
needs.”96 Within Federation, the strongest dissent came from the RAD, which maintained
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direct links to the synagogues and was thus arguably better positioned to channel the
feelings of the “Jewish street” than the Board as a whole. Resenting the idea of
Federation expenditures on non-Jews, chair Matthew Levy presented the views of the
department: “Federation... is not luxuriating in a millennium… [T]here are many unmet
needs of many Jews of the community.” He lambasted the CPC for succumbing to the
“fear of having the false label of chauvinism pinned upon Federation’s philanthropic
garments, or worse yet, the unfair stigma of bigotry or racism leveled in its direction” and
warned that Federation’s submission would abet “the aggrandizement of aggressive
charlatans of color [community-control advocates] and the further degradation of an
apprehensive Jewry.” Were Federation to allow non-Jews to serve on agency boards, “the
general purposes of these agencies [would] be totally vitiated... subvert[ing] the
traditional and necessary concept and organization of the Federation of Jewish
Philanthropies.”97
These discussions occurred against the backdrop of the racial controversies then
troubling Jewish New York, particularly the Ocean Hill-Brownsville labor dispute.
Pitting the mostly Jewish United Federation of Teachers against African American
community-control advocates, the strike occasioned accusations of antisemitism and
fueled white racial resentment among Jews.98 Trustees from inner-city institutions that
served an increasingly African-American clientele, and who therefore felt deeply the
effects of the urban crisis, disputed the views articulated by the RAD. One such trustee,
Justine Wise Polier, scolded Levy for “wav[ing] the flag of the difficulties of community
control in the schools” in service of opposing the humanistic recommendations of the
report.99
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In the end, the Board approved a compromise version of the report: “It retained a
statement that agencies with nonsectarian clients and programs could remain affiliated
with Federation, but deleted references to non-Jews serving on agency boards. In general,
it eliminated the nonsectarian emphasis.” As Liebman correctly notes, “The report never
played a major role in Federation’s life. The language of its final draft was so vague that
it could serve many purposes.”100 Indeed, the protracted deadlock of the episode and the
equivocation of the final report reflected the obsolescence of a Jewish distribution
technology now chronically linked to non-Jewish communities by way of an enormous
sunk investment. Further exacerbating the atmosphere of crisis was a series of economic
shocks. Nationally, rising inflation and an overall slowdown in postwar economic growth
culminated in the stagflation of the 1970s. Despite the success of the 1967 and 1968
maintenance campaigns largely on the back of the Six Day War, the 1969 campaign took
a severe blow as a result of the Tax Reform Act passed that year, which limited charitable
deductions for high-income earners. In 1970, the Board faced a $2.4 million deficit, 50
percent larger than any deficit in Federation’s history. The chair of the development
committee, in charge of boosting Federation’s endowment, sounded the alarm: “in the
last dozen years we have invaded legacies every year in amounts ranging from 11% to
100%. In each of the last eight years, more than 50% of the legacies had to be invaded for
maintenance purposes.”101 The DC warned bleakly of “a plateau of contributions in good
times.” With no internal consensus on the very purposes of Federation and a fiscal crisis
on a scale not encountered since the Great Depression, a series of contentious
mobilizations was able to affect Federation’s trajectory decisively.
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Contentious Actors Mobilize against Federation
In January 1970, six months after the “Goals and Purposes” report was approved,
Federation president George Heyman recounted to the Board that the Organization of
Yeshivah School Principals had voted at a meeting at the New York Hilton Hotel on
January 7 to “picket Federation in the event that the request from this organization of
Federation for a $6,000,000 subsidy for purposes of Jewish education as conducted by
the yeshivas, was not met.” The organization presented its demands to Federation and
was declined on the grounds that Federation was then engaged in a study of Jewish
education in New York and that any new allocations would have to await its results. On
January 8, the group picketed the Federation building, and Heyman reported that they
planned to do so again in the near future.102
The question of Jewish education had been bubbling to the surface for some time.
Historically, Federation considered Jewish education peripheral to its mandate to serve
the needy and feared the consequences of intervention into religious controversies. Its
allocation to education remained small until the 1970s, and nearly all of it was channeled
through the Board of Jewish Education, a vestige of the Kehillah that provided
consultation and pedagogic aid to schools. Requests to hand money directly to religious
schools were rejected. In 1952, Federation approved the creation of the Functional
Committee on Jewish Education, but it did not become active until 1969. Comparative
national statistics show that federations across the country were contributing an average
of only 7–8 percent of the operating budgets of Jewish schools in 1958.103 By 1994, this
figure averaged 12.5 percent but went as high as 50 percent in smaller communities. In
New York, Federation’s allocation for education as a percent of its total expenditure was
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around 9 percent by the early 1990s, significantly lower than the national average of 25
percent but double what it had been in the 1960s.104 In 1964, Levy reported that the RAD
had been “confronted with the issue of direct Federation support of the Yeshivoth, the allday school... [I]t has been pressed upon us by a number of contributors to our federation,
actual and prospective, by several existing day-schools, and by the Rabbinical Council of
America and the Union of Orthodox Congregations.”105 As of 1970, however, the only
concrete action had been the commissioning of the study mentioned above.
A month after the yeshiva principals’ demonstration, Federation received a letter
from 40-year-old Rabbi Meir Kahane, head of the Jewish Defense League (JDL).
Modeled on black-power organizations, the JDL was a militant Jewish-power group that
emerged from the white backlash to the Ocean Hill-Brownsville controversy.106 Kahane
and the JDL declared their intent to protect Jews from antisemitism—including “black
antisemitism”—“by whatever means necessary.” As Lederhendler shows, Jews began
participating in “white flight” about a decade later than other white groups, leaving them
more exposed to the inner-city racial uprisings of the 1960s.107 In 1968, for example,
three Jewish yeshivas were damaged in arson attacks (Federation helped pay for the
repairs). Kahane’s organization drew upon the sense of Jewish working-class insecurity
arising from this situation.108 Kahane’s letter to Federation made several demands,
including 1) a commitment from Federation to fund only Jewish projects; 2) increased
allocations to Jewish education, specifically day schools and yeshivas; 3) funding for
armed patrols to guard Jewish institutions from crime and violence; and 4) the
democratization of Federation’s decision-making process. As with the yeshiva principals,

107

Federation politely declined Kahane’s demands, and the JDL picketed Federation
facilities.109
A longer campaign of agitation and violent intimidation of Federation and its
employees by JDL members continued throughout the year. Reflecting back, Heyman
recounted the “difficulties caused Federation by the Jewish Defense League, including
the active harassment engaged in by that organization at fund-raising functions, the
occupation of places of business of officers of Federation, and seizure of the executive
offices of Federation.” He accused Kahane of publishing “utterly untruthful material
about Federation” and reported the JDL’s continued demands “that Federation grant them
substantial funds to equip their paramilitary organization,... that the Board of Trustees of
Federation be elected at a general meeting of the Jewish community, and that funds be
allocated by Federation for action on behalf of Soviet Jewry.” Federation ultimately took
out a restraining order against Kahane. In response, the JDL filed a countersuit against
Federation for $1 million, alleging that Federation had used that amount—supposedly
contributed by JDL members—in violation of Federation’s charter: “JDL contends that
since the activities of some of the Federation agencies include service to non-Jews,
Federation is making incorrect representations to members of the Jewish community who
are contributors to Federation.”110
On the heels of the first JDL protest, a college group calling itself Concerned
Jewish College Youth wrote Federation to request $250,000 for a new organization they
described as a foundation that would conduct Jewish activities on campus—newspapers,
courses in Jewish history, and other cultural activities. At a meeting in April with
Sandford Solender, Federation’s chief executive, the students upped their demands to
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include money for political mobilization on behalf of Soviet Jewry, which Solender
informed them “was not an appropriate use of Federation funds, within the framework of
its present authorizations.” They then demanded “the appointment of a ‘citizens’
committee’... to conduct a public investigation of Federation, and whether it was
sufficiently democratic, with the results of such an investigation to be binding upon
Federation.” Solender responded that the reasonable parts of their demands would be
addressed, but the more outlandish elements were out of the question. “The result of all
this,” reported Heyman,
was that on Wednesday, April 8th, approximately a hundred of these college
students came to the Federation building and occupied Administration Offices,
seized control of the switchboard, blocked access to the corridors, occupied staff
offices, prevented staff members from reaching their offices, and prevented
people who had business here from getting into the building.111
Solender offered peaceful discussion if the students would agree to cease disruption, but
the occupation lasted six hours and the police were called in to clear the building. Fortyfive students were arrested. Although Federation declined to press charges, “a number of
traditional rabbinical organizations... sent lengthy telegrams to Federation expressing
great displeasure” with the decision to arrest the protesters.112
Thus it was that after a half century of relative quiet, Federation became the target
of multiple episodes of contentious mobilization, all within the first four months of 1970,
at a time of deep uncertainty regarding Federation’s goals and purposes. Not only were
the contentious episodes highly concentrated, but three unrelated groups articulated a
shared set of demands bearing directly on Federation’s existential crisis. The overlapping
demands were for increased funding for Jewish education, support for Soviet Jewry, and
communal democratization. In short order, two of these three demands were met, with the
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contentious episodes explicitly cited as a rationale. The third, communal democracy, was
addressed through elite co-optation and Federation’s decision to engage the field of
community relations. By the late 1970s, two leaders who emerged from the Jewish
student-protest movements—Jonathan Braun and Malcolm Hoenlein—headed
Federation-funded agencies. In addition, the embrace of Jewish education and ideological
politics coincided with the beginning of efforts to slough off responsibility for medical
agencies located in African American and Hispanic neighborhoods.
Federation’s wholesale transition flowed quickly from the contentious episodes
described above. In June, just two months after the student occupation, the CPC
presented the Board with a proposal to establish and subvent the Jewish Association for
College Youth (JACY) to the initial tune of $75,000. The creation of JACY was a
fulfillment of protesters’ demands insofar as its function was to supply Federation grants
to college students for independent Jewish projects. As a prologue, the CPC’s David Sher
expressed “revulsion” at those student radicals who “seize buildings, rough up deans, and
thunder nonnegotiable demands in expression of their anger” and assured the Board that
in making our proposal we are not bowing to any pressure, and we are not
truckling to any threats. We do think we will be helping the decent but troubled
moderate students, the vast majority of whom do not want to be violent, but
neither do they want to be silent. To help them from being terrorized by those
hell-bent to destroy democratic society, we will be trying to help provide a
robust, democratic alternative.113
In other words, to save the moderate students from the campus radicals, the radicals’
demands had to be met, and JACY was the vehicle. The annual subvention to JACY
increased to $300,000 by 1981, when it was admitted as a permanent beneficiary agency
and formally merged with the Bnai Brith Hillel Foundation. During the initial debate over
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the merits of JACY, James Ross, chairman of the New Leadership Division, remarked
that the JACY proposal could “be summarized in just one word, i.e., ‘survival.’ Survival
of Federation definitely, survival of Judaism probably, and possibly somewhat overdramatic, survival of America itself.”114
In October 1970, the same year the occupations took place, the newly activated
Functional Committee on Jewish Education issued a major report recommending
Federation double the amount of money allocated to Jewish education from $1.1 to $2.47
million. The report also called for the creation of a $25 million Jewish Education
Endowment Fund as part of the next building-fund campaign, enabling megadonors to
circumvent the allocations process and give directly to education. Several trustees
objected on the grounds that other agencies were seeing budget reductions. Some
questioned the importance of Jewish education, as well as the report’s reference to Israel
as one the cornerstones of Jewish identity. Rabbi Hyman Chanover, a consultant to the
Functional Committee, replied by citing “about 38” separate studies conducted by the
American Association for Jewish Education establishing the connection between Jewish
education and “the production of Jewish identity.” He added that adolescents who visit
Israel return “captivated... by the social, economic and spiritual or moral climate of the
land” and that “with very few exceptions whatever drama, whatever mystique, whatever
significance is found in American-Jewish life today, it stems largely from what is
happening in Israel.”115 When questioned as to where the additional funds would come
from, Heyman noted,
there have already been received several increases by some large donors to the
current Federation Campaign merely on the basis of the presentation of the
Functional Committee’s report. And it has appeared... that there is a large body
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of the Jewish constituency which considers its feelings toward Federation to be
measured almost entirely in terms of the support that Federation is willing to
give to Jewish education.116
The report was sent to the Executive Committee for revision and a slightly modified
version was approved, retaining the various survivalist rationales that linked Jewish
education to the long-term prospects of both Federation and American Jewish life
generally. In 1972, the recommended Program Development Fund for Jewish education
was established at the marginally reduced level of $20 million, bearing the slogan “It’s
Not Just Education. It’s Survival.”117 In the early 1980s, the fund was offered challenge
grants totaling $20 million over 10 years by oil millionaire Joseph Gruss, stimulating the
accelerated collection and distribution of money for education.
The question of Soviet Jewry surfaced in mid-1971, when Federation was
approached by the American Conference for Soviet Jewry and asked to join the UJA in
establishing a New York chapter. Just a year after Solender told student protesters that
Soviet Jewry was “not an appropriate use of Federation funds,” the CPC’s Sher made an
impassioned pitch, comparing the Soviet Union’s treatment of Jews to Nazism. Sher
moved that Federation supply $40,000 to the proposed organization. During the debate,
longtime trustee Leonard Block questioned the CPC’s motives. “It had been bruited
about,” Block said, “that the activity of a particular rabbinate member [Kahane] is a
strong factor in the interest to have Federation participate… leadership recognizes that he
has developed a following, and it is theorized by some that Federation will do the same
thing, but in a more dignified manner.”118 Indeed, some trustees invoked the JDL’s
hijacking of the Soviet Jewry issue as a reason weighing in favor of Federation’s
participation. Citing the activism of college youth, one trustee argued that declining to
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participate would “go a long way to creating... an organizational generation gap.”
Another pointed to “an undercurrent of animosity toward Federation in the general
community because of the large proportion of Federation funds that are being directed to
non-Jewish causes” and asked the Board to recall that “some months ago a police escort
was necessary” to protect board members from “Jewish youth who were vehemently
protesting” against Federation’s neglect of Soviet Jewry. President Heyman boiled the
question down to “whether or not Federation wishes to be the address of the Jewish
community for Jewish communal needs” and warned that if Federation did not approve
the proposal, “the possibility is very great that there will be another Federation in its
place.” The motion passed.119
In one short year, then, a spate of contentious episodes, combined with
overlapping systemic crises, forced Federation to cross the survivalist Rubicon and
embrace a new role as an activist proponent of ideological politics. By 1978, the CPC
announced that it had “re-evaluated the excerpt from the Goals and Purposes report” and
“concluded that Jewish-sponsored, Jewish-operated agencies serving a predominantly
non-Jewish group is unsound from a broad community viewpoint.” Rather, Federation
should focus on “cultivating Jewish identity and participation, as well as strengthening
the security and continuity in New York City of the Jewish middle-class.”120 As
mentioned earlier, this monumental transition occurred amidst a fiscal crisis unmatched
since the Depression. Federation deficits throughout the 1970s were exacerbated by
conservative retrenchment in government welfare spending. The Nixon administration’s
cuts to federal Medicaid expenditures coalesced with New York City’s 1975 budget
crisis, causing a sharp reduction in government transfers to Federation’s medical
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complex. The State Emergency Finance Control Board, established to impose austerity
budgeting on New York City in the wake of the crisis, required the city to eliminate $800
million in spending over three years, of which a significant proportion was taken from the
Department of Social Services. In the following years, the CPC forcibly disaffiliated the
Bronx-Lebanon Hospital and the Joint Diseases-North General Hospital on the grounds
of changing neighborhood demographics and unsustainable expenditures, followed
shortly thereafter by disaffiliation with the Jewish Hospital and Medical Center of
Brooklyn. Federation thus averted a financial crisis and the obsolescence of its
distribution technology by breaking the historically inherited dependence on the medical
complex and forging new linkages to Jewish identity production and political advocacy.
Notably, this shift took place several years before Federation formally merged with the
UJA in 1986 and forthrightly embraced a pro-Israel identity and advocacy role. After the
transition to survivalism assumed an air of inevitability, the only remaining objections to
the UJA merger were logistical and easily surmounted. Arguments about the fiscal
benefits of merger that had been mooted for decades were embraced without hesitation.

The Federation Embraces Israel
My examination of 70 years of monthly board-meeting minutes reveals that,
outside of discussions of fundraising competition from Zionist organizations, the subject
of Israel and Zionism rarely surfaced prior to Federation’s joint campaign with the UJA
in 1974 (which became a full institutional merger in 1986). The extent of this lacuna is
striking. Despite Federation’s prominent role in New York’s Jewish community at the
time Israel was established, there is no sign that the Board marked the occasion. Searches
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of the 1948 and 1949 meeting minutes return no instances of the word Israel outside
references to the Beth Israel and Israel-Zion hospitals. The word Palestine appears just a
few times, mostly in reference to the United Palestine Appeal. The lacuna persisted until
the Six Day War of June 1967, when Federation issued a brief public statement about
Israel: “In this time of crisis and danger, the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New
York urges its membership to support to the fullest the Israel Emergency Fund of the
United Jewish Appeal.”121 The Board also authorized the purchase of $1 million in Israel
bonds as a show of solidarity. Federation’s maintenance campaign for 1967–68
commenced in the fall, several months after the war, and benefited handsomely from the
prior UJA mobilization. By January 1968, the campaign had raised $17 million, up from
$15.7 million at the same time the previous year. It was well acknowledged by Federation
trustees and staff that Israel was the reason for this bounce. At the same time, there was
no direct conflict or competition between the UJA and Federation in 1967–68 and
therefore no pressing need for a discussion about the fiscal benefits of a merger.
The same was not true of the 1973–74 fiscal year. Egypt initiated the Yom Kippur
War in October 1973, only a few days after the official launch of Federation’s fall
maintenance campaign. Federation and the UJA had agreed decades earlier to coordinate
their annual campaigns in order to avoid direct competition—Federation in the fall and
UJA in the spring. When the war broke out, Federation president Laurence Buttenwieser
met with UJA officials and secured their agreement to prioritize both the Federation
campaign and the UJA’s emergency cash collection drive. Buttenwieser noted that “any
analysis of the mood of the New York Jewish community... would indicate that it would
not be possible at this time for the United Jewish Appeal to honor its agreement with
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Federation relative to conflicting campaigns.”122 A single joint campaign was conceived
to raise $280 million—$250 million for the UJA and $30 million for Federation—
combining the lay, professional, and technical capacities of the two organizations under
the chairmanship of the UJA’s executive director, Ernest Michel. The Board unanimously
approved this temporary merger, and a year later, when a permanent combination was
proposed, the only objections that remained were on the basis of logistics.
The merger pulled up a dike that had been blocking Federation’s inundation with
pro-Israel ideology for more than a half century. Four months after the merger was
approved, Frederick P. Rose, the new president of Federation, delivered his inaugural
speech on the interdependence of Israeli and American Jewry:
These two cannot any longer be separated. They are part and parcel of one
another. Just as Israel and the American-Jewish community are interdependent,
so are the needs of this Campaign. There cannot be, there must not be, any
separation between the two. We must never, never permit it… Federation
leaders and supporters must accept the fact that Israel today is a central force in
our Jewish life… and that a strong and vital Jewish community at home is as
essential to our survival as Jews as the American Jew is to the State of Israel.
At the same meeting, Solender related that Federation staffers “who were previously
concerned essentially with Federation are learning more about Israel by participating in
missions to Israel. This process of interpretation is going on constantly.” 123 In November,
Buttenwieser, now chairman of the joint campaign, recounted a UJA-Federation board
meeting “held in Israel, where the members were briefed by the Prime Minister of Israel,
by the former Prime Minister, by a large group of government officials.”124
Missions to Israel for big donors became a regular aspect of Federation’s
campaign strategy, as did meetings with high-level Israeli officials. In 1977, a private
dinner with Moshe Dayan raked in $8 million in pledges. The Prime Minister’s Mission
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to Israel became the official launch event of the yearly joint campaign. Donors toured
Israel and the Occupied Territories and then announced their pledges to Federation from
the Knesset floor. By 1984 it was reported that “close to 1,000 people” attended Israel
missions each year. (They eventually introduced a Polish component, allowing missions
to visit Auschwitz en route to Israel.) Federation fundraising became so enmeshed with
Israel that on the day the Camp David peace accords were signed in 1979, Solender
marked them with a note of concern:
In many ways, the great events of today pose a serious challenge to our
campaigning. Now that peace with Egypt is at hand, the impression may gain
currency that the threat of attack from Israel’s enemies has lessened and the
sense of emergency has eased, with the result that support of the Campaign may
slacken and the intensity of the campaigning to which we are accustomed may
decline.125
A month later, the campaign chair noted, “One of the problems confronting many
solicitors seems to be the question of peace. They are finding resistance to giving to the
Campaign because Israel is supposedly at peace.”126 Israel’s invasion of Lebanon two
years later occasioned a renaissance in giving.
During the Lebanon war, unpopular in both Israel and the Jewish diaspora,
Federation missions to the region facilitated personalized transmission of the Israeli
government narrative to the Board of Trustees. Stephen Peck, the chairman of the joint
campaign board, reported back on the 1982 Prime Minister’s Mission to Israel and
Lebanon, describing the “hospital in Tel Aviv where Lebanese patients receive the same
fine medical attention as do Israelis; the warm reception extended to the Mission by
Lebanese civilians; the 60,000 Lebanese children who have already received polio shots
administered by Israeli medical personnel.” During his visit to the Lebanese city of
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Sidon, Peck “observed all classes of people engaged in commerce, shops and cafes open
for business, with Israeli soldiers moving freely among the Lebanese” as they attempted
“to restore a sense of municipal government to the Lebanese citizens.” Finally, he
described “the well-equipped, air-conditioned P.L.O. [Palestine Liberation Organization]
bunker, where Israeli soldiers found evidence linking the P.L.O. with world-wide terrorist
organizations.”127 In addition to sending its own donors and staff, Federation partnered
with the JCRC to organize “fact-finding missions” for non-Jewish “opinion molders” like
Bayard Rustin and Bishop Joseph Sullivan of the Brooklyn archdiocese.
The merger with the UJA thus engendered elite linkages and, as Solender put it, a
“process of interpretation” that rapidly converted Federation into an Israel advocacy
organization. Prior to 1974, UJA was principally an overseas financial conduit and lacked
anything resembling the vast domestic infrastructure of Federation. The fusion of the two
and the ideological assimilation of Federation’s board members, coupled with the
expansive physical infrastructure that Federation had evolved in previous decades,
created a set of ideal conditions for the effective reproduction of an Israel-oriented
political subjectivity in subsequent generations of New York Jews.

Conclusion
This chapter has identified the fiscal dynamics that drove transformations in the
structure, mandate, and ideological orientation of New York’s Jewish federation over a
seventy-year period. While unique in certain respects, the story of Federation’s long-term
development carries important implications for our analysis of the American Jewish
ethnopolitical field and U.S. ethnic politics more generally. First, it highlights the
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conjuncture of historical circumstances out of which the federation model emerged and
demonstrates how a chain of unintended consequences flowing from that model’s core
institutional imperatives functioned to generate the underlying reproductive infrastructure
of twentieth-century American Jewish politics. The federation model was shaped by
intra-Jewish class and political conflicts at a moment of acute humanitarian crisis—what
historical institutionalists would call a critical juncture. In the absence of U.S. welfare
state institutions, Jewish elites drew on the prevailing technocratic ethos of the
Progressive Era to develop private instruments of social amelioration. Having established
themselves by mid-century, federations were well positioned to channel the subsequent
wave of government spending on medical and human services, which both ensured their
continued solvency and facilitated their eventual transition to an ethnic-identitarian model
of institutional reproduction. Federation’s endemic fiscal crises, which ultimately helped
fortify its powers, reveal exactly how fragile and uncertain its developmental process
was. That it overcame those crises was largely a matter of timing and contingency, as was
the emergence of the federation model to begin with.
Second, the history narrated above illustrates the relationship between the
symbolic and material aspects of ethnopolitical organizations—one in which the
symbolic mediates the material by conditioning perceptions of what is or is not a
principled, legitimate, or worthwhile investment. Although symbolic mediation plays a
role in all economic transactions, the decision to invest in an ethnopolitical organization
is inextricably bound up with ideological constructions of groupness. As discussed at
greater length in the next chapter, the federation project was initially designed to advance
the assimilationist politics of the German-Jewish elite. To symbolically legitimize what
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was objectively an instrument of upper-class social control, federation officials employed
a discourse of philanthropic neutrality and Jewish ethnoreligious obligation. Federation’s
image as a “non-ideological” (that is, non-Zionist) organization was considered
symbolically necessary in order to capture what at the time were New York’s most
significant Jewish resource pools. Over the postwar decades, that understanding grew
increasingly inconsistent with the reality of the UJA’s successful fundraising operations,
which were rooted in the post-1948 symbolic power of the State of Israel. Yet Federation
leaders were unwilling to discard the entrenched institutional norm against “ideological”
politics so long as they could continue to elaborate new buffering mechanisms and
capture emerging resource pools—through links with War on Poverty programs and
expanded fundraising infrastructure and geographic scope—and as long as Federation’s
distribution mechanism remained intact. It was only with the breakdown of that
mechanism in the late 1960s and the simultaneous emergence of new contentious actors
and identitarian megadonors that Federation finally underwent its ideological
transformation.
The fact that New York’s most powerful Jewish organization remained detached
from pro-Israel fundraising and advocacy long after the overwhelming majority of
American Jews (and federations) had embraced pro-Israelism demonstrates the potential
“stickiness” of institutionalized norms and the combination of material imperatives and
collective agency required to dislodge them. Thus, while I argue for the primacy of the
economic in the last instance, we should not underestimate the autonomous power of
ideology to shape institutional strategies and priorities. Often, ideological commitments
are so central to an organization’s mission that its leadership would opt for bankruptcy
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over ideological compromise. The next chapter documents a protracted struggle by the
American Jewish Committee to insulate its ideological commitments from the material
pressures exerted by the federation system. While it was ultimately forced into
compliance through economic coercion, and chose adaptation over continued (and
potentially fatal) resistance, the conflictual process through which the AJC sought to
preserve its autonomy fundamentally reshaped the American Jewish ethnopolitical field.
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Chapter 3
Genesis of the Community Relations Dynamo:
Coercion and Consensus in the American Jewish Ethnopolitical Field, 1920-1967
Introduction
The diffusion of the federation model to Jewish population centers throughout the
U.S. during the first half of the twentieth century had unforeseen consequences for
Jewish institutional power and ethnic representation. What was framed as a practical
solution to problems of a logistical nature in the philanthropic sphere in fact laid the
institutional groundwork for American Jewish public life in the postwar period. As
federations strengthened their extractive capacity, expanded their geographic reach, and
deepened their symbolic legitimacy in communities, they emerged as local power centers
that united bearers of economic and cultural capital, systematically tapped the Jewish
grassroots, and directed enormous financial flows to a variety of local, national, and
international causes. The expansionary dynamic described in the previous chapter, in
which New York’s federation assumed ever greater local planning powers in an attempt
to boost efficiencies and minimize duplicative activity, was mirrored on a wider scale
starting in the 1920s, when an array of national Jewish organizations began to seek
financial allocations from local federations and welfare funds. This chapter focuses in
particular on the “big three” Jewish community relations agencies—the American Jewish
Committee (AJC), the American Jewish Congress (AJCongress), and the AntiDefamation League of B’nai B’rith (ADL)—which turned to federations for material
support in their battles against an insurgent anti-Semitism in the 1930s. In an attempt to
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control costs and promote institutional accountability, federations launched a coordinated
campaign to impose regulatory discipline on the national defense agencies, setting off a
power struggle that would decisively shape the emergent field of American Jewish
politics.
In line with Bourdieu’s concept of the field as a terrain of struggle, this chapter
begins by tracing the birth of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field to the end of the
nineteenth century, when mass Eastern European immigration triggered polarizing intraJewish class and ideological conflicts. It then reconstructs the decades-long process
through which federations, in regular confrontation with competing organizations over
money and jurisdiction, developed an institutional infrastructure that transformed their
initial resource advantages into a tool of collective power. Coordinating their activities
through the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJF), the federations
leveraged their local fundraising monopolies to exert economic and symbolic coercion
against the more recalcitrant national community relations agencies, forcing them into a
centralized configuration they had long resisted. Over the course of that struggle, the
national agencies strengthened their extractive and grassroots capacities even as the
federation system emerged as the field’s undisputed hegemon. By the eve of the Six-Day
War, a powerful community relations dynamo had coalesced, unified under the aegis of
the federation-linked National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC) and
capable of sustaining unsurpassed levels of grassroots political mobilization.
In addition to furnishing the institutional structures through which American Jews
would influence U.S. foreign and domestic policy for more than thirty years, the
conflictual processes described in this chapter helped adjudicate fundamental ideological
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differences regarding the very definition of Jews as a collectivity. While a soft
commitment to “Jewish peoplehood” forms part of the common sense of organized
American Jewish life today, the existence of a political collective known as the
“American Jewish community” was more controversial during the field struggles of the
1930s and 1940s. For American Zionists, Jews constituted a worldwide political people
whose security and self-determination required its democratic organization into an
international federation of Jewish parliaments. Consequently, Zionist organizations called
repeatedly for the election of an American Jewish congress that would assume
responsibility over Jewish public affairs activities. For this reason, the anti-nationalists of
the American Jewish Committee saw the language of “community” as a cover for a
pernicious majoritarianism that threatened to snuff out dissenting opinion and impose the
Zionist conception of Jewish collective identity. The AJC thus resisted anything it
perceived as national centralization, including the federations’ drive for functional
integration in the community relations sphere. By forcing the AJC into the NCRAC
framework alongside its ideological nemeses, the federation system established the
institutional vehicle through which the ideological construct of the “American Jewish
community” would achieve hegemonic status. Contrary to descriptions of American
Jewish institutional life as the quintessence of voluntarism, this chapter brings to light the
pattern of material coercions that bound the “community” together and shaped its
political character for decades to come.

The American Jewish Ethnopolitical Field: Origins and Actors
In Chapter 1, I drew on the work of Pierre Bourdieu to elaborate the concept of an
“ethnopolitical field,” a metaphorical space of contestation between differently endowed
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positions competing over symbolic claims to legitimate public representation (ethnic
representational capital). Non-racialized U.S. ethnopolitical fields have historically
coalesced through mass migrations and the subsequent processes through which ethnic
subjects are positioned in the U.S. racial field and political economy. The empirical
inhabitants of “dominant” and “dominated” positions in a field, the distribution of
different varieties of capital between them, and the observable tendencies of a field at any
given conjuncture are always, in Bourdieu’s conception, the products of specific histories
and antecedent conditions. We can therefore make sense of the salient features of an
ethnopolitical field in the present through an historical investigation of the conditions of
migration, which shape the initial coalescence of the field, and the subsequent histories of
struggle between competing positions, which are shaped by power distributions in
superordinate fields (economic, political, etc.). In this section, I describe the
circumstances under which intra-Jewish conflict over public representation first came to
assume the character of a Bourdieusian field struggle and identify the initial constellation
of positions that emerged from that struggle in the early decades of the twentieth century.

Antecedents of the Field: Central European Migration and Institutional Development
The first Jews arrived in North America in 1654 when a convoy of Sephardic
refugees disembarked at what was then New Amsterdam. But it was only in the wake of a
mass migration from German-speaking lands in the nineteenth century that American
Jewry acquired the demographic heft necessary to sustain institutional development on a
national scale. Central European Jewish migration started around 1820 and accelerated
following the abortive European revolutions of 1848.1 Surveying scholarship on the
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period, Ira Katznelson relates the markedly successful socioeconomic incorporation of
nineteenth-century “German Jews” (as they are known) to their “organic links to more
general German population movements.”2 Early German-Jewish migrants generally
integrated with German gentiles with whom they shared a language and cultural
patrimony that effectively subsumed religious difference, insulating them from the
sharper edges of American racialization. In the ethnically segmented national economy of
the period, access to broader German-American markets eased Jews’ path into the middle
class. The timing of migration dovetailed fortuitously with the migrants’ concentration in
mercantile occupations. Jewish peddlers trekked across the continent just as the
nineteenth century “market revolution” was enhancing commercial opportunity along the
frontier. “The modest size of the German-Jewish contingent, its dispersion, and its
interstitial role in urban and frontier economies in an age of economic liberalism
facilitated its entry into an emancipated world virtually free from legal disabilities.”3
Some achieved moderate prosperity in textile production and retail, while a small handful
accrued prodigious wealth as financiers of the nation’s expanding railroad system. By the
outbreak of the Civil War, entrepreneurial Jews had established 160 communities with at
least one Jewish institution, laying the demographic foundations for subsequent
institutional developments.4
The economic mobility and relatively smooth social integration that GermanJewish immigrants experienced shaped the ideological character of their institutions.
American Jewry’s first national (later international) organization was B’nai B’rith, a
fraternal order established in 1843 on the model of the Odd Fellows and the German
Gesellschaft der Freunde, along with its women’s counterpart, the True Sisters. Like the
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early Reform Movement, whose Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC, est.
1873) was the first national Jewish congregational association, B’nai B’rith embodied the
assimilationist ethos of the German-Jewish middle class. The order was both “a vehicle
for bourgeois integration”5 and a “secular synagogue” that "synthesized the components
of Jewishness and Americanism into a unique amalgam that assumed the benefits of
emancipation and affirmed the value of being Jewish.”6 In 1885, a gathering of leading
Reform rabbis in Pittsburgh distilled the spirit of German Jewry into a radically
assimilationist manifesto. The so-called “Pittsburgh Platform” aimed to elevate Judaism’s
“universal” mission by effacing doctrinal and ritual elements deemed out of sync with
Protestant norms and the American capitalist ethic. “Talmudic injunctions on dietary
laws, on dress, on the second-day observance of festival events, on the separation of the
sexes, were subject to review. Even Sunday services might be acceptable for Jews” in
lieu of traditional Sabbath observance.7 Notably, advocates of classical Reform sought to
square Jewishness with American patriotism by unequivocally renouncing Jewish
nationality, defining Jews as a “religious community” that “expect[s] neither a return to
Palestine… nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state.”8
As new prejudices flourished during and after the Civil War, an assimilationist
orientation offered the German-Jewish bourgeoisie maximum protection for its gains in
an environment characterized by racial hierarchy and anti-Catholic animus. Nonetheless,
increased manifestations of social anti-Semitism after 1848 militated against full
integration by stimulating the creation of segregated fora—from commercial firms to
country clubs—that mirrored in style and substance those from which Jews were
excluded by prejudice. The mid-nineteenth century also saw the first attempts at
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organized Jewish ethnopolitical activity. Compared to the mass mobilizations of the
twentieth century, early Jewish ethnopolitics more closely resembled the medieval
politics of shtadlanus—personalistic intercession with the authorities by self-selected
elites speaking on behalf of the Jewish community. Beginning with the Damascus blood
libel of 1840, a spate of anti-Semitic outrages abroad stimulated Jewish appeals for
diplomatic intervention by the federal government. In 1859, a group of Orthodox lay and
rabbinic figures established the first independent Jewish “defense” agency, the Board of
Delegates of American Israelites. Aided at times by the grassroots exertions of B’nai
B’rith’s lodge network, the Board protested government intrusions on religious freedom
and, less frequently, acts of state-sponsored anti-Semitism. In 1862, its longtime
representative in Washington, Simon Wolf, famously interceded with Abraham Lincoln
to reverse a Civil War expulsion decree targeting the Jews of Tennessee. The Board’s
primary site of intervention, however, was the international domain, where it coordinated
with the British Board of Deputies and the French Alliance Israélite Universelle to
mitigate Jewish hardship across Europe and the Middle East. In 1878, the Board merged
into UAHC, strengthening its association with the Reform movement. As an elite-based,
internationally-oriented association of assimilationist shtadlanim, the Board prefigured
the American Jewish Committee (AJC), one of the primary antagonists in the
ethnopolitical field struggles described below.9
Little evidence exists for serious intra-Jewish ethnopolitical conflict during this
period, to say nothing of the polarization that would characterize Jewish communal
politics at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the late 1870s, an effort to
democratize Jewish public representation by federating chapters of the Young Men’s
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Hebrew Association (YMHA) fizzled out, in part because the motive force of ideological
antagonism was absent.10 Calls for communal democratization would later become the
hallmark of intense agitation by “downtown” Eastern European Jews against the political
dominance of the “uptown” AJC elite. But during the second half of the nineteenth
century, the various nodes of communal organization—B’nai B’rith, UAHC, the
YMHAs—were essentially in accord on matters of public representation. The emergence
of the Jewish ethnopolitical field in its Bourdieusian sense would require a communal
dialectic, which in turn would require a catalytic event capable of fundamentally
transforming the position and composition of Jews in American society. That event
would begin in the 1880s.

Critical Juncture: Eastern European Influx, 1881-1924
The second Jewish mass migration was sparked by a confluence of events in
Eastern Europe, including worsening poverty, exponential population growth, new
legislation restricting the rights of Jews, and an explosion of anti-Semitic violence
following the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. Once begun, the migration
proceeded in waves until the imposition of immigration quotas by the 1924 Johnson-Reed
Act. Over that period, more than 2.5 million Jews from Russia, Austria-Hungary, and
Romania —about a fifth of the world’s Jewish population at the time—settled in the
United States, reducing the roughly 200,000 American Jews of Germanic ancestry to a
minority within a minority and catalyzing a basic restructuring of American Jewish
communal life. Situating our American Jewish case study in a comparative framework
alongside the genesis and evolution of other ethnopolitical fields requires attention to the
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critical junctures at which new capital endowments accrue, important power relationships
are reconfigured, and path-dependent trajectories of institutional development are set in
motion. To this end, it is instructive to conceive the forty-year critical juncture that
reshaped Jewish ethnopolitics from 1881 onwards in terms of a three-way interaction
between the existing Jewish institutional order (described above), the parallel assemblage
of institutions generated by Eastern European immigrants at the height of the migration,
and, no less crucially, the evolving structural characteristics of the U.S. political
economy. International developments and changes in the global economic order also
constitute important vectors of influence that I return to in subsequent chapters.
Historians tend to emphasize the class and ideological antagonisms that colored the
encounter between German Jews and the unruly assortment of Yiddish-speaking radicals,
Zionists, religious traditionalists, and ordinary Jewish proletarians that swelled New
York’s Lower East Side around the turn of the century. One historian describes the sense
of moral panic with which German-Jewish society received the destitute newcomers:
In a plea for ‘more stringent emigration laws’ in view of the ‘utterly helpless
emigrants to these shores,’ The Jewish Messenger voiced an opinion widely
shared among German American Jews. In the early 1880s, no apprehension
among the Jews of New York was greater than the looming specter of a
permanent class of immigrant Jewish paupers cast ashore in the city… The
response to pauperism on the part of the United Hebrew Charities (UHC)
consisted of ‘forwarding’ immigrants back to Europe if, for any reason, they
were unable to support themselves… They were a visible disgrace, risking the
reputation of New York’s established Jews.11
German-Jewish commentators anxiously imagined Eastern migrants as uncouth,
irrational, and politically dangerous. Nonetheless, Jewish opposition to open immigration
waned by the 1890s as fear mingled with compassion. Deportation, it soon became
evident, was neither ethical nor sustainable in the face of oppressive conditions in Europe
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and the overwhelming number of incoming refugees. In 1901, German Jews in New York
established the Industrial Removal Office (IRO), which enlisted the cooperation of farflung B’nai B’rith lodges in an effort to “foster immigrant distribution throughout the
United States.” Over two decades, the IRO “expedited the resettlement of some 80,000
people to more than 1,000 towns and cities.”12 These efforts, alongside regular kinship
networks, shored up some of the demographic dispersion that had characterized earlier
Jewish settlement patterns. The most consequential set of institutional innovations,
however, occurred in the field of humanitarian relief and social service provision.
Wherever an immigrant’s final destination, it was practically guaranteed that existing
bureaucratic arrangements, public and private, would find themselves ill-equipped to
manage the destabilizing consequences of mass migration, urbanization, and
industrialization.
With the exception of Civil War benefits, public social provision in nineteenth
century America took the form of confinement to quasi-carceral poorhouses and the
sporadic distribution of “outdoor relief”— food, fuel, and small cash transfers
administered in highly variable ways by municipal or county governments.13 As Theda
Skocpol demonstrates, the dominance of political parties and the weakness of the
bureaucratic state at the dawn of the industrial age meant that U.S. welfare provision was
effectively enmeshed with the informal distributive practices of urban political machines.
“Insofar as elements of standardization crept in, they were the work of private crusaders
and voluntary groups, often with religious inspiration and backing” who “championed
measures designed to take public welfare provision out of ‘politics’—or, more precisely,
to take it out of the grip of the patronage-oriented political parties that controlled much of
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the polity in the post-Civil War decades.”14 Progressive Era advocates of “scientific
charity” campaigned assiduously against what they saw as the corrupting influences of
outdoor relief. Calling for intensive study of social problems, they promoted an
alternative model of private philanthropy that was oriented as much towards the
cultivation of moral rectitude in the poor as it was towards the provision of desperately
needed material assistance.15 It was against this sociopolitical backdrop—the absence of
standardized government relief mechanisms of the sort that would emerge during the
Great Depression, and the ethos, both paternalistic and technocratic, of the emergent
welfare reform movement—that American Jewry shaped its response to the crisis of
immigrant poverty.
In his account of American Jewish institutional development first published in the
1970s, Daniel Elazar observed that
the present system of American Jewish communal life derives directly from the
response of the already-established, predominantly German-speaking Jews to
the needs of the new immigrants at the time of the mass migration, as they
perceived those needs, a response then modified by the organizational demands
generated by the immigrants for and by themselves.16
Elazar’s student, Jonathan Woocher, likewise understood the Eastern European migration
as catalyzing a “radical transformation in the character of the American Jewish
community.” The crisis posed an immense practical challenge to established institutions,
one that “demanded—and produced—an explosive growth of philanthropic agencies and
services” with a mandate “to transmit to the immigrants and their children a model of
Jewish identity and behavior which would promote their rapid adjustment to American
society, and thereby not undermine the hard-fought status gains achieved by their earlier
arriving coreligionists.”17 Some sense of the magnitude of institutional proliferation
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during this period is expressed in Figure 3.1, which charts the creation of 1,874 local
Jewish charities and mutual-benefit societies still in existence between 1899 and 1919,
and for which dates of establishment were available from the American Jewish Year
Book. Of these, 205 were established prior to 1880, 565 were created between 1880 and
1900, and 1,104 sprung up between 1900 and 1919. The yellow line (right axis) depicts
mergers of multiple institutions into local umbrella agencies under German-Jewish
directorship.
As described in the previous chapter, the process of institutional proliferation and
consolidation under emergency conditions engendered a new unit of Jewish communal
organization with unprecedented financial-extractive capacities: the local Jewish
federation. Figure 3.2, based on data from Elezar (1974), graphs the cumulative number
of Jewish federations over time. Between 1895 and 1933 the number of federations
increased steadily, if slowly, before experiencing an enormous spike between 1934 and
1946 stimulated by the founding of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds
in 1932. Having already traced the emergence and evolution of the New York federation,
I proceed below from the fact of federation diffusion on a national scale and map the
subsequent power struggles and accommodations between local federations and three key
ethnopolitical institutions, whose origins and capital assets we must first
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examine.

Figure 3.1
The left axis (blue) is the number of charitable agencies created; the right axis
(yellow) is the number of times multiple charities were consolidated into an umbrella
agencies.
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Figure 3.2

The “Big Three”: Origins and Capital Assets
Early social divisions between German and Eastern European Jews corresponded
to a set of roughly overlapping cleavages along class (upper and middle vs. poor and
working class), ideological (assimilationist vs. nationalistic), and religious (Reform vs.
Orthodox) lines. Around the time philanthropic consolidation peaked, these demographic
cleavages came into interaction with a rising tide of domestic and international antiSemitism of an unprecedentedly virulent and racializing variety. The interaction spawned
in turn three national Jewish “defense” (or “community relations,” or “civic protective”)
agencies representing different ideological and class constituencies. The first was the
American Jewish Committee (AJC), a group of wealthy German-Jewish businessmen,
lawyers, and other public personalities organized in 1906 in response to a wave of
Russian pogroms. Fully embodying the assimilationist perspective, the AJC “believed
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emphatically that American Jews should not view themselves as a group with interests
that differed from those of other Americans.”18 As such, it was only to the extent that
Jews were denied their rights of citizenship that the AJC considered Jewish selforganization to be appropriate and necessary. Explicit lobbying on the basis of narrow
Jewish self-interest, its founders believed, would render Jews politically vulnerable at a
time in American history when “special interests” was a phrase of opprobrium.
Avowedly elitist and secretive—the ultimate shtadlanim—AJC members worked behind
the scenes to “prevent infringement of the civil and religious rights of Jews and to
alleviate the consequences of persecution.” The organization’s membership remained
small and self-selecting until the 1940s, when the exigencies of fundraising impelled a
national expansion of local chapters. In its early years, AJC leaders like Jacob Schiff and
Felix Warburg dominated Jewish philanthropy, helping to establish the American Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) for overseas relief in 1914 and populating the
governing boards of Jewish federations across the country. Above all, the AJC was
inveterately hostile to Zionist attempts to organize the American (and world) Jewish
community into a democratic polity controlled by the masses.19
By World War I, membership in American Zionist organizations grew to around
200,000, stimulated by mass migration and the devastation visited on European Jewish
communities during the war.20 Zionist-oriented societies and lodges sprang up wherever
new migrants settled, and while the grassroots was predominantly Eastern European,
some of the most high-profile leadership figures on the American Zionist scene were
Jews of Central European background, such as Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Allied with the landsmanshaftn and much of the Yiddish
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press, Zionist groups agitated against the AJC and federation elites for control over
communal resources and representation, resulting first in the failed New York Kehillah
experiment and then, in 1918, in the convening of an American Jewish Congress to
represent all of American Jewry at the postwar peace conference in Versailles.21 With the
participation of the AJC, the Congress “staged elections all over the United States in June
1917, and over three hundred and fifty thousand Jewish women and men cast their
ballots.”22 This exercise in communal democracy brought women and second-generation
Eastern Europeans into positions of national Jewish leadership for the first time.
Dissolved by agreement after the peace conference, the American Jewish Congress
(AJCongress) was re-established by Wise in 1922 as a loose confederation of Zionist
groups. Never the mass-membership organization Wise had hoped for, AJCongress faced
financial difficulties throughout the 1920s as Zionist membership rolls plummeted. Prior
to settling into its postwar niche as an aggressive civil rights litigator, the AJCongress
struggled to distinguish itself from its competitors in the community defense field
otherwise than by its vocal advocacy for Zionist internationalism—a commitment that
functioned primarily to maintain its antagonism with the AJC.23 As we shall see, the
AJCongress survived the crucial expansionary period of the 1940s by hewing closely to
the priorities of the federation movement and strategically exploiting rifts between the
federations and the AJC. (This is what Bourdieu would call a “strategy of succession.”)
If the assimilationist/nationalist cleavage expressed itself most starkly in the
antagonism between the AJC and AJCongress, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai
B’rith represented a third position defined less by its stance on political ethnicity than by
its distinctive power endowments. As a truly mass-based organization with roots in the
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German Jewish middle class, B’nai B’rith possessed a combination of economic and
social capital rivaled only by the emerging federation network. Although created to
advance the socioeconomic integration of American Jews, B’nai B’rith never strongly
committed itself to a foundational ideology or political program, and as such remained a
relatively elastic vehicle for the evolving aspirations of its membership. The Order,
remarked Leo N. Levy, B’nai B’rith’s president at the height of mass migration, “cannot
be fashioned or conducted to suit the views of the few. It must be adapted to its purpose
and to its constituents.”24 Class was the only barrier to entry. As the children of recent
immigrants “flocked to New York’s colleges and professional schools, a new
Americanized constituency was emerging for the Order. Changes in the characteristics of
East European Jews, including the rise of an immigrant bourgeoisie, complemented B’nai
B’rith’s attitude of solidarity.”25 Relative ease of entry fostered an ideological pluralism
in its ranks. While early leadership figures vocally rejected Jewish nationalism, the
Order’s literary organ, The Menorah, became a forum for the publication of “Zionist
news” and polemics. In the early decades of the twentieth century, “philanthropic
Zionism” permeated the rank-and-file, and B’nai B’rith’s leadership was buffeted
between its sympathy for the AJC’s tactical approach and the membership’s increasing
orientation towards the Congress.26
As a functional organization, B’nai B’rith (not unlike the federations) pursued an
institutional survival strategy that involved elaborating new mechanisms for participation.
Of its organizational off-shoots, most enduring were the university Hillel foundations,
first established in 1925, and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), which constituted the
Order’s response to growing national concern with anti-Semitic manifestations.27
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Triggering the ADL’s formation was the 1913 lynching of Leo Frank, a Jewish
businessman and B’nai B’rith member from Atlanta who was falsely convicted in the
death of a young girl. Incited by the press, anti-Semitic vigilantes seized Frank from his
prison cell and murdered him, grimly concluding a legal controversy that many had
compared to the Dreyfus Affair. The Frank case punctuated a shift, beginning in the late
nineteenth century, in the way Jews were framed in the American racial imaginary. As
Hasia Diner notes, “The discourse on Jews in the American popular press, while never
articulated in a single voice, was taking a decidedly racist turn. A steady stream of
articles in some of the most respected and widely circulated publications asked questions
such as, ‘Will the Jews Ever Lose their Racial Identity?’ and, ‘Are the Jews an Inferior
Race?’” As European race science penetrated the American academy, “Jews, sometimes
called ‘Hebrews’ or ‘Semites,’ took their—lowly—place in the racial cosmos.”28 The
newly-formed ADL focused its energies on squelching negative media representations of
Jews through public information campaigns and threats of economic boycott against
offending institutions. When anti-Semitism fell into public disrepute after World War II,
the ADL expanded its mission to encompass civil rights and pro-Israel advocacy while
continuing to provide constituent services to Jewish communities through its network of
regional offices. Although it never entered into open ideological conflict with its
competitors, the ADL’s unique asset endowment encouraged it to pursue a distinctive
strategy vis-à-vis the federations.
As I demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, the AJC, AJCongress, and ADL
occupied key positions in the struggle for Jewish resources and representative legitimacy
as it coalesced in the early twentieth century under the combined impacts of mass
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migration and surging racial animus. In addition to the “big three” and the federation
system, a handful of smaller national organizations, including the Jewish Labor
Committee (JLC) and the Jewish War Veterans of the United States (JWV), were formed
in this period to represent particular mass constituencies. (By the end of the twentieth
century, the power assets of the JLC and JWV had attenuated to the point of near
extinction, largely as a result of the embourgeoisement of American Jewry and the
postwar decline in Jewish participation in the armed forces.) Table 3.1 depicts the
distribution of capital endowments in the Jewish ethnopolitical field in the 1920s, the
point at which my analysis begins. The color-coded groupings represent structural
locations defined by the interplay of capitalization and shared interests, while the
quadrants of the two-by-two table correspond to different combinations of economic
capital (financial endowment or extractive capacity) and social capital (grassroots
infrastructure or recognized claims on a national constituency). The federation system,
with its high extractive capacity and structural penetration of all local grassroots
infrastructure, was the most well-endowed actor in the field, and its positional
differentiation was a product of its antagonism with the red-coded agents over questions
of functional streamlining and institutional autonomy. The affinity of the red-coded
agents derived from their mid-level capital endowments, which incentivized a joint
strategy vis-à-vis the federations, and their de facto collaboration against the AJCongress.
Different species of capital being convertible to one another, the AJC was, over time,
able to translate its financial advantage into additional grassroots power, while the ADL’s
relationship to B’nai B’rith endowed it from the beginning with a moderately well-off
constituency and a geographically dispersed infrastructure. Finally, the green-coded
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agents were the least well-endowed in the field, possessing neither financial resources nor
a significant grassroots infrastructure. Consequently, they pursued a pro-federation
strategy that netted them both symbolic legitimacy and modest annual allocations from
federations. While this sustained them for much of the century, ultimately the greencoded agents were not well-equipped for survival. In 2010, the AJCongress shut its doors,
having lost most of its endowment in the collapse of the Bernard Madoff financial
scheme.29
Economic +

Economic -

Federation system (E+/S+)
Social +
Q2
Q1

Anti-Defamation League
(E~/S+)
American Jewish Committee

Am. Jewish Congress (E-/S~)

Social (E+/S~)

Jewish Labor Committee (E-/S~)
Jewish War Veterans (E-/S~) Q4

Q3

- = Low, + = High, ~=Moderate

Table 3.1

The Dynamics of the Field: An Institutional Meta-History, 1920-1967
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In this section, I trace the conflictual process through which the Jewish federation
system came to occupy a dominant position in the Jewish ethnopolitical field. From the
end of Eastern European migration until just before the Six Day War of 1967, the
federation network experienced a profound enhancement of its political capacities driven
in large part by the antagonism between local federations and the national community
relations agencies over the terms of federation financial support. The American Jewish
Committee—fearing encroachment on its institutional autonomy by an umbrella
organization aligned with its ideological nemesis, the American Jewish Congress—
teamed up with the Anti-Defamation League to resist federation efforts to impose
functional coordination on Jewish political agencies. When federations threatened to
deploy material sanctions, a decades-long struggle ensued at the grassroots level, where
AJC and ADL elites exerted pressures on individual federations in an effort to subvert the
increasingly unified designs of the broader federation network. Federations in turn
created, expanded, and unified local Jewish Community Relations Councils as a means of
exercising counter-pressure on the national agencies, culminating in the creation of the
National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC) in 1944. By the mid-1960s,
the AJC and ADL had been outflanked by the federations and NCRAC, even as they
enhanced their own capacities in the process. The result was a Jewish community
relations superstructure united under the benign hegemony of the federations.

The 1920s: The Origins of Collective Power
By the 1920s, the Jewish federation model had spread to more than forty
American cities and metropolitan areas.30 If the purpose of federations was to eliminate
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inefficiencies by reducing multiple fundraising appeals under their jurisdiction,
centralization posed its own of set of problems. Enforcing the federation monopoly meant
leveraging the combined symbolic and financial power of the federation’s board
members to proscribe independent fundraising campaigns in the community—something
that was considerably easier before the advent of direct mail and telemarketing. For
national Jewish organizations used to coordinating their own local fundraising drives,
however, the growth of federations replaced “the normal process of testing [an
organization’s] strength by direct appeal to a contributing public” with “the necessity of
securing support from a central, all-embracing fund.” This, inevitably, triggered an influx
of requests for federation support from cash-strapped national organizations.31 Because
most of the soliciting agencies operated extra-locally, federation officials found
themselves incapable of assessing the performance or even the necessity of the tasks
being undertaken by supplicants. The bulk of the initial claims-making, according to a
federation report, came from a range of functional fields, including health, welfare,
immigration, religion, and culture. (Community relations had not yet become a national
priority in the 1920s. Before the rise of Nazism, the budgets of the “big three” defense
agencies were a shadow of what they would later become. In 1927, for example, the AJC
and AJCongress both reported budgets of around $48,000, or just under $700,000 in
inflation-adjusted 2018 dollars.) As the report noted,
[F]ederations felt that the national agencies were too independent of the local
communities and of each other, that there was no co-ordination of program as
between agencies in the same field, that funds were being raised at too high a
cost and without controls other than the self-perpetuating boards of the
respective institutions… [and] that new institutions were being established and
new programs initiated with little consideration of social implications or existing
services, local and national.32
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In addition, there was “growing community irritation with… the character of local
representation built up by certain of the national agencies.”33 While federated fundraising
had delivered increased returns to local agencies, the nationals chafed against what they
considered meager allocations from the new centralized bodies, and resented the
prohibition on independent campaigns. In an adaptive strategy that would dog federations
for decades, national organizations began mobilizing influential supporters in federation
cities—and sometimes within federation bureaucracies themselves—to exert pressure on
the allocations process. Efficiency-minded federation officials, anxious to eliminate rentseeking behavior and develop more objective criteria for allocations decisions, were
inevitably impeded by the absence of information on national agency operations and
finances, “beyond their own literature, usually propaganda.”34
These difficulties motivated some federations to begin handling extra-local
appeals through parallel welfare funds, “designed to introduce an element of order and
control” to the application process.35 But the problem of information scarcity required a
collaborative solution. The question of national federation coordination was first raised at
the 1921 annual meeting of the National Conference of Jewish Social Service, an early
forum for communication among federation professionals. Following a series of
commissioned studies by the Bureau of Jewish Social Research (BJSR), a federation
adjunct, discussions came to a head in 1927. That year, dozens of federations convened at
the Conference to launch a National Appeals Information Service (NAIS) that would
gather and disseminate reliable information on the activities and finances of national
Jewish organizations. Facing the specter of accountability, the nationals fleetingly
attempted to organize themselves into a “National Council of National Organizations,”
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but the effort fell apart. Outmaneuvering them, the NAIS “used the B.J.S.R. as a study
agent, issued reports and built up community sentiment” for an even broader effort at
national unification.36 Economic catastrophe in 1929 provided the final impetus. With
Jewish relief agencies critically overburdened, federations needed an umbrella agency
that could both rationalize allocations and coordinate appeals to the U.S. government for
cash assistance. In 1932, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJF) was
formed, eventually absorbing the NAIS and BJSR.
Over the next half-century, the Council would emerge as the single most powerful
entity in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. Much of its power derived from a
single symbolizing function, inherited from the NAIS: the production of annual “Budget
Digests.” One longtime CJF budget analyst, S.P. Goldberg, described these reports as the
“Dun and Bradstreet of Jewish philanthropy,” referring to the popular credit rating
agency utilized by businessmen to guide investment decisions. High-dollar givers,
Goldberg wrote, demand an accounting of “the specific acts regarding the programs and
finances of the agencies seeking their support.” By maintaining the authoritative
monopoly on such information “for the use of members of allocations committees in over
200 Jewish communities [by 1967],” the CJF could exert decisive influence over national
organizations that depended on federation funding for their institutional reproduction.37
Additionally, the Council multiplied the power of federations not only by providing them
with a permanent forum for communication and coordination, but by facilitating the
adoption of the federation model in new cities. “Within a few years,” noted a brochure
produced for the Council’s fiftieth anniversary, “that mission was accomplished—
virtually every city with a significant Jewish population had a Federation” (see Figure 2
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above).38 Constituent services expanded over time, fostering improved methods of
financial extraction:
The CJF… concentrated its fundraising assistance to Federations on basic
organizations and methods. This included systematic training of volunteer
solicitors as a crucial requirement for success. In 1970-71, CJF staff and
volunteers were in 71 cities to conduct worker training, which had been
pioneered in group dynamics techniques by the CJF Women’s Division. CJF
helped organize retreats of campaign leaders to analyze campaign strengths and
weaknesses, plan multi-year programs for increases and develop professional
staff training.39
Most significantly for the long-term health of the federation project, the CJF invested
substantial energies (and by 1981, a quarter of its budget) in helping local federations set
up and maximize the returns from permanent endowment funds. The first committee and
staff resources devoted to endowments were created in 1967, and in 1974 the CJF
established a “national pooled income fund to enable Federations to invest in it with the
benefits of national expertise and important administrative savings.” Federation
permanent assets increased accordingly: “In 1948, the 12 largest Federations had total
endowment funds of $22 million. By 1962, it had increased to $62 million, and by 1980
to over $500 million.” Annual federation grants deriving solely from the interest on
endowment funds totaled $43 million in 1979. Helped along by the financialization of the
U.S. economy and the broader neoliberal turn, by end of the 1980s federations held
collective assets in excess of $1 billion.40 Today, the Jewish Federations of North
America, successor to the CJF, oversees federation endowment funds valued at $16
billion.41
Approaching the critical decade of the 1930s, however, the institutional capacities
of the CJF were still inchoate. New appendages and authorities would evolve as
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federations were forced to contend with new problem areas. The community relations
field was just one domain in which the CJF would bring its nascent powers to bear,
catalyzing profound institutional developments and reshaping the course of American
Jewish history. The earliest such intervention was in the field of humanitarian aid to
overseas Jewry. As we saw in the previous chapter, New York’s federation furnished
much of the organizational machinery for the United Jewish Appeal (UJA), the overseas
fundraising umbrella formed from the consolidation of the JDC and the United Palestine
Appeal (UPA). But federations in their collective capacity played an even more decisive
role. As welfare fund beneficiaries with distinct overseas missions and ties to conflicting
ideological camps, the JDC and UPA competed fiercely with one another for allocations.
The federations, recalled CJF president Philip Bernstein, “were distressed…by the
competition” and “felt themselves unqualified to judge as between the two
organizations.” It was “substantially the pressure of Federations on the two organizations
that brought them together,” and when financial squabbles threatened to sink the UJA
three times in a decade, “the Federations would not tolerate it.”42 When simple threats fell
short, the CJF pressed for government intervention. In 1944, the Council prevailed on the
federal War Refugee Board to outlaw separate JDC and UPA campaigns, forcing the
reestablishment of the UJA. When the State of Israel was founded in 1948, a new wave of
uncoordinated solicitation threatened to disrupt the federation-UJA monopoly: “People
were on the street corners of New York with collection boxes. Mail appeals began to
burgeon. Collectors began to stream in from Israel.”43 The CJF responded by establishing
a “National Committee on Control and Authorization” to interface with the Jewish
Agency and quash unauthorized appeals, thus solidifying the UJA as American Jewry’s
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preeminent overseas fundraiser. With the international domain under control, the Council
would turn its attention to the field of domestic community relations.

The Long 1930s: Centripetal Pressures and Political Conflict in an Expansionary Period
Prior to the 1930s, federations stood aloof from the Jewish ethnopolitical field,
providing modest subsidies to national agencies but generally refraining from substantive
intervention. This changed rather suddenly after 1933, when, as one CJF report described
it, “an upsurge of an internationally stimulated anti-Semitism following [the rise of
Hitler] was instrumental in the rapid enlargement and development of the civic-protective
activities” of the “big three” agencies and the Jewish Labor Committee.44 The financial
implications were enormous. The same report estimated the combined budgets of the four
agencies in 1933 at less than $200,000. By 1937, the aggregate expenditures of all
community relations agencies had more than doubled. By 1945, they exceeded $5
million, only to double again by 1948.45 The ADL’s spending evinced the sharpest
uptick, increasing almost tenfold from a miniscule $17,555 in 1933 to nearly $150,000
just one year later. The coincidence of heightened community relations activity with the
proliferation of federations and welfare funds pointed in an obvious direction: financial
dependency.46 While numbers are spotty and sometimes inconsistent, Figure 3.3 depicts
data on federation allocations compiled from the American Jewish Year Book and
various archival sources. If the data is accurate, by the late 1940s the “big three” agencies
were receiving between sixty (AJCongress) and ninety-nine percent (ADL) of their
budgets from federations and welfare funds. Whatever the exact numbers, it’s clear that
the community relations field relied heavily on federation contributions during this
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crucial expansionary period. Dependency, in turn, carried two important consequences.
First, at least in the AJC’s case, it caused alternative fundraising structures to wither
away. Early in the AJC’s institutional life, “a sustaining membership was built up serving
as the financial and moral constituency of the Committee… at one time number[ing]
several thousand.” But “as Welfare Funds developed in the communities throughout the
country the sustaining members in those communities were necessarily dropped.”47 The
second, more pivotal consequence was the federations’ heightened expectation of
accountability.

Figure 3.3

The same dynamic that propelled the creation of the CJF and the UJA—a sudden
barrage of solicitations coupled with the inability of local federations to rationally
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adjudicate between them—also moved federations to action on the community relations
front. Frustrating the federations was the fact that, despite demanding considerable sums
of money, the AJC and ADL refused to disclose the nature of their behind-the-scenes
political activities. (At the time, German-Jewish leaders still considered mass pressure
group activity and hardball lobbying gauche and potentially threatening, instead
preferring quiet exertions of elite influence and quasi-anonymous public information
campaigns.) In a 1938 correspondence with the CJF, one Chicago federation official
decried the “secret, or non-public, or confidential activities” of the community relations
groups, proposing their expulsion from the welfare funds: “[M]ore and more these civicprotective agencies are becoming responsible for dividing our communities amongst
themselves. I am for having them fight it out in the community and not in the Welfare
Fund.”48 Underlying the desire for transparency was the persistent suspicion that scarce
communal resources were being squandered on duplicative and potentially ineffectual
efforts that federations had no way of properly evaluating. Consequently, federation
officials began to press for a UJA-like merger of the major community relations agencies.
In fact, an attempt at coordination had occurred spontaneously in 1933, when the AJC,
AJCongress, and ADL formed a “joint consultative council” to “provide for harmonious
action by the Jews of America in relation to the Nazi war upon the Jews in Germany.”49
But differences of opinion caused a split two years later. As was the wont of the Zionist
organizations, the AJCongress responded with a populist power play in 1938, calling for
a national Jewish plebiscite to establish a unified defense agency on a democratic basis.
Sensing danger, a group of federation officials led by Edgar J. Kaufman of Pittsburgh
moved quickly with their own initiative. A June 1938 statement addressed to the
154

community relations groups and unanimously ratified by federations across the country
read,
The tragic plight of millions of Jews throughout Europe…the specter of
increasing race prejudice, intolerance and insecurity…demand the most
effective union possible of American Jewry at once. The consensus among
American Jewry at large is vastly in favor of the creation of a single,
coordinating agency of American Jewry for the defense of the human rights of
the Jewish people… We demand that you, the national leaders of the join your
forces now to create a more perfect union of all American Jewry.50
As Isaiah Minkoff, the first executive director of NCRAC, later recalled, “The country
revolted against the national agencies and the comparative character of their activities.”51
In August 1938, the General Jewish Council (GJC) was formed.
Encompassing the “big three” and the Jewish Labor Committee, the GJC’s brief
history illustrates the interplay of the centripetal and centrifugal forces buffeting Jewish
ethnopolitics in the 1930s. The new organization did not by any means represent a goodfaith effort to address federation grievances. Rather, it was a tactical and mostly
superficial capitulation whose ultimate failure signaled to the CJF the limitations of a
purely hortatory approach to fostering transparency and inter-agency cooperation.
Anticipating his NCRAC role, Minkoff was hired as an impartial chairman. While the
GJC offered a useful discussion forum, particularly when it came to reviewing and
analyzing legislative proposals, and while it generated a number of press releases and
small joint initiatives, it “undertook no central services of a professional character in any
major field of activity,” and besides “the publication of a few pamphlets under the
imprint of the GJC, there were few developments indicating active centralization or
central planning.”52 Federations kept up the pressure. In 1940, the East Central States
Regional Conference of the CJF issued a resolution urging the GJC to actively coordinate
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with local Jewish communities, whose representatives felt excluded from the community
relations activities they were financing and that had direct implications for their sense of
security and citizenship. Writing to Richard Gutstadt, head of the ADL, a Cleveland
federation official justified the resolution:
The primary purpose and the great expectation of the American Jewish
community was that the General Jewish Council would succeed in forging the
functions of the four constituent agencies…into a single powerful effective
force. It cannot be gainsaid, and the feeling among the Jewish leadership is
widespread, that there is tremendous duplication of effort in research activities
in connection with civic protection… Our resolution was directed at this
problem… In most of the large Jewish communities today and in many of the
smaller ones, there are either community councils or central representative
bodies of other kinds for defense activities… [These bodies] are rarely consulted
or even advised by the General Jewish Council… [It] is only though these local
representative bodies that a true reflection of the desires and opinions of the
Jewish communities can be obtained.53
As the letter suggests, Jewish Community Relations Councils (JCRCs) had begun
springing up in federation cities after 1933 in response to local anti-Semitic
manifestations. With the CJF still in an embryonic state, the initial phase of JCRC
proliferation was ad hoc. Although financed by welfare funds and nominally accountable
to local Jewish communities, the first JCRCs were often dominated in practice by
representatives of the AJC or ADL, depending on the city. A 1941 CJF report assessed
that “Frequently, the national agencies are represented in the local program directly or
informally in the composition of the local group responsible for the service. In other
cities, local effort may function directly as a branch or outpost of a national agency and in
a few cases, the local program represents a cooperative effort on the part of two or more
national agencies.”54 From the federations’ point of view, the JCRCs in this period too
often represented the interests of whatever national organization happened to be
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dominant on the local scene. The GJC, meanwhile, offered little by way of coordinated
information or services to the communities, even as its existence stimulated the creation
of additional JCRCs with full-time professional staff. By the early 1940s, JCRC
professionals (hired and paid by the federations) began to assert themselves as champions
of the broader community interest. Anxious to hear a range of viewpoints, they organized
themselves nationally into a “Community Relations Conference” and demanded briefings
from the GJC. A letter from Minkoff to Henry Monsky of the ADL illustrates what was
at stake. Acknowledging that the GJC possessed no unified program and had “heretofore
definitely ruled out direct contact with the communities, excepting casual information of
a general character,” Minkoff warned Monsky that continuing to stonewall the
Conference would have unwanted consequences. “So far, the C.R.C. is an unattached
organization, so-to-speak independent, without even stationery. But with the brewing
sentiment of dissatisfaction of local communities with the fact that the national agencies
cannot get together, I believe the C.R.C. in its potential development is one of the
instrumentalities of this local pressure and local opposition.”55
Minkoff was correct. In an initiative that would ultimately result in the creation of
NCRAC, the CJF soon established a “Sub-Committee on Civic Protective Activities” to
coordinate federation and JCRC strategy vis-à-vis the national agencies. The committee
keenly perceived the roots of the problem: “If we were starting out to plan the most
effective civic-protective machinery we could devise,” wrote committee member Max
Simon of Cleveland’s JCRC, “we certainly would not create four independent,
duplicating and oftentimes conflicting agencies. The only real reason for the present
structure is that each organization started and developed independently, and each is now
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reluctant to give up its independence and its place in the sun.”56 In a confidential memo
to the committee, CJF executive director Harry Lurie noted that while almost everyone
accepted coordination in principle, “opposition to united action has been expressed by the
members, followers or partisans of one or another of the national civic-protective
agencies… who believe that there are basic differences in aims and philosophies that
should not be obscured,” and that the principle of coordination was rejected in practice
whenever it was seen to involve “interference with group interests, domination of
partisan viewpoints by either majority or minority groups, weakening of agency
structures affecting other Jewish group interests, etc.”57 As mentioned above, the
concerns dividing the community relations agencies were both ideological (AJC,
AJCongress) and of a narrower institutional-reproductive nature (ADL). In all cases, the
issue of fundraising was front and center, even when ideologically mediated. Yet the
collapse of the GJC and the subsequent emergence of NCRAC vividly illustrate the
political stakes of what might otherwise seem like ordinary institutional turf wars and
resource conflicts. At issue was the very definition of American Jews as a collectivity and
their relationship to the rapidly growing international Zionist movement. The outcome of
the material struggles of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s would decide which of several
competing visions of American Jewish politics ultimately prevailed.
Were we to analyze the General Jewish Council as a Bourdieusian field unto
itself, it could be said that the AJC and the ADL together occupied the dominant sector of
the field, while the AJCongress occupied the dominated one. As we saw, when the GJC
was instituted, it represented the minimum conceivable accommodation between the
immediate demands of the federations and the interest of the AJC and ADL in shielding
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themselves from populist challenge by the AJCongress while simultaneously
institutionalizing inter-agency coordination on their own terms (i.e., in a manner that
preserved maximum autonomy for each constituent agency). This arrangement was
manifestly to the detriment of the AJCongress, which had hoped that unification of the
community relations field would provide it with greater and more stable access to the
field’s economic capital reserves, now largely in the hands of the federations. Unlike the
AJC and ADL, the AJCongress lacked a dispersed network of wealthy and influential
supporters around the country who, in addition to donating directly, could put their
fingers on federation scales. While Zionist organizations enjoyed a mass base—
disproportionately concentrated in New York—this fact did not translate into a robust
pool of financial resources for the AJCongress, due in part to the lower socioeconomic
status of its constituency. (In later years, much of the Congress’s non-federation
operating revenue would derive from the sale of organized delegations to Israel.) When it
became evident that the GJC was serving to legitimate the status quo, the AJCongress
mounted an internal opposition, allying itself with federation demands for unification and
joint fundraising. But the AJC repeatedly rebuffed these proposals. It did so, according to
one internal account, because it knew “that a considerable number of its supporters were
firmly opposed to the purposes and activities of the American Jewish Congress, and they
therefore refused to support any joint fund-raising effort of which the Congress would be
a beneficiary.”58 Adding insult to injury, in early 1941 the AJC and ADL concluded their
own bilateral agreement for joint fundraising, creating the Joint Defense Appeal (JDA).
In response, the AJCongress withdrew from the GJC and, according to Minkoff,
“declared the Council dead, thus attempting to create the impression that every
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undertaking without the Congress is doomed and that unity can be achieved only when
centered around the Congress program.”59 Using the only tool it had left—populist
spectacle—the Congress then launched “an immediate and wide-spread vituperative
attack on the GJC and, [by extension], on its constituent agencies.”60
Despite the AJCongress’s noisy secession, the GJC did not immediately dissolve.
“Instead of following the Congress,” Minkoff recalled, “the three other organizations…
proceeded to find means of implementing the Council and making it the spokesman for a
united effort, isolating the American Jewish Congress for their separate and destructive
action.”61 After all, the GJC was already tailored to the interests of the dominant players,
and to abandon it would be to invite unwanted alternatives. In a letter to Kaufman,
Minkoff offered an unusually candid account of what, from the point of view of the
dominants in the field, was at stake in the survival of the post-Congress GJC:
No other unifying effort is even feasible once the Council is permitted to die.
The country at large would have every reason not to trust the national agencies
any more. Instead, the communities would push ahead [Zionist leader] Rabbi
[Abba Hillel] Silver’s idea of discouraging the national agencies and creating a
central body composed of local community councils. Such a central body would
be the only one permitted to speak in the name of American Jewry. This would
be an additional step towards the organization of a national Kehillah [a
democratically-structured communal representative body].62
To simply construe these sentiments as reflecting an elitist worldview would be to
oversimplify the ideological conflict shaping the field during this period. At one level, it
was a conflict between different approaches to combatting anti-Semitism. Max Simon of
the Cleveland JCRC glossed the alternatives perceptively: “One group,” he wrote of the
AJC camp, “sees as its task the combatting of specific manifestations of anti-Semitism,
and cooperation with the forces of democracy to remove the causes of anti-Semitism. Its
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focus is primarily external... Its concern with internal Jewish life is [simply] that Jews
themselves should not breed the causes of anti-Semitism.” The second group, by contrast,
“links [current] anti-Semitism with the entire history of the problem and of the Jewish
people, and with a philosophy for Jewish preservation. It believes that without a positive
and nationalistic development of Jewish life, little fundamental progress will really be
made.” 63
At a more fundamental level, however, the conflict was between two radically
divergent conceptions of Jews as a collectivity. Testifying before NCRAC years later,
John Slawson of the AJC put it this way: “The basic disagreement between the
Committee and the Congress… was the concept of the Jewish community. The Congress
believed that there was such a thing as the Jewish community, and the Committee did
not.”64 In the twenty-first century, the existence of an “American Jewish community” is
as taken-for-granted as the existence of Jews themselves. “Jewish peoplehood” has today
become a hegemonic watchword, seldom if ever questioned by even the most heterodox
actors in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. But for AJC stalwarts of this earlier
period, Jewish political collectivity raised the specter of an insidious majoritarianism—
even, in their words, a “totalitarianism”—zealously determined to subordinate the
dissenting individual to its demagogic will. In addition, the problem was one of
international dimensions, with implications far beyond the American scene. The
AJCongress, after all, was not simply an American agency. In its affiliation to the World
Jewish Congress, it was also the U.S. branch of a transnational movement set on
establishing a worldwide Jewish parliament. In his letter to Kaufman, Minkoff
encapsulated the sense of global threat perceived by the AJC and its ideological kindred:
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The lack of coordination in the United States has shown disheartening results in
other lands. South American Jewish communities are constantly being subjected
to the World Jewish Congress propaganda… [with its] ambitions of becoming
the spokesman of Jewry throughout the world. It can do so only if it is strong in
the United States. By being disunited ourselves and by permitting the Congress
to paralyze every step we take, we must not blame anyone if the World Jewish
Congress will take the lead and achieve its purpose of…creating the concept of
organized world Jewry [and] proclaiming itself as the only spokesman for
Jewry.65
After 1948, the existence of the State of Israel gradually transmuted the ideological
struggle over Jewish collectivity per se into a struggle over what should constitute the
proper relationship between the world’s two largest Jewish communities—a transition
that I reconstruct in the next chapter. Before Israel, however, the nature of Jewish
collectivity was the starkest dividing line in American Jewish political life, and it
influenced the AJC’s total approach to the Congress.
But if the AJCongress could be marginalized by the field dominants with relative
ease, the federations were a different story. Not only were they anxious to resolve the
problems directly affecting their institutional machinery—multiple fundraising appeals,
wasteful spending, a lack of transparency—they also channeled grassroots frustrations
with the contradictory messages then emanating from the national agencies. “The
American Jewish Congress would take one position. The American Jewish Committee
would take an opposite position. And the communities felt that the people to whom they
were addressing this—the government officials, the public—were confused and
unresponsive,” recalled Bernstein.66 With the possibility of financial sanctions looming in
the background, the CJF resolved at its 1942 General Assembly (GA) to “make every
possible effort to coordinate the activities of the four major national agencies for joint
fundraising” and to facilitate a “gradual process of integration and centralization of
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existing services.” In subsequent testimonies before the CJF’s Sub-Committee on Civic
Protective Activities, it was revealed that in May 1941, immediately following the
Congress’s withdrawal from the GJC, Maurice Wertheim of the AJC had secured the
agreement (with some reservations) of negotiators from each of the “big three” agencies
to a consolidation plan that incorporated key Congress demands. As it was explained in
an internal AJC document, the Wertheim plan
proposed that for a period of three years the facilities and personnel of the four
organizations which were dealing specifically with American defense work be
merged into an entirely new organization. This new body would appeal to the
Jewish public for financial support for united defense work in the United States.
The four organizations were to continue their other than American activities
separately. The new organization was to be directed by a board of directors, or
trustees, consisting of twenty-five leading American Jews chosen on the basis of
qualification and interest, and not as representatives of the organizations
affected by the merger.67
The seeming reversal of the AJC’s position on joint fundraising can likely be attributed to
the parameters of the proposed organization, which, by absorbing only the domestic work
of the “big three” agencies, would allow the AJC to continue independent fundraising for
its international operations, long the heart of the Committee’s program. Additionally, the
non-democratic character of the proposed leadership structure would help ensure
continued elite control. With this arrangement, it seemed that Wertheim had managed to
square the interests of the two major ideological antagonists.
But the plan was ultimately rejected—not by the AJC or AJCongress, but by the
Executive Committee of B’nai B’rith, the ADL’s parent organization. Ideological
principles were not the only interests at stake, it turned out. Unlike the Committee and the
Congress, the ADL did not operate in the international arena. For that reason, a merger of
its domestic apparatus into a unified organization would effectively spell the ADL’s
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complete demise as an independent entity—an outcome that would deprive B’nai B’rith
of one of its most attractive auxiliaries. Anxiety over the potential loss of the ADL
“brand” was evident from the earliest negotiations with Wertheim, when ADL
representatives insisted that the name of the new organization incorporate the word “antidefamation.” “They are willing to have a central body define policies, establish functions,
and collaborate on an assembled budget, but they do not approve of any plan which
would change the character or relationship of the national B’nai B’rith or of ADL local
representatives to the ADL program,” summarized Lurie. “In effect, they wish to retain
the identity of the ADL,” including its local and regional offices, which it persistently
defended against absorption by independent JCRCs.68 Discussions continued under CJF
auspices through 1943, but with consolidation into an independent organization now off
the table, the AJC retreated to its earlier position on joint fundraising, and the Congress
openly dissented against a plutocratic governance structure. At least one federation—that
of Easton, Pennsylvania—independently imposed financial sanctions on the community
relations field, urging the whole CJF network to follow suit.69
At the pivotal Pittsburgh General Assembly in February 1944, the Sub-Committee
on Civic Protective Activities reported failure. Despite months of patient mediation by
the CJF, B’nai B’rith continued to refuse any arrangement that might strip the ADL of
current functions and award them to another agency, thereby whittling away its
independent existence. This extended in particular to the area of budgetary control,
where, along with the AJC, B’nai B’rith sought to preclude an umbrella body from
limiting or in any way conditioning the flow of welfare fund allocations to constituent
agencies without their full consent. But the federations, in Bernstein’s stylized
164

recollection, “wouldn’t accept failure”:
They rose in revolt from the grass roots and said that it was intolerable. They
would not adjourn that [1944] General Assembly until a coordinating instrument
had been authorized and would work. [Local federation leaders] rose from the
floor in the most earnest protest against this disarray. The national agency
leaders were there. The Federations insisted on meeting with them in an ad hoc
committee, at the Assembly, to hammer out a solution, which they did. That’s
when the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council [NCRAC]
was authorized and born.70
NCRAC was a federation compromise. There would be no functional merger or joint
fundraising, only a GJC-like forum for discussion and voluntary coordination, now under
the auspices of the CJF. What the federations did achieve, however, was representation
for local JCRCs, which would command a majority vote on the NCRAC executive, and
which were now guaranteed the cooperation and communication they had long demanded
from the national agencies. As with the founding of the CJF in 1932, NCRAC multiplied
the power of the local vis-à-vis the national—including by fostering the creation of new
JCRCs—and gave the councils a collective voice and a new set of tools for managing
conflict. For example, not long after the Pittsburgh GA, a group of federated communities
in the Southwest summoned NCRAC to help them prevent the expansion of AJC and
ADL branches in their area, and to instead nurture the creation of a regional JCRC under
local control. Federations in smaller Jewish communities were sometimes at an economic
disadvantage vis-à-vis the national agencies and their local patrons, and the creation of
NCRAC was another step towards leveling the field. On paper, however, NCRAC’s
powers remained strictly hortatory, anchored in the symbolic authority of the CJF and its
ability to broker voluntary agreements.71 The power to impose real financial discipline on
the national community relations agencies would require new institutional appendages—
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and new conflicts.

The War Before the War: Forging the Community Relations Dynamo, 1944-1967
At the 1940 CJF General Assembly in Atlanta, four years before NCRAC became
a reality, federations had already begun to formulate an institutional mechanism to
resolve their grievances with the national organizations. “The communities through the
[CJF] said they wanted advice on how to allocate their funds for national and overseas
needs,” Bernstein recounted. The Budget Digests already furnished by the CJF were
insufficient; instead, federations “wanted guidance by people who would meet with the
national and overseas agencies, and give them some advice as to whether those budgets
were justified,” both in terms of the magnitude of the request and “the relative urgency of
needs as between the national and overseas agencies.”72 Fierce debate over what came to
be known as “national advisory budgeting” agitated the communities for six years.
Zionist representatives fervently opposed the scheme, maintaining that any such agency
would inevitably “assume a coercive character.” In a minority report presented at the
Atlanta convening, partisans of the United Palestine Appeal argued that “wealthy people
give most of the money and control the [national] organizations and they may be in most
instances out of tune with the masses [who] are much more interested in the various
cultural and Palestinian activities rather than in what they call palliative relief efforts.”
Calling instead for “democracy” and a total decentralization of the allocations process,
Zionist opponents of advisory budgeting ironically utilized many of the same arguments
against top-down budgetary “coercion” that their AJC adversaries would later deploy
against NCRAC.73 In 1946, the proposal was decisively and overwhelmingly defeated.
166

Having initially favored advisory budgeting, the federations relented, “simply because
they felt primarily that the disruptions and conflicts that it was engendering in the
communities [were] not worth whatever value might come [of it].”74
But the idea could not be suppressed. In 1948, federations from a dozen major
cities decided to take independent action and formed the Large City Budgeting
Conference (LCBC). Funded by its member federations and staffed by the CJF—though
not responsible to the General Assembly or the Council’s executive board—the LCBC
soon became an authoritative source of information on national agency operations. By the
early 1970s, LCBC members collected approximately seventy percent of all funds raised
outside of New York City, enabling its director to credibly describe it as “the pre-eminent
representative instrumentality and process of the total organized Jewish communities”
insofar as budget authorization for participating national agencies was concerned.75 It
worked as follows:
Agencies voluntarily submitted their budgets. They voluntarily participated in a
process of consultations, including ample presentation and questioning. Standard
reporting forms were developed… The imprimatur of the LCBC stamp on a
budget was a guarantee of the legitimacy of an operation. The LCBC validates a
budget. It recommends how much of the total budget should be borne by
Federations collectively. It does not recommend [an] amount to [any particular]
community.76
At its first meeting in June 1948, before this methodology was fully elaborated, the
LCBC examined CJF data on the national community relations field and issued a series
of resolutions identifying preliminary areas of duplication and waste it hoped would be
eliminated. The AJC and ADL “objected very strongly, both to the recommendations and
to the manner in which they had been adopted.”77 In a lengthy missive to the conference’s
chairman, Joseph Proskauer, doyen of the AJC, described the LCBC’s resolutions as
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“embodying hastily developed conclusions” that “cannot be circulated without creating
gravely unjustified illusions and misconceptions” about the worthiness of the AJC’s
program. Characterizing the conference as an “endeavor to use financial pressures” to
impose “radical surgery” on the community relations sphere, Proskauer’s letter contained
a series of veiled threats to withdraw the AJC from the welfare funds and launch an
independent fundraising campaign. “Not so many years ago we raised very sizeable sums
by direct appeal to contributors outside the Welfare Fund,” he wrote suggestively. In
reference to the LCBC’s complaint that federation dollars were being inappropriately
used to fund the AJC’s local chapter expansion program, Proskauer mooted that “the only
alternative would be one which the Welfare Funds would surely wish to avoid—namely,
instead of the nominal dues we now collect from our members, a tax of such size would
be imposed as to constitute competitive money raising.”78
The AJC and ADL were keenly aware of what the LCBC was up to, just as sure
as they knew that their only leverage in the matter was their power to disrupt the
federation model, which relied on the cooperation of the most affluent members of the
Jewish community. Were AJC and ADL partisans to redirect their giving away from the
federations to independent campaigns, the federation monopoly would collapse. Or
would it? The strategy had yet to be tested, and given the symbolic authority of the
federations and their good works, issuing threats was easier than implementing them. As
Proskauer promised, the AJC provided the conference additional information about its
activities, clarifying, among other things, that what appeared to be duplication was in fact
“reinforcement of activities through multiple use of special contacts developed over the
years by each of the civic defense agencies for purposes of persuasion and education.”79
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The LCBC considered this information, along with materials provided by the other
national agencies, and returned in June of the following year with a scathing report on the
deficiencies of the community relations field. “Substantial sums are still being spent on
broad and rather generalized propaganda programs, although scientific research has
raised serious questions as to their effectiveness,” went one bullet point. The report
identified “some 650 organizations in the United States” duplicating elements of the AJC
and ADL’s program. “From discussions with the agencies and from the factual
information available, it appears that the agencies have made little progress in defining
limitations and weighing priorities.” The report recommended a major research study,
one that would survey the basic objectives, problems, and approaches of the field and
“indicate how the present level of funds available might be used most effectively, where
additional funds could be utilized to greatest advantage, and what aspects of the current
programs should be reduced or eliminated.”80 These were fighting words, and the
federations were prepared to win the fight.
In October 1949, NCRAC established a Special Committee on Evaluative Studies
to confer with the LCBC on the proposed research study, which became known as the
“MacIver Report” after its primary author, sociologist Robert M. MacIver of Columbia
University. Completed in May 1951, the report commanded such widespread attention
that it underwent two reprintings despite technically being available only to the
participating organizations. Jack Wertheimer captured the explosive nature of the report
when he wrote that MacIver
characterized the national agencies as so intent on vindicating their own
activities that they completely neglected any serious self-evaluation… Most
damning was his depiction of the rampant duplication between national agencies
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such as the American Jewish Committee and ADL… To justify their activities,
the national agencies highlighted how they differed in ideology, mass
constituencies, corporate ‘personality,’ and as separate ‘movements.’ But
MacIver had little patience for these nuances. He advocated streamlining the
entire field and bringing it under the control of federations, arguing that the
major work in community relations must be done ‘not only in but also through
the locality’ — i.e., the domain of each federation.81
In November 1951, the Special Committee adopted MacIver’s report, and the NCRAC
Plenary session passed a resolution urging the formulation of new protocols on the basis
of the report’s findings. While reaffirming NCRAC’s commitment to voluntarism,
agency autonomy, and the right to dissent, it called for measures to “relate financing to
the joint planning of program, so that the total funds available for national community
relation activities will be distributed on the basis of the entire program.”82 For the AJC
and ADL, this language ominously recalled the earlier controversy around national
advisory budgeting and confirmed the agencies’ suspicions that the CJF intended to
launch an all-out assault on their financial autonomy. When the General Assembly
endorsed NCRAC’s position in December, the AJC’s Jacob Blaustein “deplored” the
move “as further evidence of an attempt on the part of some to mobilize community
pressures against us”—and not just rhetorical pressures. “That there has been such
mobilization I am completely convinced,” he wrote to Lurie, citing “reports to that
effect” from “responsible sources in a number of widely scattered communities” and
confirmed “soon thereafter… in the form of action taken or threatened by various
Welfare Funds.”83 Benjamin Epstein of the ADL accused the CJF of lending “credence to
the charge that there has been a power drive on the part of the professional welfare fund
directors to assume leadership in [the community realtions] field.”84 These dark
premonitions curiously contradicted the AJC’s and ADL’s secondary line of
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argumentation—namely, that most federations were themselves “opposed to national
budgeting because they recognize that it inevitably leads to coercion.” “Federation
executives tend to be very jealous of their own autonomy and of their right to make their
own judgments,” said Slawson, and “the AJC and the ADL wish to preserve their right to
persuade through a voluntary competitive process.”85 These arguments, however, gained
no traction.
The dramatic denouement came during the following NCRAC Plenary in
September 1952, when a set of practical protocols known as the “Barr Resolution” was
adopted as an implementation of the previous year’s directive. Barr provided for the
formalization of a division of labor between national organizations working on NCRAC’s
main issue-areas (civil rights, labor, anti-Semitism, etc.) through majority vote of a
standing committee devoted to each issue. Despite caveats that “each autonomous
member agency may accept or reject” the proposed division of labor “in accordance with
[existing] NCRAC procedure,” and that “the rights of action and dissent of any member
agency…shall remain inviolate,” the AJC and ADL used the resolution’s passage as an
opportunity to withdraw from NCRAC and initiate a decade-long guerilla war against the
federations.86 The smaller agencies—not only the AJCongress, but also the Jewish Labor
Committee and the Jewish War Veterans—supported the Barr Resolution and aligned
themselves with the federation position. On one hand, they were already narrowlyfocused agencies whose specialized mandates could hardly be challenged (the
AJCongress, by this point, had dedicated itself to civil rights litigation). On the other
hand, absent any significant economic capital of their own, the smaller organizations had
little to gain and much to lose from a rupture with the welfare funds. “Since all the
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agencies in the field are supported not only by their own memberships but out of the
general funds of the Jewish community,” remarked Isaac Toubin of the AJCongress, “it is
natural and right that the Jewish community should be concerned about the operations
and activities of the agencies.”87 The AJC and ADL saw things differently. For them,
federation support was simply a well-deserved expression of the community’s
appreciation for all they did. “And we must assume that if they do not approve our
program, they can diminish or even eliminate their financial support,” said Slawson not
long before the AJC’s withdrawal from NCRAC. “But in this event, we would of course
have the right to reinstate the procedure of financing that we surrendered, namely, the
right to appeal directly for support to our membership in the various communities and to
those who believe in our program. We cannot shape our program to suit the desires of
those who hold the purse strings.”88 Threats of this nature reflected a “you need us more
than we need you” attitude—a belief that AJC and ADL partisans represented the hard
core of federation donors—and by late 1952 the two organizations were ready to put this
proposition to the test.
The first step was a propaganda barrage. Even before withdrawing from NCRAC,
the two agencies, united through their Joint Defense Appeal (JDA), were preparing the
ground for a counter-offensive. The ADL circulated two thousand copies of a Zionist
newsletter, Cross-Section, U.S.A., that reported a set of ostensibly anti-Semitic
statements from MacIver’s earlier sociological work in an attempt to discredit his
report.89 David Ullman, a NCRAC co-chairman who also happened to belong to the AJC,
noted sardonically in mid-1952 that “the A.J. Committee is holding its executive session
this weekend, and we will have the usual set speeches on autonomy and ‘monolithic
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octopuses.’” “I am personally getting very fed up with conferences where threats take the
place of arguments and clichés the place of facts,” he told Benjamin Olin, chairman of
the LCBC.90 Offering a particularly illustrative specimen of internal AJC discourse some
years later, Morris Abram told the group’s Executive Board:
The power to control and approve budgets is often turned into a power to control
function and program. This isn’t true only in American Jewish life. It is true in
history. King John was perfectly free in England until it was necessary to
summon the Parliament in order to obtain a budget. King Charles was perfectly
free in England until he had to summon the money-raising agency, and ask its
approval. The King of France was perfectly free until he had to summon the
Estates General in order to obtain funds. It is the experience of history, in all
organizations, among all peoples, that the control of money ultimately involves
control of function.91
This image of the AJC as an absolute monarch under threat from democracy was
apropos, if inconsistent with other political metaphors deployed over the course of the
JDA’s propaganda war. Following the exit from NCRAC, the AJC and ADL “pressed a
vigorous campaign among their members and in the communities, attacking the MacIver
report [and] making wild charges of ‘conspiracy,’ ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘imperialism’
against any who advocated so much as a dispassionate consideration of proposals for
joint planning, division of work, integration.”92 When the CJF endorsed MacIver, “both
agencies professed to see in the action of the General Assembly… a threat ‘of turning the
NCRAC into an authoritarian agency.’”93One AJC partisan disseminated an anti-NCRAC
pamphlet warning that the Barr Resolution “would establish a Kehillah in America.”94
After a certain point, even “the most ardent seekers for compromise” recognized that the
JDA agencies “had, in effect, repudiated the whole underlying concept of the NCRAC.”95
Beyond rhetoric, the dissenting organizations took a series of concrete steps to
threaten or, in some cases, actually destabilize, what they perceived as vulnerable nodes
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in the federation network—communities in which they assessed the combined power of
the AJC and ADL to be commensurate with or superior to that of the federation
professionals. The vehicle for joint action was the JDA, which since 1941 had conducted
joint fundraising operations for the two agencies. Understanding the implications of the
LCBC, in 1950 the JDA preemptively withdrew from the UJA in New York and the
Combined Jewish Appeal in Chicago—two cities in which the AJC and ADL were
practically guaranteed a better return from an independent appeal to their partisans than
from acquiescence to the centralized campaign.96 Elsewhere the JDA was more cautious,
remaining within the welfare fund fold but aggressively mobilizing “friends” across the
country to exert pressure for stable or increased allocations. A JDA mid-year report from
1953 provides some sense of the minutiae:
In one important city where our friends were promised an increase from $50,000
to $55,000, this was reduced to $54,000 in order to allocate $1,000 to NCRAC.
The Sub-Committee later recommended $45,500, the Budget Committee
brought it back to $50,000, and we are now embroiled in a heavy continuous
struggle.97
When the Cleveland welfare fund withheld half of its JDA allocation pending the
implementation of the MacIver report, the JDA ordered a tally of its supporters’ unpaid
pledges to the Cleveland federation—an implied threat of retribution through reciprocal
withholding.98 But the JDA’s standard-issue weapon was the threat of launching an
independent fundraising campaign. In a brief submitted to NCRAC prior to the Plenary’s
debate on MacIver, the ADL recalled that the two JDA agencies “raise approximately 60
percent of [their] funds outside of federations” and forecast the “destruction of the idea of
federated fundraising” should “the welfare funds seek to curtail unduly funds allocated to
these agencies.”99 After NCRAC announced plans to create “an over-all functional
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community relations set-up excluding or ignoring AJC and ADL,” the JDA suggested
that “friends” in “two or three major cities” threaten to “avail themselves of the same
privilege which is given to our friends in New York City and Chicago—namely, to
express their conviction as to our program in terms of directly contributed funds.”100 With
overall federation revenues declining from their high-water mark of 1948, the JDA
predicted with some accuracy that federations, if pressed, would offer concessions in the
form of increased JDA allocations if it meant preempting existential threats to their local
fundraising monopolies. “The inference that Welfare Funds and the JDA are tied up by
some divine right is false,” wrote JDA executive director Samuel Hyman, using another
kingly metaphor. “Welfare Funds must meet the JDA needs or suffer the
consequences.”101
The case of the Greater Miami Jewish Federation illustrates an effective
deployment of the JDA strategy. Founded in 1938, the Miami federation struggled to
raise adequate sums throughout the postwar period, in part because a significant number
of Miami’s Jews were seasonal migrants who pledged their annual contributions to
federations in their cities of permanent residence. Fundraising shortfalls in the late 1950s
led to the retrenchment of JDA allocations, and in 1961 the JDA rejected the federation’s
proposed $23,500 contribution and threatened to withdraw from the following year’s
campaign unless it received more than three times that amount.102 In a concerned letter to
the CJF, Arthur Rosichan, head of the Miami federation, worried that the JDA’s
“withdrawal from Federation could very well start a pattern of withdrawals on the part of
other agencies dissatisfied with our allocations, and this could mean the eventual breakup of Federation.”103 Rosichan’s suspicion was reiterated in an internal CJF memo, which
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characterized the JDA’s actions in Miami as “an attempt at an opening wedge in picking
off the weaker federations one by one.” “In essence,” the memo complained, “JDA has
set up an office for its Miami operations and is using this office to break up a community,
now having difficulties, in order to primarily finance its own Miami office.” At the same
time, CJF officials believed the Miami federation had “more or less built itself into this
present impasse” through “loose organization in the past and through failure to develop a
local CRC” that could have wrested area defense work away from the JDA
organizations.104 Rather than allowing the JDA to withdraw and risk precipitating the
demise of Miami’s federation, Rosichan agreed to double its allocation for 1962 and
authorize a supplementary JDA campaign limited to “plug” gifts (that is, gifts over and
above the giver’s baseline contribution to the federation).105
Miami was not an isolated case. According to records, the JDA forced
supplementary campaigns in numerous cities, usually through similar power plays. In
Newark, according to an AJC memo from 1953, the JDA moved forward with an
independent campaign, receiving an immediate $25,000 in pledges. “At that point, the
welfare fund asked the JDA to return to the fold on the basis of a minimum guaranty for
1953 of $35,000. Our friends in Newark have served notice that failure to honor this
pledge will mean immediate reversion to an independent campaign.”106 The result going
forward was a “special arrangement for JDA supplementary giving” alongside the annual
federation campaign.107 From the JDA’s point of view, the lesson of Newark was clear:
“Withdrawal cannot be discussed, it must be done.”108 Across the country, rumors of JDA
defection fueled concern among welfare fund professionals. “From some of the
scuttlebutt coming my way,” wrote the head of the St. Louis federation, “I get the
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impression that the JDA and its agencies… are beginning to discuss among themselves
the wisdom of setting up independent drives in various cities where they feel they might
be able to do better financially than at present.”109 Minutes of a joint AJC-ADL
coordinating meeting reveal that, by 1959, the JDA had won supplementary campaigns in
sixteen of the thirty top welfare fund cities, and that “in the remaining 14 cities where we
do not have a supplementary fundraising program, allocation income has declined.” “It is
apparent,” the minutes concluded, “that the supplementary fundraising program…
provides effective leverage for exerting pressure on the community power structure and
potentially is the greatest source of future income.”110
In order to win agreement to supplementary campaigns, however, the JDA
agencies needed local troops on the ground—in particular, troops with big wallets. “[T]o
a large extent,” wrote Hyman, “the JDA allocation is determined by the degree of
participation of large contributors… JDA leaders, when stating our case before Welfare
Fund committees, must be prepared to give directly.”111 In cities where the AJC and ADL
commanded an insufficient reserve of well-heeled partisans, declining allocations were
difficult to counteract. Detroit, for instance, was “the most hostile welfare fund in the
country to AJC and ADL, and is, indeed, watched by other welfare funds for setting an
example.”112 Isadore Sobeloff, executive director of the Detroit federation, was a staunch
advocate of NCRAC and the MacIver report—and consequently a JDA adversary who
withheld allocations as a tool of coercion.113 But the problem from the JDA’s point of
view was not personalistic. Rather, it was the weakness of local JDA representation:
“Neither AJC nor ADL is strong in the community, and more often than not, the JDA
allocation is secured by people who do not have a primary identification with either of
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the agencies.”114 To remediate vulnerabilities nationally, the AJC and ADL pursued a
parallel strategy of expanding their local presence through aggressive branch- and
chapter-building activities in cities and regions without prior representation. The basic
objective was to set up shop and exert directive control over civic protective activities
before the federation and welfare fund professionals could create independent JCRCs. It
was cognizance of this modus operandi that led the LCBC to oppose the use of
community funds to support the agencies’ chapter-building activities. Responding to the
LCBC’s complaint, Proskauer defended AJC chapters as “nuclei for imparting to the
general Jewish constituency in a particular locality, desirable points of view and plans of
action.”115 That, however, was exactly the problem from the federations’ perspective.
JCRCs had long been recognized as a threat by the JDA organizations. As early as
1944, a member of the AJC’s administrative committee “stressed the fact that the
maintenance of local defense agencies in the large Welfare Fund cities has a tendency to
cut down the allocations from the Welfare Funds to the national agencies.”116 By the
early 1960s, the AJC was deeply attuned to “the essential relationship of membership to
AJC's financial existence and its existence as a vital national organization.” Recognizing
that “present membership is grossly inadequate to meet AJC's minimum programmatic
needs,” the organization pushed forward an aggressive chapter expansion program that
would attempt to translate its economic capital into grassroots heft (social capital), “even
to the extent of diverting some funds from ongoing programs.”117 Despite its more
extensive grassroots presence, the ADL felt similar pressures to preempt JCRC
development. An LCBC report from 1949 complained that the ADL
seems to insist upon its right to conduct direct operations even where a local
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[JCRC] exists and upon its right to evaluate whether the local agency is or is not
performing an adequate job. Another source of confusion is that the ADL bases
itself upon the B’nai B’rith constituency as the nucleus for its local operations
but at the same time seeks to establish community-wide committees under ADL
auspices. The record indicates that the ADL community service program has
expanded steadily despite the greater development of locally organized and
administered agencies for this type of work.118
Between 1946 and 1949, the ADL doubled the number of regional offices it maintained
from eleven to twenty-two. In a letter to ADL board members, Epstein recounted the
local resistance the organization incurred during its expansion into southern Illinois:
“Opponents of ADL and proponents of a state community relations office, headed by
federation and welfare fund leaders, promptly requested NCRAC to conduct a special
survey on the needs of the area.” The survey recommended creating both an ADL office
and a state-wide JCRC, but local leadership eventually decided that the latter “be rejected
in the face of the present activity of the Anti-Defamation League, with the understanding
that a representative board of directors be chosen by the local communities in outstate
Illinois.”119 This represented a victory for the ADL. Through proactive investments, it
had managed to preempt an independent JCRC and successfully embed itself in southern
Illinois’s Jewish community relations structure. Although welfare fund professionals
greatly preferred independent JCRCs, when resources were scarce, federations could
hardly justify the expense of a full-time community relations operation where an existing
agency was already performing the task adequately. With this knowledge, the ADL
attempted similar entrees in Des Moines, Buffalo, and elsewhere, with varying degrees of
success.120
Where the ADL and AJC managed to gain local footholds, they used their
influence not only to boost JDA allocations but also to enlist local communities in their
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campaign against NCRAC. A 1961 joint memo from the Houston chapters of the AJC
and ADL urged the city’s JCRC not to affiliate with NCRAC in protest of the
federations’ drive towards “centralism.”121 While most JCRCs embraced the federationNCRAC agenda, a handful threw in their lot with the JDA. In a series of letters to
affiliated JCRCs, NCRAC importuned them to bring pressure on Jewish leadership in
neighboring states to affiliate with NCRAC and contribute their fair share of membership
dues. “Denver is the only community in the United States in the intermediate and largesize category that makes no contribution whatever to NCRAC,” complained a letter to
federation officials in Kansas. “The community is under the complete influence and
control of the ADL… Any influence that could be brought to bear on their Allied Jewish
Community Council would be most welcome.”122 Dallas, similarly, was “completely
dominated by the American Jewish Committee,” and had “not affiliated with NCRAC,
again because of American Jewish Committee influence.”123 “Seattle is very strongly
under the influence of ADL and American Jewish Committee,” said a letter to Herbert
Leland of the San Francisco JCRC. “When ADL and Committee left NCRAC following
the MacIver Report, the [Seattle] community was closed to NCRAC.”124
Despite all their successful power plays, however, the AJC and ADL did not
prevail over the federations. David Ullman, the NCRAC co-chairman who also belonged
to the AJC, predicted the failure of the insurgency as early as 1952. “I feel very strongly,”
he wrote “that the National Agencies, particularly the J.D.A. Agencies, should be coming
to us, beseeching us to set up” a committee to implement the MacIver report.
It is infinitely more to their advantage than it is to the advantage of anybody
else, including the L.C.B.C. Last year they got about $1,800,000 apiece. This
year, they have about $1,300,000, and next year, without some such review
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committee to dispel the widely held belief—which I, incidentally, do not
share—that there is widespread duplication and waste and that their
intransigence is to prevent its being discovered and eliminated, they will be
lucky to get a million dollars each… They are now in a bad, and steadily
worsening financial position.125
From the beginning, federations held an inbuilt advantage: they controlled the money.
Scattered partisans of the national agencies, however vigorous, could only do so much to
counter the federations’ overwhelming corporate interest in efficiency and functional
coordination. “In the average community,” Hyman acknowledged, the “JDA represents
an absolute minority.”126 While a handful of especially adversarial federations issued
overt threats to terminate JDA allocations unless the AJC and ADL returned to NCRAC,
hostile declarations were not strictly necessary. Rather, allocations committees could—
and did—simply implement reductions, citing low fundraising returns or pressing
community needs, quietly forcing the AJC and ADL to reap the fruits of their
intransigence. According to JDA internal records, Ullman’s prophecy was not far off:
between 1951 and 1958, total annual federation allocations to the JDA declined
slightly.127 Figure 3.4, constructed from American Jewish Year Book data, depicts a
minor increase over the same period. In either case, the rate of change suggests stagnation
in comparison to the escalating receipts of the early 1940s, prior to advent of the LCBC.
By the 1960s, the head of the AJC’s campaign cabinet was forced to acknowledge that
“the welfare fund industry was no longer a growth industry.”128 Stagnant JDA returns
fostered conflict between the AJC and ADL over what constituted a just distribution of
funds, exacerbating tensions that already existed inside the organization. Both constituent
agencies conceived the JDA in tactical, opportunistic terms, rather than as an organic
solidarity. As a confidential memo reveals, the AJC engaged in a comprehensive power
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mapping of local communities to determine whether continued participation in the JDA
would yield the AJC higher returns than would the alternative of disbanding the
collaboration and entering into direct competition with the ADL.129 By 1962, internal
tensions had reached a breaking point, and the JDA dissolved itself.

Figure 3.4

The details of the JDA’s collapse are not illuminating except insofar as they
reflected heightened demands by both organizations to launch separate, supplementary
campaigns outside JDA auspices in order to shore up insufficient allocations. The AJC
felt the JDA was preventing it from fundraising on the basis of its international work and
demanded an unlimited right to solicit additional allocations from welfare funds
specifically for its overseas advocacy. The ADL, having no overseas program of its own
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and predicting diminished returns for its domestic work should it grant such a request,
refused. For its part, the CJF was enthused by the breakup. Since the ADL’s objections to
federation processes “had never been on philosophical grounds—rather the questions
involved were practical ones of financial benefits,” the CJF saw “a greater likelihood that
the ADL could now participate in the LCBC budget process.”130 That prediction soon
became reality. The “practical and timely reason for moving into the LCBC relationship,”
the CJF’s Bernstein remarked, was that the “ADL will be coming directly to the Welfare
Funds for grants. It will require the fullest and most sympathetic understanding it can
build in the Welfare Funds. The involvement in the LCBC process should be a part of
that development.”131 The return to NCRAC would take slightly longer, surmised the
head of the ADL, “because we sold our people so hard at the time of the MacIver
study.”132 In fact, the reunions occurred simultaneously, at the November 1962 General
Assembly in Dallas. The ADL was now firmly within the federation fold, leaving the
AJC isolated.
At its December 1962 administrative board meeting, the AJC lamented its new
condition. One board member who had attended the General Assembly and witnessed the
ADL’s return reported that
the immediate impact appeared to be a public relations coup for the AntiDefamation League... There is a feeling that this development will make AJC’s
approach to allocations committees more difficult— and so renewed
consideration should be given to LCBC participation. There was no feeling that
AJC join the NCRAC under its present pattern. Also, it was generally felt that if
AJC continues to remain apart from these two ‘coordinating’ groups an effective
community interpretation job will be required.133
While other board members echoed “the fear that if AJC remains apart from LCBC a
negative impact will be made on our efforts to obtain funds,” not everyone was worried.
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Joseph Willen, longtime director of the New York federation and AJC board member,
argued that “tendencies toward centralism in the American Jewish community are
weakening and centrifugal forces are now more effective.” Citing the “waning dominance
of federations” and the “growth of independent funds,” Willen “saw this pattern as the
‘wave of the future,’ and thought [the] AJC would gain in strength, prominence, and
respect by continuing its principled independence.”134 As Chapter 6 demonstrates, Willen
was prescient in his own way, but the centrifugal tendencies he foresaw would take an
additional thirty years to fully manifest themselves. In the meantime, the AJC was
grappling with serious financial troubles. At the same December board meeting, the
AJC’s fundraising chair “drew attention to the perilous shortage of funds and reserves for
supporting AJC's program,” and warned that the first year of independent campaigning in
more than two decades would naturally prove difficult.135 By 1964, following the
approval of an austerity budget “entail[ing] a reduction of program in vital areas,”136 the
executive board had come to the conclusion that the “AJC's representatives should
continue to extend every effort, consistent with the retention of basic principles, to reach
a satisfactory arrangement with LCBC.”137 In 1965, the AJC rejoined both the LCBC and
NCRAC, having availed upon the latter to implement a set of cosmetic changes to its
“Statement of Purposes” embracing “the reciprocal concepts of common cause and
voluntarism.”138

Conclusion: Coercion and Consensus in the American Jewish Ethnopolitical Field
“It is only during the last few years that it has been possible to speak about the
American Jewish community without being challenged,” said Isaiah Minkoff in his
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keynote address to the 1969 NCRAC Plenary. According to Minkoff, what produced the
emergent consensus on the existence of a Jewish community was not the hegemony of
“any one single view of Jewish life or any one single centrality.” On the contrary, what
fostered the shared belief in “community-ism,” he said, was the creation of sound
institutional processes that ensured the representation of “all legitimate expressions of
Jewish life—religious, ideological, cultural, social, domestic, international,” their
“involvement in decision-making and planning,” their “participation in collective or
concerted action”—and “all of this by free choice.” These institutional processes, which
facilitate “challenge and creative conflict” through “continual competition within the
community for priorities,” were, on Minkoff’s view, embodied in the newly re-unified
NCRAC. As “the instrument for seeking effective cooperation” within “a framework
embracing the reciprocal concepts of common cause and voluntarism,” NCRAC was the
Jewish community in action. “The exchange of views, the clashes of interest, the
deepening of understanding, the vitality of concern, the feeling of participation and
involvement that enter into the [NCRAC] process are themselves the ingredients of which
community is made.”139
But if Minkoff’s voluntaristic community was an impressive achievement, it was,
as we have seen, an achievement premised on decades of material coercions and countercoercions that ultimately thrust the antagonistic players into a lasting accommodation.
The federations unquestionably triumphed, forcing the AJC and ADL to submit to a
rigorous budget review process while defensively expanding and buttressing their
network of independent JCRCs, coordinated and programmatically aligned through
NCRAC. While the AJC and ADL lost the war, their institutional capacities were
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nonetheless strengthened by the battle. Through their allied campaign of resistance, the
two agencies forged new local chapters and regional offices that enhanced their financial
autonomy, enabling them to gradually wean themselves off federation dependency while
constructing the permanent financial endowments that long-term survival required. At the
same time, the AJC and ADL submitted to a communal process that channeled their
institutional resources and capabilities into a common cause directed by JCRC and
NCRAC officials. Thus was the American Jewish ethnopolitical field transformed
through the unification of prior antagonists—dominants and dominated alike—into a
single dominant coalition. The resulting community relations dynamo, whose operations I
explore in Chapter 5, wielded grassroots powers unequaled before or since.
In making such a collaboration possible, the economic coercions deployed by the
federation system were the material thrusters of a centralization process that had equally
important symbolic dimensions. The Holocaust and the creation of Israel in 1948
dramatically transformed the ideological cleavages that once structured field contests
between Jewish nationalists and anti-nationalists. New international and domestic
political realities placed great strain on the once-dominant anti-nationalist camp,
precipitating internal fragmentation and an overall reconstruction of ideological alliances
in the field. That reconstruction, in turn, eased communal unification under the NCRAC
aegis. The AJC’s eventual capitulation to the federation system owed as much to the fact
that its ideological conflicts with Jewish nationalism had abated as it did to the
organization’s dire financial straits. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, those two
factors were closely linked. While the events of the 1940s presented Zionists with a
symbolic coup, the outcomes of the material struggles described above were decisive in
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creating the institutional pathways through which grassroots pro-Israel sentiment could
exert concrete financial impacts on the national political organizations, reshaping their
official ideological commitments in the process.
As the creation of Israel and the Six Day War eroded old ideological cleavages,
new ones were born. In Minkoff’s phrase “all legitimate expressions of Jewish life,” one
can read the present-absence of the ideologically dominated: those beyond the pale of
legitimacy. As we will see in the next chapter, that position was first inhabited by the
American Council for Judaism, a key catalyst in the transformation of the Jewish
communal agenda from one dedicated to combatting anti-Semitism into one preoccupied
with the defense of Israel. Unlike the relative power parity that characterized the struggle
for field dominance between the federations and the JDA, the post-1967 Jewish
ethnopolitical field was a far more unequal arena, due in no small part to the processes
described above. In that new asymmetrical context, the coercions applied to dominated
positions became at once more formidable and less conspicuous, rooted as they were in a
long-forgotten prehistory of power consolidation. If, as we explore in Chapter 6,
institutional survival subsequently became something of a Sisyphean task for dominated
insurgents, it was because the struggle for monopoly control of the field’s economic and
symbolic capital had already long been decided—in their competitors’ favor.
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Chapter 4
Transforming the Nomos of the Field:
The Defeat of Anti-Zionism and the Rise of the Israel Lobby, 1942-1956
Introduction
It has become a cliché in discussions of American Jews and Israel to identify
the Six Day War as a turning point, a critical juncture that cemented the bonds of
peoplehood between the world’s two largest Jewish communities. But for all the
emotional electricity generated by Israel’s lightning victory in June 1967, the
institutional machinery it helped supercharge had been operating on a continuous
basis since the Suez Crisis of 1956. The surge of Jewish enthusiasm and awareness
associated with 1967, intensified by broader cultural upheavals in American society,
was channeled through a grassroots, pro-Israel apparatus almost fifty years in the
making. As described in the previous chapter, the basic infrastructure of the
communal apparatus was assembled over the course of a protracted struggle between
the Jewish federation system and the national community relations agencies. The
creation and fortification of the National Community Relations Advisory Council
(NCRAC) and its associated network of local Jewish Community Relations Councils
(JCRCs) was the outcome of this initial developmental process. But until the second
half of the 1950s, NCRAC’s mandate was exclusively domestic. Accommodating
key non-Zionist power players in the philanthropic and defense spheres required that
the question of Palestine be relegated beyond the scope of legitimate community
relations concern. Thus, a critical realignment of priorities and commitments would
have to occur before the communal apparatus could be placed at the disposal of pro195

Israel advocacy. That realignment is the subject of the current chapter.
As the federations waged their quiet battle for communal centralization, the
twin shocks of the Second World War and the creation of Israel precipitated the
fragmentation of the non-Zionist “center” in American Jewish politics. In the
aftermath of the Holocaust and the fait accompli of Jewish statehood in Palestine,
non-Zionists were forced to grapple with the implications of their longstanding,
principled opposition to Jewish nationalism. How would non-Zionists reconcile the
sudden fact of Jewish sovereignty with the imperative of undivided political
allegiance to the United States? Two divergent perspectives on this question split the
non-Zionist body politic after 1948. The first perspective, espoused by the American
Jewish Committee (AJC), called for pragmatic adaptation to new realties. Conceding
Israel’s hold on the Jewish imagination, the AJC advocated for multicultural
democracy at home while advancing the idea of Israel as an American Cold War
asset. In adopting this strategy, the Committee was in part motivated by financialinstitutional considerations flowing from the organized community’s intensely
negative reaction to the alternative perspective, championed by the American
Council for Judaism (ACJ). Emerging in 1942 from a schism in the Reform
rabbinate, the Council represented a crystallization of extreme anti-nationalist
tendencies that could no longer find expression in the AJC. It not only rejected
Zionism and Israel, but tended to regard expressions of Jewish ethnic particularism
as stimulants to anti-Semitism. By insistently raising the specter of “dual loyalty”
and other seemingly conspiracy-theoretic charges in the national press, the Council
managed to unite Zionists and non-Zionists against it. A new communal consensus
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was forged in large part through the coordinated exclusion and reputational
destruction of the American Council for Judaism.
In the first two sections of this chapter, I explore the fracturing of nonZionism and assemble an ideological portrait of the American Council for Judaism.
Once again, I draw on Bourdieu’s conceptual repertoire to discipline my findings,
framing the interactions between Zionist, non-Zionist, and anti-Zionist organizations
in terms of their impact on the “nomos” of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field.
In the third section, I trace the institutional processes of layering and conversion
through which NCRAC cast off its initial restraints on pro-Israel advocacy. In
attempting to prosecute the fight against domestic anti-Semitism in the early 1950s,
NCRAC and its constituent agencies increasingly encountered what they described
as “pro-Arab propagandists”—university students or national circuit speakers who,
in the course of their presentations, were said to blur the lines between Jews and
Israel, thereby raising suggestions of “dual loyalty.” To counter the spread of the
“dual loyalty” canard, NCRAC reframed “pro-Arab propaganda” as a source of
domestic anti-Semitism, in effect constituting it as a legitimate object of community
relations activity. By early 1956, NCRAC had resolved to combat “pro-Arab” antiSemitism by waging a vigorous and ongoing public relations campaign aimed at
promoting Israel as a strategic U.S. ally in the war against Communism. Having
served its function as a bridge between pre- and post-Israel visions of the American
Jewish ethnopolitical field, the link between domestic anti-Semitism and the Middle
East conflict soon disappeared as an articulated rationale for pro-Israel advocacy.
Lobbying for Israel took on a life of its own and would continue to dominate the
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NCRAC agenda for more than thirty years.

Zionism, Non-Zionism, and the Nomos of the American Jewish Ethnopolitical Field
According to Bourdieu, every field is constituted by a “principle of vision and
division”—a nomos—that circumscribes its domain of interest, constrains the behavior of
field contestants, and defines the particular form of capital at stake in the field. Rohit
Chopra writes:
[The] nomos is neither a transcendental eternal idea nor a principle of abstract
logic. It is a historically shaped view that reflects the interests of the groups that
hold dominant positions in a field. It is, in this sense, arbitrary because there is
no necessary or intrinsic reason for one principle as opposed to another to orient
the functioning of the field.1
To describe a field’s nomos is thus to provide an empirical account of the emergent
principles that appear to structure the competitive behavior of actors as they seek to
monopolize a particular form of symbolic capital. Broadly, the nomos of the American
Jewish ethnopolitical field is characterized by a recognition of the distinction between
Jews and non-Jews, a presumed identity of interest among American Jews (however
defined), and a commitment to advancing that interest in the public domain. As Chopra
notes, while the nomos “is the constitutive structure of a field,” its specific interpretation
is arrived at through the ongoing struggle of contestants. Changes in the identity or
ideological orientation of a field’s dominant coalition can transform the prevailing
interpretations of the nomos. Conflicts in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field are
therefore conflicts over the proper interpretation of American Jewish interests and the
most effective program for advancing them. The unique capital at stake in these
contests—the prize enjoyed by the dominant coalition and coveted by insurgent
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challengers—is legitimacy in the public representation of American Jews (Jewish
representational capital). In what follows, I trace the process through which an
interpretation of the American Jewish nomos that held sway since the birth of the field
was displaced by an alternative interpretation in the period between 1942 and 1956. In so
doing, I focus on the role of the Second World War and the creation of Israel in
catalyzing a reconfiguration of ideological alignments in the field.
As we observed in the previous chapter, the distribution of economic endowments
in a field is the principal determinant of outcomes. But capital distributions are not
static—rather, they are shaped by the dynamic interaction of higher-order processes. Like
the fields Bourdieu examines in his empirical work, the American Jewish ethnopolitical
field is ensconced in a “field of power” comprised of political and economic fields that
operate according to their own distinctive nomoi, and which impose limitations on
subordinate fields through their impact on capital distributions. For example, a regime
change in the political field can result in the destruction or expropriation of capital
endowments held by dominants in lower-order fields, toppling old hierarchies and
revolutionizing the makeup of dominant coalitions. Less drastically, a slowly shifting
balance of forces in the economic field—brought about by technological developments,
say—can redistribute economic capital in the political field, eventually changing the
makeup of the governing coalition. In this chapter, I highlight the limitations imposed on
the American Jewish ethnopolitical field by the field of American politics. The
ideological antagonisms that structured intra-Jewish competition as it developed at the
turn of the century were tightly bound up with the normative demands of the American
political field. Recall, for instance, that the philanthropic institutions set up to acculturate
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Eastern European immigrants in part reflected the convictions of the German-Jewish
bourgeoisie as to the incompatibility of Zionism, Communism, and other immigrant
ideologies with the reigning patriotic-nationalist and white supremacist interpretation of
the American political nomos. The rudiments of the federation system were thus
established to ameliorate the dangers emanating from the American political field.
No less cognizant of the constraints of American politics, early Zionist leaders
formulated discursive innovations aimed at reconciling Jewish nationalist ideology with
the minimal requirements of the American nomos.2 In what Melvin Urofsky calls the
“Brandeisian synthesis,” future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis asserted the
complementary nature of Zionism and Americanism. “The highest Jewish ideals are
essentially American,” he proclaimed. “It is Democracy that Zionism represents. It is
Social Justice which Zionism represents… Zionism is the Pilgrim inspiration and impulse
over again.”3 The conceptual framework known as “cultural pluralism,” first developed
by philosopher (and lifelong Zionist) Horace Kallen, likewise functioned to normalize
Jewish nationalism by re-envisioning American democracy as a patchwork of ethnic
communities.4 Thus was European political Zionism discursively transformed into
American “Palestinianism,” an essentially charitable orientation towards Jews overseas
that was “devoid of any characteristic which might provoke conflict between Zionist
beliefs and American obligations,” as one historian put it.5 Brandeis’ leadership of the
American Zionist movement fatefully coincided with the immiseration of European
Jewry during the First World War, propelling movement membership into the hundreds
of thousands. But organized Zionism proved remarkably unstable. Membership in the
Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the largest of the national formations, fell from
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its wartime peak of 149,000 dues-paying members to 18,500 in 1922 before hitting an
absolute nadir in the early 1930s. It then rebounded in response to Nazism, surging from
43,453 members in 1939 to more than a quarter of a million by 1948.6 Following the
creation of Israel, enthusiasm for Zionism deteriorated once more, this time abetted by
the Israeli government’s deliberate marginalization of the ZOA.7 The timing and
magnitude of these fluctuations would appear to confirm American Zionism’s mass
appeal as a philanthropic enterprise—a “Zionism of rescue” responsive to crises abroad.
Only an ideological core of American Zionists fetishized Jewish territorial sovereignty,
and even fewer were prepared to heed Zionism’s messianic call for the “negation of the
diaspora”—the mass immigration of Jews to Palestine.
To the extent that American Zionism was conceived as a humanitarian project, the
average dues-paying Zionist scarcely differed from the self-described “non-Zionists” of
the American Jewish Committee. “The concept of non-Zionism in the United States,” one
historian notes, “came to mean opposition to a nationalist ideology, coupled with the
support of practical programs of settlement and development in Palestine.”8 Indeed, as
the wealthiest sector of American Jewry, non-Zionists of German extraction furnished
much of the philanthropic capital on which the survival of the Yishuv (the pre-state
Jewish community in Palestine) depended. As described in the previous chapter, what
motivated non-Zionists to assume an independent and adversarial posture vis-à-vis the
Zionist movement was their opposition to “world Jewish nationalism,” a doctrine they
considered deeply inimical to the prevailing American nomos. The AJC first modeled its
non-Zionist approach to Palestine in response to the Balfour Declaration, which pledged
Great Britain to facilitate the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
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Jewish people,” while ensuring that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” In an April 1918 statement, the
AJC “welcomed” the Declaration “with profound appreciation,” professing
“wholehearted sympathy” with “Jews everywhere who, moved by traditional sentiment,
yearn for a home in the Holy Land.” At the same time, the statement foregrounded the
Declaration’s guarantee of Jewish civil status and hailed American Jews as “loyal and
patriotic citizens” with an “unqualified allegiance to this country, which they love and
cherish and of whose people they constitute an integral part.”9 For the next three decades,
the Committee would continue to navigate cautiously between contending nomoi,
asserting the undivided patriotism of American Jews and opposing what it considered the
excesses of Jewish nationalism—including, until 1947, demands for political sovereignty
in Palestine—while also embracing a fraternal, humanitarian responsibility for Jews
everywhere, including the Yishuv.
Although popular ideological sentiment began to shift in the 1930s, until World
War II, the non-Zionist vision dominated the American Jewish ethnopolitical field by
virtue of its proponents’ superior material endowments and control over important
communal institutions. By 1956, the AJC’s careful blend of anti-nationalism,
integrationism, and philanthropic Palestinianism had been decisively supplanted by an
anti-Communist “pro-Israelism” that would typify the nomos of the field for decades to
come. The story of this transition is not a story about the triumph of American Zionist
organizations. It is instead a story about the fracturing of non-Zionism under the impact
of exogenous developments, and the subsequent realignment of the major non-Zionist
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fraction with pro-Israelist forces against an emergent third term: reactionary Jewish antiZionism. As the war progressed, submerged tensions within the non-Zionist camp were
brought to the surface by a radicalization of the Zionist position. The war not only
threatened the annihilation of European Jewry, it also jeopardized the security of the
Yishuv and the future of the Zionist project. Britain’s 1939 “White Paper” sharply
curtailed Jewish immigration to Palestine just as continental anti-Semitism intensified,
prompting American Zionists to establish a united front organization, the Emergency
Committee for Zionist Affairs. In 1943, under the leadership of Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver,
the front changed its name to the American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC) and
launched an aggressive grassroots campaign aimed at securing U.S. support for a “Jewish
commonwealth” in Palestine.10 Following decades of strategic ambiguity, the Zionist
movement had at last declared its goal of a “Jewish commonwealth” at the Biltmore
Conference of 1942. The following year, American Zionists successfully reprised their
World War I-era push for a democratically elected congress to represent all of American
Jewry in postwar peace negotiations. When the resulting “America Jewish Conference”
voted to endorse the Zionist platform, the AJC staged a withdrawal, signaling non-Zionist
resistance to the erosion of Palestinianism and the emergence of a more overtly political
Zionist agenda.11 The AZEC, for its part, was spurred to radicalism by the appearance of
a hyperactive delegation of Revisionist Zionists, emissaries of the dissident Irgun Zvai
Leumi militia in Palestine. Known as the “Bergson Boys,” they agitated for the creation
of a Jewish army in Palestine to aid the Allied war effort. “The heads of the Emergency
Committee [AZEC],” notes one historian, “realized that only by organizing for bold
political action could it counteract the powerful Irgun propaganda machine.”12
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It was against this general backdrop that one of the most consequential events of
the period took place. As early as 1935, the Reform movement’s rabbinical association,
the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), had begun to loosen theological
restrictions on Jewish nationalism. By the early 1940s, ideological anti-Zionists had been
reduced to a minority of the Reform rabbinate. When the CCAR’s February 1942
assembly passed a last-minute resolution endorsing the “Jewish army” proposal, a group
of rabbis long opposed to the movement’s nationalist drift seized the opportunity to break
with the CCAR and create the American Council for Judaism (ACJ). As a rabbinic
initiative, the early ACJ advocated a return to the theological anti-nationalism of classical
Reform Judaism. By 1948, however, most of the founding rabbis had resigned and the
Council had become a lay anti-Zionist organization under the leadership of Sears,
Roebuck heir Lessing Rosenwald and Rabbi Elmer Berger, its guiding spirit and longtime
executive vice president. The ACJ was demographically similar to the American Jewish
Committee—German-Jewish, upper-class, highly acculturated—and a number of Council
members belonged to both organizations. But whereas the AJC increasingly tempered its
non-Zionist principles to avoid alienating communal sentiment, the Council pursued an
unadulterated anti-nationalist agenda with great zeal and little regard for popular
sensitivities. American Jews, it believed, were ill-informed about the serious threats to
Jewish civic status posed by Zionist machinations, in part due to the failure of ostensibly
non-Zionist agencies to sound the alarm. The Council therefore assumed the burden of
engaging in naked ideological combat with the Zionist movement. The only American
Jewish ethnopolitical organization to oppose the creation of Israel, the Council was
undaunted by the emergence of the Jewish state, redoubling its efforts to warn
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“Americans of Jewish faith” about the dangers of divided political loyalties. In
proclaiming the hard truths it believed Jews (and gentiles) needed to hear, the Council
flouted communal taboos against airing intra-Jewish disputes in public, drawing the ire of
the organized Jewish community down upon itself.13
The emergence of the Council effectively externalized the tensions that recent
events had stirred up within the non-Zionist camp. The traditional preference of the
American Jewish Committee for behind-the-scenes persuasion, and its unwillingness to
match the radicalism of the newly mobilized Zionist movement, stimulated demand for
an alternative approach. From the beginning, the Council linked its fate to the AJC,
which at the time was undergoing an internal leadership struggle between moderate
Palestinianist and assertively non-Zionist factions. “If the non-Zionist element in the
A.J.C. gains control,” one Council founder speculated at a November 1942 meeting,
“they will work with us and supply us with funds. If they fail to gain control, this group
may secede, and their funds will be at our disposal.”14 As it happened, the AJC neither
splintered nor agreed to help facilitate the work of the Council. Even as the Committee’s
hostility deepened, Council leaders remained positively disposed to their erstwhile
comrades. In the event that the Committee should ever decide to implement its nonZionist principles, remarked Rosenwald on more than one occasion, “the work of the
Council would then be finished and we would do whatever we thought right or proper
under such conditions as would then exist: merge with them, collaborate with them, or go
out of existence entirely as having accomplished our mission.”15 But the hoped-for
rapprochement never came. By the end of World War II, open resistance to Zionism
appeared at odds with the AJC’s financial-institutional strategy of local chapter
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development, as well as with its commitment to aiding dislocated European Jews. With a
substantial majority of American Jews believed sympathetic to Zionist objectives in
Palestine, and with hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees languishing in displaced
persons camps, the Committee endorsed the 1947 UN partition resolution on
humanitarian grounds. This choice was predicated on the U.S. government’s support for
the proposal, but after the State Department withdrew its endorsement in early 1948, the
Committee succumbed to decision-making paralysis, unable to reconcile the competing
nomoi that constrained it.16
The considerations motivating the Committee to mute its anti-nationalism during
this period are illuminated in a 1945 letter to AJC scientific director Samuel Flowerman
from Max Horkheimer, the famed “Frankfurt School” philosopher retained by the AJC’s
research department during the war. Lamenting that “apart from the shortsighted and
completely insignificant utterances of the Council for Judaism, no Jewish voice is heard
in this country but the Zionist clarion,” Horkheimer recommended the creation of a
wholly new organization to advocate the non-Zionist position on Palestine. “While, on
this occasion,” Horkheimer wrote, “a positive stand and presentation of the [non-Zionist]
view point would be quite natural for an independent non-Zionist agency, any critical
statement coming directly from the A.J.C. would, in the eyes of many uninformed Jews,
only serve to identify us with the Council for Judaism.”17 Other internal documents from
the period confirm the AJC’s acute sensitivity to any association with the Council. A
memo laying out the AJC’s “Strategy for Influencing Jewish Attitudes” acknowledges
the “suspicions” then prevailing among rabbis and Jewish educators—key suburban
constituencies the Committee hoped to woo—that might prevent them from joining local
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AJC chapters: “These suspicions will boil down to the fear that we are trying to insinuate
by stealth and diplomacy the ideology of Jewish assimilation, or at least of Jewish
coolness, that the Council for Judaism seeks to impose by open conflict.” While
underscoring the need to “resist leaning over backwards and making concessions to
Jewish separatism,” the memo described “the most important function of AJC staff
people” as “demonstrate[ing] concretely that the AJC does not stand for the program of
the Council for Judaism.”18 The identification of anti-Zionism with assimilation through
the boogey of the Council, impressed upon the public mind by so much Zionist activity,
was one ingredient in the redefinition of the nomos of the Jewish ethnopolitical field.19
As I explore in the final section of this chapter, a second and perhaps more potent
ingredient was the identification of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, also projected onto
the Council by the increasingly coordinated machinery of the organized Jewish
community.
The creation of the Jewish state triggered soul-searching within the American
Jewish Committee regarding the proper relationship between Israel and American Jews—
a debate that was clearly bounded on one side by the anathematized positions of the
American Council for Judaism. During the UN partition debate, the Council had
advocated the creation of a unitary democratic state in Palestine, predicting that “a
division of the country based on religious, racial, or ethnic groups is foredoomed to
bloodshed, bitterness, and strife.”20 Following Israel’s declaration of independence in
May 1948, the Council “emphatically declare[d] that the State of Israel is not the state or
homeland of ‘the Jewish people,’” but rather “a foreign state” as far as “Americans of
Jewish faith” were concerned. It warned that Israel’s claims to represent world Jewry
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“impinge upon the authority of the government of every nation of the world over its
citizens of Jewish faith” and “constitute a danger to Jewish citizens whose sole national
rights and obligations belong exclusively to these governments.”21 In rejecting the Zionist
claim to represent Jews everywhere, the Council echoed long-standing principles of the
AJC, which continued after 1948 to declare itself “unalterably opposed” to “world Jewish
nationalism” and to regard its traditional integrationist philosophy as the surest means of
“immunizing” American Jews “against the influence of those groups whose spiritual
assets are not in America but elsewhere.”22 But while the AJC pragmatically
distinguished between hard nationalist doctrines and what it considered the more benign
pro-Israel sentiments of the overwhelming majority of American Jews, the Council
regarded mainstream pro-Israelism as a slippery slope leading to the involuntary
“nationalization” of American Jewry by a foreign power.
In January 1949, the Committee hailed the creation of Israel as “an event of
historic significance” and pledged “within the framework of American interests” to “aid
in the upbuilding of Israel as a vital spiritual and cultural center.”23 But what sort of “aid”
would the Committee furnish, and what exactly did “the framework of American
interests” mean? To consider these questions, the AJC convened an ad hoc “Committee
on the Impact of Israel,” whose underlying points of unity were laid out in an earlier
memorandum of September 1948 entitled “Israel and the AJC Program.” That the AJC
would support the continued immigration of Holocaust survivors to Israel and the
provision of substantial economic aid by both private and governmental donors were
taken-for-granted principles. But other questions remained. “Should the American Jewish
Committee seek to stimulate friendship for Israel in this country?” the memo asked.
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Illustrative of AJC thinking during this transitional period, the memo weighed the
question of pro-Israel advocacy solely in terms of its potential effects on the civic status
of American Jews. “Unquestionably, sympathetic and friendly attitude[s] on the part of
American public opinion for the State of Israel would directly affect the image of the Jew
in this country and considerably enhance his security,” the memo observed. But proIsrael advocacy “must be carefully conducted to obviate any possibility of raising the
allegation of conflicting loyalties and thereby having a boomerang effect on the position
of the American Jew.” Success, moreover, would depend “largely on the extent to which
the political and social structure of Israel resembles or deviates from the American
pattern.”24
At the April 1950 meeting of the ad hoc committee, AJC leaders discussed
whether the provision of humanitarian aid for the resettlement of Jews in Israel
necessitated political support for the Israeli government. One participant answered in the
negative: “We still ought to support world Jewry in matters of philanthropy, education
and culture. This means we want to aid Jewish individuals and a Jewish community, in
Israel as elsewhere, without reference to a Jewish state” (emphasis in original). But the
majority saw things differently. “The difficulty,” replied another committee member, is
“that whereas formerly support of a Jewish community raised no question of support of a
Jewish state, in Israel precisely this question becomes relevant.”
[Since] the fate of the [Israeli Jewish] community depends to a great degree
upon the fate of its political expression, it is artificial to speak of support for the
one and to ignore the other. The more schools and hospitals we support, for
example, the more arms the State can afford to buy. No one... will be convinced
or fooled by this distinction… We ought to recognize these facts explicitly…
and assert that American Jewry wants, and properly so, to see a flourishing and
strong State of Israel.
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Arriving at a consensus, the committee determined that Israel’s “failure” would represent
a “catastrophe” for American Jews “because it would 1) lay Jews open to the charge that
they cannot ever maintain their own state and community, 2) reduce Jewish prestige
enormously, and 3) stimulate or increase insecurity among world and certainly American
Jewry.”25 In other words, Jewish sovereignty had for better or worse tethered American
Jewish security—and thus the nomos of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field—to the
success of the Israeli state-building enterprise.
In the tense Cold War atmosphere of the early 1950s, the AJC imagined Israel’s
“failure” as much in political as in military terms. The upshot of the ad hoc committee’s
April meeting was that American Jewry ought “not only extend aid but also consciously
try to influence Israel to progress further and further in a democratic way,” offering
“American democracy as a model for Israel.”26 The Marxist-Leninist heritage of Mapam,
Israel’s largest opposition party, particularly vexed the AJC. A document summarizing
the committee’s findings warned that “in the case of Israel, we may praise its democracy
today; but tomorrow Mapam, with its pro-Soviet orientation, may come to power in the
government.”27 AJC President Jacob Blaustein, an important lobbyist for Israel during the
Truman presidency, told David Ben-Gurion “explicitly that the support of the American
Jewish community would hinge on Israel’s identification with the Western camp.”28 In
October 1953, when Israel’s reprisal attack on the Jordanian village of Qibya received a
barrage of negative press coverage, the AJC worried the incident would exacerbate
hostile attitudes towards American Jews. “The Kibya incident,” an AJC memorandum
noted, “wherein Jews appear as cold-blooded killers of women and children, adds one
more ugly feature to an image already displeasing to many Americans.” Warning that
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“the charge of ‘dual loyalty’ may gain increasing credence” should American Jews
demand the use of international military force “to pull Israel’s chestnuts out of the fire,”
the memo noted that “the hand of the Mapam may be strengthened as a result,” in turn
breeding further resentment that “might be vented on American Jews who would be
charged with Communist sympathies.” To avert this deadly cycle of events, it urged the
AJC to adopt a media strategy presenting Israel as “the only democracy in the Middle
East” and the “anchor” of a “Middle-East defense system against communism.”29
By the end of 1953, the Committee could speak of “our assumption that by
helping Israel both economically and politically we are acting within the framework of
American interest and that the long-range interests of our country and that of Israel are
parallel.” Accepting as axiomatic that both countries sought “to associate the Near
Eastern peoples with the free world in the struggle against Communism,” the AJC began
pursuing what quickly became the dominant strategy for reconciling the shifting nomoi of
the American and Jewish political fields: asserting Israel’s status as a U.S. Cold War
asset.30 Given the centrality of the East-West conflict to the postwar American nomos, the
strategy of presenting Israel’s interests as ultimately (if not always proximately) aligned
with America’s was sustainable so long as Israel maintained its Western orientation. But
the Soviet alignment of the Arab states would soon rendered that a fait accompli. By the
end of the decade, the notion that Israel’s behavior might reflect negatively on American
Jews and stimulate domestic anti-Semitism had largely disappeared as an explicit
rationale for pro-Israel advocacy. Having served as a bridge between pre- and post-Israel
interpretations of the American Jewish nomos, it faded from internal AJC discourse. AJC
polling data from the late 1950s revealed that Americans were not in the least troubled by
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Jewish support for Israel, or by Israel’s actions themselves.31 A study of the press
response to the October 1956 Suez Crisis, which brought Israel into direct conflict with
the Eisenhower administration, found that most editorial comment supported Israel’s
position over that of the American government.32 While it continued to fret internally
over Zionist and Israeli government statements that it believed might trigger dual loyalty
accusations, the AJC was increasingly reluctant to criticize Zionists, even as it loudly
condemned the American Council for Judaism. In 1958, the AJC voted to suppress a
critical report it had written on “Zionist and Pro-Israel Activities in the U.S.” on the
grounds that “criticism of Zionists would certainly be exploited by anti-Semites.” Were it
to publishing the report, the Committee reasoned, “we would be doing the same thing that
we criticize in the American Council for Judaism.”33

The American Council for Judaism: The Last Gasp of Reactionary Anti-Zionism
With the exception of Thomas Kolsky’s Jews Against Zionism, which covers only
the period between 1942 and 1948, historians have largely ignored the American Council
for Judaism.34 Hasia Diner, for example, devotes only three sentences to the Council in
her Jews of the United States.35 Jonathan Sarna’s American Judaism likewise includes
only two references to the Council, both underscoring its marginality.36 Howard Sachar,
who provides a somewhat more detailed account of the Council’s relationship with the
State Department, concludes that “by the early 1950s, the Council’s peak membership of
some fifteen thousand (in 1944) had dropped off to barely three thousand.”37 In fact, the
Council’s following peaked at around twenty thousand members in the late 1950s, having
successfully rebounded from the resignation of its early rabbinic constituency.38 By way
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of comparison, the American Jewish Committee claimed only fourteen thousand
members in 1950, its research director estimating that Council adherents were “at least as
numerous as ours.”39 Neither the size of the Council nor the fact that it was treated as a
communal pariah can justify its erasure from historical record. On the contrary, the
unremitting attacks to which the Council was subjected by almost all of organized
American Jewry indicate the important role it played in the realignment of the American
Jewish ethnopolitical field after 1948. As the “constitutive outside” of the emerging
coalition of dominants, the Council served as a screen onto which all the antitheses of the
field’s newly hegemonic nomos could be projected. In this section, I attempt to elucidate
the interpretation of the American Jewish nomos for which the Council so unsuccessfully
fought for close to thirty years. Carefully examining the defeated element in American
Jewish life can yield insight into the structural and cultural forces that brought about its
demise.
In his address to the ACJ’s annual meeting in 1945, Executive Director Elmer
Berger offered an illuminating distillation of the Council’s mission as he conceived it.
“The American Council for Judaism,” Berger said, “was born not out of whimsical or
capricious opposition to a particular political formula for Palestine,” but instead
represents “the organized expression of a positive and far-reaching philosophy as to the
destiny of Jews in the modern world.” Tracing its lineage from the dawn of the
Enlightenment through the “great, political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries” that “shatter[ed] the ghetto walls,” Berger identified the Council with an
emancipatory impulse in Jewish and Western history that sought “to free Jews from the
isolation forced upon them on the pretext of separate race, national status and aspirations
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during the middle ages.” Freedom for Jews, Berger insisted, could be achieved only on
the basis of what he called “the universal principle”:
If Jews wished to share the privileges of a new world, they must accept its basic
principles. In religion alone, they might be distinctive and different, since all of
the new states recognized freedom of worship as one of the individual’s
inalienable rights. But in other respects the Jew was expected to integrate
himself; to harmonize his life with the life of the nations into which, as an
individual, he was being accepted on the basis of full equality.
The “very crux of the problem,” Berger told his audience, was that “the self-appointed
spokesmen of Jews—the Jewish nationalists—do not speak the language of
emancipation.” Rather, “they seek to retain a medieval control over a so-called ‘worldwide Jewish people’ and to prevent the emancipation of the individual Jew out of this
ghetto medieval mentality.” Like the “official Jews” of earlier ages, today’s nationalists
undertake a “relentless, ceaseless hammering at the process of integration and
emancipation,” seeking to “discourage that process by labeling it ‘assimilation.’”
“Emancipated Jews,” meanwhile, have either ignored Jewish nationalism or
“concentrated all their opposition on its attempts to realize a political formula for
Palestine.” The Council’s task, Berger declared, was not merely to “pinch off the tip of
Jewish nationalism” in its current Palestinian form but to clarify for American Jewry the
all-encompassing dimensions of the problem, and “with zeal and energy and vision [to]
create an instrument to raze the medievalism in Jewish life” once and for all.40
For close to a quarter of a century, the basic themes of Berger’s speech would
inform the statements and activities of the Council as it attempted to advance an
interpretation of the nomos of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field starkly at odds
with the interpretation of the federation-NCRAC bloc. At the heart of the Council’s
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“fundamental principle of vision and division” was its strict conceptualization of Judaism
as a religious profession, an individualistic commitment to a spiritual doctrine denuded of
all political solidarities. Council leaders were not unaware that such a minimal definition
chafed against the self-understandings of thousands, if not millions of American Jews
who considered themselves Jewish by ethnicity, nationality, or culture. In his writings,
Berger acknowledged the existence of an ethnonationalist strain in Jewish tradition. But
“the point of the Council,” he told members of the Executive Committee in 1951, “[is]
that we reject… this nationalistic tradition in favor of the universalistic tradition” first
shaped into a coherent doctrine by the German Reformers. Council members, Berger
said, “are as apart from the Jew who accepts [the nationalistic] tradition of Judaism as the
Protestant is from the Catholic,” and “the gulf [is] just as unbridgeable.”41 The utility of
this Protestant-style conception of Judaism was its compatibility with what the Council
considered acceptable forms of difference under the liberal nation-state, which ratified a
depoliticized religious pluralism while demanding undivided political allegiance to the
nation. “Religious differences,” the Council resolved at its 1952 meeting, “are an
accepted and respected part of American life, but the manufacture of cultural an external
differences not required by the essential nature of our religion is to be deplored and
avoided.”42 The Council’s interpretation of Jewish identity aimed to resolve tensions
between the nomoi of the Jewish and American political fields by denying the existence
of corporate Jewish interests beyond an interest in the health and survival of liberalism
itself. “The Jew will rise or fall with the extension or contraction of the great, liberal
forces of civilization,” proclaimed an early statement of ACJ principles.43 While the
Holocaust led many to question liberalism’s guarantee of Jewish life and liberty, the
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Council viewed Nazism as a tragic exception to the forward march of freedom in
history—an exception that proved the general rule. “Today,” said Berger in 1945, “even
on the heels of history’s worst set-back to freedom, the overwhelming majority of Jews in
the world are free” thanks to the triumph of liberalism. “To deny that at the end of this
war still more Jews will come to live under systems of government that will endow
individual men with inalienable rights is to proclaim that the war will have been fought in
vain.” It would constitute “a perversion of everything that men hope to achieve” were
Jews to now mimic the same narrow nationalism that had just cost them so much.44
Here it must be recalled that avowedly Zionist organizations like the American
Jewish Congress—not to mention the broad, non-Zionist “center”—were themselves
among the most passionate and effective exponents of postwar American liberalism,
having long embraced theories of “cultural pluralism” that not only legitimized
expressions of subnational, ethnic identity but presented them as the very quintessence of
American democracy. The Council’s conception of liberalism, by contrast, rejected an
overabundance of ethnic particularism as destructive of the nation’s common civic
identity. Non-Zionists, the Council believed, had committed a fatal error in conceding the
doctrine of cultural pluralism to their Zionist adversaries. In clarifying the Council’s
ideological differences with the AJC, its leaders noted the “Committee’s attitude… that it
is quite proper and acceptable for Jews in America to constitute a separate group with its
own distinct cultural life, separate and apart from America.” The Council, on the other
hand, held that “our [Jewish] distinctiveness lies purely in our religious identity, and that
the ‘melting pot’ of America is merging all nationalities and cultures into a distinctive
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American culture of which Jews are, and must be, an integral part.”45 “American Jews,” it
insisted, “are not and ought not to be a cultural entity.”46
A number of ideological and programmatic implications flowed from the
Council’s rejection of cultural pluralism, including its attitude towards anti-Semitism. In
both diagnosis and remedy, the Council’s approach differed appreciably from that of the
mainstream community relations agencies. As Stuart Svonkin explains, the American
Jewish Committee’s postwar collaborations with the Institute for Social Research helped
popularize an understanding of anti-Semitism—and of “prejudice” more generally—as a
form of psychopathology. Notwithstanding the participation of leading “Frankfurt
School” Marxists, the AJC’s Studies in Prejudice series minimized the role of socialstructural factors in the genesis of fascist movements and focused instead on the
dispositions of the “authoritarian personality.” Prevention was said to demand
psychotherapy on a mass scale: a society-wide program of democratic education
“devoted to increasing the kind of self-awareness and self-determination that makes any
kind of [fascist] manipulation impossible.”47 The community relations agencies quickly
operationalized these findings, launching what Svonkin calls a “propaganda crusade” that
utilized all forms of media to “combat negative stereotypes of minority groups, to
demonstrate the deleterious consequences of prejudice, and to emphasize the importance
of intergroup harmony to the advancement of American interests at home and abroad.”48
The idea of inoculating the public against prejudice gelled nicely with a liberal vision that
celebrated expressions of ethnic difference as healthy and desirable. In its own analysis of
anti-Semitism, however, the American Council for Judaism started from a very different
set of premises, and arrived at a correspondingly different conclusion.
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Dr. George A. Lundberg—a University of Washington sociologist who worked
closely with the Council and shared its anti-pluralist bent—offered an alternative account
of the origins of social prejudice at the group’s 1957 annual meeting. “There are many
sets of conditions,” he observed, “under which a community regards with hostility certain
distinct subgroups.” While “groups suspected of intellectual or biological inferiority”
often become the targets of discrimination, “especially does prejudice tend to develop
towards minorities who themselves profess superiority over the dominant majority.”
Addressing himself to the “distinctly Jewish antagonism,” Lundberg identified several
types of behavior thought to “give rise to hostility on the part of the majority group,”
including “conspicuous ethnocentrism,” “political influence out of proportion to their
numbers,” “conspicuous allegiance to any foreign culture, cult, religion, or political
group,” and “great activity and coercive techniques on behalf of such foreign and alien
groups.” Regardless of whether all Jews exhibit these behaviors, “the actual facts,”
Lundberg said, “are less important than the impression created by the pronouncements of
leaders of highly articulate and well-organized factions of a minority group who
undertake to speak for the whole group.” It is the imprudent activities of such minority
spokesmen, and not “the moral turpitude of some people, groups, nationalities, classes,
and races as compared with others,” that form the sociological basis of inter-group
hostility. While Lundberg brooked “no objection” to those who would place the burden
of responsibility first and foremost upon the “perverted prejudicial attitudes” of the
majority group, he warned that, as a practical matter, the preferences of the majority are
largely impervious to the control of minority groups except insofar as their own behavior
is concerned. The most effective prophylactic against anti-Semitism, therefore, is a
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program aimed at reducing excessive manifestations of Jewish ethnocentrism and
separatism.49
Lundberg’s perspective, which prominent colleagues like Nathan Glazer labeled
“obviously anti-Semitic” for its victim-blaming quality, was warmly embraced by the
Council.50 In an earlier essay excerpted in the January 1953 edition of Council News,
Lundberg took aim at the “popularity of the psychoanalytic approach” that “absolves
minorities from any responsibility whatsoever for any prejudice that may exist against
them.” It remained an open question, he wrote, as to “how much of the total hostility to
Jews at present is attributable to psychopathic personalities and how much is attributable
to perfectly rational and justifiable grounds.”51 Prudently, the editors chose not to excerpt
the section of Lundberg’s essay dealing with Nazi anti-Semitism, which he portrayed as a
“rational” response to the international Jewish boycott of Germany.52 But the original
paper, revisionist history and all, was received favorably by the Council’s top
leadership.53 While it would be wrong to conclude that the Council blamed Jews for all
manifestations of anti-Semitism throughout history, it did view Zionism as actively
abetting the racialization of Jews by anti-Semitic movements in both Europe and
America. Sidney Wallach, an important Council strategist, told its 1945 annual meeting
that “Zionist ideology has developed entirely under German influence… with its
emphasis on ‘blood,’ race, [and] descent as the most determining factor in human life.”54
In 1956, the Council initiated an internal research project on the relationship between
Zionism and Nazism. Under the direction of Rabbi Albert Belton, a Hungarian Holocaust
survivor, the project aimed to trace “how the German government in very precise ways
used statements and attitudes of Jews themselves, Zionists, in their propaganda directed
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at other Jews.”55 Discussing the progress of the study at an off-the-record session of the
Council’s 1957 annual meeting, Executive Director Leonard Sussman reported that,
having surveyed eighty percent of all relevant Nazi propaganda, Belton had “prove[n] the
use by the Nazi movement of Zionist statements, reasoning and philosophy”:
Four of the executed war criminals, among them Alfred Rosenberg, the chief
theoretician of the Nazis, used Zionism in their defense at Nuremberg after the
war. They revealed considerable knowledge of Jewish history and Zionist
literature. They made frequent references to Theodor Herzl, Chaim Weizmann
and other prominent Zionists… The Nazis found in Zionism an understandable
similarity to their definition of Jews, Judaism and the future of German Jews.
Consequently, from the earliest days of Nazism, its leaders used Zionism’s own
theories: that Judaism is a race, an organized blood community; that integration
was considered by Jews to be the root of all evil; that Judaism was merely a
camouflage of ‘Jewish nationalism’… [and] that there is an organized hatred of
gentiles by Jews.56
Emphasizing that he in no way intended to “imply that without Zionism there would have
been no Hitler, no persecution and no World War,” Sussman urged that “even without
attributing a causal relationship, we must recognize the dangerous counter-integrative
force that Zionism becomes for Jews in every nation outside of Israel.”57
Behind closed doors, non-Zionist leaders were skeptical of the Council’s motives.
In a memo to AJC vice president John Slawson, Martin Himmelfarb, the Committee’s
research director, questioned the Council’s professed commitment to Judaism as a
religious creed. “I should hazard a confident guess that a very large proportion of the
Council's membership are not religious in any significantly Jewish sense,” Himmelfarb
wrote58. He was not incorrect. As early as 1942, when the Council was still an unnamed
rabbinic initiative, its founders recognized that “so many of our people had so little
interest in Judaism, that the title [of the organization] should include ‘Jew’ as well as
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‘Judaism.’”59 But the suggestion was voted down as inconsistent with the organization’s
ideological thrust. Himmelfarb’s suspicions were later confirmed by a 1967 survey that
classified Council members by ideological subtype. The largest category, making up
forty-five percent of the total membership, was the “Departer Type,” representing those
who believed that “Judaism is a static and dormant tradition” and that “the best Jewish
way of life” involved “the deliberate abandonment of ‘Jewish’ matters and positive
attempts to assimilate to become an indistinguishable portion of the majority
population.”60 In the South, where the Council was most popular, the proportion of
“Departers” was fifty-five percent. In 1958, Irwin Glatstein, a Jewish leader from El
Paso, recounted a candid conversation with Elmer Berger in which the latter expressed
his “disillusionment” with the Council’s membership. According to Glatstein, Berger
“seemed to accept for them some of the ‘psychiatric’ accusations that have frequently
been directed against him: self-hatred, escapism, assimilationism, etc.”61
Himmelfarb saw in the Council’s “compulsive insistence on the exclusively
religious nature of the Jewish community” a desire to stave off racialization by
conforming to white American social patterns. “Since Christianity is the accepted formal
mode of society in the United States, the Council hopes that the parallel mode, Judaism,
will also be acceptable.” But the Council’s claim to champion a “universal,” “prophetic”
Judaism was, on Himmelfarb’s view, grossly belied by its members’ acceptance of white
racial reaction:
The Houston congregation (very Council-minded) proclaims its allegiance to the
“mission of Israel” and to “prophetic Judaism.” The Congregation describes
itself as Jewish in religion, American in nationality, Caucasian in race, and adds
openly that in excluding Negroes it is legislating only for itself… The mission of
Israel would dictate that the congregation set an example in race relations in the
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South, that it be “a light of the nations”… Obviously, in a pinch prophetic
Judaism and the mission of Israel are not taken very seriously… I have an idea
the Council would look upon a man who tried to put prophetic Judaism into
action as a dangerous and fanatical revolutionary, and a menace to American
Jews.62
Berger’s paeans to liberalism sat uncomfortably with the Council’s persistent refusal—
alone among national Jewish organizations—to support the embryonic Civil Rights
movement. In a scathing assessment of the Council released after his 1968 resignation,
former Executive Director Norton Mezvinsky wrote that “the ACJ leadership has vied
with some of the more bigoted circles in this county in its approach to the race problem.”
The Council, Mezvinsky recalled, had refused him permission “to invite any Negro, no
matter what his outlook, to speak at the forthcoming annual conference,” and “decided
against issuing any statement or making any gesture on the death of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.” One member of the ACJ National Executive Committee had “frankly” revealed
to the former E.D. “that he ‘didn’t like too many of those niggers.’” “His, I fear, is a too
typical ACJ leader opinion,” Mezvinsky told the news media on the eve of the Council’s
collapse.63
Invested in an interpretation of the American nomos premised on the maintenance
of a white, Christian monoculture, the Council promoted a Jewish politics consistent in
every respect with that reactionary order. The anti-Zionism of the 1950s was antipluralist, (U.S.) nationalist, and white supremacist, but it also reflected the anxieties of an
acculturated upper and middle class for whom Zionism seemed to threaten dis-integration
from the American body politic. The Council’s assertive approach becomes explicable in
this light. Convinced that Zionists were weaponizing communal institutions to project the
image of a monolithic “Jewish community” unified in support of a foreign power,
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Council leaders resolved to shatter that perception whenever possible by trumpeting their
perspective to the media and elected officials. Conceiving dissent as a form of selfpreservation, they anticipated a day of reckoning—“and not too far off”—when the
American people would turn on Zionism, and all that would stand between Jews and an
anti-Semitic outbreak would be “the record of a group of Americans of Jewish faith who
have seen through this entire problem” from the beginning.64 George Levison of San
Francisco, the Council’s chief foreign affairs analyst, predicted
a situation in the Middle East which is going to be very damaging to the United
States. Questions will be asked. How did it happen? We have already seen what
has happened through the loss of China and the same may take place in the
Middle East. If that should occur, the only record the Jews in the United States
would have would be the Council’s consistent denial of the Zionist position. I
think we should keep building up the record that there are some Jews who want
no part of the group which pressured our government into its pro-Israel
position.65
To his critics, Berger suggested that by drawing a hard line between Jews and Zionists,
he had “done much to moderate Arab propaganda in the U.S.,” and that “eventually
history will vindicate his role.”66 “If Arab diplomats talk of the Zionists and the Israelis,
rather than of the Jews, that is the result of Elmer’s and the Council’s work,” remarked
Levison.67 Privately, Berger even maintained that the Council’s fervent anti-Zionism was,
in the final instance, good for Israelis. “To whatever extent we can lay Zionism low,” he
told the Council’s executive board, “whatever we can do to lay it low, will be a
contribution not only to the United States and to the dignity of American Jews, but the
only hope which the people of the state of Israel have for their own survival.”68
The Council’s record of dissent was indeed prolific, and may well have served to
distinguish Judaism and Zionism in some quarters. But many Jewish observers were
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genuinely disturbed by the tone and framing of the Council’s statements, which not
infrequently took the form of conspiracy-theoretic jeremiads against malign Zionist
influence. From the Council’s point of view, however, there really was a conspiracy
afoot. The organization’s paranoia in part reflected the underlying reality that a vast
institutional machinery was, in fact, being arrayed against it. As early as 1946, the Zionist
Organization of America (ZOA) was reported to have established a special fund of some
half a million dollars “devoted exclusively to combat the activities of the American
Council for Judaism.”69 The Council’s own budget at the time totaled only three hundred
thousand dollars. An object of continuous obsession for the Council was the United
Jewish Appeal (UJA), the major beneficiary of annual federation and welfare fund
campaigns. Council leaders, many of whom contributed generously to local federation
drives with the aim of supporting humanitarian relief for overseas Jewry, believed that
the UJA was secretly diverting a portion of their donations to fund Zionist propaganda
activities in the United States.70 By all accounts, they seem to have been correct.
Confidential documents acquired by the Council in 1942 revealed that hundreds of
thousands of dollars annually were being remitted to U.S.-based Zionist organizations,
including the ZOA, by the United Palestine Appeal, a constituent of the UJA, and by the
Jerusalem-based Jewish Agency, which received the bulk of its funding from annual UJA
campaigns.71 By the early 1960s, according to Howard Sachar, the Jewish Agency was
“surreptitiously divert[ing] back to the American Zionist Council in New York some $4
to $5 million a year to help fund such ‘cultural’ activities as the Herzl Foundation and its
quarterly journal, Midstream.”72 Beyond the fact that Council members’ own charitable
contributions were being used against them, the probable illegality of the UJA’s activities
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under the Foreign Agents Registration Act agitated the Council. Levison “expressed his
hope that there would never be a Congressional investigation of the Zionist lobby”
because “he was frankly frightened at what might result from it.”73 Berger described the
UJA as “an organization ostensibly philanthropic in nature, but which is simply a
conspiracy directed against the Jews of the world.”74 “There are forces in the U.S. which
now seem to be gathering themselves against Zionism and Israel” he warned in 1956.
“We have to point out that people in this country are being asked to give money to help
Jews but what they are actually doing is killing Jews.”75
In the end, there was a Congressional investigation, spearheaded by perennial
Israel-antagonist Senator J. William Fulbright. But while the inquiry appeared to confirm
suspicions about illicit Zionist funding arrangements, none of the doomsday predictions
came to fruition.76 The Council’s decades-long campaign against the UJA failed to sway
Jewish opinion, instead only fueling rumors that anti-Zionists were “against
philanthropy.”77 Notwithstanding a few modest efforts to transmit the Council’s antinationalist Judaism to a younger generation, the conditions of possibility for the
reproduction of reactionary anti-Zionism were quickly evaporating. Anti-Semitic
sentiment declined precipitously over the postwar decades, while a combination of
colorblind liberalism and corporate-backed multiculturalism emerged hegemonic from
the Civil Rights and Black Power struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. American Jews were
increasingly comfortable squaring their identification with Israel and their allegiance to
the United States, especially after the Six Day War cemented Israel’s status as a muscular
Cold War asset. The incentive structures that shaped the social and political dispositions
of Council members—what Bourdieu would call their habitus—had for the most part
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vanished. In his 1968 resignation statement, Mezvinsky drew attention to the Council’s
“exceptionally old membership.” “Attempts to rejuvenate the organization by appealing
to a younger audience,” he complained, were “constantly rebuffed.” Council leaders, it
seemed to the former Executive Director, hoped “to preserve the ACJ as a kind of
exclusive club for wealthy and aging Jews of German extraction who, on the whole,
regarded, and still regard, their Jewishness as a source of embarrassment rather than
pride.”78 Afflicted by endless financial difficulties, the Council would sink irreversibly
into irrelevance after 1967. But its brief period in the spotlight, accompanied by so much
animosity, ultimately helped solidify a pro-Israel consensus within the ascendant
NCRAC-federation bloc.

Slouching Towards Jerusalem: NCRAC and Israel, 1948-1956
The unveiling of the National Community Relations Advisory Council at the
March 1944 General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds
(CJF) culminated a decades-long federation push to foster coordination between local
JCRCs and the national Jewish defense agencies. NCRAC’s initial membership included
the “big three” community relations agencies, the Jewish Labor Committee, and fourteen
JCRCs. Over time, other national organizations affiliated, including the Jewish War
Veterans of America, the National Council of Jewish Women, the Union of American
Hebrew Congregations, the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, and United
Synagogue of America. Through the efforts of NCRAC’s Committee on Community
Consultation, which helped organize new JCRCs across the country, the number of local
affiliates expanded to eighty-one by 1968 and would surpass one hundred by the 1980s.
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To be eligible for NCRAC membership, JCRCs had to represent a Jewish population of
at least 12,000, maintain an ongoing community relations program supported by locallyfunded professional staff, and solicit the participation of a broadly inclusive coalition of
organized Jewish constituencies in the area.79 What made the creation of NCRAC such a
revolutionary development was exactly this ability to multiply, connect, and coordinate a
far-flung network of professionally-staffed JCRCs whose lay leadership represented an
array of preexisting local membership organizations. As a centrally-managed network of
networks, NCRAC’s potential for mass, grassroots mobilization was unmatched by the
infrastructure of all the national community relations agencies combined.
Reflecting its tilt toward the local, by the mid-1950s around seventy percent of
NCRAC’s operating income was furnished by federation welfare funds.80 As a
coordinating entity without primary responsibility for program planning or
implementation, NCRAC’s annual budgets represented only a small fraction of the
Jewish community’s overall spending on community relations activities. According to its
statement of “Aims and Objectives,” NCRAC’s mandate was to “study, analyze, and
evaluate the policies and activities of the national and local organizations” in order to
“seek agreement on and formulate policies” that would authoritatively bind constituent
agencies. In addition, it was to “serve as a coordinating and clearance agency for projects
and policies” with the goal of “eliminate[ing] duplication and conflict of activities.”81
Ultimate decision-making authority was vested in the NCRAC Plenary, an annual
conference at which delegates of the member agencies would hear expert testimony,
debate the issues, and hammer out the yearly “Joint Program Plan,” a comprehensive
policy platform for the organized Jewish community. The Plenary’s deliberative process
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aimed to crystalize the consensus view of NCRAC member agencies on a broad range of
national and (eventually) international concerns, from affirmative action and abortion to
Middle East diplomacy and the plight of Soviet Jewry. Absent consensus, minority
factions were empowered to issue statements of dissent alongside the majority view.
Though never free from exclusions, the NCRAC policy process was among the more
democratic procedures in American Jewish institutional life.
Between Plenary sessions, an Executive Committee and small professional staff
managed NCRAC’s day-to-day administrative affairs. Programmatic decisions were
made on an ongoing basis by issue-based standing committees, appointed according to
the interests of member agencies and always with an appropriate mixture of national,
local, and staff representation. While combatting domestic anti-Semitism was NCRAC’s
principal charge, its approach reflected what Svonkin calls the “theory of the unitary
character of prejudice”—a premise widely shared by mid-century community relations
professionals holding that “the security of American Jews was dependent upon the
realization of full equality for all Americans.”82 Accordingly, NCRAC agencies were
active participants in the liberal coalitions of the 1950s and 1960s, contributing vital
material and intellectual inputs to postwar movements for civil rights, free expression,
and economic justice. While historians like Svonkin, Marc Dollinger, and Gregg Ivers
have extensively documented NCRAC’s contributions to American liberalism, its
relationship to pro-Israel advocacy has received minimal attention.83 At its inaugural
meeting, member agencies drafted a list of pressing community relations issues and
ordered them according to “relative interest and concern.” Topping the list was “AntiSemitism in Political Campaigns and in Politics Generally,” followed by “Inter-Faith
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Relations,” “Labor,” “Industry,” and “Inter-Racial and Inter-Creedal Organizations.”84
Absent was any reference to the Palestine question, which at the time was considered
beyond the scope of the domestic community relations field and the exclusive domain of
American Zionist organizations. NCRAC continued to avoid the issue until the early
1950s, when its approach to Israel began to undergo a gradual reorientation. By the
outbreak of the Suez Crisis at the end of 1956, NCRAC was operating as a full-fledged
Israel advocacy organization.
How did this shift occur? Unlike its predecessor organization, the General Jewish
Council, NCRAC was designed to promote accountability to local Jewish communities.
Just as a constant stream of information and directives flowed from the center outwards,
so too did local JCRC officials transmit their concerns and preferences to the Executive
Committee in a dynamic feedback loop. As early as 1945, NCRAC began to receive
“inquiries and requests for guidance” from JCRCs regarding “the solution to the Palestine
problem [that was] currently engaging the attention of the United States government.”85
According to one internal memo, JCRCs were “uniformly of the opinion that the issue
should be discussed in the NCRAC, and some clarification of viewpoints achieved, so
that the member agencies might be guided in their own dealings with the problem.”86 A
decision was made to authorize a “Special Committee on the Public Relations Impact of
Palestine Developments,” but no further discussion appears to have taken place until
1947. That year, according to the only available minutes of the Special Committee, a
“consensus emerged” that public debate surrounding the recent UN partition plan had
produced community relations problems of great magnitude for the American
Jewish community; that the scope of these problems would probably grow as the
UN moved toward a solution in Palestine; and that the NCRAC had the
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responsibility of seeking to contribute toward the solution of these community
relations problems, if it could do so without encroaching upon the proper
concerns of other Jewish organizations which deal primarily with Zionist issues,
and without going outside its own proper concern with Jewish community
relations on the American scene.87
A subcommittee comprised of NCRAC Executive Director Isaiah Minkoff, Isaac Toubin
of the AJCongress, and the ADL’s Benjamin Epstein—all sympathetic to Zionism—was
tasked with informally consulting Zionist leaders as an initial step towards policy
formulation. The subsequent outbreak of violence in Palestine prompted a resolution by
NCRAC’s April 1948 Plenary (just weeks before the creation of Israel) declaring that
“the problem of Palestine has today become the overwhelming concern of American
Jewry.” Recognizing that “community relations organizations and councils possess skills,
talents, and abilities which can be helpful in this situation,” the resolution directed
NCRAC’s Executive Committee “to explore with responsible Jewish groups vested with
responsibility in the Palestine situation the ways and means through which that
contribution can most effectively be made.”88
Recalling the Plenary’s resolution two and a half years later, Minkoff lamented
that “there has not been any genuine clarification of that role nor of the relationship
between the community relations agencies and the [Zionist] organizations.”89 In the
intervening period, however, two related developments had planted the seeds of an
expanded NCRAC role in pro-Israel advocacy. The first was the intense communal
backlash to a string of public statements issued by the American Council for Judaism that
seemed to cast doubt on the patriotic loyalties of American Jews. The second
development was the sudden appearance across the country of so-called “pro-Arab
propagandists”—typically exchange students or members of the clergy sympathetic to the
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Palestinian cause, but who JCRC leaders believed were raising the specter of “dual
loyalty.” Likely informing the Jewish reaction to both developments was the drastic surge
in anti-Semitic agitation that had swept the country between 1939 and 1945—what
Leonard Dinnerstein calls the “high tide” of American anti-Semitism.90 Prominent
opponents of U.S. entry into World War II from Father Coughlin to Charles Lindbergh
had blamed Jews for dragging America into conflict with Nazi Germany. In February
1939, the German American Bund held the country’s largest ever pro-Nazi rally at
Madison Square Garden, attracting a crowd of 20,000. Following the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the assets of organized Nazi sympathizers were seized and Americans rallied
behind the anti-fascist war effort. But as late as 1946, according to polls, more than sixty
percent of Americans reported hearing anti-Semitic remarks over the previous six
months.91 Against this backdrop, fear of the “dual loyalty” charge loomed large in the
minds of Jewish community relations professionals. Ironically, it was exactly the same
fear that motivated the American Council for Judaism.
Shortly after the passage of the UN partition resolution, at the Council’s January
1948 meeting in St. Louis, Rosenwald placed the burden of “future developments relating
to the Jews of the United States” on “the way we, Americans of Jewish faith, think, act
and react” to the imminent reality of Jewish statehood. “If we act,” he predicted, “as if, in
fact, we [have] overpowering attachments to, and concerns for, the destiny of a nation
other than our own United States, no device of law or language will make a difference.
We will be judged by the reality—not protestations.” The word “Jewish,” Rosenwald
continued, was now associated with “an alien ‘nation,’” making it ever more urgent that
American Jews clarify to themselves and others “whether being a Jew means a new
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devotion to, or even a link with, a separate nation” or whether it means adherence to “the
eternal truths of the religion of Judaism.”92 Responding to the speech in a letter to the
New York Times, Joseph Proskauer of the American Jewish Committee obliquely chided
Rosenwald: “We are told by the anti-Semite, through malice, and by some small sections
of American Jewry, through confusion, that this partition has created a problem of
possible inconsistency between our obligations as Americans and as Jews.” That was
simply not the case, Proskauer declared; American Jews “suffer from no political
schizophrenia… We are bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of America.”93
Unconvinced by Proskauer’s assurances, Rosenwald replied in his own letter that “the
reality of [dual loyalty] does not depend altogether upon the wishes of some Americans
of Jewish faith or upon an ex-cathedra declaration of any individual or group.” With the
emergence of Israel, an external power was now at work on American Jewry, and nothing
could “preclude the possibility that attempts to involve American Jews will be made by
representatives of the newly created state.” After all, he added, “more than one country
has attempted to manipulate the political attitudes and loyalties of Americans who had an
association with those countries due to common national origin, common religion, or
common class interests.”94
Over the next year and a half, Council officials and their associates would
repeatedly return to this theme, painting American Jews simultaneously as victims of
Zionist designs and as potential subversives. While professing to hold only “the most
charitable of attitudes to the new State of Israel,” Rosenwald maintained that “one must
still consider the possibility that it will want—and need—to influence the actions and
attitudes of American Jews for its own purposes.”95 At the Council’s 1949 annual
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meeting in Chicago, Rosenwald argued that “Zionism can no longer be excused as
humanitarian” but must instead “be recognized as the active participation in a foreign
nationalism which it is.”96 Lecturing at a Council luncheon whose proceedings were
reported in the Times, Henry Smith Leiper, associate general secretary of the World
Council of Churches, told his audience that “Americans of the Jewish faith must be on
their guard against a ‘dual nationality’ that would divide their patriotic allegiance
between Israel and the United States” and thereby “brand Jews in this country
permanently as a national and ‘racial’ minority, different from the rest of the nation.”97 At
another luncheon (covered by the Chicago Tribune), a New York City magistrate judge
and former ZOA president, Morris Rothenberg, was condemned for refusing to preside
over the trial of Jewish teens arrested for pelting British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin
with tomatoes. Instead of conveying their “unqualified duty to obey the laws of the
United States,” the Council speaker said, “Judge Rothenberg attempted to make heroes of
them and at the same time succeeded in creating the impression in the minds of
newspaper readers that American Jews can no longer be trusted to defend and protect
American interests.”98 The Times ran a response from Rothenberg, who accused Council
leaders of “spreading suspicion and ill-will towards their Jewish brethren.”99
While the Council believed it was shielding American Jews from broad-brush
accusations by underscoring the heterogeneity of Jewish opinion—and by educating
fellow Jews about the dangers of Zionism—community relations professionals saw things
differently. At the April 1949 NCRAC Plenary, members “expressed their deep concern
with the mischief which was being wrought by the publicity of the American Council for
Judaism and by the utterance of its spokesmen and of some who spoke under its
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auspices.”100 In June, the Executive Committee approved a resolution “tak[ing] note of
the allegations of dual and diminished loyalty made against millions of American Jews,
Zionist or non-Zionist, who express their cultural and religious relationship to the Jewish
people of Israel.” It “declare[d] these allegations to be a malicious libel” and, without
mentioning the Council by name, charged “those who persist in impugning the loyalty of
the American Jewish community” with “rendering gravest disservice to the principles of
American democracy.”101 Although the resolution passed, circulation was postponed at
the request of AJC representatives, who worried that releasing it to the general press
would give wider exposure to the “dual loyalty” charge. Instead, a NCRAC committee
was charged with engaging the Council in the hope of dissuading it from making further
damaging statements. The AJCongress and ADL, whose pro-Israel leanings heightened
their animus towards the Council, opposed negotiations and called for immediate censure
and isolation. In a letter, Arnold Foster of the ADL deplored the Council for “two
essential reasons”: first, because it “offers a ‘respectable’ platform to opponents of
Israel,” and second, because the Council’s obsession with “the dangerous charge of socalled dual loyalties” had “found ready acceptance among out and out anti-Semites.”102
The head of the Jewish War Veterans invoked America’s preeminent anti-Semite in
describing Council utterances “as of a piece with any of [Gerald] L.K. Smith’s well
known carnivals.103” Despite its tactical caution, the AJC shared this view. In the words
of one Committee leader, the Council was “unwittingly... giving enormous aid to the antiSemites, who could ask nothing better than to be able to cite a Jewish organization in
support of their charge that the Americanism of a substantial number of Jews is
dubious.”104
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When dialogue with the Council failed to yield agreement, NCRAC moved
forward with a public denunciation. The AJC had successfully convinced NCRAC to
delay its statement for several months while Committee leaders pursued private
negotiations with Rosenwald. In the end, however, the Committee agreed to sign on to
the denunciation in order to prevent the other agencies from releasing their own
statements to the general press. In exchange for the AJC’s participation, NCRAC agreed
to limit the circulation of its press release to the Anglo-Jewish newspapers.105 The
statement, issued in January 1950, “vigorously condemned” the Council by name,
describing it as “numerically insignificant” and as a “small but highly vocal group of
Jewish individuals” whose utterances “constitute thinly veiled slurs on the allegiance of
substantially the whole American Jewish community.”106 That the AJC, however
reluctantly, joined a condemnation of “Jewish individuals” in the name of “the whole
American Jewish community” vividly illustrates the shift in its priorities following Israeli
independence, and underscores the extent to which its withdrawal from NCRAC two
years later was motivated by financial-institutional concerns rather than a principled
opposition to “centralism” in American Jewish life. If, as Minkoff was to argue some
years later, the creation of NCRAC and its procedures for reconciling intra-Jewish
difference signaled the birth of “the American Jewish community,” then NCRAC’s
repudiation of the Council was the first in a long series of communal boundary
enforcements intended to fix the nomos of the Jewish ethnopolitical field. Backed by the
symbolic capital of the federation system and nearly every Jewish community relations
organization, the excommunication specified a new interpretation of the nomos grounded
in an equation of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism as exemplified by the Council. It is no
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coincidence that in 1976, the reputation of the first American Jewish “anti-Occupation”
organization, Breira, was effectively assailed by a defamatory pamphlet entitled, “Breira:
Counsel for Judaism.”107 (For more on Breira, see Chapter 6.)
Not long after the Council’s excommunication, another concatenation of events
deepened the emerging association between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, this time
with a more decisive impact on the community relations agenda. “Within recent weeks,
and months,” wrote NCRAC Executive Director Isaiah Minkoff in a January 1951 memo,
“reports and inquiries have come to the NCRAC from various Jewish communities
regarding the appearance of speakers and propagandists for pro-Arab and anti-Israel
interests.” After describing several examples of “pro-Arab propaganda” activity, ranging
from benign humanitarian appeals to statements that appeared to evoke the “dual loyalty”
canard, Minkoff recalled the 1948 Plenary resolution recognizing the “problem of
Palestine” as the “overwhelming concern of American Jewry”:
It is not alone the ‘problem of Palestine’ (which must now be read ‘problem of
Israel’), referred to in that resolution, which is of concern to American Jewry. It
is, in addition — and from the point of view of American Jewish community
relations agencies perhaps more specifically — the problem of overt domestic
anti-Semitism, which is beyond question affected by the types of anti-Israel
propaganda with which this memorandum is concerned. Whether or not some of
the authors of that propaganda pursue a deliberate purpose of attacking Jews as a
whole, many of the writings and utterances which they produce have that
effect.108
As the passage suggests, NCRAC acknowledged a distinction between “pro-Arab
propaganda” and “over domestic anti-Semitism” but believed the former was acting as a
stimulant to the latter, even if inadvertently. “In some cases,” wrote NCRAC Chairman
D. Beryl Manischewitz, “the thin line between anti-Israel and anti-Semitic propaganda in
[pro-Arab] speeches seems to have been obliterated completely.”109 Although detailed
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records of these events are unavailable, it is not implausible that pro-Arab activists
speaking to non-Jewish audiences would appeal to the patriotic-nationalist nomos of the
American political field in order to frame their adversaries as subversive. Jewish
organizations utilized this same tactic against their anti-Zionist adversaries, painting them
as Nazi sympathizers, often unfairly.110 Particularly after 1967, Arabs in the U.S. were
increasingly portrayed as Communist agents and in some cases targeted for harassment
and deportation.111
In part reflecting home-grown sympathy for the plight of the Palestinian refugees,
pro-Arab political activity received a boost after 1951 from an anti-Zionist CIA front
group, the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME). Established by celebrity
journalist Dorothy Thompson at the instigation of Kermit Roosevelt, a U.S. intelligence
operative best known for orchestrating the 1953 coup in Iran, AFME received its funding
from several CIA “pass-through” foundations and the U.S. (now Saudi) oil company
Aramco. Throughout the 1950s, AFME staged lectures, sponsored exchange students
from the Middle East, supported Arab student organizations in the U.S., and ran an
extensive publishing operation. Abroad, the organization advanced U.S. cultural
diplomacy in the Arab world, serving as a “non-governmental” transmission belt for antiCommunist, pro-American propaganda. In 1952, AFME helped initiate the Organization
of Arab Students (OAS), “which became the most politically active Arab organization
nationwide for much of the 1950s and 1960s.”112 Both AFME and the OAS were careful
to avoid overt anti-Semitism, often frustrating Zionist organizations seeking to portray
them otherwise. Among their most enthusiastic collaborators was Elmer Berger of the
American Council for Judaism, who tutored them in the Council’s understanding of the
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distinction between Judaism and Zionism. Echoing the views of State Department
“Arabists,” both groups framed good relations with the Arab states as crucial to American
national interests and deployed arguments tailored to the American “mainstream,” thus
hewing closely to the dominant American nomos. As Geoffrey Levin notes, it was
exactly for that reason that Jewish organizations perceived implications of “dual loyalty”
in AFME and OAS speeches and publications: “For if pro-Arab advocacy was acceptable
and in line with American interests, what did it suggest about pro-Israel advocacy?”113
In April 1952, NCRAC leader Jules Cohen attended a special meeting at the
office of the American Zionist Council (AZC), the successor organization to AZEC,
convened specifically to address the recent upsurge of pro-Arab propaganda. Present
along with AZC officials were representatives of the “big three” agencies, as well as
Israel’s New York consul-general, Avraham Harmon. Bringing up AFME, Harmon
inquired “whether Jews and non-Jewish Zionists should become affiliated with the
organization on the chance that the group might be neutralized.” (Although endorsed by
Rabbi S.A. Fineberg of the AJC, the idea does not seem to have been pursued.) The
conversation then turned to the question of whether NCRAC and the community relations
agencies might assist the Consulate in arranging speaking engagements in local Jewish
communities, presumably to counteract the effects of pro-Arab propaganda. All
responded affirmatively, and Cohen was appointed to coordinate. The AZC would make
speaker itineraries available to Cohen, “who, in turn, will call together the NCRAC
agencies to work out the mechanics of securing speaker engagements, radio
engagements, etc. in various parts of the country.”114 This was not the first instance of
NCRAC collaboration with Zionist agencies, although it appears to have been the first
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relatively systematic effort. In early 1951, Isaiah “Sy” Kenen, the eventual founder of the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), an AZC offshoot, briefed NCRAC’s
Executive Committee on the AZC’s plans to lobby Congress for a grant-in-aid to Israel.
Minkoff subsequently forwarded to all JCRCs a memo provided by Kenen that included
basic instructions for lobbying politicians and civic groups, pro-Israel talking points, and
a list of Congressmen on the Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and Rules committees.
“You will undoubtedly be interested in this memorandum, which you may find useful for
your own guidance,” he added.115 For the next few years, NCRAC continued to forward
AZC updates and instructions to local member agencies, but Israel advocacy remained
strictly optional and was not formally institutionalized or systematically implemented.
By the 1955, however, JCRCs were reporting a “tremendous stepping up of proArab propaganda” in “every possible forum,” advanced “largely through the activities of
exchange students from Arab countries and certain Christian ministers who have been
indoctrinated with an anti-Israel point of view.”116 The previous year’s Joint Program
Plan had been the first to call on member agencies “to counter the antisemitic impact of
Arab propaganda and to promote understanding of Israel’s role among the democratic
nations.”117 Since then, the activities of AFME and OAS had been augmented by the
Arab Information Center, established by the Arab League in 1954, and the increased
propaganda output of various Arab embassies. As the number of voices grew, so too did
the opportunities for anti-Zionist advocates to trigger Jewish anxieties. Two pamphlets
distributed by the Egyptian embassy in the mid-1950s appear to have crossed the line into
overt anti-Semitism, describing the “money-massing activities” of “the wealthy, educated
Jew” and portraying Zionism and Communism as twin evils colluding to “destroy the
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Islamic and Christian countries” in pursuit of “their aim—Zionist world supremacy.”
According to the AJC, these pamphlets were distributed by, among others, Gerald L.K.
Smith and “the National Renaissance Party, an openly Hitlerite group in New York.”118
AFME executive vice president Garland Evans Hopkins inflamed Jewish organizations in
1955 when he predicted “a wave of anti-Semitism in this country” once Americans
realized who “was responsible for the loss of the Middle East.”119 At the June 1955
Plenary, member agencies came to agreement that “pro-Arab anti-Israel propagandists
create community relations problems which are the concern of the entire community” and
must therefore be dealt with through a “machinery and program that will speak in the
name of the local community council… not merely in the name of the Zionist group.”
Participants stressed “the need for a continuing, positive educational program” to convey
“an appreciation of the tremendous achievements of Israel” and “to interpret the
relationship of American Jewry to Israel straightforwardly and courageously.”120
The outcome was the creation the following year of a “Standing Committee on
Community Relations Aspects of Developments Affecting Israel”—the abstruse title
reflecting NCRAC’s official position that U.S. Middle East policy per se was beyond the
scope of the community relations field, but that “countering the anti-Semitic impact of
Arab propaganda” was not. In practice, however, it was a distinction without a difference.
The pivotal April 1956 meeting that established the new standing committee concluded
that “Jewish community relations agencies nationally and locally have a responsibility to
help create a climate favorable to Israel” and that “the central theme to be advanced must
be that… the fundamental interests of the United States require the security of Israel as
essential to the preservation of peace in that part of the world, and that advocacy of
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United States aid to Israel for this end is not special Jewish pleading.”121 A resulting
memorandum outlined the whole battery of grassroots political tactics that would come to
characterize NCRAC’s Israel advocacy: mass rallies, interfaith work, educational
initiatives tailored to special interest groups, including labor, veterans, and “racial and
ethnic groups,” preparation and wide distribution of “factual and interpretive” materials,
outreach to Hillel foundations and other campus groups, efforts to influence local news
coverage and editorial comment, and a nationally coordinated approach to elected
officials.122 At the committee’s first meeting in May, Minkoff hailed the “changed
thinking” of the JCRCs on the question of Israel and called for “an on-going day-to-day
program of interpretation to foster an understanding and sympathetic public opinion”
towards Israel, one that “would make political action that much easier.” Suggesting as an
interpretive frame “the theme of ‘what is best for America,” Minkoff noted how
“strange” it was “that only the Jews seem to be saying that a pro-Israel policy is good for
America.”123
NCRAC’s new approach to the Middle East came together in the Joint Program
Plan unveiled at the June 1956 Plenary session. While “pro-Arab propaganda” had
received only a brief mention in the previous year’s Program Plan, the 1956 edition
included four pages of analysis and recommendations under the heading “Developments
and Trends of Primary Significance.” The “struggle between the free world and the
communist bloc,” it began, “underscores the greater need in the coming period to
interpret to the general American community America’s stake in the maintenance of an
independent Israel as a bulwark against communist influence and aggression in the
Middle East.” Alluding to the border altercations between Israel and Egypt that would
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soon escalate into the October 1956 Suez Crisis, the document claimed that the “peril in
which the Jews of Israel find themselves” had “deepened and strengthened the sense of
affinity… which American Jews always have had with the young State.” As a result of
their “sympathetic and concerned study of events and developments in the Middle East,”
which has “given them a deeper understanding of the situation than is general among the
American populace,” American Jews “have come to hold views regarding United States
policy in the Middle East that differ rather sharply from those being pursued by our
government.” “The duties of democratic citizenship,” the document declared, “demand
the vigorous assertion of opinions as to the best interests of the nation.”124 In contrast to
the pro-Israel policies of the Truman administration, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had spent the previous three years
attempting to woo the Arab states, in part by pursuing a tougher line against what Dulles
called “expansionist Zionism.” In this context, NCRAC’s assertion of the right of
American Jews to employ mass pressure techniques to advocate an independent line on
U.S. foreign and military policy—albeit within the broader parameters of Cold War antiCommunism—was a significant development.
But beyond slogans touting Israel’s importance to the free world, the beginnings
of a communal foreign policy did not emerge until the outbreak of the Suez Crisis—the
first in a series of wars that would intermittently stimulate the growth of NCRAC’s
grassroots political apparatus. The 1956 Program Plan instead focused entirely on
transitional issues that linked domestic anti-Semitism and Jewish civil rights with the
Middle East conflict. “Special community relations significance” was accorded to the
Arab League boycott of Israel, under which “the U.S. government acquiesces in various
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discriminations against U.S. citizens,” including the refusal of Arab states to “issue entry
or transit visas… to U.S. citizens of Jewish faith or origin” or to “admit into Arab
countries members of the United States Armed Forces… if they are Jews.” Similarly, the
Program Plan pointed to “evidence of a two-way exchange between the Arab
propaganda-makers and some of America’s most extreme anti-Semitic hate-mongers,”
suggesting “potentialities for a dangerous resurgence of anti-Semitism.” Included among
its nine-point list of programmatic recommendations for combatting anti-Semitism and
rectifying “violations of civil liberties and civil rights” was a call for
Effective counteraction of the disruptive activities of the American Council for
Judaism, through exposure of its record of defamatory statements, and of the
similarity of its propaganda to that of the Arab propaganda machines, the
American Friends of the Middle East, and similar groups, and through
publicization (sic) of statements of other organizations and rabbis condemning
the Council.125
That same month, the rabbinical associations of all three major denominations of
American Judaism issued denunciations of the Council.126 Not long afterwards, the AJC
published a nineteen-page booklet devoted exclusively to demolishing the Council’s
reputation along the lines proposed by NCRAC.127 Thoroughly discredited, the Council
would decline, and the modern Israel lobby would rise. The great irony, of course, was
that the Israel-related “community relations problems” identified in the Joint Program
Plan—threats to Jewish civil status and increasing domestic anti-Semitism—were
precisely the outcomes that the Council had predicted all along.

Conclusion
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The Suez Crisis would mark the beginning of nationally coordinated pro-Israel
advocacy under the aegis of the federation system. Once the community relations
dynamo kicked into high gear, the conceptual link to domestic anti-Semitism
disappeared, and lobbying for Israel came to assume an intrinsically motivated quality.
Organized Jewish resistance to the newly ascendant nomos of the field, limited to the
isolated and stigmatized American Council for Judaism, was effectively quarantined. For
the next quarter of a century, “pro-Israelism” would exert nearly unchallenged hegemony
over the nomos American Jewish ethnopolitical field. Among the most important factors
that underwrote this new status quo was the totality and structural overdetermination of
anti-Zionism’s defeat. The subject position represented by the Council—explicitly
assimilationist, fearful of racialization, averse to particularistic Jewish expression, yet
motivated by self-interest to invest in Jewish politics—could not reproduce itself under
the cultural and political conditions of postwar America. The racial, ethnic, and sexual
upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal—each blow
would attenuate the symbolic power of authoritative institutions and ratify an
interpretation of the American political nomos premised on individual liberty, free
expression, and representational multiculturalism. On an official and discursive level, the
liberal-pluralist vision of the community relations mainstream would achieve hegemonic
status. Under these conditions, reactionary anti-Zionism was slated for extinction. When
green shoots of Jewish resistance began to reemerge in the mid-1970s, they came from an
altogether different subject position—an avowedly Zionist one. Both Breira and its
successor organization, New Jewish Agenda, carefully framed their prescriptions for U.S.
Middle East policy in terms of what was best for Israel. It would take an additional thirty
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years, the emergence of a human rights paradigm, revolutionary transformations in
communications technology, and a battery of political shocks before an American Jewish
organization would again advance claims on American Middle East policy without
primary reference to the interests of the Jewish state.
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Chapter 5
The Dynamo at High Noon:
NCRAC and the Grassroots Origins of the Israel Lobby, 1956-1982
“When people have asked me, ‘What do you do?’, I put it very succinctly in one
sentence, ‘We appeal to local leadership to write or telegraph or telephone their
Congressmen to urge them to call upon the President to overrule the Department
of State,’ and this has been going on now for some twenty years.”1
- Isaiah “Sy” Kenen, founder, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1973
Introduction
In March 1975, negotiations over the fate of the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula
hit an impasse. Attributing the diplomatic failure to Israeli intransigence, President
Gerald Ford threatened Israel with a comprehensive “reassessment” of U.S. policy in the
Middle East. Not long after, Ford received a letter of protest from seventy-six sitting U.S.
senators urging sensitivity to Israel’s “military and economic needs.” The so-called
“letter of seventy-six,” credited with successfully obstructing Ford’s reassessment, is an
often-cited illustration of the extraordinary clout of the pro-Israel lobby in general and the
America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in particular. “The lopsided
percentage of signatories,” write John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “is eloquent
testimony to AIPAC’s ability to twist arms.” Mearsheimer and Walt illustrate the point
with a remark attributed to Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) after he signed the “letter of
seventy-six”: “It’s easier to sign one letter than to answer 5000.”2 Yet, in the mid-1970s,
AIPAC was still what journalist Edward Tivnan called “a mom-and-pop shop”—an
under-staffed, low-budget operation run from a single, cluttered office in Washington,
D.C.3 How, in an age before the Internet, could an organization with such meager
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institutional capacity mobilize hundreds of thousands of letters? The above epigraph
provides a clue. While it would later emerge as the embodiment and central
instrumentality of the pro-Israel lobby, for more than a quarter of a century AIPAC was a
small but centrally located cog in a much larger Israel advocacy apparatus—the tip of a
Jewish communal iceberg whose bulk was comprised of the National Community
Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC) and its constituent agencies. During the postwar
decades, scores of federation-financed Jewish Community Relations Councils (JCRCs)
across the country coordinated thousands of voluntary associations with millions of
members, systematically implementing the political directives channeled through
NCRAC’s Executive Committee. While agencies like AIPAC, the American Jewish
Committee (AJC), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and the American Jewish
Congress (AJCongress) all contributed crucial inputs, the NCRAC-JCRC infrastructure is
what enabled grassroots pro-Israel mobilization on a national scale.
With few exceptions, the decades of NCRAC-JCRC activity of which AIPAC was
the downstream beneficiary have gone unremarked in the Israel lobby literature.4 The
lacuna may reflect a presentist orientation: most scholarly and journalistic investigations
of the Israel lobby appeared after 1980, when NCRAC’s role was less pronounced and
AIPAC’s more accentuated.5 It may also reflect a focus on Capitol Hill to the exclusion
of local, grassroots networks whose operations are dispersed and therefore more difficult
to document. In what follows, I reconstruct the lost prehistory of the Israel lobby, tracing
the evolution of NCRAC’s pro-Israel advocacy apparatus over a twenty-five year period.
In so doing, I avoid gratuitously cataloguing each and every instance of pro-Israel
mobilization, instead highlighting documents that shed light either on the extent of
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grassroots advocacy or on the relationship between international crises, U.S. domestic
politics, and the progressive expansion of the pro-Israel apparatus. The Arab-Israeli wars
of 1956, 1967, and 1973 each stimulated the growth of a network that both channeled
Jewish public opinion and actively synthesized it out of raw, inarticulate sentiment. Each
exogenous war-shock (and many lesser shocks in between) led to the elaboration of an
increasingly intricate local and national machinery. The Suez Crisis of 1956, which pit
Israel against the Eisenhower administration, precipitated the total collapse of preexisting
jurisdictional boundaries separating Zionist and non-Zionist organizations and
commenced a decade of narrowly-tailored pro-Israel advocacy by NCRAC and its
affiliates. The Six Day War of 1967 fully electrified the institutional circuitry laid down
in the interim, mobilizing the American Jewish community on an unprecedented scale
and establishing new material incentives for pro-Israel advocacy. Between 1967 and
1973, a procession of international crises catalyzed the expansion of the NCRAC-JCRC
network, while an infusion of financial resources following the Yom Kippur War
transformed an already extensive pro-Israel apparatus into what journalist J.J. Goldberg
properly called the “superlobby.”6
But the superlobby as it emerged after 1973 was not a stable formation.
Underpinning the NCRAC-JCRC model of grassroots ethnopolitics was a particular set
of sociological facts: a relatively affluent Jewish population dispersed across the
country’s major metropolitan areas and heavily organized by mass membership
organizations that were themselves hierarchically coordinated on both a local and
national scale. In addition, the effectiveness of NCRAC’s pro-Israel advocacy—at least
in the view of its professional leadership—hinged on Jewish participation in broad liberal
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coalitions for racial and economic justice. As NCRAC Chairman Bennett Yanowitz put
it, “The fact that the Jewish community relations field is concerned with the total
American agenda makes it the effective advocate of Israel. Sole preoccupation with
issues related to Israel undermines our ability to interpret Israel to our friends.”7 By the
1970s, organized Jewry had begun to abandon mid-century civil rights coalitions in favor
of a more insular, ethnocentric communal agenda. At the same time, broader structural
transformations in American society were eroding the sociological underpinnings of the
federation system. The immense allocation of emergency resources to the NCRAC-JCRC
network after 1973 thus represented a final, extraordinary flash in the pan for an
organizational model that was entering long-term decline. Having built its reputation and
institutional capacity on the back of the federation system, AIPAC ascended to a place of
prominence in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field just as the period of mass,
grassroots mobilization was coming to an end.

AIPAC and the Federation System
From the founding of Israel until the Suez Crisis of 1956, lobbying for Israel was
spearheaded by the American Zionist movement. In 1951, the former American Zionist
Emergency Council, which had reorganized as the American Zionist Council (AZC) after
Israeli independence, embarked on an intensive campaign to secure $150 million in U.S.
foreign aid for the struggling Jewish state. While individual powerbrokers like the AJC’s
Jacob Blaustein and B’nai B’rith’s Philip Klutznick interceded on Israel’s behalf with the
executive branch, the AZC was the only organization to mount a concerted grassroots
pressure campaign targeting members of Congress.8 Like the AZEC, the AZC was an
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umbrella organization charged with coordinating the activities of the major Zionist
factions—the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the Religious Zionists of America
(Mizrachi), the Labor Zionist Movement, and Hadassah, among others.9 Participation in
organized Zionism hit its all-time peak in the years immediately before and after the
establishment of Israel. By 1948, AZC constituent groups collectively enrolled upwards
of 700,000 members, distributed into more than 700 local Zionist councils throughout the
country.10 In January 1951, AZC president Louis Lipsky issued the initial marching
orders for the grant-in-aid campaign.11 “The major responsibility rests with the local
communities,” Lipsky wrote in a March memorandum. “Within recent weeks there has
been joint and coordinated action by all groups. They have worked in complete harmony
in New York, Washington and many other communities in support of this undertaking.”12
Two months later, Isaiah “Sy” Kenen, head of the AZC lobbying outfit later renamed the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee, reported to NCRAC chairman Irving Kane
that 130 members of Congress had signed a declaration in support of the aid legislation.
Kenen requested JCRC assistance in securing additional signatures, but given NCRAC’s
limited mandate, Kane could only forward the AZC’s material on an advisory basis.13
Regardless, the inaugural campaign was a success: Israel received $65 million of the
$150 million it had requested.
As the 1950s wore on, Zionists were increasingly successful at enlisting JCRC
support for their lobbying and educational initiatives, though never in a systematic
fashion.14 The AZC recognized the limitations of a Zionists-only approach and sought “to
gather under one coordinated leadership in every community all local Jewish
representatives willing and able to cooperate” on pro-Israel objectives, “regardless of
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group affiliation.”15 In other words, where existing JCRCs could not be persuaded to
collaborate with the AZC, the AZC attempted to establish practically identical communal
structures. The Zionist councils also drew heavily on the community relations playbook,
fostering local coalitions of liberal Christians, labor organizations, and leading opinionmolders in the hope “that these local leaders will then register their endorsement of
United States Government aid to Israel with the Governors of their States, their Senators
and their Congressmen.”16 Like the JCRCs, the Zionist councils placed a premium on
disseminating educational literature to the local press, radio stations, church groups, and
major civic organizations, and kept in frequent contact with their national coordinating
body. In a constant stream of memos, the AZC central office provided its local councils
with strategic guidance, analytic literature, and model newspaper editorials and
Congressional resolutions.17 But if the AZC copied its methods from the community
relations field, it originated the political-rhetorical framing that most major Jewish
organizations would eventually come to deploy. Several years before the American
Jewish Committee embraced the same line, Zionist organizations had adapted their prestate arguments for a Jewish commonwealth to the emerging Cold War context. “It is
obvious that Israel will have to be included in the globular plans of the United Nations to
defend world freedom against aggression in Asia and Western Europe,” wrote Lipsky in
early 1951. “Small as it is, it yet has at its command manpower and military resources
which may be of substantial value and significance.”18 An early model editorial on U.S.
aid noted Israel’s status as “the only exponent of democracy in the strategic Middle East
where our Government is in urgent need of a constant and dependable friend.”19 The

256

transition from framing the Yishuv as a bulwark of Western civilization in the Orient to
framing Israel as U.S. Cold War asset required no great leap of the imagination.
By 1955, however, AZC records indicate a near-complete abandonment of direct
lobbying efforts and an increased emphasis on cultural and educational activities. The
change appears to have resulted from a major diminution of the resources—both human
and financial—of the American Zionist movement. According to Melvin Urofsky,
following the establishment of Israel, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion “set out on a
deliberate policy of emasculating the ZOA,” fearing that an independent Zionist
movement would interfere with the diplomatic relations of the newly sovereign Jewish
state.20 In addition, ZOA leaders were known partisans of Ben-Gurion’s domestic
political opponents, the more capitalist-oriented General Zionist party.21 In 1949, the
Israeli government endorsed a plan that reduced the ZOA’s control over the United
Palestine Appeal (UPA)—then the main U.S. fundraising instrument for Israel—and
transferred authority to the federation-linked communal leadership. “The effect of this
agreement on American Zionism in general, and on the Zionist Organization of America
in particular,” writes Urofsky, “was immense”:
Prior to 1948, American Zionism, led by the ZOA, had had three main areas of
responsibility - political affairs, education, and fund raising. The establishment
of Israel effectively removed political matters from Zionist hands… The
reconstitution of the UPA shifted the burden of fund raising [away] from the
Zionists … The ZOA foundered, losing members, groping for something to do,
watching helplessly while new institutions and agencies, non-Zionist for the
most part, assumed the work of public relations, lobbying, and fund raising on
behalf of Israel.22
Rumors then surfaced in 1953 that the AZC’s tax-exempt status was under federal
investigation. According to Natan Aridan, Kenen prompted the IRS inquiry when he
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released a critical assessment of Eisenhower administration policy that “merely parroted
views circulated by the [Israeli] embassy,” thereby raising questions about the AZC’s
status under the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).23 To preempt legal
entanglements, the AZC transferred its political activities to an independent, non-taxexempt lobbying organization, the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs
(AZCPA). Whatever funding the AZC had been receiving through “conduit” transfers
from the Jewish Agency (see Chapter 4) was suddenly no longer available to Kenen.
Those transfers, and the AZC’s unwillingness to register as a foreign agent, continued to
attract government scrutiny. In 1963, Senator J. William Fulbright spearheaded a Senate
Foreign Relations Committee investigation into FARA violations that revealed modest
foreign payments to Kenen for the purchase of his newsletter, the Near East Report. “As
a result of justified fears that it had contravened FARA,” writes Aridan, the AZC’s
“budget had been so drastically reduced that it could only cover salaries and coordination
of activities with other Jewish groups.”24
The AZC’s infrastructure decayed gradually over the 1950s and 60s. But already
in April 1956, when NCRAC met to consider launching its Israel advocacy program, the
decrepit state of local Zionist councils was one of several rationales offered in support of
the new initiative. Rabbi Jay Kaufman of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations
observed that “most local Zionist councils either are not sufficiently active or do not have
the financial or other resources to carry out the programs and activities suggested by the
American Zionist Council.”25 Referring to his experience in Newark, New Jersey, Julius
Glaser of the Essex County JCRC noted that “since the Zionist Council has no staff or
financial resources, [its] material is not circulated locally and when it is, it only goes to a
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few people.”26 At the national level, the AZCPA—later renamed the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee—was not in much better shape. With gross revenue topping
$100 million in 2015, it is difficult to imagine AIPAC as a financially distressed
organization.27 Yet, until the late-1970s, it was exactly that. Deprived of AZC funds and
considered ineligible for federation allocations, the AZCPA relied on individual
contributions, speaking fees, and subscriptions to the Near East Report. In its first year as
an independent organization, it raised only $55,000. “I was the most unpopular Jew in
America,” Kenen recalled. “They couldn’t understand why [the AZCPA] was
necessary.”28 In 1957, Kenen wrote to AZCPA president Philip Bernstein that “Fundraising for our Committee, as now constituted, is very difficult indeed.”
Last Thursday, a friend of mine personally invited 15 of his close personal
friends in New York to come together so that he might explain the problem. The
word got out as to what he really wanted; only three came… [One of them,] a
multi-millionaire, said he would send us a $1000. But, then… he turned and
said, “But you should take the word ‘Zionist’ out of your name.”29
Despite broad American support for Israel, “Zionist” remained an unpopular epithet in
some wealthy quarters of the Jewish community, a point Kenen eventually conceded by
adopting AIPAC’s current name in 1959.30 Prone as they were to factional infighting,
even certain Zionists were reluctant to assist the early AZCPA. “The ZOA just doesn’t
give a damn,” Kenen griped after the organization refused his request to dispatch a
fundraising mailer.31 Although Kenen ultimately availed upon an array of Jewish groups
to purchase bulk subscriptions to his Near East Report, the AZCPA continued to run
budget deficits of between $15,000 and $22,000 throughout the 1950s.32
A major factor contributing to AIPAC’s financial turmoil was the oversaturation
of the federation-dominated Jewish fundraising field. Jews “have been hammered this
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year by UJA and State of Israel bonds to the point where they are insensible to any
request from anyone else,” reported Bernstein in 1957. “I arranged for meetings in
Trenton, Milwaukee, Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh… The results were not very
successful… It is quite evident that the American Jewish community is completely jaded
on raising money.”33 Before it restructured in the 1980s, AIPAC’s board of directors
consisted of representatives of the major national Jewish agencies. But even its
communal overseers hesitated to jeopardize their own organizations’ fundraising
campaigns by aiding the lobby group: “We had a special meeting in New York on
Wednesday with the representatives of our own constituent organizations to have a
showdown on money problems,” Kenen wrote. “Once again, they refused to send out a
letter to all their districts and chapters informing them of our existence and urging them
to raise money in each community.”34 While internal AIPAC records from the 1960s and
1970s are mostly inaccessible, the organization’s money struggles appear to have
continued until at least the Yom Kippur War of 1973. NCRAC’s Jordan Band joked
about the state of AIPAC’s finances during a 1969 gala dinner: “I am delighted that Irv
could be with us tonight,” said Band in reference to Irving Kane, the former NCRAC
chairman turned AIPAC president, “I understand that thieves broke into the AIPAC
office earlier today and stole $50,000.00—all in pledges.”35 A 1972 letter from Kenen to
Yehuda Hellman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
requested a reduction in AIPAC’s financial contribution to the Conference—from $2,000
to $1,000.36 And despite the legendary outpouring of pro-Israel sentiment after the Six
Day War, AIPAC’s gross revenue by 1973 was only $252,000—a small fraction of the
multimillion dollar budgets of the “big three” community relations agencies.37
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Owing to these financial constraints, AIPAC remained—in the words of journalist
Edward Tivnan—“a mom-and-pop shop” through the end of Kenen’s tenure. “Kenen was
hardly known to most Jews,” writes Tivnan. “In fact, few Jews had even heard of
AIPAC. When one of Kenen’s lieutenants asked an audience of three hundred Jews in
Memphis in 1974 how many had any idea what AIPAC was about, two raised their
hands.”38 With only a handful of D.C.-based staffers, Kenen’s AIPAC relied on the
broader infrastructure of the American Jewish community to build up its nation-wide
network of Jewish influentials. By their very nature, federations aggregated the political
and economic elite of the Jewish community. At least in the postwar decades, major
Jewish political donors were almost invariably engaged with Jewish philanthropy, and
therefore with their local federations and welfare funds. Records show that Kenen
maintained regular contact with heads of Jewish federations and community councils to
intermediate with politicians and solicit lists of federation donors with ties to both
political parties.39 In many cases, federation leaders were themselves important political
players. For example, in 1972, Kenen appealed to Albert A. Spiegel and Edward
Sanders—then President and Vice President, respectively, of the Jewish FederationCouncil of Los Angeles—for the names of high-level operatives involved in that year’s
presidential campaign.40 Sanders, a prominent Democrat, would later serve as Jimmy
Carter’s special advisor on the Middle East, while Spiegel, a Republican, became Ronald
Reagan’s liaison to the Jewish community. Detroit businessman Max Fisher advised
Richard Nixon while concurrently serving as president of the Council of Jewish
Federations and Welfare Funds (CJF). “A number of people who became active in
AIPAC became involved through the Jewish federation,” said Steve Grossman, a former
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AIPAC president and advisor to Michael Dukakis who was first approached by AIPAC
during his time as head of the Boston federation’s annual campaign. “When you think
about credibility in American Jewish life, if you’re going to be an asset to AIPAC, you
have to be credible among the leading people in that community.”41
The lobby’s most influential connector, however, was its third president, Irving
Kane. According to Kenen, Kane “found roots for AIPAC in every major city, because,
as the former president of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council
and of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, both with active
constituents throughout the country, he is welcomed by the Jewish leaders in every
city.”42 Together, Kane and his predecessor, Philip Bernstein, another one-time CJF
president, helped AIPAC make inroads with Jewish communal leadership far beyond
what its limited resources and low profile would otherwise have allowed. Once those
relationships were successfully brokered, JCRC officials raised money through their
personal networks, organized local AIPAC chapters, and encouraged politicians and
Jewish leaders to attend AIPAC’s annual policy summit.43 But by far the most important
asset that the federation system offered AIPAC was its capacity for grassroots
mobilization. In 1976, Kenen credited his decades of success in part to “a rather
sophisticated Jewish community.” “When an issue comes before us… we have a lot of
people who don’t need to be told to take pen in hand and to begin to act,” he said. “Since
all the major Jewish organizations cooperate with AIPAC, it’s not difficult to get a large
mass of letters and communications to Congress.”44 Contemporaneous press accounts
strike a similar note. “The Jewish American community,” hyperbolized the London
Sunday Times in 1974, “provided the grassroots political muscle to give Kenen the ability
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to push through Congress virtually any policy the Israeli Government wished.”45 The
following year, Time magazine reported that
One key to AIPAC’s effectiveness is that the leaders of a number of major
national Jewish organizations sit on its executive committee. These other
leaders, in turn, can alert their large memberships whenever extra pressure is
needed in Congress… Just as often, however, local Jewish leaders and activists
are keenly aware of any approaching crisis and closely monitor their homedistrict Representatives on their own… The lobby in practice is a blend of a
well-staffed professional nucleus in Washington and the normally undirected but
highly effective outpouring of articulate and intense sentiment from Jews
throughout the nation.46
But the Jewish community’s “outpouring of articulate and intense sentiment” was far
from “undirected.” What these press accounts omit is that the primary vehicle for interagency coordination and local political organizing was the NCRAC-JCRC network. If
AIPAC remained relatively obscure to the Jewish rank-and-file until the 1980s, it was
because the lobby’s grassroots mobilization function was carried out almost exclusively
through the community councils, with AIPAC and other national agencies funneling
information and directives through NCRAC’s Executive Committee. The remainder of
this chapter documents that process.
NCRAC and Israel, 1956-1982
Israel Through the Community Relations Lens
In his book Jewish Power, veteran journalist and communal insider J.J. Goldberg
offers one of the only analyses of American Jewish politics to acknowledge the
foundational role of NCRAC and the federation system. By conducting interviews with a
range of obscure but influential Jewish bureaucrats, Goldberg is able to sketch the

263

contours of the postwar communal apparatus in a way few others have done. According
to one of his informants,
During the 1950s an amazing network grew up in the Jewish community… You
had the organizational base of the federations and CRCs… You had the national
agencies, which were doing extraordinary work in terms of getting out published
material and training the local people. The CRCs were much larger in terms of
active leadership, but depended on the national agencies for guidance and
material. And you had NCRAC coordinating it all with a staff of six people.
NCRAC created a miracle.47
With respect to Israel advocacy, a national division of labor emerged by the end of the
1950s. At the top of the pyramidal structure was the Council of Presidents of Major
Jewish Organizations, formalized in 1956 at the behest of the Eisenhower administration
to simplify Jewish intermediation with the executive branch. A convening body without
autonomous powers, the President’s Conference formulated consensus policies on behalf
of its member organizations and conveyed them to the White House. Lower down in the
pyramid was a D.C.- and New York-based bloc that included AIPAC, which continued to
lobby on Capitol Hill and issue political directives, and the major community relations
agencies, which prepared analytic and public relations materials on Israel and the Middle
East. These informational inputs were then funneled through NCRAC into the vast base
of the pyramid—the JCRCs—which mobilized Congressional constituents, forged
relationships with local politicians and civic organizations, and orchestrated ongoing
campaigns to sway public and elite opinion at the municipal and regional level. While
Goldberg identifies the creation of NCRAC’s Israel Task Force in 1973 as “the first
crucial step in the birth of the superlobby,” in fact, as I demonstrate below, the $3 million
Task Force was merely an emergency accelerant injected into a preexisting Israel
advocacy machine that NCRAC had begun operating during the Suez Crisis of 1956.48
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As described in the previous chapter, the appearance in the early 1950s of “proArab propaganda” bearing anti-Semitic motifs facilitated the recoding of pro-Israel
advocacy as an integral part of the fight against domestic anti-Semitism. Culminating in
NCRAC’s 1956 Joint Program Plan, this reorientation received a boost in early 1955
when an ad hoc group of seventeen national Jewish organizations (later formalized as the
President’s Conference) called for “an extraordinary conference to review the whole
complex of American-Israeli relations.”49 The first of three such “extraordinary”
convenings over the next twenty months, and the first time JCRC officials participated en
bloc in policy deliberations about Israel, the March 1955 conference came in response to
the intensifying Middle East arms race and the heightened military tensions between
Israel and its neighbors leading up to the October 1956 Suez Crisis. The second
conference was held in January 1956 in reaction to the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, and
the third occurred in November, shortly after Britain, France, and Israel launched their
tripartite invasion of Egypt with the aim of toppling its nationalist president Gamal Abdel
Nasser50. Bringing together Zionist and non-Zionist organizations (with the exception of
the independent-minded AJC2), this rapid-fire series of national gatherings was the initial
site of articulation of the new communal consensus that emerged after 1948 (see Chapter
4). In his speech to the post-Suez conference at New York’s Delmonico Hotel, NCRAC
chairman Bernard H. Trager modeled the Cold War rhetoric that would typify
mainstream pro-Israel discourse for the next thirty years:
We see Nasser entrenched in his control over the oil which is the life-blood of
western Europe… We see the Soviet Union fulfilling the centuries-old Russian
dream of a Middle East falling within its sphere of influence. We see a wedge
2

The ADL also did not participate, but its parent body, B’nai B’rith, did.
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driven into the alliance between us and Britain and France, a consummation
long the special objective of Soviet diplomacy. We see Nasser… threatening
annihilation of the strongest force for democracy in the whole vast and strategic
area of the world that he seeks to bring within his grasp.51
In generating support for Israel, Trager declared, “it is axiomatic that we cannot achieve
our community relations objectives except as we are able to enlist support in the general
community for those objectives.” That, in turn, meant “develop[ing] our appeals in terms
not of our special interests but of the larger interests of those to whom we address
ourselves.”52 The community relations approach to Israel advocacy would be a coalitional
approach, based on a presumed mutuality of interest between Jews and other organized
social groups—as well as between Jews and the American state itself—all couched in the
simultaneously egalitarian and bellicose discourse of Cold War liberalism.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the Cold War frame was merely a
cynical mask for Jewish self-interest. In private, NCRAC officials appeared convinced
that the cause of Israel was indeed the cause of America. In a letter to Kansas City JCRC
chief Sidney Lawrence, NCRAC’s Jules Cohen laid out his vision for U.S. foreign policy:
“It seems almost elementary to say that the best thing we could do in the Middle East is
to pull the rug from under the Communists by using U.S. prestige and influence… to
settle the various issues… of which the Communists take advantage. The real or
imagined fears and hatreds, the antagonism, the illiteracy and poverty… The Soviet
Union exploits all of these issues, rides the horse of Arab nationalism and keeps the pot
boiling.” Arab enmity towards Israel, Cohen insisted, was merely a product of “the ageold device of ‘divide and conquer’ which the Nazis employed and which the Commies
are again using.” Were the U.S. to pursue peace negotiations aimed at securing Israel’s
borders, “this part of the world would be stabilized to the benefit of world peace, the
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democratic nations and to the detriment of Communist efforts to take over that area.”53
For both Cohen and Trager, American and Jewish interests coincided in part because
American Jews were preternaturally equipped to identify threats to the nation as a whole.
“As a religious and democratic people, we are opposed to Communism as a form of
totalitarianism and we are especially sensitive to tyrants, oppressors and dictators like
Nasser,” wrote Cohen.54 “Jews and Jewish agencies,” Trager noted, “were among the first
to penetrate the Soviet masquerade and have been among those longest aware of
communist duplicity and the dangers it poses to the free world.” Possessing “fuller
insights into the [Middle East] situation than many of our fellow Americans,” Jewish
citizens “owe it to them to share our knowledge and our insights with them,” for “our
goal is a common one.”55
But despite these special insights, NCRAC’s approach to Israel advocacy
committed significant resources to transforming Jews themselves. Later in his speech,
and without a hint of irony, Trager recounted the “deluge” of inquiries received by
NCRAC following Israel’s invasion of the Sinai: “The questions raised suggest that there
is, even among American Jews, an abysmal lack of knowledge of the most elementary
facts of the recent history of Israel’s relationships with her Arab neighbors, and a
distressing lack of comprehension of what must be involved in a permanent solution of
the problem.”56 Notwithstanding his belief in the inherent wisdom of the Jewish
community, then, Trager argued that a far-reaching program of internal education was at
least as urgent as externally-oriented propaganda. As for the latter, Trager made a case
for the existing strategies and tactics of the community relations field, which would
increasingly take charge of grassroots pro-Israel activity. To assemble local, pro-Israel
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coalitions, he explained, Jews must relate the issue of Israel directly to the “spontaneous
concerns” of other religious, racial, and occupational groupings through specialized
appeals. “To women’s organizations,” he illustrated, “the issue may be best interpreted in
terms of an end to the devastation of war and its decimation of youth,” while “to
businessmen’s organizations, in terms of the maintenance of the free flow of commerce
and traffic among nations.” Furthermore, successful community outreach demanded a
total coordination of effort. “Multiple approaches,” Trager warned, “can arouse
resentment and antagonism. Contradictory appeals may confuse and exasperate. The best
efforts of all, if independently pursued, may end in nought.” Zionists had agitated
fruitlessly for Jewish unity since the turn of the century, but new conditions in the Jewish
ethnopolitical field had now engendered new possibilities. With the Zionist/non-Zionist
antagonism in abatement, with anti-Zionist resistance weakened and isolated, and with
the advent of new coordinating mechanisms like NCRAC and the President’s
Conference, a relatively united front was at last feasible. As a step in that direction,
Trager lauded the “many communities—the number is rapidly increasing—[that] have
developed sound working cooperation between the local Zionist organizations and the
community council.” “It is this kind of cooperation,” he urged, “that must be continued
and expanded, both nationally and locally.”57
Indeed, the period between 1956 and the early 1980s proved to be a golden age of
intra-Jewish agreement and cooperation on Israel-related matters. When Jonathan
Woocher described pro-Israelism as the “civil religion” of American Jews, it was to this
period that he was referring.58 An important institutional mechanism for achieving the
unprecedented consensus of those decades was NCRAC’s newly-formed Committee on
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the Community Relations Aspects of Developments in the Middle East, renamed the
Commission on International Community Relations Concerns in 1965, and then the Israel
Task Force after 1973. The shifting nomenclature reflects a gradual loosening of the
connection between Israel advocacy and the efforts to combat domestic anti-Semitism
with which it was originally bound up. Between 1956 and 1967, NCRAC’s pro-Israel
advocacy focused on combatting “pro-Arab propaganda” and the Arab League boycott—
phenomena that could be directly linked to the civic status of American Jews. This phase
primed the pump for subsequent Israel advocacy by expanding local collaboration
between Zionist groups and community councils and exposing JCRC affiliates to a
stream of new information and public spectacle related to Israel and the Middle East.
With the Six Day War of June 1967, this relatively quiet, initiatory phase came to an end.
The war set a match to the psychic and institutional kindling that had amassed over the
previous decade, unleashing a conflagration of energy and emotion that engendered a
new set of material incentives for pro-Israel advocacy. In addition, Israel’s conquest and
retention of Arab territories triggered a progression of crises in Arab-Israeli relations,
each stimulating the development of new organizational appendages and protocols. By
the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the rudiments of NCRAC’s Israel advocacy
infrastructure were largely in place. The new conflict—more traumatic and less triumphal
than the last—stimulated a significant increase in the financial resources available for
pro-Israel activity under the newly-rebranded Israel Task Force. The decade of grassroots
activity that followed laid the reputational foundations of the contemporary Israel lobby.

Stockpiling Tinder: Israel Advocacy from Suez to the Six Day War
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As we saw in the previous chapter, two Israel-related bridge issues arose prior to
the outbreak of the Suez Crisis in October 1956: the spread of “pro-Arab propaganda”
and the Arab League boycott of Israel. In the brief period of 1955-1956, JCRCs observed
a programmatic distinction between Israel-related concerns that could plausibly be said to
impact American Jews, on the one hand, and those that pertained only to Israel, on the
other. An April 1956 memo from the St. Louis JCRC, for example, proposed the
following division: “1. The substantive issues relating to Israel such as arms, economic
aid, and mutual security pacts,” and “2. The community relations impact [of the ArabIsraeli conflict] on (a) relationships between Jews and non-Jews, and (b) internal Jewish
relationships.” While noting that “it is extremely difficult to make fine distinctions in
these roles and emphases,” the memo instructed JCRC personnel not to address
themselves directly to the first category of concerns.59 Similarly, in September,
Philadelphia’s JCRC issued a speaking invitation to NCRAC leader Jules Cohen on the
assumption “that you will not spend any particular time discussing such outside activities
as the Arab refugee problem, the Suez Canal, border incidents, Jordan waterway, support
for Israel, etc., etc., but rather that you will talk specifically on the subject of Arab
discrimination against American Jews.”60 Little more than a month later, however,
Israel’s Sinai invasion prompted NCRAC to begin loosening its self-imposed constraints.
At the first post-invasion CJF General Assembly in November, Philadelphia’s Nathan
Edelstein delivered a changed message: “The recent outbreak of hostilities between Israel
and Egypt and the reaction of the American government have had a tremendous impact
on Jewish community relations,” he said. “Many believe and declare that the ‘Jews’ were
guilty of unprovoked aggression and have thereby endangered the peace of the world... It
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is incumbent upon Jewish community relations agencies… to interpret this situation to
the American community.”61 Several months into the Suez Crisis, Cohen conceded that it
had become “impossible clearly to draw the line between the interests of the community
relations field and the Zionist organizations.”62
The British-French-Israeli bid to overthrow Nasser elicited a sharp rebuke from
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who regarded the neo-colonialist maneuver as an
embarrassment to U.S. efforts to contain Soviet imperialism in Europe. Eisenhower had
already distanced the new Republican administration from his predecessor’s more Israelfriendly outlook, and the Sinai invasion only further ratified Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles’s fear that the U.S. would alienate the Arab world by becoming “the backer
of expansionist Zionism.”63 The combination of an unfriendly White House and a brazen
act of Israeli military aggression galvanized the organized Jewish community to
unprecedented forms of political action. For the first time, under direction by the
President’s Conference, NCRAC mobilized its local units to pressure the American
government on a foreign policy matter not immediately related to the civic status of
American Jews. The campaign’s opening gambit focused on counteracting public
sympathy for Nasser by highlighting the maltreatment of Egyptian Jewry under his
regime. In December, NCRAC circulated for local publication a letter from 34 nationally
prominent Christians decrying Nasser’s behavior as “clearly imitative of the Hitler
pattern, and of the present communist pattern in Hungary.”64 In January, NCRAC helped
orchestrate six regional conferences around the country to educate local Jewish
leadership on the Middle East and train them in common community relations
techniques.65 When Eisenhower threatened sanctions to compel an Israeli withdrawal in
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February, Julian Freeman, chair of NCRAC’s Middle East committee, directed JCRCs to
send “as many telegrams as possible” to Eisenhower, Dulles, and members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and to dispatch delegations of influentials to lobby on
Capitol Hill. Enclosing a statement from the President’s Conference, Freeman advised
community councils to run modified versions as local newspaper advertisements and to
“obtain widest possible coverage by press, TV and radio” for the anti-sanctions message.
On the internal education front, he recommended the staging of “special prayer services
by congregations including appropriate sermons by the rabbis, with attendant
publicity.”66
By all accounts, NCRAC’s maiden engagement with pro-Israel mobilization was
a success. In Detroit and Flint, MI, Fort Wayne, IN, and elsewhere dozens of Protestant
ministers agreed to sign pro-Israel declarations, and nearly all federated communities
reported facilitating the adoption of organizational resolutions, generating favorable
newspaper editorials, and dispatching a barrage of wire communications to elected
officials.67 According to Michael Doran,
Dulles complained bitterly to a colleague about the “terrific control the Jews had
over the news media and the barrage which the Jews have built up on
Congressmen.” He described the opposition to sanctions in Congress as
“overwhelming.” The idea of a bill rejecting sanctions on Israel was being
bandied about on Capitol Hill and, Dulles said, it would certainly pass both the
House and the Senate unanimously.68
Although Israel relented in the face of U.S. pressure and withdrew its forces from the
Sinai in March 1957, the grassroots pressure campaign was a striking display of force. It
was not until 1967 that the JCRCs would again be called upon to conduct such a fevered
emergency mobilization. For NCRAC’s leadership, the Suez campaign confirmed the
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importance of Jewish participation in local coalition-building. In May, Freeman reflected
in a letter to Cohen that “a more effective job was done where the community had
previously been engaged in community relations activities with contacts and lines of
communication in the Jewish community and in the general community.” In cities where
“the Federations, Welfare Fund or JCRC had established contacts with Christian church
groups, service clubs, the newspapers, television and radio stations on such general social
issues as discrimination in employment, education, housing, immigration, etc.,” Jewish
outreach to allies during the Middle East crisis appeared to be a “natural development” of
preexisting relationships. Where no such relationships existed, “lines of communication
had to be established in the emergency period, on an ad hoc basis and pretty much for the
first time” and “the Jewish group placed itself in the position of engaging in self-pleading
and making such approaches purely on the basis of Jewish self-interest.” Freeman
concluded that, going forward, pro-Israel advocacy would only be effective where JCRCs
had “previously been solidified on a variety of other issues” and that communities must
therefore “initiate such a program of on-going community relations activities instead of
acting only when another emergency may arise.”69 While there is no reason to doubt the
sincerity of organized Jewry’s far-reaching liberal commitments during this period, we
miss an important piece of the picture if we neglect the role of Israel advocacy as a
rationale for Jewish engagement, especially at a time when domestic anti-Semitism was
in precipitous decline. When American Jews began withdrawing from the fight for racial
and economic justice in the 1970s, NCRAC would repeatedly highlight the danger of
disengagement for its pro-Israel coalition work.
As mentioned earlier, the Suez Crisis awakened NCRAC to the average Jewish
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leader’s troubling ignorance of Middle Eastern affairs. It was during the Crisis that
NCRAC first began providing its local agencies with a continuous stream of pro-Israel
information and analysis from the national press, the community relations agencies, the
Israeli foreign ministry, and other sympathetic sources, both for internal consumption and
distribution to non-Jewish leaders and civic groups.70 The practice would continue for
decades and increase in sophistication as technology advanced. Once received by the
community councils, the material was then made available to local JCRC affiliate groups,
which in the immediate postwar period could number into the hundreds in a single city
(for example, in 1957, the Detroit JCRC listed over three hundred voluntary Jewish
associations on the back of its stationery).71 In a time before the Internet, this pyramidal
distribution system gave the Jewish community relations field a decided informational
advantage over its political adversaries. In addition to written material, NCRAC and
JCRC affiliates also began receiving periodic briefings from Kenen, who relied on
speaking fees and institutional sales of the Near East Report to finance his Capitol Hill
activities.72 Public, pro-Israel spectacle also came under the jurisdiction of the
community councils during this period. Beginning with Israel’s tenth anniversary in
1958, NCRAC assumed the task of coordinating annual Yom Ha’atzmaut (Israeli
Independence Day) celebrations across the country. Israel thus came to feature far more
prominently on the community relations agenda than it had prior to Suez, while Jewish
elites and grassroots activists were increasingly exposed to pro-Israel information and
emotional-patriotic appeals.
But the issue that kept Israel front-and-center during the relatively crisis-free
decade from 1957 to 1967 was the Arab League boycott of Israel. Instituted in 1945
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against the Yishuv and intensified after 1948 to include secondary and tertiary boycotts,
the Arab effort to economically isolate Israel quickly became a pivot point enabling
NCRAC and its member agencies to bridge the gap between domestic community
relations and pro-Israel advocacy. The campaign against the boycott—framed as a
campaign against U.S. acquiescence in the infringement of Jewish civil rights—would
persist for decades and help sustain the momentum of Israel advocacy between
emergency mobilizations. One of the first actions taken by NCRAC’s newly-formed
Middle East committee was to disseminate a report enumerating the various forms of
anti-Jewish discrimination flowing from the boycott. These included “the denial of entry
or transit visas to American Jews,” “the boycott of American Jewish businesses” on a
religious basis, and “the exclusion of American Jewish citizens from United States
Government civilian and military posts and from employment on U.S. defense contracts”
located in Arab countries.73 As part of the initial outpouring of anti-boycott activity in
1956-1957, NCRAC tasked JCRCs with encouraging test-case visa applications by
“Jewish State and City legislators, Mayors, [and] national, state and local democratic and
republican leaders” in their areas; asking legislators to sponsor Congressional resolutions
condemning the boycott; organizing “non-sectarian delegations” to national party
conventions and securing local delegate approval of anti-boycott platform planks; and
screening “dramatic films” on “principled actions” taken in the past by the U.S.
government to combat “discrimination by foreign countries against American citizens.”74
Although federal legislation penalizing boycott compliance was not enacted until 1977,
the Senate immediately adopted an anti-boycott resolution and both major parties
integrated anti-discrimination language into the Middle East planks of their 1956
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platforms.75 Over the next decade, JCRCs would petition local chambers of commerce,
city councils, and international business associations to pass symbolic anti-boycott
resolutions, even where no evidence of boycott compliance existed. At a June 1966
Plenary session titled “Countering the Arab Boycott,” the head of Kansas City’s JCRC
conceded he had “no knowledge of any actual business or financial establishment in
Greater Kansas City subjected to pressure by the Arab boycott apparatus” but that his
Council had run an aggressive anti-boycott initiative “in response to recommendations
from national Jewish bodies that communities throughout the country engage in
interpretation and seek commitments from commercial organizations and public
agencies.”76
While JCRCs had become more engaged with Israel than ever before, the decade
following the Suez Crisis was a period of relative quiet for Israel advocacy. The
conditions of withdrawal from the Sinai in March 1957 provided Israel with a decade of
security along its southern frontier as UN peacekeepers positioned themselves on the
Egyptian side of the border. Tensions with the executive branch receded after the more
Israel-friendly Democrats returned to power in 1961, making increased economic and
military aid (now including sophisticated weapons sales) easier to secure. Pushback from
the legislative branch was practically non-existent during Kenen’s tenure as AIPAC
chief. “There was never a lack of support in Congress,” Kenen told his oral historian.
“We had 70 Senators way back in the 40s, when we were beginning to struggle for the
Jewish State.”77 To a London Sunday Times reporter he confided, “I rarely go to the
Hill… There’s so much support for Israel that I don’t have to.”78 Despite its financial
tribulations, AIPAC’s modest budget was sufficient to carry out most of what the lobby
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hoped to accomplish in those years. Its handful of staffers “[walked] through open doors
in many offices in Washington,” and with a comparative dearth of international crises,
there were few incentives to substantially increase communal investment in pro-Israel
advocacy.79 While community councils continued to cooperate with AIPAC, their role
centered primarily on the anti-boycott crusade and the battle against “pro-Arab
propaganda” locally (rebutting charges of Israeli responsibility for the Palestinian refugee
crisis was a major focus of early NCRAC Israel advocacy). That would change after 1967
as the rate of crises increased, galvanizing new forms of political activity and
infrastructural investment.

A Spark to Kindling: The Six Day War as Catalyst
Like the Suez Crisis, the Six Day War delivered an exogenous shock to the
American Jewish ethnopolitical field. But 1967 was not 1956. National and local Jewish
agencies had accrued a decade of experience advocating on Israel’s behalf and, in so
doing, had established an institutional circuitry better equipped to channel the great surge
of emotional energy that accompanied military conflict in Israel. In addition, the (still
comparatively small) mainstream Jewish educational system had seen a steady infusion
of pro-Israel curricular materials. The study of Hebrew language was reintroduced to
Reform movement religious schools after 1948, and the number of university courses and
faculty positions in Jewish studies ballooned between 1945 and 1966.80 In 1957, Henry S.
Moyer, the national vice president of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism,
presented a study of Zionist themes in American Jewish religious schools and summer
camps at the 12th annual ACJ conference. “The Council analyzed 113 textbooks of the
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[Reform] Union of American Hebrew Congregations and could wholeheartedly
recommend only 10 of them,” he explained. “50 others were acceptable with some
changes. The rest were totally unacceptable as being indoctrinated with ‘Jewish
nationalism.’” In addition, Moyer identified several “supposedly non-denominational,
non-political educational bodies supported by our welfare funds”—federation
beneficiaries like the Jewish Education Committee of New York, the American
Association for Jewish Education, and the National Jewish Welfare Board—that now
routinely disseminated pro-Israel curricular material. “Israeli culture is included in most
religious school curricula as Jewish culture,” he reported, referring his audience to an
accompanying booklet of pictorial evidence. “For example, Israeli folk songs, Israeli
dances, the Israeli anthem (the Hatikva), the teaching of modern secular (not Biblical)
Hebrew, [and] the use of the Israeli flag” had become regular features of the Jewish
school, the Jewish summer camp, and the Jewish community center, Moyer claimed.81
The general American public, too, had come to view Israel in a more heroic light.
American literature and cinema in the postwar period portrayed Israelis much as they did
the rugged, Indian-fighting settlers on the western frontier. As Michelle Mart
demonstrates, “images of Israel’s masculine pioneers permeated popular fiction as much
as they permeated the news media.”82
Israeli bravery and military ingenuity were popular themes in fiction of the late
1940s and early 1950s. Images of fighters were part of a broader picture of
masculinity that shaped attitudes toward Israeli pioneering and development.
During this period, the ‘tough Jew’ was introduced to fiction as a character and a
role model… The ideal of a ‘tough Jew’ was built on a set of traits long prized
in American culture. Thus, tough Jews are ‘insiders’ in American culture
because they exemplify characteristics of ideal masculinity.83
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The 1961 motion picture Exodus, based on the 1958 novel by Leon Uris, is widely
considered a cultural touchstone in this respect. Tivnan describes Exodus as “the primary
source of knowledge about Jews and Israel that most Americans had” in the early
1960s.84 According to cultural historian Melani McAlister, the film “presents an
enthusiastic portrait of Israel and the Jews who founded it… With the Holocaust as its
back story, it is a loving tale of struggle, manliness, and state formation, of European and
Palestinian Jews becoming Israelis, making (and earning) their state through their love of
the land, their commitment to family, and their democratic ethos.” Conversely, “both the
film and the novel are decisively anti-Arab,” McAlister writes. “The novel is simply
vicious, littered with every imaginable stereotype… The film version eschews most of
the virulence that peppers the novel, but it adds an entire plot development in which
Nazis arrive at a tiny village to advise the Arabs on how to deal with their ‘Jewish
problem.’”85 In addition, the postwar religious revival coincided with the release of a
number of Biblically-themed blockbuster films portraying Jews as central to the Christian
self-understanding. “Previously, the Christian image of Jews was dominated by negative
views of their religion and unflattering social stereotypes,” notes Mart. But in films like
Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Commandments, “that image was superseded by the idea that
the Jews were the founders of Western monotheism. Moreover, the identification
between the modern American audience and ancient Hebrews carried over to modern
Jews and Israelis, because of the underlying message that modern Jews embodied ancient
values.”86
By the outbreak of the Six Day War, then, cultural developments both within the
Jewish community and without had fostered new investments in the idea of Israel, just as
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new institutional configurations were emerging to facilitate their expression. For NCRAC
and its constituent agencies, the explosion of pro-Israel sentiment in 1967 came as a
welcome surprise and an object lesson in the power of Israel to galvanize American
Jewish identification and engagement. A session on “Prospects for Jewish Survival in an
Open Society” at the 1964 Plenary had identified “portents of the decline or even the
eclipse of vital Jewish life” in America and the “alienation and seeming indifference
toward Jewish traditions and Jewish institutions” characteristic of the younger
generation.87 But “three years later,” observed retiring NCRAC chairman Aaron
Goldman at the late-June 1967 Plenary, “I think there are fewer doubts about the unifying
power of the ancient bonds of Jewish peoplehood. Who has witnessed the clamor of
Jewish youth to join their people in Israel in their time of trial and still doubts the
identification of our young men and young women?” The task now facing the American
Jewish community, said Goldman, was
to bring such a spirit to life in conditions of peace and tranquility. The
manifestations of fellowship, of one-ness, that we are witnessing must not be
allowed to dissipate when the crisis passes… Those of us who would be leaders
in the building and strengthening of vital Jewish communities and a creative
Jewish people are presented with a challenge…to capture, somehow, the sense
of common commitment that now suffuses Jewish life and to turn it…to the
invigoration of Jewish life in America.88
At a special Plenary session dedicated to the Middle East conflict, AJC president Morris
Abram recalled his past difficulties in “interest[ing] many of the academic community
who happen to be Jewish in identifying with the Jewish community.” During the recent
war, however, “this community, as well as other ‘unidentified’ Jews, have become
heavily involved in the current issues of the Middle East; and that involvement has grown
out of one thing only: the recognition of the vulnerability of Jewish life.”89 In the weeks
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leading up the Plenary, said William A. Wexler of B’nai B’rith, “our so-called alienated,
apathetic youth has become vocal and involved, gathering signatures on petitions, raising
money and volunteering to go to Israel.” An “entire group that we had virtually written
off,” said Wexler in reference to Jewish college students, “people that we didn’t even
consider as being part of the Jewish framework or fabric anymore,” had “suddenly
decided that they were Jews once again.”90
The lessons of 1967 were immediately internalized by the organized Jewish
community. Journalist Robert Spero would later maintain in Present Tense magazine
that, in the aftermath of the Six Day War, “Israel soon took up most of the time of
[Jewish] organizations’ bureaucracies and accounted for much of their often considerable
budgets.” No Jewish organization, Spero claimed, “felt it could survive financially or
hope to maintain even its declining membership without devoting a significant portion of
its agenda to generating public support for Israel.”91 Institutional records bear out Spero’s
claim. By 1973, pro-Israel advocacy had become the AJC’s single largest spending area
(roughly 30% of the total), while the Anti-Defamation League—a domestic civil rights
organization—dedicated almost half of its budget to programs related to the Middle
East.92 According to John Ruskay, former CEO of the UJA-Jewish Federation of New
York, the emergence of an “Israel at risk” fundraising paradigm “fostered the explosive
growth of the Federation system post-1967.”93 At the 1969 General Assembly, the CJF’s
Charles Ziebell demonstrated the “effectiveness” of organized delegations to Israel by
listing out donation records for a recent set of participants: “In 1967, that group
contributed $244,000; in 1968, $267,000; in 1969, $452,000. Q.E.D.”94
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But even where fundraising was not the overriding institutional imperative—
community relations councils, for example, did not conduct their own fundraising; they
were financed by federations but remained autonomous of federation governance—Israel
still came to displace other issues by virtue of its urgency and excitement. In the early
1970s, NCRAC’s Julian Freeman estimated that “Our [J]CRC’s probably devote a
majority of their time to this one concern [Israel], and our national agencies similarly.”95
JCRCs in search of recruitment and youth engagement tools quickly discovered the
appeal of Israel and its sister cause, Soviet Jewry. Both issues resonated with the ethnic
protest movements of the 1960s while fitting safely within the Cold War political frame.
At the 1969 Plenary, Albert Chernin of the Philadelphia (later NCRAC’s executive
director) relayed his community’s experience with youth outreach. After staging a
“variety of education programs for young people” to “poor response,” Chernin’s JCRC
“decided to give programming for Soviet Jewry high priority.” “The response was most
enthusiastic,” said Chernin, and “activities in this sphere [were] broadened to include
issues related to Israel, Polish Jewry, and Jews in the Arab countries.” In the discussion
that followed, JCRC executives from cities across the country shared similar experiences:
Israel, Soviet Jewry, and the Holocaust were, they reported, the issues most “effective in
reaching many Jewish young people of every variety of Jewish opinion and affiliation.”96
The Six Day War thus interacted with preexisting cultural and institutional
trajectories dating back to 1956 and earlier to generate a new set of material incentives
for pro-Israel organizing. While all levels of the pyramidal advocacy structure were
affected, the remainder of this sub-section deals primarily with the base of the pyramid:
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the NCRAC-JCRC network. Reflecting on recent pro-Israel activities at the late-June
1967 Plenary session, B’nai B’rith president William Wexler observed that
Virtually every Jewish community created ad hoc structures for interorganizational cooperation in fund-raising and community relations during the
crisis… [J]CRCs in most communities proved the most effective
instrumentalities for community-wide planning and action and many of them
were the spearheads of the special actions undertaken during the crisis.97
The earliest mobilizations took place at the end of May during the build-up to the war.
Tensions between Egypt and Israel had escalated after Nasser ordered UN peacekeeping
troops out of the Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping—an act that
Israel’s government considered tantamount to a declaration of war. A May 29th memo
from NCRAC executive director Isaiah Minkoff instructed JCRCs to organize “meetings
with United States senators and representatives at home or in Washington” and to
dispatch “thousands of telegrams and letters to the White House and Congressmen.”
NCRAC had already received “reports from communities which are sending by plane
today special groups to Washington,” Minkoff wrote. “[I]n one community it took
Western Union three days to catch up with the back-log of telegrams which were being
sent.”98 On June 1, the President’s Conference called for a “National Emergency
Leadership Conference” to bring together “the largest number of communities ever
gathered in Washington” for a pro-Israel event. JCRCs were charged with “coordinat[ing]
local efforts to create impressive community delegations” featuring “prestige leadership
known to members of Congress.”99When the war broke out on June 5, Minkoff issued an
emergency telegram to NCRAC affiliates, enlisting them to stage a “mass repeat mass
rally with fullest participation” on two days’ notice. “Urgent [that] you promote via ads,
press, radio, TV and charter buses and planes,” he instructed. The same day, the Council
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of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds notified its members that “action to convey to
President Johnson, the State Department, to Senators and Congressmen the full weight of
American public support to assure Israel’s territorial integrity and political
independence… is being coordinated nationally through the President’s Conference” and
that “the national agencies look to the CRC’s to coordinate this vital work in each city.
Where there is no CRC, they look to the Federation to do this.”100
JCRC and federation-sponsored political activity during the war was extensive.
According to a NCRAC compendium of events, mass rallies were mounted in “nearly
every community” and “many were of unprecedented size.”101 The Jewish Community
Council of Greater Washington, for example, instructed each of its 134 affiliate agencies
to “bring out every member of your organization to the [D.C. emergency] Rally,” noting
that many had already “call[ed] special meetings of their membership to mobilize
maximum attendance.”102 JCRC leaders met personally with their governors and other
state-level politicians.103 Citizen lobbying was continuous: “The volume of messages to
government officials, legislators and others, both from individuals and from
organizations, is believed to have exceeded any previous limits,” according to
NCRAC.104 The Savannah Jewish Council affixed a telegram “permission card” to its
rally notification leaflet as a way of streamlining the process of mass political
communication.105 Press relations were “coordinated through CRCs or, where they lacked
resources, through Federation publicity departments” and communities elaborated new ad
hoc structures like mass media committees and speakers bureaus that would become
permanent fixtures after the war.106 Ostensibly apolitical, federation-funded service
entities like the Jewish Ys and Centers of Greater Philadelphia (JYC)—an operator of
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recreational facilities—also participated in the mass mobilization. The front page of its
June newsletter carried the names and addresses of local and national politicians, noting
that “officers of JYC and its branches and hundreds of members are writing to elected
officials urging that the full efforts of the U.S. be devoted to bringing about peace.”107 All
of this political activity was seamlessly interwoven with an extraordinary fundraising
effort, centrally coordinated by the CJF on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal’s Israel
Emergency Fund. “In six months, an unprecedented $307 million was collected, more
than double the UJA's total for the entire year before,” writes Goldberg.108
Worthy of special mention were the (federation-funded) Hillel foundations, which
worked closely with JCRCs in May and June 1967 to orchestrate “a vast mobilization for
Israel” on college campuses.109 A May 24 memo to all “Hillel Directors and Counselors”
from the national B’nai B’rith Hillel Foundations “strongly suggested” that “you, your
students, your community leaders, campus leaders, faculty, Jews and non-Jews, send
telegrams to the President, the Governor of your state, [and] your Senators and
Congressmen,” and recommended they integrate prayers for Israel into their religious
services.110 Over the next month, Hillel staffers organized teach-ins, staged youth rallies,
circulated petitions, and distributed model letters of support for Israel along with
instructions for dispatching telegrams to elected officials. At Tulane University, Hillel
Director Jay Krause launched a “campus-wide drive to get the university community to
send wires to the United States government and the United Nations.” 111 Hillel directors
secured thousands of faculty signatures for a pro-Israel declaration in the New York Times
(the Hillel at UCLA alone recruited close to four-hundred professors). In late June,
signatories of the Times statement formed “American Professors for Peace in the Middle
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East,” a chapter-based campus group that “work[ed] with and through the Hillel
Foundation and the Hillel Director and Counselor,” according to a B’nai B’rith memo.112
The University of Michigan’s Herman Jacobs was one of many Hillel directors who
recruited Jewish students for “a special summer work program in Israel” intended to
“alleviate [the] shortage of manpower” resulting from the May-June military
mobilization. “Help is crucially needed in the Kibbutzim and Moshavim to harvest the
crops,” Jacobs implored. “Prompt action is so desperately required that we wish the first
contingents… could leave shortly.”113 The University of Maryland’s Hillel “set up an
office in Washington in front of the Israel Embassy to process students volunteering to
work in Israel.”114 Not to be left out of the fundraising effort, Hillel directors solicited
tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars in UJA donations and Israel bond purchases from
students, faculty, and university staff.115
While many communal leaders construed the eruption of energy during the Six
Day War as a spontaneous manifestation of American Jews’ latent commitment to Jewish
peoplehood, it would hardly have been possible without the facilitation of a federationfunded institutional matrix operating at the grassroots level. As NCRAC perceptively
recognized, what held true for American Jews also held true for U.S. politicians and the
American public in general: their attitudes towards Israel were in large part the emergent
product of Jewish (and other pro-Israel) institutional activity. A summary of the first
post-1967 Plenary noted,
It cannot be taken for granted that the overwhelmingly pro-Israel sentiment that
characterized American public opinion and supported government policies
during and just after the crisis of May-June, 1967 will continue. The tremendous
change in [pro-Israel] sentiment from 1956 must be attributed in some part at
least to the continual program of interpretation that Jewish community relations
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agencies pursued in the interim. Intensification of that program now is
necessary, and its extension into all sectors of American society.116
NCRAC advised its constituent agencies to utilize the “period of relative stabilization”
following the war to mount an “intensive review of their programs of interpretation” and
“their procedures for speedy communication with various sectors of the Jewish
community.”117 As Charles Posner of the Los Angeles JCRC reflected several years later,
whereas before the war “approaches to interpretation of Israel and its needs and
aspirations were exceedingly circumspect,” the “self-imposed restraints… were discarded
in 1967.”118 Going forward, JCRCs would no longer limit themselves to aspects of the
Arab-Israeli conflict thought to bear directly upon American Jewish civil status. Instead
they would develop what Rabbi Daniel Silver, speaking at the 1970 Plenary, called “a
continuing and systematic year-in and year-out public information campaign concerned
with maintaining for Israel the sympathy and understanding of the American people.”119
Subsequent political events were key to the development of that campaign. Unlike the
Suez war, which engendered a decade of relative peace and stability, Israel’s conquest
and retention of Arab territories in 1967, as well as the uncompromising posture of the
Arab states, set the stage for further conflict, ultimately culminating in the Yom Kippur
War of 1973. As Silver observed, “up to 1967 there was a breathing space between crises
— 1948, 1956, 1967. Now we live in a period of unrelenting crisis.”120 By inundating the
Jewish ethnopolitical field with a continuous barrage of exogenous stimuli, the
procession of Israel-related crises between 1969 and 1973 fueled the expansionary
dynamic kicked off by the Six Day War.

Stoking the Flames: The Era of Crisis-Driven Expansion, 1969-1973
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After a regrouping process that lasted through the end of 1968—an American
election year consumed by political assassinations and urban upheavals—the beginning
of 1969 witnessed what Minkoff called a “succession of emergencies” that, for NCRAC
and its agencies, reinforced “the long-recognized need for an ongoing year-round
affirmative program of interpretation of Israel’s position.”121 On December 28, 1968, two
days after an El Al jetliner was hijacked by members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, Israel launched a retaliatory raid on Beirut International Airport,
destroying several passenger planes. Under NCRAC’s direction, “Jewish communities
throughout the country were alerted and informed by means of a swiftly organized
telephone relay” to begin pressuring the outgoing Johnson administration to oppose
censuring Israel at the United Nations. “Many thousands of messages were received in
that brief period by the President, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N.,” reported NCRAC’s Julian Freeman. “Although, regrettably, the United States
voted for censure, [US] Ambassador [James] Wiggins’ speech did incorporate the
essential arguments conveyed in many of those messages.” To inform the Jewish
community, “background, fact sheets and interpretive materials were disseminated very
widely” and “recipients and readers were urged to send messages incorporating facts and
viewpoints contained in the material.” Favorable newspaper editorials “were duplicated
in quantity and made available for redistribution. Requests for thousands of copies were
received by the NCRAC.” According to Freeman,
Contacts with radio and television, widely employed, proved very significant…
[I]n one large city, the CRC organized a round-the-clock monitoring activity of
television and radio by volunteers, who also phoned in to counter hostile
comments; this activity was backed up by a continually staffed desk at a central
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telephone location, to receive information from and give guidance to
monitors.122
Following the Beirut raid, French President Charles de Gaulle tightened the arms
embargo that France had imposed on Israel during the Six Day War. In response, Jewish
communities across the country took swift action to protest De Gaulle’s move. In
Philadelphia on January 9, “more than 400 persons participated in a demonstration in
front of the French Consulate, organized by the Jewish Community Relations Council,”
reported NCRAC’s Arnold Aaronson. On January 14, the Washington JCRC staged “a
dignified ceremony of protest” across from the White House that featured “closing
prayer[s] by a Negro bishop” (intended to signal Catholic opposition to the French
embargo). “The desire of people, non-Jewish as well as Jewish, to express their strong
indignation over President De Gaulle’s callous and arbitrary action should be given
encouragement and assistance,” Aronson instructed. “Rabbis should be encouraged to
preach on the subject and provided with background material for that purpose.”123 Within
a week, anti-French protests had been conducted “in all fourteen U.S. cities in which
France maintains consulates,” and “remonstrances flowed by letter, telegram and
telephone into the French Embassy and into the headquarters and other offices of Air
France and other government-sponsored French firms.” While no Jewish organization
called for a boycott, “picket lines were maintained outside the offices of such companies
in a number of cities.”124
Over the next four years, pro-Israel mobilizations of this nature would become the
bread and butter of the community relations field. To describe them all in detail would
risk redundancy; a birds-eye sketch of NCRAC- and JCRC-led efforts will suffice to
establish the point. Contemporaneous with the De Gaulle affair (January 1969) was a
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national campaign to highlight the treatment of nine Iraqi Jews accused of spying for
Israel.125 In December, Secretary of State William Rogers proposed a ten-point
framework for Arab-Israeli negotiations intended to resolve ongoing military hostilities in
the Sinai. Although the Rogers Plan was quickly rejected by both sides and eventually
undermined by Nixon himself, it occasioned “a very active program of communication
with public officials” by NCRAC agencies.126 Illustrating the scale of the operation, one
memo noted that Philadelphia’s JCRC alone had “set a goal of 100,000 written
communications” to Nixon, Rogers, and key Senators and Congressmen.127 A campaign
of similar magnitude was launched in June in response to news of a Soviet-backed
military build-up in Egypt. “A major effort in many of the communities has been to ‘toolup’ for the enormous effort necessary to stimulate responses in the general community,”
wrote NCRAC’s Jerry Hochbaum in a memo that described extensive JCRC activity in
more than forty major cities. “Jewish leadership in many communities, as a result of the
most recent crisis, are growing more cognizant of the need for more intensive
interpretation and are providing funds for staff and programs.”128 When an end to the
Israeli-Egyptian “War of Attrition” was brokered in August, NCRAC led an “urgent mass
letter campaign” demanding the strict enforcement of ceasefire terms.129 NCRAC’s proIsrael activities for the following year were summarized in a report to the Large City
Budgeting Conference:
In the course of 1971, a succession of developments — the increasing flow of
Soviet arms and personnel into Egypt the escalation of the attack on the
reunification of Jerusalem, the U.S. initiative for an interim opening of the Suez
Canal, the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship, the lag in U.S. arms
commitments, among others—created the need for a corresponding succession
of interpretive memoranda and contacts to stimulate communities to make
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effective use of community relations approaches to media, church groups, civic
organizations, governmental figures and others.130
In addition to the crises mentioned above, JCRCs reported having organized “action
responses” to the “Deir Yassin Affair,” the “Four-Power Meeting,” the “Al Aksa Affair,”
the “Second Iraqi Affair,” and the “Syrian Affair,” among other episodes.131 While the
precise nature of these mobilizations is not immediately evident from the documentation,
most appear to have been part of nationally-coordinated responses to incidents abroad.
The pace of events was frenetic.
This cascade of international “affairs” and communal reactions catalyzed new and
consequential institutional developments. According to NCRAC executive committee
minutes from late 1969, “During the past year, especially since the Beirut raid… NCRAC
had intensified its services to communities on [Israel]; and… there had been a great
expansion of community organization and activity in this area, including the creation of
special task forces or other structures in several larger cities, including Cleveland, San
Francisco, Columbus and Cincinnati.”132 As NCRAC chairman Jordan Band explained at
the National Emergency Conference on Peace in the Middle East held in January 1970,
local Israel task forces, convened under JCRC auspices, brought together “all concerned
organizations in the Jewish community,” including “local constituent members of
community relations committees, federations, local chapters of national Jewish agencies,
synagogues, Zionist groups, Jewish intellectuals, youth groups, and all of the other
segments of Jewish life which are interested in these issues.”133 With support from the
UJA Emergency Fund, NCRAC facilitated task force expansion by disseminating a
detailed blueprint to every federated community and making its staff available for
personal consultation. The task force idea—which would receive a major injection of
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resources after 1973—was a product of the feedback loop linking JCRCs to the NCRAC
central office. Beginning in 1967, NCRAC appears to have implemented more rigorous
procedures for recording and reporting local achievements on the Israel advocacy front,
enabling it to better discern which communities were operating most efficiently.
Unsurprisingly, the data confirmed that “communities that do the most effective job, both
in emergencies and an ongoing basis, are those with structured bodies, properly funded,
adequately staffed, conducting continual programs, from a central address, usually the
CRC and the federation, but involving all concerned segments in the Jewish community.”
In other words, “the creation, in effect, of a miniature Presidents Conference at the local
level.”134 With their effective task forces, San Francisco and Cleveland served as national
exemplars. In both cities, the Israel task force fostered state-wide communications
networks that prefigured the associations of Jewish federations that emerged in response
to state and federal budget retrenchment in the 1980s.135
Cooperation between national and local agencies also grew stronger during this
period. In September 1969, the CJF’s Philip Bernstein sent Minkoff a confidential memo
proposing a centralized “information service” for the pro-Israel apparatus. Among other
things, it called for
A continuous and continuing flow of information from all parts of the country to
assure accurate assessment of… the state of public opinion [and] shifts of
opinion among critical groups… A daily flow of press clippings [and]
analysis…[and] the establishment of a working headquarters manned by the best
available people gathering, assembling, and preparing materials for interested
Jewish groups in communities throughout the nation.136
On the question of implementation, the memo identified “the National Community
Relations Advisory Council [and] its local affiliates” as a “machinery ready-made both
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for gathering opinion reports and disseminating information.”137 In early 1971, the
Presidents Conference initiated a “large-scale program” for information production and
dissemination that in many respects resembled the CJF proposal. It involved “the
production and press placement of feature articles, photographs, cartoons, and a variety
of other material… touching upon many aspects of Israel’s economy, social organization,
culture,” although avoiding explicitly “political issues.” The goal was “to blanket the
press throughout the United States” during Israel’s 23rd anniversary celebration and to
continue to achieve “the most extensive possible placement of material at other times.”138
As with the CJF’s plan, while information was to be aggregated and synthesized
nationally, the NCRAC-JCRC network would serve as the local transmission mechanism.
“The success of this program,” NCRAC information director Samuel Spieler told
member agencies, “insofar as it requires access to local newspapers and the many
religious, labor, Negro and other specialized papers published locally, will rest upon your
cooperation and that of other Federation and CRC executives.”139 After 1967, national
agencies also played a greater role in the provision of ready-made materials for locally
orchestrated Yom Ha’atzmaut celebrations—gatherings that NCRAC increasingly
attempted to politicize. In a 1969 memo entitled “Celebration of Israel’s 21st Anniversary
as an Interpretive Vehicle,” Julian Freeman advised JCRCs that “stress should be given to
such themes as: Israel’s desire for peace, the continuing intransigence of the Arabs, that
lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be imposed from the outside… and that
America’s national interest in the Middle East are best served by continuance of the
traditional support of Israel by our government.” In addition, “individuals attending the
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celebrations should be encouraged to send letters or telegrams to the White House and
State Department and their Congressmen and Senators conveying similar thoughts.”140
In sum, by the outbreak of war in October 1973, the NCRAC-JCRC network had
assumed its basic character as the key mechanism underwriting total community
mobilization for Israel. AIPAC’s lobbying operation on Capitol Hill, still modestly
staffed and budgeted, relied on the groundswell of pro-Israel opinion and political
representation generated by the national community relations infrastructure, which since
the Six Day War had grown to include specialized Israel task forces and systematic media
production and distribution initiatives. While 1967 represented a qualitative departure
from the previous era of domestically-focused advocacy, the Yom Kippur War was a
quantitative turning point. After 1973, a significant amount of additional money was
invested in an already robust apparatus to further expand and specialize its activities.
What Goldberg called “the first crucial step in the birth of the superlobby”—the
establishment of NCRAC’s national Israel Task Force in 1973—was in fact the final step.

Conflagration: The Heyday of Grassroots Israel Advocacy, 1973-1982
On October 6, 1973, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat launched a war to retake the
Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula. The surprise attack, which took place during the Jewish
holiday of Yom Kippur, inflicted initial losses on Israel but was ultimately repulsed after
the Nixon administration launched an emergency airlift to aid the Israeli military. In
response to American intervention, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries imposed an oil embargo on the U.S. and its allies, quadrupling the
price of oil globally. Discontent over gasoline rationing led community relations agencies
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to fear a sudden resurgence of anti-Semitism. Jewish anxiety proved unfounded,
however. “We have come out of these four months enormously better off than we had
any reason to expect,” wrote one AJC leader. “The expected pogrom has not occurred…
The American people seem to have a clear understanding that Israel is not to blame for
the oil shortage.”141 Nonetheless, the war galvanized an intense communal reaction.
Perhaps the most significant institutional outcome was the CJF’s allocation of close to a
million dollars “to make possible public information programs beyond what the local and
national community relations agencies could do with their available resources.”142 To
administer these funds, NCRAC created a national Israel Task Force (ITF) that was
authorized by the CJF to issue grants for special projects. “This system required the
national agencies to be responsive to the needs of the communities and gave [NCRAC]
an important financial role,” an internal document later recalled.143 Over the next decade,
the CJF reauthorized ITF funding to the tune of around $3 million total.144 In effect, the
federations injected emergency blasts of high-octane fuel into a political machine whose
normal energy reserves—federation campaign donations and high rates of participation in
Jewish mass membership organizations—were moving towards eventual depletion.
Mass mobilization for Israel during the 1973 war evinced all the fervor of 1967
but with the added benefit of the infrastructural developments that had occurred in the
interim. Local Israel task forces and national information production mechanisms kicked
into high gear. “Literally within hours” of the attack,
Informational bulletins, backgrounders, fact sheets, pamphlets, brochures and
other materials have flowed in a steady torrent to editors, commentators, writers,
leaders and opinion-molders in all walks of life. Communities have organized
countless rallies, demonstrations, prayer meetings and other events. Letters,
telegrams and telephone calls have poured into Congressional offices, the White
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House and State Department, and at times, the United Nations, International Red
Cross, Soviet and Arab embassies.145
During the effort, “each CRC and regional office became the nerve center and command
post for coordinated local activities which complemented and buttressed the national
effort,” noted ADL chief Benjamin Epstein.146 Whether as the result of this activity or
simply due to the changed geostrategic calculations of the Nixon administration,
Congress subsequently authorized $2.2 billion in post-war military aid for Israel,
increasing U.S. financial support by 800% and setting a new precedent for U.S.-Israel
relations. “What was accomplished in the last several weeks was possible because of the
community relations foundation laid down over the years since the creation of Israel,”
declared NCRAC in a report shortly after the war, “—a foundation of intergroup and
interpersonal relationships and contacts cultivated assiduously by Jewish community
relations agencies at the national level and in the communities.”147 Characteristically, the
report called for further expansion of local pro-Israel activity. To that end, the national
Israel Task Force authorized a $125,000 grant for an “Augmented Community
Consultation Service” (ACCS) that would “focus on the creation in communities of
[local] Israel Task Forces or equivalent bodies” and “the strengthening of those already in
being.”148 Under the ACCS, NCRAC employed three full-time “community consultants”
who visited far-flung JCRC communities, trained and maintained ongoing
communication with their leadership on Israel-related matters, and organized special
seminars and regional conferences for the exchange of best practices among JCRCs of
different sizes and needs. ACCS carried out 205 consultations in 121 communities
between November 1974 and September 1976 and would provide scores of additional
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visitations over the next several years. By the end of 1976, all but eight federated
communities had a functioning Israel task force149
In addition to the ACCS, ITF dollars funded a range of special projects carried out
by NCRAC member agencies. These included opinion polling, the production of Israelrelated TV news features and a full-length feature film, a bi-weekly radio news and
analysis service, the creation of a national speakers bureau, construction of “a national
data bank of influentials in support of Israel,” and special outreach projects to Black
media and labor organizations.150 Especially noteworthy was an ITF initiative known as
the “Washington Truth Squad,” established in late 1973 by recently-retired AIPAC
founder Isaiah Kenen. According to a document detailing the operation, “70 or 80 percent
of all written and spoken words about the American position in the Middle East and
about the energy crisis originate in Washington”—a fact that demanded continuous
monitoring of the D.C.-based media.151 The truth squad, formally titled the “National
Media Project,” maintained “direct communications with editorial writers, columnists or
broadcasters whose observations require clarification or further information,” stimulated
letters to the editor “in reply to critical or inaccurate editorials, columns, or news stories,”
and encouraged “statements by public figures to counteract those made by pro-Arab or
anti-Israel spokesmen.”152 Organizationally, the squad consisted of a Steering Committee
of Kenen, Washington, D.C. Jewish Community Center director Daniel Mann, and
representatives from eight national Jewish agencies; an advisory council of “Washingtonbased professionals in the P.R. [public relations] field”; and a paid professional staff that
included future CNN anchorman Wolf Blitzer.153 NCRAC played a key coordinating
role, “transmitting questions and concerns from localities to Mr. Kenen and, in turn,
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serving as both contact and outlet for Mr. Kenen in reaching the national and local
agencies.”154 While there does not appear to have been any direct continuity, Kenen’s
truth squad prefigured later pro-Israel media-monitoring outfits like the Committee for
Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, established in Washington, D.C. in 1982.
The strengthening of local Israel task forces after 1973 increased the amount of
pro-Israel advocacy undertaken vis-à-vis state legislatures and other state-level elected
officials. For instance, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization was admitted to the
UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders in 1975, JCRCs managed
within a 48-hour period to convince 52 of the 77 board members of the National District
Attorneys Association to sign a letter of protest.155 The most extensive translocal
initiative, however, was the ongoing NCRAC campaign to pass state-level legislation
outlawing compliance with the Arab League boycott—a campaign that reached new
heights in the 1970s. NCRAC’s ITF-funded community consultants provided JCRCs and
federations with model legislation (typically framed around anti-discrimination
provisions), facilitated cooperation between national and local agencies, and monitored
the ratification progress from beginning to end. By late 1976, anti-boycott laws had
passed state legislatures in New York, Maryland, California, Illinois, and Ohio, with
active campaigns in Massachusetts, Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Virginia,
Louisiana, and Georgia.156 In some cases, as in New York and Maryland, state legislators
eager to impress Jewish constituents took the initiative on anti-boycott legislation,
working closely with and advising JCRCs on political strategy.157 In other cases, JCRCs
encountered difficulties that necessitated creative responses. The head of the New
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Orleans JCRC, for instance, reported that her legal team had initially decided “to attach
[anti-boycott] legislation to the state’s civil rights laws, as has been done elsewhere.”
However, after examination of the question it was found that Louisiana has no
civil rights laws! Furthermore, it has no state-wide enforcement body for such
policy. [The JCRC] therefore contemplated forming a coalition of groups in the
state to press for civil rights legislation in general, of which the anti-boycott
measures will be a part.158
Finding state legislators to be “largely ‘rednecks,’ and… not likely to be too receptive to
civil rights legislation,” the JCRC instead proposed “pursuing [anti-boycott measures] via
commerce or anti-trust law — or failing that some type of executive order.”159
Beyond the anti-boycott campaign, JCRCs became more proactive after 1973:
they attempted to influence public school curricula in a pro-Israel direction; kept close
tabs on Arab-American organizations (even in their incipient stages) and mobilized to
subvert them, when necessary; and organized regular delegations to Israel for politicians
and opinion-molders.160 Aggressive, specialized outreach to coalitional partners
continued apace, paying dividends in periods of crisis, as when the UN declared Zionism
a form of racism in 1975. “Within 24 hours,” wrote Earl Raab, then-head of San
Francisco’s JCRC, “cross-sectional public protests were held in most of the major
population centers of the country at which identifiable leaders appeared to register their
protests from the following politically potent communities, among others: black,
Hispanic, Asian, labor, Catholic and Protestant.”161 Bayard Rustin’s short-lived Black
Americans to Support Israel Committee ran a full-page advertisement in the New York
Times rebutting the racism charge. Signed by, among others, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott
King, and the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins, the ad was financed by an ITF grant.162 Such
displays of “cross-sectional” support for Israel would grow less frequent by the 1980s, as
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American Jews turned away from coalition politics. But perhaps the most significant
development after 1973 was NCRAC’s participation in a series of increasingly bold
challenges to the executive branch, starting with the 1975 “reassessment” crisis
(described above). In 1977, and then again in 1981, Jewish organizations mobilized to
prevent U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, bringing themselves into direct conflict with
two presidential administrations. Both challenges were unsuccessful, but the bruising
1981 confrontation with Ronald Reagan over the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning
And Control System) spy planes is said to have significantly raised the profile of the proIsrael lobby—particularly its Washington-based spearhead, AIPAC. The “AWACS
battle,” according to Edward Tivnan, brought about “the end of AIPAC’s national
obscurity.”163 In the wake of defeat, the newly-reorganized lobby would grow
increasingly prominent and powerful. But as J.J. Goldberg notes, “it was not even
AIPAC's fight.” Rather, the confrontation with Reagan “was waged by a broad
consortium under the umbrella of NCRAC,” which “delivered its armies of local
community leaders to call their representatives and talk tough.”164

Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that the Jewish federation system, through its political
auxiliaries, NCRAC and the JCRCs, was the driving force behind pro-Israel advocacy in
the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—a time of immense grassroots political activity. For
most of this period, what is today understood as the core of the “Israel lobby,” the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee, barely scratched the surface of public
consciousness. AIPAC’s legislative victories, to whatever extent they were hard-fought,
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were underwritten by its ability to pass political directives through the increasingly wellorganized NCRAC-JCRC apparatus. By the 1980s, however, the foundations of that
apparatus were beginning to crumble. Coalitional ties frayed as American Jews,
increasingly affluent and suburbanized, abandoned domestic civil rights struggles.
Consensus on Israel within the American Jewish community was challenged by the
election of Menachem Begin in 1977, and then irreparably fractured by Israel’s
unpopular 1982 invasion of Lebanon. A series of insurgent Jewish organizations arose to
channel this discontent, and by 1984 NCRAC was struggling to maintain the fragile unity
forged decades earlier through the communal exorcism of the American Council for
Judaism. Structural transformations in American society, meanwhile, diminished the
grassroots institutional capacity that NCRAC had so effectively harnessed. America’s
neoliberal economic turn transformed the communal balance of power as federation and
welfare fund professionals lost influence and autonomy to an increasingly wealthy
conservative donor base. Among the major beneficiaries of this process was AIPAC.
Infused with millions of dollars in right-wing contributions, AIPAC underwent a total
restructuring. It replaced communal oversight with a board dominated by Republican
donors, vastly expanded its professional staff, and enhanced its proprietary networks—all
while leveraging the reputational and infrastructural benefits bequeathed by NCRAC and
the federation system. While federations continue to engage in Israel advocacy, the
grassroots character of JCRCs has been reduced, and pro-Israel nonprofits financed by
private family foundations play an increasingly important mobilizing role. The next
chapter tells the story of these transformations.
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Chapter 6
Conservation and Subversion
Federations, Foundations, and the "Privatization" of Israel Advocacy, 1973-2018

Introduction
From the highpoint of its institutional and ideological coherence in the aftermath
of the Six Day War, the community relations dynamo underwent a slow but definitive
unravelling over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Political, economic, and
technological developments reordered the external environment, transformed internal
resource distributions, and unlocked new doors to sustainable institutional growth for
counterhegemonic challengers. This chapter explores the centrifugal and centripetal
forces that have shaped the American Jewish ethnopolitical field since 1973. In so doing,
it departs from the linear narrative of previous chapters and traces three separate threads
leading from the “consensus” period following the Six Day War to the more chaotic and
conflictual order we encounter today. The first section characterizes some of the broad
tendencies of American Jewish politics since the Yom Kippur War. From the 1960s
onward, but especially with the rise of the Israeli right in 1977, the routine operation of
the Israel advocacy apparatus engendered in communal activists a set of increasingly
hardline, pro-Israel dispositions—a Jewish-nationalist habitus, in Bourdieusian terms.
The concurrent embrace of Palestine solidarity politics by Black radical elements
intersected with material dynamics in U.S. inner cities to erode grassroots Jewish support
for traditional civil rights coalitions. But the ideological effects of the pro-Israel
apparatus varied across institutional venues. Where pro-Israel habitus came into
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sustained contact with institutional complexes productive of more transformativeegalitarian dispositions—for example, on university campuses—the resulting “friction”
fostered the emergence of the first organized liberal-Zionist challenges to the field’s post1967 dominant coalition. While the initial challenger—Breira—quickly collapsed under
pressure, subsequent liberal-Zionist challengers fared better under changed political
circumstances. The dominant coalition was more drastically destabilized in 1993, when
the government of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin entered into peace negotiations
with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), abruptly reversing decades of Israeli
policy.
The second section is devoted to economic change. It traces the impact of shifts in
the U.S. and global political economy during the Reagan era on resource and power
distributions in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. As wealth and income
inequality hit pre-Depression levels, Jewish philanthropic dollars fled the federation
system into private foundations. Federations adapted by offering additional incentives to
large donors, including increased control over programmatic decision-making. In the
twenty-first century, Jewish family foundations helped sustain a new generation of rightleaning, pro-Israel nonprofits, further diminishing federation control over the Israel
advocacy agenda. Among the major beneficiaries of these economic processes was
AIPAC. Following the 1980 election, the lobby populated its lay leadership with top
Republican Party donors in an effort to forge closer ties to the Reagan administration. As
a result, AIPAC’s budget ballooned dramatically, enabling it to construct much of the
proprietary national infrastructure it enjoys today. As AIPAC’s fortunes were on the rise,
the underpinnings of the NCRAC-JCRC network were crumbling. Resource scarcity
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stimulated conflicts between federations and JCRCs, as well as between NCRAC and its
national member agencies. At the same time, sociodemographic changes were hollowing
out Jewish participation in local membership organizations, reducing the capacity of
JCRCs to facilitate mass mobilization. Under siege from without and facing a long-term
fiscal crisis, NCRAC was forced to restructure in 1996, changing its name and reducing
the scope of its activity.
The third and final section is devoted to mechanisms of conservation. In
Bourdieu’s framework, dominant actors pursue strategies of conservation aimed at
reproducing the distribution of capital most favorable to them. Since the late 1960s, when
“survivalism” came to replace “assimilationism” as the guiding logic of the organized
Jewish community, federations adopted a new conservation strategy involving heavy
investment in Jewish educational, cultural, and identity-building initiatives aimed at
fostering an Israel-positive “Jewish peoplehood” paradigm. In so doing, they were able to
tap new reserves of economic capital—large donors with survivalist inclinations—and
reinforce their symbolic authority as guardians of Jewish values and authenticity. To the
extent that these investments in symbolic capital reinforce the basic ideological
dispositions on which the stability of the dominant coalition depends, they work to
impose an important countervailing pressure on the field’s mounting disequilibrium.
While the first subsection examines how federations reproduce pro-Israelist habitus
through systems of Jewish education, the second subsection considers the way “symbolic
exclusion” was deployed by elements of the dominant coalition to materially impede the
institutional development of liberal-Zionist (and later non-Zionist) organizations.
Drawing on new archival material, I explore the relationship between symbolic power
312

and financial survival in the history of Breira and its successor organization, New Jewish
Agenda, and set up a comparison with today’s principal counterhegemonic challenger,
Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP). While changed political circumstances and the
development of new fundraising and communications technologies have mitigated the
financial impact of symbolic exclusion on JVP relative to its predecessors, the political
“red lines” currently enforced by the federation system continue to fragment opposition
to the status quo even as they stimulate greater resistance to it.

Coming Apart at the Seams: American Jewish Politics After 1973
Right Turn: The Rise of Israel Advocacy and the Fall of the Jewish Social Agenda
Not long after the Six Day War, NCRAC leaders embarked on a study mission to
Israel where they met with high-level officials, including Prime Minister Levi Eshkol,
and “observed first-hand the conditions on the West Bank, Golan Heights, Gaza and
Sinai.”1 The internal account of the mission, authored by NCRAC chairman Jordan Band,
is an instructive document. As described in the previous chapter, the 1967 war catapulted
community relations agencies into an era of Israel advocacy for its own sake, free of the
rhetorical moorings that had once tethered it exclusively to concerns about the status and
security of American Jews. Over time, the imperative of defending Israeli policies
without reference to higher-order objectives eased the adoption of increasingly
militaristic and ethnonationalist rhetoric, both before but particularly after the election of
right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1977. In light of that shift, Band’s
trip report appears a remarkably far-sighted engagement with the ethical quandaries
posed by Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. While marveling at the Israeli
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military’s “sense of compassion, understanding, and empathy for the Arabs for whom
they are responsible,” Band noted “the severe problem of an enormous Arab population
now under Israeli control,” a problem that was “compounded by the question as to how
long people can be governed while disenfranchised.”2 The conquest of the territories, he
observed, had “reopened old debates about such issues as Israel as a bi-national state.”
Sympathetically recalling a discussion of Palestinian statehood with an “Arab leader”
from the West Bank, Band alluded to the existence of “Israelis who share this view” and
“visualize an Arab Palestine as an autonomous, demilitarized entity which has a special
economic relationship with the State of Israel.” Liberal Israelis, he wrote, “warn that
annexation requires giving complete and full citizenship to the Arabs on the West Bank,”
and would therefore “seriously endanger the integrity of Israel as a Jewish state.” Of his
personal encounters with political elites over the course of the mission, however, Band
was “frank to say that I can’t recall hearing one Israeli admit his willingness to give up
the West Bank. And I heard plenty who would refuse to give it up.” While some among
the hardliners envisioned a “federated state or other variations of such a concept,” others
“urge[d] the immediate establishment of Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank”
in anticipation of mass aliyah (Jewish immigration to Israel).
Band’s report was available for internal consumption only and no official
NCRAC document or forum—internal or external—would revisit these vexing political
questions or the diversity of Jewish-Israeli orientations towards them until the late 1970s,
and only then in response to irrepressible controversy. Instead, NCRAC’s discourse on
Israel became increasingly hardline in ways that would contradict long-held communal
commitments in other policy domains. In a speech to the 1975 Plenary, for instance,
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political scientist Edward Luttwak linked the survival of Israel—and, by extension, the
“moral survival of the Jewish community”—to the strength of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,
calling on organized Jewry to oppose arms reduction treaties and efforts by “anti-defense
lobbies” to shrink the military budget.3 Observing that such lobbies “all have boards of
directors prominently decorated with Jewish names,” and that “among Jewish
congressmen, rare is the one who votes for anything in the defense budget,” Luttwak
declared that he “personally cannot take seriously the other priorities”—that is, the social
and economic concerns—“that seem to animate so much of Jewish communal life.”
“True, there are a few people starving in America,” Luttwak said in response to a
question about the trade-off between military and social spending, but
the truth is, there’s a war on… The war began perhaps, in 66 A.D. when a
Syrian legion of the empire descended to Palestine, was defeated, and then the
Romans began the real war. The failure to comprehend the state of war has
always been an ingredient in the destruction of successive Jewish generations.4
The notion that defending Israel would require American Jews to compromise core
ethical values was strikingly reiterated two years later in a Plenary speech by Daniel
Mann, head of the Washington, D.C. JCRC. Just months before the shock electoral
victory of Israel’s right-wing Likud party, Mann warned his audience against subjecting
the Jewish state to liberal-democratic standards of political conduct by way of “rigid
analogies” to the American system.5 The “American model of church-state separation,”
he argued, “cannot be applied totally and absolutely to a nation engaged in renewing an
ancient religious civilization.” Likewise, when it came to “the question of the rights of
Israel’s Arab citizens,” democratic principles were of equally little relevance. “Attractive
as many of us may find the proposition of full equality in exchange for full obligations,”
315

Mann reasoned, “the power of ethnic/national loyalties in the Middle East (and of Arab
rhetoric) should give us pause.”
But nowhere were the implications of the community’s rightward shift on Israel
more evident than in an address to the 1974 Plenary by Benjamin Epstein, national
director of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Presenting the thesis of his recently
published book, The New Anti-Semitism (co-authored with the ADL’s Arnold Foster),
Epstein identified the American “Radical Left” as a “political movement quite as
threatening to Jewish security as the Radical Right.”6 This assessment—that Black
activists and “New Left” student protesters who challenged Israel’s treatment of the
Palestinians embodied a form of anti-Semitism on par with the American Nazi Party—
hinged on the erosion of prior conceptual distinctions between American Jewry and the
State of Israel. Whereas, in the 1950s, community relations agencies viewed themselves
as combatting manifestations of domestic anti-Semitism arising out of, but ultimately
distinct from, legitimate debates about the Middle East, by the 1970s American Jewish
institutions had so thoroughly identified themselves with Israel that the ADL could
effectively redefine anti-Semitism to include hostility towards, or even a simple lack of
affection for, the Jewish state. In Epstein’s words, the “New Anti-Semitism” consisted of
insensitivity, indifference, apathy, callousness and even hostility to Jewish
feelings, Jewish interests and to Jewish concerns and commitments… Pervading
this entire phenomenon is an all-too-frequent blindness to the centrality for
Jews of Israel’s survival as an independent and sovereign Jewish state. It is a
blindness to the fact that for the overwhelming majority of Jews in the U.S. and
around the globe, Israel’s survival is the most profound commitment, save for
the commitment of Judaism itself.7
Having leveraged a series of international crises to channel Jewish sentiment and
articulate Jewish interests in line with their financial-institutional imperatives (see
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Chapter 5), the community relations agencies now sought to encode their consensus
priorities into the DNA of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. As argued in
previous chapters, insofar as it enjoys continuity and stability, the nomos of the Jewish
field is defined by opposition to anti-Semitism and a commitment to promoting American
Jewish interests as defined by the field’s dominant coalition. The ADL’s new chain of
equivalences closed the gap between Israeli and American-Jewish interests and advanced
a concept of anti-Semitism appropriate to that consolidation. Advocacy of Palestinian
rights was consequently transformed from something bearing the potential to promote
anti-Semitism into a form of anti-Semitism tout court. “We will have to make clear to the
American people,” Epstein added, “that when the Arabs talk about ‘the rights of the
Palestinians,’ most of them mean the elimination of Israel as a sovereign Jewish state.”
Beyond debuting the “New Anti-Semitism,” Epstein’s speech is instructive for the
way it relates conflicts over Israel to the organized Jewish community’s withdrawal from
civil rights activism and its emergent embrace of a “colorblind” racial politics.
Identifying the period from 1945 to 1965 as a “golden age” of American Jewish security
and prosperity, Epstein alleged that Jewish socioeconomic advancement had since come
under attack by an alliance of liberal, anti-Israel, and Black Power forces. Through a
discourse on Jewish “whiteness,” the ADL chief created a point of articulation between
the “New Anti-Semitism” and the shifting strategies of the Black freedom movement:
By some sort of sociological ‘sleight-of-hand,’ six million Jews have become
part of the ‘white majority.’ … United States Government agencies concerned
with ‘affirmative action’ already classify Jews as ‘other whites’ and there
appears to be a tendency for that denial of Jewish identity to spread beyond the
government bureaucracy… [T]his ideological hostility to the corporate Jew…
goes hand in hand with the hostility widely expressed toward the legitimacy of
Israel as a Jewish state… There is, in short, a clear relationship between
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‘indifference’ and even hostility to the Jewish community’s legitimate goal of
fair and equal treatment in our pluralistic American society… and the
indifference, even hostility, towards Israel’s right of existence.8
For Epstein, far-left rhetoric framing Israel as a European, settler-colonial state and
affirmative action initiatives classing Jews among white Americans represented two sides
of the same coin. Both constituted attacks on “the legitimacy [of] Jews as a group,” and
both were reflections of the fact that “the Jew in America is no longer perceived as a
victim… nor even as a ‘minority group.’” This two-pronged assault on the “corporate
Jew,” Epstein argued, offered the organized Jewish community a compelling rationale for
a more self-interested political course. Praising the recent Supreme Court challenge to
affirmative action in DeFunis v. Odegaard—the first time American Jewish agencies had
opposed a major priority of the mainstream civil rights movement—Epstein called for an
intensified legal offensive against “anti-white discrimination” coupled with robust
programs of Holocaust and pro-Israel education. While the civil rights movement had
“served its purpose, achieved significant victories, and scored important advances for
American democracy” in the 1950s and 60s, Jews could no longer afford to “enter into
coalitions at the expense of our own principles or by sacrificing Jewish interests merely
to achieve coalition.”
In synthesizing a unitary threat to American Jewry from anti-Israel and civil rights
currents, Epstein’s speech represents what Michael Omi and Howard Winant call
rearticulation—“a practice of discursive reorganization or reinterpretation of ideological
themes and interests already present in subjects’ consciousness, such that these elements
obtain new meanings or coherence.”9 Epstein himself appears to have grasped this:
“Leaders,” he declared, “must verbalize and clarify the unarticulated gut feelings of the
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rank-and-file of the community.”10 For years, the “gut feelings” that Epstein and an
emerging cadre of Jewish neoconservatives took it upon themselves to “clarify” had been
bubbling up from the grassroots. According to historian Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, a 1967
NCRAC report “found ‘Jewish backlash’ in virtually every city it studied. This ‘varied in
intensity from “indifference” … about civil rights … to resentment and hostility toward
Negro demands. On balance,’ [the report] concluded, ‘the responses indicate a definite
and substantial withdrawal of rank and file Jewish support’” from the fight for racial and
economic justice.11 By the late 1960s, most American Jews had achieved middle class
status. When it came to “levels of education, earnings, [and] proportion in the
professional and managerial ranks,” writes Greenberg, “Jews outperformed most other
groups in the United States.”12 Like other “white ethnics,” many elected to relocate from
inner cities to newly-constructed suburbs, where, according to Marc Dollinger, they
“acquiesced to the prevailing racial status quo in an attempt to enjoy the hard-fought
privileges of middle-class American life.”13 Those who remained behind were buffeted
by escalating material conflicts between Jewish business owners and Black inner city
residents—conflicts onto which the many frustrations and setbacks of the civil rights
struggle were superimposed. The urban uprisings of the 1960s took a disproportionate
toll on Jewish-owned property, and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville teachers strike of 1968
pitted the largely Jewish United Federation of Teachers against advocates of Black
“community control,” raising reciprocal charges of racism and “Black anti-Semitism.”14
As described in Chapter 2, among the more alarming symptoms of urban decay and
Jewish racial reaction was the growth of the Jewish Defense League (JDL), a militant
Jewish nationalist organization that combined armed “defense” patrols targeting African
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Americans with hardline pro-Israelism and anti-Arab racism. The “gut feelings”
expressed violently by the JDL at the street level were rearticulated by Epstein and other
neoconservatives into a more genteel doctrine of explicit Jewish self-interest, one that
would increasingly hold sway in the organized community.
But while NCRAC embraced hardline pro-Israelism—by the mid-1980s, the
organization was championing Israel’s “legitimate security, historic, and religious claims
to Judea and Samaria [the West Bank, in religious-nationalist parlance]”—its leadership
was growing increasingly uneasy with rank-and-file repudiation of liberal social causes.15
With federation-linked human service agencies heavily dependent on state and federal
social spending and JCRC political strategies premised on local coalitions with other
minority communities, NCRAC officials were among those most committed to continued
Jewish participation in movements for racial and economic justice. At the June 1969
Plenary, chairman Jordan Band lamented that “all too many Jews share in the trend of
white attitudes in the direction of indifference toward the war on poverty and antagonism
toward Negro demands.”16 Citing “alarming defections from the struggle for equality,”
Band alluded to the consequences for coalitional activity. American Jews “would be
naive to assume that our inaction or our silence is not observed, or that inferences are not
drawn from it,” he warned. The following year, Band indicated divisions with the
grassroots when he declared it the “special responsibility” of JCRC professionals to
“convince our own constituents of the relevance of Jewish religious tradition to the
struggle to end racism and want.”17 As time went on, those divisions would eat away at
NCRAC’s ability to effectively coordinate a multi-issue communal agenda as it had since
its establishment in 1944.
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The impact of the Six Day War (described in the previous chapter) not only brought
Israel to the forefront of the community relations agenda but, in the process—and in
conjunction with broader socioeconomic dynamics—displaced what many NCRAC
leaders considered important domestic priorities. In his inaugural address to the 1971
Plenary, incoming NCRAC chairman Albert Arent identified Israel and Soviet Jewry as
“the current top priorities of American Jewish community relations,” as well as “the
priority concerns of the rank and file of Jews.”18 “It is sometimes arguable that our
priorities do not reflect grass roots attitudes,” he observed. “Not so in this instance,
certainly.” But Arent was not altogether pleased with new realities in the community
relations field. Echoing Band, he returned to the “danger of being propelled by our
concern with the security and welfare of Jewish life… into an isolationism from
America”:
Too many Jews… seem prepared to withdraw into an exclusive Jewish
particularism. They take Israel and Soviet Jewry not as major priorities — as we
all do — but as the preemptive concerns of Jews… Some go even farther. They
are not just unconcerned about other issues — issues to which we assign varying
degrees of priority in our Joint Program Plan — but actively hostile toward
them. They want no resources or energies deflected from what they see as our
only real priorities.
At the same meeting, Band reflected on intra-communal class divisions and the growing
inability “to detect a consensus as to what Jewish interests really are” when it came to the
simmering urban crisis. “In the hallowed halls of NJCRAC3,” the scourge of poverty was
seen to demand ambitious liberal solutions—“massive programs of the kind suggested by
the Kerner Commission and the Freedom Budget.”19 But this broad-minded perspective
3

In 1969, reflecting the overall movement towards particularism, NCRAC added the
word “Jewish” to its name, becoming the National Jewish Community Relations
Advisory Council (NJCRAC). For consistency, I will continue to refer to “NCRAC.”
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was not shared by inner-city Jews, most of whom “demand that we Jewish organizations
reorder our own priorities to meet the needs of those… left behind, trapped without the
resources to stabilize what’s left of their neighborhoods.” As the era of sustained postwar
economic growth came to an end, NCRAC’s longstanding view of Jewish security as
“dependent upon the realization of full equality for all Americans” was increasingly
challenged from below. “How many lower and middle class Jews do you know who are
in favor of higher taxes to solve the nation’s social ills?” Band asked. “If Eldridge
Cleaver and Huey Newton frighten you and me even a little bit with their rhetoric, think
what they do to your poor and aged aunt, who will never have the money to move out of
Flatbush.”
By the end of the decade, Meyer Fine of the Metropolitan New Jersey JCRC
would describe the community’s social agenda as “dead in the water.”20 In response to
rank-and-file pressures, Jewish leadership had split between those who were “uneasy,
frustrated, worried and even guilty about our marked withdrawal to the sidelines of the
urban fray,” and those like Epstein who, “more candid, share their conviction that the
future and security of the Jewish community is no longer significantly linked to the fate
of blacks and other minorities.” Fine located himself among the former, convinced that
disengagement would engender a situation in which “the Jewish community may find
itself painfully and dangerously isolated.” Topping his list of the reasons for the
community’s attitudinal shift was its almost single-minded devotion to Israel. Muriel
Bermar, social action director for United Synagogue of America, drew the same
conclusion several years later. “Many American Jews no longer define themselves in
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terms of religious identity but as an ethnic group whose ‘home country’ is essential to
their sense of themselves as Jews,” she observed in a 1980 position paper for NCRAC.21
In the process of redefining ourselves via Israel, we have neglected other aspects
of our Judaism. We have retrenched in our efforts to alleviate, if not eradicate,
poverty in the general society; we have not been in the forefront as we once
were, of efforts in this country to secure full employment, better housing and
adequate medical care for all. While the left-wing leadership consciously
becomes anti-Israel, we give up on just those issues which are important to the
poor and dispossessed they are trying to convince.
As the 1980s wore on, NCRAC leaders expressed alarm that the transformation of
American Jewry into a “single-issue” constituency was undermining the organization’s
efficacy in all realms, including Israel advocacy itself. “The fact that the Jewish
community relations field is concerned with the total American agenda makes it the
effective advocate of Israel,” stressed chairman Bennett Yanowitz in 1983. “Sole
preoccupation with issues related to Israel undermines our ability to interpret Israel to our
friends.”22 Amidst the rise of the Christian Right, NCRAC chairman Michael Pelavin
castigated the growing body of Jewish political action committees (PACs) for prioritizing
support for Israel over the traditional Jewish commitment to separation of church and
state. While “members of Congress may know that there are other issues on our agenda
besides Israel and Soviet Jewry,” he said, “based on their experience, they doubt whether
we are prepared to press vigorously those other issues.”23 To illustrate the point, Pelavin
recalled the failure of JCRCs to sign off on a recent NCRAC-sponsored letter demanding
an escalation of sanctions against apartheid South Africa.
The gradual jettisoning of the multi-issue Jewish agenda in favor of a program of
pro-Israel advocacy thought to command universal assent did not restore the community
relations network to a stable footing for long. Cracks in the hitherto rock-solid pro323

Israelism of the American Jewish public—at least as conceived by the field’s dominant
coalition—began to emerge after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, intensified in response to
the 1977 election of Menachem Begin and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and
finally exploded into open intra-communal warfare following the election of Yitzhak
Rabin and the initiation of the Oslo peace process. I provide an overview of that history
in the next section.

We Are Not One: The Dissolution of American Jewish Consensus
In Trouble in the Tribe, his wide-ranging account of the unraveling of the post1967 pro-Israel consensus, Dov Waxman observes that the “period of disillusionment”
with Israel that began in the early 1970s “has lasted much longer than the brief period of
intense and uncritical devotion to Israel” that preceded it, suggesting that the current state
of communal conflict may be “the most normal state, and perhaps the most lasting one.”24
According to Waxman, a concatenation of historical developments in the aftermath of the
Yom Kippur War worked to erode the American Jewish love affair with Israel. Among
them was the rightward lurch of Israeli politics after 1977; the emergence of an Israeli
peace movement; the negative media coverage occasioned by Israel’s 1982 invasion of
Lebanon and its heavy-handed response to the First Intifada; diplomatic developments
that enhanced the credibility of peace advocates; enhanced American Jewish knowledge
of Israeli society, politics, and culture; and a shift in American Jews’ “collective
psychology” in the direction of greater self-assurance and assertiveness. In addition,
Waxman points to the recent divergence in attitudes towards Israel between Orthodox
and non-Orthodox Jews, suggesting the existence of a positive “causal connection
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between religiosity and attachment to Israel.” My aim in this section is to read the history
narrated by Waxman and the secondary accounts he draws on—including important
studies by Ofira Seliktar, Michael Staub, and Steven Rosenthal—through the lens of the
institutionalist and field-theoretic framework elaborated in previous chapters.
From the birth of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field in the 1920s until the
Six Day War, the boundary line between dominant and dominated—between the
communal “mainstream” and the realm of counterhegemonic challengers—had always
mapped neatly onto ideological conflicts between self-described Zionists, non-Zionists,
and anti-Zionists (even as these cleavages were intensified by class and religious
distinctions). With the effective collapse of the American Council for Judaism after 1967,
that longstanding vector of political antagonism temporarily abated. Following the Yom
Kippur War, however, the brief interregnum ended and field conflict over Israel resumed
as new liberal-Zionist political formations emerged to contest the recently enshrined
communal consensus. As indicated above, a whole host of counterhegemonic challengers
arose between 1967 and 1973 to contest the liberal, assimilationist, and hardline Zionist
elements of the dominant coalition: liberal Zionists, neoconservatives, survivalists, and
radical right-wing militants. Each challenger represented a distinct social constituency
whose location at the intersection of ideologically diverse institutional complexes
engendered both an investment in the stakes of the American Jewish ethnopolitical field
and a clash of interests with the field’s dominant coalition. Comfortable suburbanites and
distressed working class residents of America’s decaying inner cities were
simultaneously exposed to the educative and mobilizing organs of the Jewish communal
apparatus and to the shifting dynamics of the postwar political economy, which militated
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(from different directions) against the entrenched liberalism of the dominant coalition.
Similarly, the habitus of Jewish university students—who protested in the late 1960s for
increased communal funding of Jewish survivalist initiatives (see Chapter 2) and later
comprised the rank-and-file of the first liberal-Zionist peace organizations—was shaped
by exposure to federation-funded Hillel centers, Jewish summer camps, and Zionist youth
groups, on the one hand, and by the radical currents of the 1960s college campus, on the
other.
Over the ensuing decade, the neoconservative and survivalist challengers of the
late 1960s were more or less successfully accommodated by the dominant coalition,4
leaving the field’s dominated sector to right-wing militants, far-left radicals and, most
significantly, the precursors to today’s mainstream liberal-Zionist organizations.
According to Seliktar, more than a hundred “radical Jewish groups” had come into
existence by the early 1970s, bearing names like the Committee on New Alternatives in
the Middle East (CONAME), the Jewish Peace Fellowship, the Jewish Radical
Committee, and the Radical Zionist Alliance. Incubated amidst the revolutionary ferment
of the campus anti-war movement, “with various degrees of vigor these groups attacked
Israel for forming an imperialist alliance with the United States and [for] its ‘colonial’
subjugation of the Palestinians.”25 In the aftermath of the Six Day War, a smattering of
prominent American rabbis and Jewish intellectuals had also begun to criticize the
lockstep pro-Israelism of the organized Jewish community. Some, like the eminent civil
rights crusader Joachim Prinz, one-time president of the American Jewish Congress
4

Aspects of this process of incorporation were described in Chapter 2; below, I elaborate
on the rise of conservative foundations and the development of cultural-nationalist
programs in response to youth agitation.
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(AJCongress), maintained close connections to left-wing opposition factions in Israel,
where dissent from the official government line was a normal feature of party politics.
Others had grown increasingly aware of the widening moral gulf separating their personal
liberal and humanitarian commitments from Jewish institutional support for Israeli
foreign and military policy. While the unadulterated radicalism of the early youth and
campus formations was easily dismissed, a more formidable center-left alliance
eventually arose in the form of Breira: A Project of Concern in Diaspora-Israel
Relations.26
I return to Breira below; here I simply note the organization’s constituency and
ideological-rhetorical positioning vis-a-vis the dominant nomos of the field. Formed
shortly after the Yom Kippur War, Breira (“Alternative” in Hebrew) united New Left
standard-bearers like Rabbi Arthur Waskow and executive director Bob Loeb (both
formerly of CONAME) with nationally prominent communal figures like Prinz, Rabbi
Arnold Jacob Wolf, and Balfour Brickner, director of Social Action at the Reform
movement’s Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC). In a sympathetic
profile of the organization, journalist William Novak described Breira’s rank-and-file
membership as comprising young adults with “all the right credentials: they had been
involved all their lives with Jewish schools, Jewish youth groups, seminaries, summer
camps, programs in Israel, Jewish publications, and the like.”27 According to historian
Michael Staub,
Breira drew considerable support from numerous Hillel Foundations across the
U.S. While they would later be mocked as “incubators of Breira,” Hillels across
the country indeed proved remarkably receptive to this new peace initiative; at
least eight Hillel directors (including those at UCLA, Dartmouth, CarnegieMellon, Adelphi, Temple, and Yale) served on Breira’s advisory committee.28
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Politically, Breira both challenged Israeli policy towards the peace process and
consciously contravened Jewish communal norms against public dissent. Adopting
positions similar to those of the nascent Israeli peace movement, Breira called on Israel to
relinquish occupied territory, recognize the legitimacy of Palestinian national aspirations,
and implement what came to be known as the “two-state solution.”29 Crucially, it
attempted to do so from within the rhetorical frame and definition of American Jewish
interests established by the field’s dominant coalition—what Bourdieu would call
pursuing a strategy of succession rather than a strategy of subversion. “Breira represented
a dissenting Jewish voice,” writes Staub, “but it was a voice that saw itself coming, as
one Breira publication put it, ‘from within the mainstream of the American Jewish
community and from a more moderate perspective’ than the ‘extreme’ views one heard
from groups like the Jewish Defense League.”30 Breira’s self-styled moderation, its
rhetoric of “Jewish peoplehood,” and its professions of emotional attachment to Israel—
conscious attempts to leverage the field’s existing reserves of symbolic capital (see
below)—set the pattern for future liberal-Zionist articulations. “Our concern grows out of
our love and respect for the people and the land of Israel,” read a 1975 Breira statement,
“as well as our understanding that the continuity of Jewish life in the Diaspora is
inextricably linked to the existence of Israel.”31
For reasons explored below, Breira collapsed within five years. Assailed by
hardline forces, it suffered high-level defections and slid into bankruptcy by 1978. The
attacks on Breira were less concerted than the total-community offensive against the
American Council for Judaism some two decades earlier (see Chapter 4). Rather, the antiBreira campaign was spearhead by a handful of right-wing instigators—assisted by like328

minded members of the communal bureaucracy and egged on by Israeli consular
officials32—who agitated the federation system in an attempt to enforce the informal
norms governing Jewish communal discourse. As with the assault on the Council, the
attacks on Breira helped clarify the hitherto ambiguous boundaries of the dominant
coalition. According to J.J. Goldberg, a series of internal inquiries on Jewish dissent were
commissioned by the major establishment groups in the wake of Breira’s demise.33 The
vitriol and purported mendacity of the right-wing campaign dismayed elements of the
Jewish establishment, prompting bouts of institutional soul-searching. In a long memo
circulated to NCRAC member agencies, Steven Shaw of the Bergen County, New Jersey
JCRC lambasted the national organizations’ “totally inappropriate response to the
challenge [of] Breira,” which had “again proven that many of our constituent bodies have
little understanding of a whole generation of young Jews and even less relevance to their
concerns and life styles.”34 Shaw’s call for “honest discussion” and “fair debate” inside
the Jewish community went unheeded, however. As Goldberg recounts, NCRAC instead
joined with the Presidents Conference and Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz “to develop
a set of baseline principles to govern behavior within the organized Jewish
community.”35 These newly-codified rules stipulated that Israelis, through their
democratic mechanisms, were alone entitled to determine their government’s policies;
that American Jews should publicly support Israel and dissent only behind closed doors;
and that Israel should never negotiate with the PLO (a substantive policy determination
that sat awkwardly with the first two precepts and would ultimately prove destabilizing).
“Jews who disagreed,” writes Goldberg, “found themselves unwelcome in community
forums, asked to leave governing boards, [and] shouted down at meetings.”36
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Although both episodes helped clarify the internal boundaries of the field, there
was a crucial difference between the controversies surrounding Breira and the American
Council for Judaism. As described in Chapter 4, the excommunication of the Council
occurred at a time when the conditions of possibility for the reproduction of the Council’s
political subject-position (American nationalist, de facto white supremacist, and antiZionist) were rapidly disappearing. Drawing on the work of political scientist Robert
Lieberman, we can understand American Jewish politics in the 1950s as structured by
multiple “ideological and institutional orders”—Cold War liberalism, cultural pluralism,
and the increasingly “Zionized” Jewish institutional complex—that worked concertedly
to reinforce the emerging dominant coalition and its interpretation of the nomos of the
field.37 By the 1980s, however, the ideological and institutional orders operating on
American Jewry had become progressively misaligned, generating what Lieberman calls
“friction” at the points of overlap between Jewish nationalist and liberal-egalitarian
orders. The attitudinal divergence between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews with
respect to Israel can be explained in this light. Non-Orthodox Jews are more likely to
experience conflicting ideological orders as the result of their more frequent exposure to
non-Jewish socializing institutions. The Orthodox, by contrast, tend to experience a
greater degree of “institutional completeness,” patronizing an array of separate and
specifically Jewish social, educational, and economic institutions that reinforce rather
than complicate the formation of Jewish nationalist habitus. As Waxman observes,
synagogue attendance significantly increases the salience of Israel as a basis for
political behavior. This is partly because synagogue attendance strengthens
ethnic consciousness (the aforementioned sense of “Jewish peoplehood”),
leading to an increased concern with Jewish interests and encouraging collective
action on behalf of Jews. It is also because individuals regularly attending
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synagogue services are more likely to encounter “persuasive communication”
about the importance of Israel (in rabbis’ weekly sermons, for example), and
participate in cultural and symbolic activities that highlight the role of Israel as
crucial to Jewish identity.38
The same holds for Jewish all-day schools and Orthodox establishments of higher
education (for more on the effects of Jewish education, see below), and likely for more
quotidian spaces like kosher restaurants and other commercial enterprises that cater to the
Orthodox community. In conjunction with the overseas developments described below,
the movement of Orthodox Jews into positions of bureaucratic authority in the federation
system since the 1970s has almost certainly contributed to the field’s disequilibrating
tendencies.39 As Jewish communal institutions moved to the right, friction between the
increasingly discordant ideological orders affecting non-Orthodox Jews began to
accelerate the production of a hybrid, liberal-Zionist habitus. Thus, whereas the
excommunication of the American Council for Judaism inaugurated a new, selfreinforcing equilibrium that lasted for nearly two decades, the campaign against Breira
and the subsequent elaboration of communal “red lines” can be seen as a rearguard action
in defense of an increasingly unstable status quo.
It is a point of consensus among analysts of American Jewish politics that the
election of Menachem Begin as Israeli prime minister in 1977 exerted a profound effect
on the dynamics of the field. Leader of the Revisionist Zionist Likud bloc, Begin
fervently opposed territorial compromise with the Palestinians and sought to deepen
Israel’s control over the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip by accelerating the
construction of Jewish settlements. American Jewish leaders, accustomed to the secular
and ostensibly more pragmatic leadership of Israel’s founding Labor Party, had difficulty
adjusting to the sudden ascendency of Begin’s religious-nationalist coalition. According
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to Seliktar, “the heightened visibility of the Orthodox parties in the Likud coalition put a
spotlight on their ambitious agenda,” which had long involved denigrating the legal status
of non-Orthodox denominations in Israel, particularly American Reform Judaism.40 As
Rosenthal notes, the combination of Begin’s election and Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat’s historic peace overture later that year “seriously weakened the foundation of the
American Jewish consensus on Israel… by providing an alternative to Israel’s three
decades of necessarily hard-line policies.”41 While the establishment organizations soon
reconciled themselves to Begin, the friction generated by this conjuncture of events
precipitated a spate of elite defections to the emerging liberal-Zionist peace camp.
Despite Breira’s collapse, the early 1980s saw the successful institutionalization of liberal
Zionism in the form of Americans for Peace Now (the official U.S. affiliate of the Israeli
peace movement), the New Israel Fund (a fundraising conduit for liberal causes in Israel),
and New Jewish Agenda (NJA), Breira’s most obvious successor organization. One
advantage that NJA possessed was its multi-issue platform, through which it appealed to
the growing pool of Jewish liberals dissatisfied with the establishment’s emaciated social
agenda. In addition to advocating for Palestinian self-determination, NJA maintained
taskforces devoted to economic and social justice, feminism, nuclear disarmament, and
Central American solidarity.42
Although Begin defied expectations by negotiating an historic peace agreement
with Sadat in 1978, his government’s highly destructive war of choice against the PLO
presence in Lebanon triggered increased censure from American Jewish liberals.
Communal elites openly flouted redlines against public criticism as competing newspaper
advertisements appeared in support and opposition to Begin’s Lebanese misadventure.43
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When Begin abruptly rejected a Middle East peace plan brought forward by the Reagan
administration, even Tom Dine of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) gently broke with the Likud leader by praising the initiative.44 Seemingly as a
result of the Lebanon war and its unfavorable reception by the American news media,
opinion polls began to reflect growing American Jewish support for negotiations with the
PLO.45 In this chaotic political environment, the community relations network scrambled
to maintain a semblance of Jewish unanimity on Israel—a united front that it believed
necessary to the achievement of its broader goals. “At no time in recent years has the
unity of the Jewish people been subjected to greater strains than in the past 18 months,”
declared NCRAC chairman Bennett Yanowitz in February 1983.46
The unity of the Jewish community is a critical factor in our ability to effectively
influence public policy… Were the Jewish community to act as though it
accepted criticism of Israel or the policies of its government as unobjectionable,
we would become parties to open season on Israel… When it seemed that some
within the establishment differed from positions of the government of Israel, it
was not surprising to see even good friends in Congress begin to follow suit and
publicly voice their concerns.
NCRAC identified “maintaining and emphasizing a public unity of support for Israel
within the American Jewish community” as one of the organization’s “prime objectives”
for 1983.47 To this end, it vowed to provide “appropriate non-public channels for free
discussion and debate ‘within the family’ on specific controversial aspects of Mideast
policy,” as well as “effective channels for frankly communicating divergent views to
Israeli officials and policy-makers.”
But as in the period following the Six Day War, when endemic crises helped
accelerate existing dynamics toward communal unification (see Chapter 5), a succession
of disruptive events in the 1980s undermined NCRAC’s efforts to arrest mounting
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instability in the field. These included the high-profile case of Jonathan Pollard, a JewishAmerican intelligence operative convicted in 1987 of providing classified material to
Israel; the continued efforts of Orthodox political parties to invalidate Reform and
Conservative conversions under Israeli law; televised images of the mostly nonviolent
First Intifada (Palestinian uprising) and Israel’s severe military crackdown; and the
PLO’s 1988 declaration recognizing Israel and accepting the two-state solution.48 The
1992 NCRAC Plenary gave vent to intracommunal divisions that had become
increasingly visible over the previous decade. At a special closed session on Israeli
settlement policy, the AJCongress, UAHC, and several JCRCs proposed a resolution
opposing further settlement construction, while the Orthodox Union, the AntiDefamation League, and other communal hardliners accused the sponsors of providing
aid and comfort to Israel’s detractors.49 By the eve of the historic Oslo peace accords, the
post-1967 consensus had already given way to sharp internal polarization.
Ironically, it was the sudden leftward tack of Israel’s government with the
election of Yitzhak Rabin that catalyzed the total destabilization of the field. During the
previous decade and a half of right-wing dominance under Begin and his successor,
Yitzhak Shamir, mainstream Jewish organizations had thoroughly institutionalized
Likud’s hardline orientation towards the peace process. When Rabin initiated interim
negotiations with the PLO in 1993, the internal contradiction that had characterized the
nomos of the field since 1977 —total deference to Israeli governments, on one hand,
combined with a substantive anti-PLO stance, on the other—finally came to a head.
Seliktar describes the way pro-Israel habitus was thrown into crisis following the Oslo
Accords:
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[S]tarting in the eighties, the relatively liberal leadership and the professional
staff of many Israel-oriented organizations had been progressively replaced with
individuals who fitted the national-religious profile… [Those leaders] were
more reluctant to accept the fact that Israel was dealing with the PLO, which for
years was described as the worst enemy of Israel… [T]he peace process
undermined the three ‘nos’ that formed the boundary of organized Jewry: no
independent Palestinian state, no Syria on the Golan, and no divided Jerusalem.
One Jewish journalist explained that being let down on the three ‘nos’ left many
supporters of Israel ‘disappointed, confused, and saddened,’ and wary of any
message coming out of Israel.50
With Oslo, the American Jewish establishment was expected to fall in line behind the
previously stigmatized agenda of the liberal-Zionist peace camp. Although AIPAC
dutifully (if tepidly) endorsed Rabin’s initiative, open opposition to the Oslo process
coalesced around the reinvigorated Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and, to a
lesser extent, the Orthodox Jewish establishment. Disavowing the long-standing principle
of fidelity to Israeli governments, the ZOA launched a fierce lobbying campaign aimed at
scuttling the peace process.51 Over the next twenty years, the breakdown of the Oslo
process, the more violent Second Intifada that followed, and the sharp rightward lurch of
successive Israeli governments only deepened communal polarization, triggering new
institutionalizations that further transformed the internal boundaries of the field.52 By the
dawn of the twenty-first century, however, the field’s capital distributions had undergone
a significant shift in response to broader trends in the U.S. and international political
economy, empowering new actors and diminishing the influence of others. In the next
section, I discuss the ramifications of those transformations for contemporary Israel
advocacy.

Jewish Politics in a Neoliberal Age
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I have argued throughout this dissertation that the American Jewish ethnopolitical
field cannot be understood in isolation of the superordinate fields whose quasiautonomous dynamics shape the resource endowments available to Jewish institutional
actors. The rightward trajectory of American Jewish politics since the 1980s cannot be
fully understood without an analysis of the changed funding patterns of communal
institutions over that period. In this section, I describe how the political and economic
processes broadly included under the rubric of “neoliberalism” have transformed capital
distributions and power relations in the Jewish field, and how these and other
sociodemographic processes empowered AIPAC and diminished the influence of the
NCRAC-JCRC network.

Rise of the Foundations: Jewish Communal Finance and American Inequality:
The American political economy underwent two major transformations in the
twentieth century. The first occurred in the decades following the Great Depression,
when the effects of the catastrophe, the strength of organized labor, the expansion of the
New Deal state, and the institutionalization of Keynesian economic principles combined
to substantially remediate the vast wealth and income disparities of the nineteenth
century. Prior to the Depression, the wealthiest one percent of Americans owned more
than fifty percent of the country’s total household wealth. By 1949, the share of the top
one percent had fallen to just under thirty percent, bottoming out at around twenty-two
percent by the late 1970s.53 Economists refer to this unprecedented period of wage and
wealth equalization as “the Great Compression.”54 As noted in Chapter 2, in the
aftermath of the Depression, one New York federation trustee described “the changed
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sources of our income, from families of great wealth and long endowment, to men of
high income, charitable impulses, but relatively little capital.” In response, federations
retooled their bureaucratic machinery to tap this newly fertile expanse: upper middleclass business owners and professionals eager to offset their flagging personal
commitment to Judaism with philanthropic good works. By the 1970s, however, changes
in the international arena had begun to effect a second major transformation, one that
would necessitate further adaptations on the part of communal fundraisers. As nations
recovered from the devastation of the Second World War, often with U.S. aid,
competition from the renascent economies of Europe and Japan in particular fomented a
crisis of corporate profitability. Exacerbated by the 1973 oil embargo, declining profit
margins prompted American business associations to declare war on the institutional and
ideological foundations of the Great Compression.55 Aided by the forces of globalization
and automation, business undermined the power of organized labor through an onslaught
of investment in political advocacy groups, think tanks, and litigation aimed at
systematically rolling back workers’ rights. The Democratic Party, in turn, was rendered
increasingly dependent on corporate campaign finance.56 The result, beginning under
Jimmy Carter and accelerating with the election of Ronald Reagan, was a bipartisan
assault on the New Deal state and the postwar Keynesian consensus. Wealth and income
inequality consequently rebounded over the next three decades, reaching pre-Depression
levels by 2013.57
In light of these developments, scholars have devoted increased attention to the
relationship between economic inequality and political oligarchy. “In recent decades,”
concludes political scientist Martin Gilens, “the responsiveness of policy makers to the
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preferences of the affluent has steadily grown, but responsiveness to less-well-off
Americans has not.”58 Likewise, Larry Bartels “provides strong evidence that economic
inequality impinges powerfully on the political process, frustrating the egalitarian ideals
of American democracy.”59 Changes in the philanthropic sector, from which Jewish
organizations derive the bulk of their operating revenue, suggest that analogous dynamics
are at play in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. Paralleling the rise of wealth and
income inequality, the total number of private grant-making foundations quadrupled
between 1975 and 2014, with more than 30,000 coming into existence since the turn of
the century.60 In the New Gilded Age economy, private foundations have become popular
legal instruments for minimizing tax burdens while maintaining effective control over
family fortunes. One recent study found that between 2003 and 2013, “itemized
charitable contributions from people making $500,000 or more increased by 57 percent,
while itemized contributions from people making $10,000,000 or more increased by 104
percent.”61 According to Jeffrey Solomon, president of the Andrea and Charles Bronfman
Philanthropies, of the roughly 60,000 grant-making foundations that existed in the year
2000, “it is estimated that 10,000 of these are Jewish family foundations, an
overrepresentation by more than eight times of the Jewish proportion in the
population.”62 Mark Charendoff of the Jewish Funders Network provided a slightly lower
estimate of 9,000 Jewish foundations in 2006, of which he claimed that more than twothirds had been formed over the previous twenty years.63 Table 6.1 uses data from
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 990 forms to depict change over time in the total assets of
the top twenty-five5 Jewish family foundations as identified in a 2007 study by Tobin and
5

Measured by the percentage of dollars donated to Jewish causes.
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Weinberg.64 While some spent down their endowments, the combined holdings of the top
twenty-five Jewish foundations increased by close to $4 billion between 2004 and 2014.
In addition, substantially more than half of them were established after 1980.

Table 6.1: Change in Total Assets of Jewish Family Foundations, 2004-2014
(Source: IRS, Tobin and Weinberg 2007)

The growth of Jewish family foundations has had a significant impact on the
agenda-setting power of federations vis-à-vis their major donors and other Jewish
organizations. As we saw in Chapter 3, the relative power of federations was a
determinative factor in the consolidation of the field at mid-century. Twenty years ago,
Jack Wertheimer documented the increased reliance of federation fundraisers on large
donors, private foundations, and Donor Advised Funds (DAFs), along with a
corresponding decline in the importance of small and medium-sized donors—trends that
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have only accelerated in the decades since.65 According to Charendoff and Prager,
beneficiaries of the New Gilded Age economy tend to incline towards a more
participatory, hands-on model of Jewish philanthropy:
Today’s [Jewish] foundations are being created by people who are younger, at the
peak of their earnings and at the height of their business careers… The new
philanthropic approach is sometimes referred to as “venture philanthropy” and is
characterized by (a) an interest in reviewing relevant research and performing
other due diligence before making a grant, (b) a willingness to act quickly and
nimbly, either alone or in partnership with others who share their social
objectives, [and] (c) a desire to be personally involved in the development and
implementation of the programs they choose to fund.66
The era of big donors ceding programmatic discretion to communal bureaucrats—the
essence of the old federation model—appears to have come to an end. Federations, in
turn, have adapted to this reality by pursuing individualized partnerships with foundations
and megadonors—collaborations that empower “venture philanthropists” to exercise an
unprecedented degree of personal influence over the substantive agenda of the organized
community. A second adaptation, which also limits federation discretion relative to the
unconditional giving of the past, is the growth of DAFs—special private accounts housed
within federations and other public charities that entitle account holders to direct the
allocation of funds on an advisory (but usually unchallenged6) basis. Since 2000, an
estimated 185,000 DAFs (Jewish and non-Jewish) have come into existence nationwide.
As historian Lila Corwin Berman has shown, the DAF was in fact first conceived by a
federation-affiliated tax attorney as a legal instrument for exploiting ambiguities in the
1969 Tax Reform Act.67 From the donor perspective, utilizing a public charity for
essentially private ends ensures preferable tax treatment and lower start-up and overhead
6

The few reported instances in which federations have denied DAF allocations involved
left-wing, allegedly “anti-Israel” organizations.
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costs than establishing an independent family foundation. From the perspective of
federations threatened by government attempts to tax and regulate private philanthropy,
on the one hand, and by the proliferation of independent family foundations, on the other,
DAFs help reduce the outflow of Jewish philanthropic dollars from the federation system.
This adaptive strategy comes at a price, however. Although DAFs increase the likelihood
that account-holders will make unrestricted contributions to a federation’s annual
campaign, compared to the free rein that federation allocations committees once
exercised over the distribution of communal funds, the advent of DAFs has shifted
greater decision-making authority to the donor.
While more successful in some parts of the country than others, federation
adaptations to the New Gilded Age economy have not, on average, reversed the waning
fortunes of the federation system. As Wertheim noted in 1997, “[f]or over a decade,
[federation] annual campaigns, the major fund-raising efforts of local Jewish
communities, have been essentially flat. When inflation is taken into account, there has
been a real and noticeable decrease in the funds received through the annual
campaigns.”68 Although overseas transfers have been reduced since the 1990s and many
large federations have accrued prodigious financial endowments enabling them to sustain
base allocations, there is nothing to suggest that the overall trend of stagnant returns has
witnessed a reversal in the years since Wertheimer’s study.69 One casualty of shifting
power dynamics in the philanthropic domain has been the broader purview and relative
responsiveness and diplomacy that federation executives once brought to bear on
communal politics. As Waxman, Theodore Sasson, and others have observed, since the
collapse of the peace process in late 2000, the field has seen a proliferation of new, right341

leaning Israel advocacy nonprofits operating outside of (albeit in interaction with) the
federation system.70 Figure 6.1 charts the growth in the individual and aggregate revenue
of six of the most active of these independent advocacy groups. Between 2005 and 2015,
their combined revenue more than doubled. Because 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations
are not legally required to supply information about their donors, tracing their sources of
income can be difficult. But an analysis of IRS 990 forms from selected pro-Israel family
foundations and DAFs, alongside limited data aggregated by CitizenAudit.org, an online
transparency tool, provides an incomplete but instructive picture.7 Figure 2 shows the
percentage of the total 2005-2015 revenue of each of the six organizations that was
derived from the small handful of family foundations and DAFs contained in my data set.
Figure 6.3 breaks down the aggregate over time, illustrating the extent to which the six
organizations relied on foundation and DAF funding year by year. Although the median
figure is around twenty percent, some organizations display dependencies as high as
forty, fifty, and even eighty percent in given years. Were this data set to include the full
range of Jewish family foundations giving to pro-Israel causes, we would likely observe
significantly higher levels of financial dependency.

7

The initial set of foundations and DAFs is derived from “The Business of Backlash: The
Attack on the Palestinian Movement and Other Movements for Social Justice,” a report
by the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network. Despite (or precisely because of) its
partisan source, the report is a useful guide, as it identifies the most active U.S. funders of
right-wing, pro-Israel nonprofits. Whereas other nonprofit transparency databases restrict
searches to the name of the grant-making entity, CitizenAudit.org allows users to search
by grantee name, yielding a non-comprehensive set of 990 forms.
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Figure 6.1

Figure 6.2
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Figure 6.3
(Source: IRS)
Even with its limitations, the above data analysis suggests that private family
foundations and DAFs are a major source of funding for the new generation of
memberless, right-leaning Israel advocacy nonprofits. Although the right has been the
primary financial beneficiary of neoliberalization, the resulting shift in power relations
within the American Jewish ethnopolitical field has come at the expense of the
“center”—represented by federations—rather than the left. This is due to the fact that
many of the same economic, technological, and sociodemographic changes that have
enhanced the power of the right vis-à-vis federations have also, in conjunction with
growing disequilibrium in the field, stimulated the growth of dedicated liberal-Zionist
and, more recently, non- and anti-Zionist Jewish institutions. Before turning to those
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developments in the final section, I address the impact of America’s shifting political
economy on the mainstream pro-Israel lobby and its two central pillars: AIPAC and the
NCRAC-JCRC system.

The Decline of NCRAC and the “Privatization” of the Israel Lobby
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how AIPAC—today the leading
instrumentality of the mainstream pro-Israel lobby—utilized the elite networks and
communal infrastructure of the federation system to enhance its modest institutional
capacity during the early postwar decades. While internal AIPAC records from the 1970s
onward remain largely inaccessible to researchers, a number of secondary accounts based
on interviews with former AIPAC staffers describe the lobby’s general developmental
trajectory since the beginning of the neoliberal counterrevolution. The story they narrate
is one of diminished communal accountability and increased reliance on an insular clique
of wealthy donors, stimulating the extraordinary growth of AIPAC’s financial and
institutional assets. While the lobby’s rags-to-riches story began in 1974 with its second
executive director, Morris Amitay, it underwent a more significant transformation under
Amitay’s successor, Tom Dine, appointed shortly before the election of Ronald Reagan.
After decades of financial turmoil, AIPAC’s annual gross revenue increased from
$252,000 in 1973 (the first year the organization had faced a fiscal deficit since 1967) to
more than $400,000 in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. “The communities now realize
that a strong AIPAC is essential, and accordingly contributions are being raised,” read the
minutes of an Executive Committee meeting from January 1975.71 The previous year,
Congress had passed both the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 and
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the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which respectively modified
campaign finance laws and complicated the federal budgetary process. According to
Michael Thomas, “After the 1974 organizational changes in Congress,” AIPAC’s new
chief executive “needed to be able to educate members and staff outside the small
network of key chairmen and staff with whom [Isiah] Kenen [his predecessor] had
worked.”72 To this end, Amitay utilized the post-1973 windfall to hire additional
lobbyists, expand AIPAC’s engagement with the media, and upgrade its data processing
capabilities. The 1974 legislative changes also brought into existence the political action
committee (PAC), which would quickly become an essential, if unofficial, weapon in
AIPAC’s arsenal.
By the end of Amitay’s six-year term, writes J.J. Goldberg, he had “increased
[AIPAC’s] staff from a handful to several dozen,” “tripled the annual budget from
$400,000 to $1.2 million,” and expanded “Kenen's key-contacts list… from a few
hundred names to eleven thousand.”73 However dramatic the improvements under
Amitay, they paled in comparison to what would occur in the 1980s. The $1.2 million
budget figure for fiscal year 1980, the final year of Amitay’s tenure, was still relatively
modest. By comparison, the 1980 budget of the AJCongress, among the smallest of the
national community relations agencies, was around $4 million, while those of the
American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League topped $10 million each.74
As Thomas notes, AIPAC’s diminutive stature during the Amitay era “meant
contributions were relatively small, and the ‘strings’ that come with large contributions
were avoided.”75 That was to change under Dine, as major donors—Republican
businessmen who benefitted from Reagan’s economic agenda—steadily gained control of
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AIPAC’s inner circle. During the Kenen and Amitay years, AIPAC was overseen, albeit
in a mostly hands-off way, by an Executive Committee comprised of leaders of other
major Jewish organizations. After the 1982 Lebanon war, the size of the Committee was
doubled and the voting power of communal leaders was diluted through the addition of
influential lay members. According to Goldberg, the Committee became large and
unwieldy, shifting effective decision-making power to an inner circle known as the
“officers group.”76 Beginning with Los Angeles real estate developer Larry Weinberg, a
procession of major Republican donors with access to the Reagan White House assumed
AIPAC’s presidency during the 1980s, populating the “officers group” with like-minded
partisans and pushing the organization’s political allegiances in an increasingly
neoconservative direction.8 By the end of the Reagan era, and under the stewardship of
this moneyed, right-leaning clique, AIPAC’s annual budget reached $15 million.77
Dine, a liberal Democrat hired by Weinberg as AIPAC’s executive director in
October 1980, put the lobby’s burgeoning war chest to effective use. He oversaw an
expansion of AIPAC’s staff from 25 employees in 1980 to more than 150 a decade later
and transformed the organization “from a small agency, run by the national Jewish
organizations as their congressional lobbying arm, into an independent mass membership
powerhouse run by its wealthiest donors.”78 According to Thomas, in the aftermath of the
“AWACS battle” (discussed in Chapter 5),
Dine set out to establish a regional support system. Working with AIPAC
Executive Committee members, he set up offices in San Francisco, Austin and
Miami… Local pro-Israel activists were identified to organize contact teams for
8

Citing contemporaneous studies, Thomas notes that in the 1980s “’hardliners’ in
foreign policy were overwhelmingly conservative on social and economic issues and
were Republicans by an 8:1 margin.”
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each member of Congress… Over the next two years, Dine built a network of
AIPAC members who were regularly informed on issues and had access to
members of Congress. That greatly increased the congressional base from which
AIPAC’s Washington staff worked.79
Membership in AIPAC more than quintupled from 9,000 to 55,000 members during
Dine’s tenure (and today it claims double that number).80 As Thomas reports, Dine
became aware of the need to enhance AIPAC’s mobilizing capacity following the
AWACS defeat, which demonstrated the lobby’s weakness in parts of the country lacking
in Jewish communal organization. The 1980 census had revealed significant population
movement to the South and the West. With twenty-five percent of all Congressional seats
now concentrated in Florida, California, and Texas, “Dine resolved to go, not where the
Jews were, but where the votes were,” investing in proprietary grassroots infrastructure
beyond the federated communities (while continuing to instrumentalize the NCRACJCRC network).81 In addition, Dine expanded and professionalized AIPAC’s research
publications and launched the Political Leadership Development Program, which
operates through university Hillel centers to train student leaders on more than 350
college campuses.82 Finally, a working relationship developed during the 1980s between
AIPAC and the scores of pro-Israel PACs that had sprung up following the 1974
campaign finance act. Without formal coordination (which would violate the law),
AIPAC began signaling candidate preferences to its growing membership, indirectly
orchestrating the flow of pro-Israel PAC dollars.83
AIPAC’s monumental growth during the 1980s transformed it from a centrallylocated appendage of a much larger, integrated network of Jewish Israel advocacy
organizations into a relatively autonomous powerhouse that continued to leverage
federation-financed infrastructure to its own ends. While the neoliberalization of the
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American political economy centrally contributed to this transformation, it was only one
of several interlocking causes. Just as important was the affinity of interest between key
elements of the Reagan coalition and the Israeli government of Menachem Begin. Most
notable was Begin’s assiduous cultivation of ties with American evangelical Christians,
and in particular with Reverend Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority organization, which had
registered and mobilized evangelical voters to elect Reagan in 1980.84 Through the
vehicle of pro-Israel PACs, of which more than seventy were established between 1981
and 1986, a symbiotic relationship developed between far-right, evangelical legislators
and the Israel lobby. By signaling its associated PACs to support pro-Israel Republican
incumbents (who received sixty percent of all pro-Israel PAC dollars during the Reagan
era), AIPAC rewarded fealty to Israel with campaign contributions regardless of a
lawmaker’s stance on other issues traditionally of concern to American Jews. As
journalist Robert Kuttner put it in 1986, “the Israel connection is now delivering Jewish
financial backing to candidates far to the right of positions that most Jews hold on most
issues.” Conservative Republicans “have only to demonstrate sufficient loyalty to Israel,
and they can all but lock out their Democratic challengers from a substantial fraction of
Jewish support.”85
Second, although AIPAC and the Reagan administration locked horns on several
occasions over U.S. weapons sales to Arab countries, the Begin-era Israel lobby was a
strong exponent of the administration’s neoconservative foreign policy. “Given its
awesome reputation among the lawmakers on Capitol Hill,” writes Goldberg, “the lobby
could often sell administration policies that the White House itself could not sell.”
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Through the 1980s, AIPAC lobbyists regularly helped the Reagan
administration line up Democratic congressional support on unlikely issues from
Central America to sub-Saharan Africa. The lobbyists told the liberals that Israel
needed its friends to compromise on other issues in order to maintain solid
American support for Israel. Besides, the lobbyists argued, a strong U.S. defense
posture was good for Israel, since a weakened America could not defend its
small allies.86
AIPAC’s proximity to power during the Reagan administration was both a consequence
of its new, elite-driven funding model and one of the major factors contributing to that
model’s success. According to Thomas, “the relationship between AIPAC and its
financial supporters changed” in the 1980s. Although “many wealthy supporters of Israel
also supported Reagan’s economic programs, and were happy to help AIPAC build
strong relationships with the administration,” they nonetheless “wanted, and were
accorded, titles and the promise of access to senior officials, even briefings at the White
House.”87 Or as Goldberg put it, “AIPAC offered Jewish activists access to genuine
power, rubbing shoulders with senators and representatives and bullying the White
House.”88 Today, a tiered membership structure rewards financial generosity with
exclusive access to AIPAC-aligned legislators, often by way of special briefings and
receptions at the lobby’s annual policy conference, where color-coded lanyards
distinguish those with elite access from those without.89
As shifts in the U.S. and global political economy were fostering the growth of
AIPAC, those same processes were weakening the institutional foundations of the
NCRAC-JCRC system. At a 1992 meeting of NCRAC’s Israel Task Force, Rabbi Doug
Khan, Executive Director of the San Francisco JCRC, described a “dramatic erosion of
support and activity for Israel among the Jewish grass roots”—a “partial paralysis” that
was “plaguing the Jewish community’s efforts regarding Israel.”90 The previous year,
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after President George H.W. Bush moved to delay Israel’s request for $10 billion in loan
guarantees, the community relations network had launched its most high-profile
mobilization since the 1981 “AWACS battle.” As part of a four-month campaign, thirteen
hundred Jewish citizen-lobbyists descended on Capitol Hill in what Goldberg
characterizes as a major show of force.91 From NCRAC’s point of view, however, the
1991 campaign augured ill. Task Force members spoke of “dampened enthusiasm for the
loan guarantee advocacy effort” and the “dilemma of trying to generate grass roots
activity” amidst “internal conflict within the Jewish community regarding the wisdom of
Israeli settlements policy” and “changing global realities which weaken longstanding
lines of argument.”92 A few years earlier, at the 1988 Democratic National Convention,
followers of presidential candidate Jesse Jackson had introduced what JCRC leader Earl
Raab described as “a spate of anti-Israel resolutions” that “made considerably more
progress than was expected.” According to Raab, “the Jewish community was startled,
but one of the reasons [for the success of the resolutions] was evident: Jewish community
connected influentials had become less involved in local and regional public affairs than
they had been in the past.”93 Whereas AIPAC had once relied on the federation system to
build up its contacts and orchestrate mass mobilizations, by the 1992 election season
NCRAC Chairman Michael Pelavin, marveling at the lobby’s enhanced clout and
resources, proposed “us[ing] the AIPAC structure… to intrude [NCRAC’s] broader
public affairs agenda into the presidential debate.”94 The relationship of dependency had
witnessed an inversion as JCRC networks weakened and new campaign finance laws
shifted political power towards Washington, D.C. with its legions of PACs and lobbyists.
“Jewish political influence has always been a kind of integrated involvement in politics at
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the local and regional level,” Raab told a reporter in 1991. “But there’s… been a
tendency in recent years to say that all we have to do is go to Washington. There’s been a
little less emphasis in getting Jews involved at the local and regional level.”95
The coalitional model of local community organizing that JCRCs successfully
pursued for almost half a century was rooted in three sociopolitical realities: 1) broad
Jewish commitment to an array of civic and social causes as the basis for local coalitionbuilding; 2) the autonomous financial power of federations to shape the community
relations agenda and bring national agencies into line with local priorities; and 3) high
rates of Jewish participation in local, voluntary, mass membership organizations. None of
these conditions survived the 1980s. I have already described how economic
transformations began to erode federation power just as Jewish organizations were
distancing themselves from movements for racial and economic justice. Likewise, a set of
related sociodemographic changes in American society since the 1960s have substantially
reduced the extent of local Jewish organizing and civic participation. As Daniel Elazar
observed in the updated (1995) edition of his classic study of American Jewish
institutions:
A great change taking place in American Jewish community life is the decline in
membership of the mass-based Jewish organizations. B’nai B’rith had been in
serious trouble since the mid-1970s as its older members have died and fewer
and fewer younger people find it attractive… The women’s organizations,
including Hadassah and the National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW), have
also been hard-hit by the changing environment. The feminist movement… has
attracted many younger women, occupying their time… [Women] are more
likely to seek expression in what were once men’s groups that now recruit
leadership regardless of gender, such as the federations themselves and their
agencies, synagogue and school boards, and the local chapters of the AmericanIsrael Public Affairs Committee.96
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Although Elazar specifies that “the synagogues have become the institutions that have the
troops (i.e., they have become the only places where large numbers of Jews assemble
regularly),” rates of synagogue membership have also declined since the 1970s.97 The
1970-71 National Jewish Population Survey found that 49% of respondents belonged to a
congregation, as compared to 31% of adults in Pew’s 2013 survey.98 In a 1990 article for
Present Tense magazine based on interviews with Jewish establishment leaders,
journalist Robert Spero concluded that the membership figures of major Jewish
organizations listed in the 1989 Encyclopedia of Organizations were grossly overstated.
For example, one “former umbrella group executive” told Spero that the Zionist
Organization of America’s claim of 150,000 members was “nonsense… Z.O.A. is dying
and most Zionist organizations, while they won’t admit it, have become irrelevant… In
fact most of the organizations in the presidents conference are paper organizations.”99
Declining grassroots participation in turn weakened the dense organizational networks
that JCRCs once relied on. At the height of JCRC power, the number of Jewish
organizations (or chapters of organizations) affiliated with JCRCs ranged from 300 in
Detroit (1967) and 150 in Cleveland (1946) to 34 in Philadelphia and 27 in Boston (both
1967). While the smaller number of organizations affiliated with the Philadelphia and
Boston JCRCs has remained stable, Detroit lost roughly two-hundred institutional
affiliates since the 1960s, while Cleveland recently listed only ten local “partner”
organizations on its website.100
As Robert Putnam and Theda Skocpol have demonstrated, the decline of the mass
membership organization is a broadly American phenomenon. In Bowling Alone, Putnam
examines data from “thirty-two diverse national, chapter-based organizations… ranging
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from B’nai B’rith and the Knights of Columbus to the Elks club and the Parent-Teacher
Association,” and finds a precipitous drop-off in the ratio of actual to eligible members
since the 1960s.101 Skocpol similarly reveals that two-thirds of the “membership
federations” that enrolled one percent or more of the U.S. population in 1955 “have
experienced significant membership share losses in recent decades—including thirteen
associations that lost from 20 to 90 percent of the share of the U.S. adult population they
once recruited.”102 Although the absolute number of registered civic associations
increased over the second half of the twentieth century, most recently-created groups are
professionally-staffed advocacy organizations without mass memberships or local chapter
structures. In addition, the programmatic content of civic organizations has changed.
According to Skocpol, whereas after World War II “most large American voluntary
associations were fraternal or religious federations focused on celebrating brotherhood or
sisterhood, or civic associations devoted to community service,” by the end of the
twentieth century “the goals of very large associations were much more narrowly
instrumental or recreational.”103 In the American Jewish ethnopolitical field, there has
been a corresponding proliferation of single-issue organizations as foundation grantmakers reward targeted initiatives and heightened tensions over Israel make multi-issue
organizing more difficult.104 To explain the overall trend, Skocpol posits a confluence of
factors, from “changes in racial ideals and gender relationships” to new political
opportunity structures that “drew resources and civic activists towards centrally managed
lobbying,” to “technologies and sources of financial support [that] enabled new,
memberless models of association building” to “shifts in America’s class structure…
[that] created a broad constituency for professionally managed civic organizing.”105 In
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short, the shifting distribution of capital endowments in the American political and
economic fields supported new forms of civic engagement that decimated participation in
mass membership organizations, Jewish and non-Jewish alike.
By the early 1990s, the NCRAC-JCRC system was in crisis. Once
instrumentalities of the federations in their struggle against the national community
relations organizations (see Chapter 3), JCRCs increasingly found themselves at odds
with federations and their conservative stakeholders on domestic political questions. At
an officers retreat in late 1992, NCRAC executive vice-president Larry Rubin
complained that “many federation executives and lay leaders neither share our passion for
civil liberties and equal rights nor have a firm understanding of their stake in our
success.”106 Rubin recalled one federation executive informing “the CRC directors that
the federation [had] created a separate government relations structure because they
view[ed] the leadership of the CRCs as insufficiently committed to Jewish ‘selfinterest.’” Writing the following year, Steven Windmueller, head of the Los Angeles
JCRC, observed that “in the last several years, community after community has
downsized their JCRC system,” in some cases merging JCRCs with local ADL or AJC
chapters, “and in other cases simply leaving the field or ceding it to one or more of the
national agencies.”
In certain communities… there are some Federation leaders who want to restrict
the subject matter that the JCRC may act on, arguing that it should not be
permitted to take under advisement such matters as Supreme Court nominations,
the issue of abortion, or certain social justice or inter-group relations questions.
These critics believe the JCRC should be limited to the issues of Israel and antiSemitism, historically the two primary points of consensus within the
community.
On the basis of these grievances, wrote Rubin, responsibility for local community
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relations was “being transferred from the CRCs to other centers of power — to the
Federation director, the President of Federation and their group of top lay insiders. In
contrast with 45 years ago, now everyone considers himself a Community Relations
expert.”107 Even after NCRAC restructured in 1997, changing its name to the Jewish
Council for Public Affairs (JCPA) and significantly reducing the scope of its political
interventions, federations continued to express opposition its liberal domestic agenda. In
1999, the New York and Chicago federations dispatched letters criticizing the JCPA’s
advocacy of increased taxation, expanded government services, universal health care, and
affirmative action. “There is a portion of our community,” wrote the UJA-Federation of
New York’s James Tisch and Stephen Solender, “who questions if it is even appropriate
for an organization to speak on behalf of the Jewish community on some of these issues.”
Reminding the JCPA that the New York and Chicago federations together furnished
thirty percent of its budget, the letters, in the words of Lawrence Grossman, urged a
“clearer focus on issues of direct concern to Jews.”108
Exacerbating the political tensions between federations and the NCRAC-JCRC
network was the long-term financial crisis of the federation system. In the early 1990s,
declining real-dollar campaign returns coincided with the mass migration of Soviet Jews
to Israel and the United States, placing extreme strain on the federation system.109 The
new climate of scarcity had already intensified conflicts between the Council of Jewish
Federations and Welfare Funds (CJF) and its overseas partner, the United Jewish Appeal
(UJA), over the relative importance of domestic versus overseas allocations. As the more
powerful of the two entities, the CJF had for some time presided over a retrenchment of
overseas (mostly Israel-related) spending, diverting campaign dollars into what
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federations perceived as more pressing domestic priorities.110 Renewed tensions
following the Soviet migration catalyzed a restructuring process that ultimately resulted
in the 1999 merger of the CJF, the UJA, and the United Israel Appeal into a single
organization under effective federation control, the United Jewish Communities (UJC).
Amidst struggles between advocates of domestic and overseas spending, the national
community relations organizations were hard-hit. The findings of the 1990 NJPS had
triggered a communal panic over intermarriage and assimilation, giving rise to a
“continuity agenda” that called for massive investments in Jewish education and identitybuilding programs (more about which below). A NCRAC officer summarized the fallout
in late 1992:
The strain on the communal dollar has deepened; major communities that
rarely—if ever—had shrinking campaigns now face them; dollars allocated to
national [community relations] agencies are now well below the customary—
though always paltry—2% of the total raised; validations to the NJCRAC (and
other fair share agencies) remain flat and actual allocations decline. In my
judgment, this situation is unlikely to improve for a number of years, perhaps
throughout the 1990s.111
Projecting a fiscal deficit of between $200,000 and $600,000 by 1996, NCRAC
considered a number of outside fundraising strategies, including an appeal to Jewish
family foundations.112 In 1993, it relocated its offices to CJF headquarters, effecting an
annual savings of $100,000.113 In the wake of the intermarriage crisis, several NCRAC
officers proposed emphasizing the linkage between community relations activity and
Jewish identity-formation. Noting that “federations increasingly are focusing on matters
related to Jewish continuity and identity,” treasurer Michael Newmark urged that
“NJCRAC be prepared to demonstrate to communities how its activities contribute to
these goals.”114 Other officers concurred. Maximizing the efficacy of its appeals to the
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federation system would require NCRAC to “more effectively interpret the tremendous
impact involvement of Jews, as Jews, in the public affairs arena can have on reinforcing
their identification with the organized Jewish community.”
In the end, however, NCRAC’s crisis was as much political as it was financial.
Having built up their own reputations and financial endowments in the period since they
were first reined in and disciplined by the federation system (see Chapter 3), the national
community relations agencies began to reassert their institutional independence by the
end of the twentieth century. The climate of fiscal scarcity and the narrowed focus of
community relations activity revived turf wars between the “big three” organizations and
NCRAC. According to a 1991 report in the Baltimore Jewish Times, NCRAC’s decision
to hire a part-time consultant based in Washington, D.C. “produced howls of outrage
from the three most influential groups under NJCRAC’s umbrella”—the AJC,
AJCongress, and ADL—howls “so ferocious… that NCRAC was forced to terminate the
consultant.”115 In the aftermath of that episode, Rubin reflected that “our principal
national member agencies are worried by what they perceive as a growing activism and
heightened visibility within” NCRAC. “At a meeting last year with the ADL and the two
AJCs,”
the discussion focused on the question of whether the NJCRAC has the right to
issue press releases. The agencies expressed the fear that once the media begin
coming to the NJCRAC for press comment they would become increasingly
irrelevant and we would have become a fourth national agency. [The ADL’s]
Abe Foxman described what might be considered the ‘classical’ view of the
system when he repeated [his predecessor] Nate Perlmutter’s observation that
the NJCRAC was created solely to be a mailman.116
Relations with the national agencies continued to deteriorate as the latter increasingly
brandished their veto power to quash NCRAC initiatives and political expressions with
358

which they disagreed (including the call for more aggressive sanctions on apartheid South
Africa).117 Buffeted by internal conflict and fiscal crisis, NCRAC was forced to
restructure. At its 1996 Plenary—boycotted by the “big three”—it voted to eliminate the
national agency veto, ostensibly shifting power back to the JCRCs.118 The following year
it adopted its current name, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, and in 2000 it agreed
to “withdraw from the realm of policy formulation and concentrate on providing services
to the UJC, its member federations, and the community councils.”119 From then on, the
JCPA ceased to oversee systematic implementation of political directives at the local
level, instead becoming a resource provider and national platform from which JCRC
professionals articulate a liberal outlook on domestic and international affairs. According
to Chicago federation leader Michael Kotzin, in the years following NCRAC’s
restructuring, the national community relations agencies “mostly followed a passive route
reflective of their perception that the JCPA is less of a force than it once was,
increasingly marginalizing their involvement in JCPA affairs.”120 By the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the once-formidable community relations dynamo had decomposed
into its constituent parts, giving way to a more decentralized and chaotic field.

Countervailing Dynamics: Federations as a Source of Stability Amidst Change
This chapter has thus far described the latter-day transformation of the NCRACJCRC network and the ascendance of an increasingly “privatized” model of pro-Israel
advocacy. As significant as those changes have been, federations remain essential players
in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. With $16 billion in combined holdings as of
2017—an asset base that continues to grow by $900 million annually as the result of
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investment returns—federations maintain critical Jewish infrastructure, finance a range of
Jewish educational and identity-building programs, and police the political boundaries of
the organized Jewish community.121 In this final section, I explore how the federation
system has helped buttress the dominant coalition by reproducing the beliefs and
dispositions on which its stability depends, and by facilitating the deployment of
“symbolic exclusion” against counterhegemonic challengers, in the process limiting their
access to needed social and economic capital.

Federations and the Reproduction of Pro-Israel Habitus
An important feature of Bourdieu’s field-theoretic model is the role of “symbolic
power.” As discussed in Chapter 1, Bourdieu defines symbolic capital as the “form that
the various species of capital [economic, cultural, social] assume when they are perceived
and recognized as legitimate”—that is, when their underlying interested character is
misrecognized as disinterested or benevolent.122 The production of symbolic capital
involves the conversion of economic resources into authoritative systems of meaning that
structure comprehension of the social world and naturalize the relations of domination in
a field. To capitalize on the misperceptions engendered by symbolic capital is to deploy
symbolic power. By shaping “belief in the legitimacy of words and of those who utter
them,” symbolic power is “an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the
equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of
the specific effect of mobilization.”123 Since the late 1960s, the federation system has
invested billions of dollars in cultural, educational, and identity-building programs that
shape participants’ understanding of what it means to be Jewish. To the extent that this
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federation identity apparatus molds the habitus of participants in a manner consistent
with the reproduction of the dominant coalition, it provides an important anchor of
institutional stability. In this section, I trace the development of the federation system’s
symbolic capital investments and their entanglement with pro-Israelist subject formation.
In Chapter 2, I described the federation system’s transition from an
“assimilationist” paradigm geared towards immigrant absorption and “Americanization”
to a “survivalist” paradigm focused on ethnic self-preservation. By the 1970s, federations
had begun to prioritize two interrelated areas of concern: the security of Jews abroad
(particularly in Israel, but also in the Soviet Union) and the demographic survival of the
American Jewish community. “The turn to survivalism,” observes Jack Wertheimer, was
stimulated in part by “the growing realization that the American Jewish community itself
was rapidly changing.”124 Once authoritatively disclosed by communal demographers,
new patterns of geographic mobility, rising rates of divorce and intermarriage, and
declining Jewish fertility became the focal point of federation activity. While Jewish
educators had fretted about “Jewish continuity” for decades, it was the 1971 National
Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) that first aroused broader anxieties. Commissioned by
the CJF as an adjunct to local planning efforts, the NJPS confirmed a sharp uptick in rates
of intermarriage, stimulating further population research aimed at informing the
development of survivalist strategies. Because (as I have argued throughout) commitment
to the survival of American Jewry is constitutive of the nomos of the American Jewish
ethnopolitical field, the specter of demographic decline became a prominent mobilizing
trope in the wake of the NJPS. By 1986, Jonathan Woocher would identify collective
survival in the face of assimilation as the organized community’s “consuming passion”—
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a “broad legitimating canopy” that “validates virtually the entirety of the [American
Jewish] polity’s agenda” and “serves as the primary motivator in fundraising.”125 As the
federations’ assimilationist strategy of institutional reproduction broke down in the late
1960s (again, see Chapter 2), investment in Jewish survivalist initiatives became key to
legitimizing the continued role of the federation system and attracting new megadonors
for whom Jewish education was a top priority.
The recent communal obsession with the reproduction of Jewish identity, known
since the 1990s as the “continuity agenda,” occasioned a flurry of investment and
experimentation. As Wertheimer notes, “no sector has been deemed more central to this
effort than the field of Jewish education.”126 Given their undeniable affinity with the
nomos of the field, pre-NJPS calls for increased financial support of Jewish education
were “widely endorsed by federation leaders in principle, [but] not always adhered to in
practice.”127 Until the collapse of the assimilationist paradigm in the early 1970s,
federations paid lip-service to the cultural aspects of Jewish survival but allocated few
resources to Jewish education, preoccupied as they were with ensuring the physical and
economic survival of the immigrant population. As late as 1970, Isidore Breslau,
president of the American Association for Jewish Education (AAJE), excoriated the
federation system for contributing what he considered the comparatively paltry annual
sum of $6 million to the cause of Jewish education nationwide:
Time and again, spokesmen for the Association and others, underscoring the
calamitous conditions of Jewish life, have called for the establishment of multimillion dollar foundations for Jewish culture and education. Yet, as we stand
here, the manpower shortage is now verging on disaster… and the funds made
available by communal or private sources are not adequate to finance a holding
operation, let alone create those new instruments and opportunities without
which we shall continue to languish.128
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But the previous year’s confrontation with youth activists at the CJF General Assembly
(described in Chapter 2) dramatized the need for change and prompted the creation of a
Jewish Identity Task Force.129 In the wake of the NJPS, investment patterns began to
shift. According to Wertheim, after 1970 federations “reallocated their domestic spending
so that Jewish educational institutions [came to] receive the largest percentage of
funds”—roughly a quarter of the total by 1995, up from around ten percent in the mid1950s.130 If we add to that figure the amount spent on Jewish Community Centers
(JCCs)—whose programming increasingly focused on Jewish cultural enrichment—then
federation spending on Jewish identity-building activity accounted, at a minimum, for
around forty-five percent of all federation allocations in the mid-1990s.131 Figures 4 and 5
illustrate similar trends in the balance of identity-related spending (Jewish education,
community centers, and summer camps) relative to other domestic spending for the UJAFederation of New York over the whole of the twentieth century.
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Figure 6.4
(Source: American Jewish Historical Society and IRS)
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Figure 6.5
(Source: American Jewish Historical Society and IRS)
Featuring prominently in the cultural and educational output of federation
beneficiary agencies was, of course, the State of Israel, conceived as both a mechanism
for strengthening the bonds of “Jewish peoplehood” and as an expression of the
organized community’s political consensus. Already by the 1950s, welfare funds supplied
a major part of the funding of the America-Israel Cultural Foundation (AICF), which
fostered Israeli-American artistic exchange and, according to a 1950 prospectus described
by Emily Alice Katz, aimed “to underscore the consonance between American history
and that of Israel, particularly shared traditions of pioneer settlement, fighting for
independence, and providing a refuge for the oppressed.”132 In this way, federations
helped reproduce in the cultural sphere the political themes on which NCRAC’s defense
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of Israel as an American Cold War asset rested. According to Katz, “American Jewry's
increasingly muscular political attachments to Israel beginning in the late 1960s were
premised on the culture work of the preceding two decades”—much of which was
brokered by the AICF and other federation-funded entities.133 In 1971, at the urging of
the Jewish Identity Task Force, the CJF established the Joint Cultural Appeal (JCA), a
fundraising umbrella for national Jewish cultural agencies9, and the Institute for Jewish
Life, a grant-making body that dispensed nearly $2 million in pursuit of goals like
“upgrading Jewish education,” “strengthening the Jewish family,” and “utilizing Israel as
an educational and cultural resource for North American Jews.”134 A 1969 report by the
AAJE entitled “Israel and the Jewish School in America: A Statement of Objectives,”
disclosed the linkage between Israel education and the emerging priorities of the
federation system. Among the objectives of Israel education were, 1) “to familiarize
Jewish students with the basic similarities between the democratic ideals of the United
States and the State of Israel;” 2) “to tie Jewish students more closely to the Jewish
people throughout the world;” and 3) “to help them to consider favorably the various
opportunities for aliyah [migration] to Israel.”135 In 1977, B’nai B’rith Hillel
Foundations—perhaps the most vital educative institution on the federations’ payroll—
described as its “highest priority” to “enhance and deepen the understanding of the role
and meaning of Israel in the contemporary Jewish experience.”136
A second major wave of investment in Jewish education and identity initiatives
followed the release of the second NJPS in 1990. Just months earlier, the Commission on
9

The JCA also provided most of the funding for the National Foundation for Jewish Culture,
created by the CJF in 1959 to foster university-level research and teaching in Judaic Studies.
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Jewish Education in North America (CJENA, a federation-foundation collaboration) had
issued A Time to Act, its landmark report on Jewish identity. Arguing that “[Jewish]
survival could only be ensured through a strong, versatile, and adequately resourced
education system,” CJENA’s clarion call was amplified by the NJPS findings, which not
only revealed an intermarriage rate of 52% but also affirmed the positive relationship
between “Jewish identity”—as measured by traits like endogamy, synagogue attendance,
federation contributions, Jewish social networks, and attachment to Israel—and Jewish
education.137 The 1990 NJPS was American Jewry’s “Sputnik moment,” writes historian
Jonathan Krasner. “Sociologists and communal leaders seized on the findings… to argue
that the Jewish community was fracturing into two sub-communities; one that related to
Judaism as a central force in Jews’ lives, and another that considered Jewishness to be
peripheral.”138 Sociologist Sylvia Barack Fishman encapsulated the state of Jewish
identity research in the 1990s:
Extensive Jewish education is definitively associated with every measure of
adult Jewish identification. Its impact can be clearly seen in every public and
private Jewish life. Younger American Jewish adults (25 to 44) who have
received six or more years of Jewish education are the group most likely to join,
volunteer time for, and donate money to Jewish causes, to belong to synagogues
and attend services at least several times a year, to seek out Jewish
neighborhoods and Jewish friends, to perform Jewish rituals in their homes, to
visit and care deeply about Israel, and to marry another Jew.139
For Jewish communal planners, the 1990 NJPS and follow-up studies prompted a focus
on what former UJA-Federation of New York CEO John Ruskay calls “total Jewish
environments” and “intensive mini-communities” like summer camps and “Israel
experience” trips.140 Like federations across the country, New York initiated a $2 million
“Continuity Commission” to “increase the numbers that participate in summer camps,
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youth groups, [and] Israel trips, and to transform the key gateway institutions like
synagogues.”141 The Commission offered New York-area synagogues $75,000 grants to
help them create “compelling settings for Jewish living and learning.”142 Prefiguring the
Taglit-Birthright Israel program, the UJA-Federation dramatically increased spending on
youth trips to Israel from $55,000 in 1992-1993 to more than $1.1 million in 19951996.143 In total, New York committed an additional $15 million over base allocations to
Jewish identity programs between 1993 and 1999.144 According to Ruskay and former
UJA-Federation Executive Vice President Alisa Rubin Kurshan, by the turn of the
century “virtually every significant community [had] established task forces and
commissions led by senior lay and professional leaders, frequently by federations. In
many communities, substantial additive resources have been provided.”145
In their efforts to advance the “continuity agenda,” federations did not act alone.
In fact, many of their most ambitious initiatives originated as joint undertakings with
private foundations and megadonors. Taglit-Birthright Israel, a program that communal
researchers consider enormously successful at fostering Jewish identity as they define it,
began in 1999 as a collaboration of private philanthropists, federations, and the Israeli
government, each contributing a third of the initial funding.146 Between 1999 and 2015,
Birthright provided free trips to Israel to more than 500,000 Jewish young adults.147 In
1997, another consortium of leading Jewish philanthropists committed $18 million to the
Partnership for Jewish Education, a joint venture with the UJA-Federation of New York
to construct twenty-five new Jewish day schools throughout the country.148 Hillel, the
network of Jewish student centers on college campuses, has evolved in recent decades
into an effective collaboration between the federation system and independent
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megadonors. While individual Hillel centers receive millions of dollars annually from
local federations, the network’s umbrella body, Hillel International, has come under
essentially private management since the 1980s, when it split from the federation-linked
B’nai B’rith and underwent an AIPAC-like transformation. According to journalist Batya
Ungar-Sargon, then-president Richard Joel
transformed Hillel from a group of small, independent centers into a more
centrally organized, corporate institution with localized funding, provided by
some of the American Jewish community’s largest donors. Joel scored grants
from hedge fund manager Michael Steinhardt, mega-philanthropists Lynn and
Charles Schusterman, and the now-deceased businessman Edgar Bronfman,
among others… When Joel started in 1988, Hillel’s annual budget was $14
million… By the time he left, the budget had quadrupled.149
The influx of capital has enabled Hillel to vastly expand its campus outreach activities. In
2006, for example, it launched the Campus Entrepreneurs Initiative, a $10 million pilot
program to train student interns in decentralized recruitment strategies, empowering them
“to organize their own Jewish micro-communities based on shared interests and
values.”150 According to Hillel’s internal program evaluation, Jewish student involvement
with Hillel increased fourteen percent between 2005 and 2012, with 22,380 new students
reached across ten pilot campuses.151 At the same time, the outsized financial power of
activist megadonors has led Hillel to more vigorously police political discourse on
campus. In 2010, Hillel International formalized its “Standards of Partnership,” a set of
guidelines that prohibit collaboration between Hillel-affiliated campus groups and
individuals or organizations deemed anti-Israel. According to one former Hillel director
interviewed by Ungar-Sargon, “When an organization becomes larger, they become
increasingly dependent on large donations from a small group of donors… In the Jewish
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community, the big donors have unnuanced views on Israel, and they have come to see
college campuses as a war zone and they have to protect Israel.”152
Notwithstanding the recently enhanced role of megadonors donors, the federation
system remains by far the single largest investor in Jewish identity-production activities.
The New York Federation alone spent more than $45 million on identity-related
programs in 2008, just before the global financial collapse. In 2014, the Forward
estimated total federation grant-making at $1.7 billion annually. Conservatively assuming
that a third of that amount comprises identity-related spending—a low-end estimate that
accords with the Forward’s finding that education and culture account for 32% percent of
all Jewish philanthropic spending, federation and non-federation alike—we arrive at an
estimate of around $550 million in total, annual federation allocations to Jewish identity
programs, or roughly the same amount contributed by all other donors combined.153
Beyond direct allocations, federations have also been instrumental in the construction and
maintenance of the physical infrastructure through which most Jewish identity initiatives
are carried out—JCCs, camp grounds, Hillel centers, etc.—and oversee much of the
demographic research on which the “continuity agenda” is premised.
As to whether the Jewish community’s identity investments have achieved their
intended aims, a host of “impact studies” suggest that participation in “Israel experience”
programs,154 summer camps,155 youth groups,156 and (as mentioned) day schools
increases the likelihood that participants will report the attachments and behaviors that
communal researchers associate with Jewish identity. Whatever the methodological
shortcomings of Jewish communal research, it is not unreasonable to assume that billions
of dollars of strategic investment over half a century has had some appreciable impact on
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Jewish beliefs and dispositions. On the other hand, the overall picture assembled by
demographers of American Jewry is a complicated one. In the broadest sense, selfdescribed Jews10 report a strong and positive attachment to Jewish identity: the 2013 Pew
Research Center study found that 94% of Jewish respondents and 96% of the youngest
cohort said they were “proud to be Jewish,” while 75% said they possess “a strong sense
of belonging to the Jewish people.”157 At the same time, intermarriage rates continue to
climb (58% for marriages after 2005),158 fewer Jews report participating in Jewish
communal institutions,159 and studies reveal flagging emotional attachment to Israel
among Jews aged 35 and under.160 Researchers attribute the generational decline in proIsrael attachment—a central pillar of Jewish identity as conceived by the federation
system—indirectly to intermarriage by way of an associated drop in exposure to Jewish
communal institutions.161 This picture, then, suggests that the achievements of the
“continuity agenda” come amidst a broader, long-term, and potentially inexorable trend
towards disengagement from organized Jewish life on the part of the non-Orthodox. Still,
for those Reform, Conservative, and non-denominational Jews who remain institutionally
affiliated, the federation identity apparatus is the principal extra-familial mechanism
working to reproduce modes of “Jewish identity” congruent with the dominant nomos of
the field. To the extent that it has succeeds, the federation system has imparts an
important countervailing stability to an institutional order characterized by mounting
disequilibrium.

Stabilization Through Symbolic Exclusion
10

As opposed to respondents who qualify as Jews by virtue of matrilineal descent but no
longer identify as Jews.
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While symbolic power can operate in a diffuse and quotidian manner to fortify
existing hierarchies in a field, it can also be frontally deployed against adversaries of the
dominant coalition. In Chapter 4, we witnessed one such deployment of symbolic power
in the form of what sociologist Dawne Moon calls “symbolic exclusion”: “efforts to
codify the ‘principles of vision and division’ that define the group by working
performatively to cast some out.”162 NCRAC’s excommunication of the American
Council for Judaism was the original and, until recently, most coordinated use of
symbolic exclusion against an internal adversary of the dominant coalition. NCRAC was
a unique vehicle of coercion insofar as it was the first permanent institution that
aggregated and channeled the collective symbolic power of practically every major
national Jewish organization. But while the American Council for Judaism was slated for
extinction in any event, subsequent deployments of symbolic exclusion targeted liberalZionist (and later non-Zionist) organizations whose fortunes the dynamics of the field
favored over the long term. In this final section, I explore how the federation system’s
hold on the instruments of symbolic power has enabled members of the dominant
coalition to impede the development of counter-hegemonic institutions—in particular,
Breira, New Jewish Agenda, and Jewish Voice for Peace—by limiting their access to
material resources and fragmenting potential membership pools through the imposition of
political “red lines.” Although I focus here on groups that openly contest(ed) the
dominant nomos of the field—marginal players inhabiting the field’s dominated
polarity—I demonstrate how a combination of technological developments and
progressively mounting disequilibrium mitigated the material effects of symbolic
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exclusion over time, prolonging the institutional longevity of counterhegemonic
challengers.
As described above, Breira was the first national, organized challenge to the
dominant pro-Israelist coalition that fortified its position in the field following the Six
Day War. Works by Michael Staub and Jack Wertheimer have established the standard
account of Breira’s trials and tribulations: after a promising initial period of activity
lasting from 1973 to mid-1976, Breira came under sustained attack from right-wing
elements within the organized Jewish community—an onslaught that included threats of
professional retaliation against Breira-affiliated Hillel employees.163 “Within a year after
the explosion of this controversy,” writes Wertheimer, “Breira folded its operations.”164
While this narrative correctly relates the communal assault on Breira to the organization’s
demise, it omits specific reference to the most proximate cause of Breira’s collapse—its
fiscal crisis—and fails to consider the mechanisms linking rhetorical attack to financialinstitutional death. Drawing on internal documentation, I provide a supplementary
examination of Breira’s financial life. By shedding light on the relationship between
symbolic and material power, it will inform our closing discussion of more recent
developments in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field.
As I have emphasized throughout this dissertation, building sustainable
organizations demands stable access to material resources, whether in the form of profits,
voluntary labor, in-kind donations, membership dues, service fees, foundation grants, or
individual financial contributions. Given the inherently limited appeal of
counterhegemonic projects, new organizations emerging from the dominated sector of a
field face steeper hurdles to sustainable institutionalization than do members of the
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dominant coalition. Challengers must either tap into an extraordinarily motivated and
cohesive membership base or appeal to ideologically-aligned sweetheart benefactors.
While aspiring to a membership-centered fiscal model over the long run, Breira relied
heavily on the second strategy. After launching in December 1973, it devoted much of
the subsequent year to ad hoc educational activity before resolving on the basis of
positive communal response to “establish itself as an independent organization with a
broad base of support.”165 Reaching out to progressive foundations for “seed money” in
September 1974, Bob Loeb, Breira’s first executive director, wrote that he did “not
foresee long term dependence on large foundation grants,” anticipating that “eventually,
literature sales, speaking engagements, membership fees, and individual contributions
should provide a substantial part of our income.”166 As it would turn out, however,
Loeb’s predictions never came to fruition.
Even before the wave of vituperation that engulfed Breira from the spring of 1976
onward, its efforts to build a self-sustaining mass membership organization proved
challenging. Minutes of an Executive Board meeting from August 1975 projected that
“an initial membership of 1000… will provide us with the rock-bottom yearly budget on
which we’ve operated thus far,” while an “additional commitment of 100 Council
members”—that is, sustaining contributors of $100 or more—“would give us a modest
total budget of $25,000.”167 By the end of the year, it was evident that these targets were
overly optimistic. In December, Loeb penned a remarkably candid letter to the Board
explaining that “Breira’s constituency remains very limited,” consisting of “hardly 250
members at the present time.”
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I do know from personal conversations that we have many “secret” friends who
agree that we are more or less on the right track, but they have not been willing
to publicly identify with us, nor open up many doors to their friends. I think this
has to do primarily with our being perceived as a one issue, partisan
organization that wants little more than the creation of a Palestinian state. (Our
public statements have specifically created this image.) In particular, we have
not been able to carve an identity niche broad and deep enough in the Jewish
community to be an effective Jewish base from which to make partisan stands…
Part of the problem is that our rhetoric reflects that as individuals and as an
organization we have failed to touch emotional Jewish bedrock, and as a result
are incapable of mobilizing energy and concern beyond an intellectual elite.168
Breira, in other words, had failed to tap into the field’s existing reserves of symbolic
capital, which in turn impeded its ability to activate new members and mobilize financial
resources. Rather than scaling back operations, however, the Executive Board decided to
press forward. It authorized a budget of $40,000 for the coming fiscal year and, with
Loeb’s critical assessment in mind, proposed a new “National Strategy for Action” in
January 1976.169 Attempting to harness the symbolic power of the dominant coalition, the
proposal distanced Breira from the pro-Palestinian label and called on the organization to
“clearly appeal to a renewed sense of Jewish identity, free from manipulation by rightwing, anti-democratic, militarist forces in Israel and America which increasingly threaten
Jewish survival.”170
Breira’s fortunes improved in 1976. After receiving positive media attention in
April, membership increased from less than 400 members in February to 1,200 by year’s
end, generating a projected $30,000 in membership dues for the 1976-1977 fiscal year.171
The most fateful turn of events took place that summer, when philanthropist Samuel
Rubin offered the organization a $100,000 matching grant.172 Anticipating a continuously
growing base of financial support, Breira moved quickly to expand its publishing and
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outreach operations, began planning for a national membership conference, and made
several additional hires. Records suggest that Breira’s 1976-1977 budget proposal went
through several iterations and that the organization ultimately spent around $200,000 in
the year after the Rubin grant was authorized.173 This rapid growth, predicated as it was
on receipt of a single, large foundation grant, had the effect of rendering Breira
extraordinarily vulnerable. Because the Rubin grant was awarded on a matching basis,
any loss of additional foundation money took a doubly negative toll on Breira’s bottom
line. Making matters worse was the fact that Breira had earlier depended on private bank
loans and lines of credit to sustain itself.174 When several smaller foundation grants fell
through and membership growth faltered over the first half of 1977, Breira struggled to
meet its now-vastly-expanded monthly expenses.175 With debts piling up, chairmen
Arnold Jacob Wolf and Balfour Brickner issued an emergency appeal to Board members
in August, detailing a “severe short term cash flow problem that can only be solved by
raising $15,000 to $25,000 within the next month.” “It is up to us to see Breira through
until mid-September,” they wrote. “Without your immediate response, the office will
close.”176 The necessary support was not forthcoming, however, and in December, with a
debt load exceeding $15,000, the organization incurred its final setback: the withdrawal
of the Rubin Foundation grant.177 By 1978, Breira was insolvent.
Breira’s demise, then, was the product of financial mismanagement predicated on
an unduly optimistic assessment of the organization’s capacity to mobilize support. The
anti-Breira campaign spearheaded by, among others, the ZOA and the far-right
Americans for a Safe Israel (AFSI) had a decisive impact exactly because liberal Zionism
was so weakly institutionalized in the 1970s, its support base nascent and therefore
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exceptionally vulnerable to threats of symbolic exclusion. When it came to light in
November 1976 that Breira leaders Max Ticktin (a Hillel employee) and Arthur Waskow
had been among a group of prominent American Jews that met secretly with PLO
representatives, the campaign against Breira received a critical boost.178 Since 1967,
American Jewish institutions had constructed the PLO as the consummate symbol of
enmity, on par with Nazism. Now a small contingent of right-wing actors seized upon
that potent reserve of symbolic capital to destroy an upstart adversary. The anti-Breira
campaign culminated in early 1977 with the wide circulation of Rael Jean Isaac’s Breira:
Counsel for Judaism, an AFSI tract that deployed innuendo and guilt by association to
implicate Waskow and other Breira leaders as PLO sympathizers. The force of Isaac’s
accusations, which prompted several high-level resignations, hinged largely on the
symbolic power of the Breira-PLO association. The ZOA, B’nai B’rith, and the AntiDefamation League all made Ticktin’s meeting with PLO representatives the basis of
their efforts to purge Breira-affiliated rabbis from university Hillel centers.179 A year
before it rejected the D.C. chapter’s application for membership, the Jewish Community
Council of Greater Washington condemned Breira for allegedly conspiring “to spark a
major political initiative on behalf of the PLO cause.”180 Drawing on Isaac’s pamphlet, an
April 1977 cover story about Breira in Commentary magazine invoked the PLO no less
than twenty-eight times.181 In his public letter of resignation, the eminent Jewish studies
scholar Jacob Neusner accused Breira of championing an “activist program that
supported not dialogue with hopefully dovish Arabs, but the murderous PLO.”182 David
Tulin, Breira’s national vice chairman, resigned in September, citing (among other
concerns) unauthorized statements by chairman Arnold Jacob Wolf “defending American
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Jewish meetings with the PLO”—statements that “became the grist for new and more
intense attacks against Breira.”183
The most financially significant consequences of the anti-Breira campaign,
however, were the erosion of the organization’s dues-paying membership and the loss of
its Rubin Foundation grant. In a November 1977 memo to the Board, Dan Gillon, Loeb’s
successor as executive director, warned that Breira had been “badly battered by the
experience of the past several months,” and that, as a result, its recent “membership drive
has yielded poor results and is running at about half of last year’s renewal rate.”184
Writing to Samuel Rubin in a plea for additional funds, Gillon acknowledged that
the anti-Breira campaign created an image problem for us. This image problem
(particularly with regard to misconceptions about our position on the PLO) is
still with us and limits our ability to attract active and public support from many
sympathetic elements within the organized Jewish community. While we
maintain friendly private contacts with most Jewish leaders and groups, Breira
has become a divisive public issue which inhibits coalition building.185
The composition of Breira’s income had shifted. By July 1977, a year after the attacks
commenced, it derived “almost all from large donors [Rubin in particular], rather than
from membership or Board.”186 Ironically, the termination the Rubin Foundation grant
came in response the Board’s decision in September 1977 to remove Bob Loeb as
executive director—a decision Rubin perceived as a craven act of capitulation to the
right. Confirming the suspension of financial support in a letter to Arnold Jacob Wolf,
Rubin decried the Board’s “submission to a handful of dissidents who forced the
dismissal of a man [Loeb] you had reason to defend.”187 While it appears that Loeb’s
dismissal was rooted in concerns about his managerial style, the decision to terminate
followed several months of internal turmoil stemming from the reactionary onslaught.188
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As Arnold Jacob Wolf described it in a postmortem, Breira’s Board “suffered grievous
inner conflict, partly related to our protracted defense, and defensiveness, and partly a
function of our own confusions and inadequacies.”189 Having lost its primary source of
funding, the Board voted to terminate all paid staff positions at its next meeting and spent
the following year liquidating the organization’s debts.190
Just as Breira was born of fissures in the field’s dominant coalition, its death
reflected the fact that those fissures had not yet sufficiently widened to permit the
development of a stable base of material support. In the period between the 1967 and
1973 Arab-Israeli wars, the institutional and ideological cohesion of the community
relations dynamo, including its hold on the instruments of symbolic power, had reached
an apex. Breira was both a casualty of that cohesion and, in the end, an instrument of its
undoing. Because the dynamics of the field favored liberal Zionist institutionalization
over the long run, Breira’s demise created space for the emergence of a second
iteration—New Jewish Agenda (NJA)—that would both experiment with alternative
institutional strategies (e.g., multi-issue organizing, Jewish ritual framing) and build on
the inherited networks that Breira had forged de novo. As the election of Menachem
Begin, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and events throughout the 1980s exacerbated
conflict within the dominant coalition, the capacity of right-wing actors to impede the
development of liberal-Zionist institutions with credible threats of symbolic exclusion
progressively weakened. Additionally, by the time NJA got off the ground, events had
clarified the uncertainties identified by Gillon when he observed, shortly after Begin’s
election, that “Many potential [Breira] sympathizers are simply confused by the course
and speed of recent developments in the Middle East and afraid to go out on a limb by
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associating with any organizational position until the situation is clarified.”191 In the
changed political environment, and with strategic adaptations, NJA survived longer
(twelve years vs. five), attracted more dues-paying members (5,000 vs. 1,500), and raised
more money per annum (between $150,000 and $200,000) than Breira.192 It received
federation and DAF allocations and met with acceptance in a handful of Jewish
communities.193 Chapters in Los Angeles, Kansas City, New Haven, Ann Arbor, and
Santa Fe were admitted to local JCRCs or federations, and NJA members worked with
federation delegates from Chicago at the 1983 CJF General Assembly to sponsor a
resolution calling on Israel to freeze West Bank settlement construction.194
Notwithstanding these genuine gains, NJA was bedeviled with many of the same
obstacles to growth that had afflicted Breira. Wertheimer likely overstates the matter
when he writes that NJA members “were not roundly attacked or ostracized, as Breira
activists had been.” In fact, NJA chapters were refused access to communal spaces like
JCCs and synagogues and prevented from publishing their views in federation-funded
newspapers.195 A confidential NJA strategy document from 1990 summarized the
situation as follows:
[Jewish] Community institutions are generally not receptive or are actively
hostile to points of view defined as outside the ‘mainstream’. For example,
although objective criterial for membership in institutions such as [J]CRCs exist,
some chapters of NJA have been denied admission, despite meeting the tests for
membership… Slanderous attacks on NJA are disseminated nationwide by
[right-wing] organizations. To the extent that NJA lacks the resources—
including access to the media—to counter them, NJA’s purpose and activities
are misconstrued. This includes, for example, the degree to which NJA is seen
as explicitly affiliated with the PLO.196
AFSI’s Rael Jean Isaac returned in 1987 with another attack pamphlet, The New/AntiJewish Agenda, which called on the organized Jewish community to reprise its isolation
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of Breira.197 In 1989, the Philadelphia chapter of the American Jewish Committee (AJC)
prepared an eleven-page report purporting to document NJA’s hostility towards Israel
and “its affiliation with the PLO.” “As the NJA seeks to mainstream itself,” the report
concludes, “the Jewish community cannot help but be concerned with the ‘ripple effect’
of its proposed entry into Jewish organizational life.”198 While the AJC’s New York
office moved to suppress the report, it was publicized and circulated by AFSI, which
accused the AJC of shielding “a dangerous pro-PLO organization which deserves to be
condemned, not coddled.”199 NJA’s reputation was such that when Rabbi Michael Lerner,
editor of the left-of-center Tikkun magazine, announced his intention in 1988 to establish
a new liberal-Zionist lobby organization, he preemptively dissociated his project from
NJA.“I am not interested in trashing New Jewish Agenda,” he said, “[but] there is a
flavor of anti-Israel that makes many people uncomfortable.”200
With a broader base of support and a more decentralized organizational structure
than Breira, NJA managed to survive the communal isolation and right-wing attacks it
endured, but not without a cost. As U.S. policy moved closer to accommodation with the
PLO in the late 1980s, right-wing attacks on NJA intensified. “Since then,” recounted the
1990 strategy document, “chapters and the national organization have worked hard to
counter the censorship and slander directed at them, but significant time, money and
energy have been required to counter these attacks.” Due to the organization’s overall
isolation, when attacks were allowed to go unanswered, “over time, slanderous
accusations came to be seen as common knowledge, without reference to their original
source.”201 Whether related to intensifying criticism or to some broader complex of
factors, NJA’s membership growth began to stagnate in its final years of existence,
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hovering around 5,000 with a fifty percent annual turnover rate.202 Although compared to
Breira NJA maintained a higher ratio of membership dues to foundation grants in the
composition of its annual revenue, increased reliance on large donors towards the end of
its institutional life “masked the absence of coordinated dues renewal at either the
national or the local levels in the short term. Consequently, membership retention
dropped.”203 Like Breira, NJA consistently struggled with debt, its liabilities ballooning
from $30,000 in 1984 to more than $60,000 towards the end of its institutional life.204
In a letter announcing the end of national operations, NJA’s co-chairs cited the
organization’s “financial crisis” and suggested a range of additional explanations. One
that recurs throughout internal documentation is the fact of increased competition from a
range of new, single-issue Jewish organizations. “Paradoxically,” the co-chairs wrote,
“this proliferation of progressive Jewish voices was part of the challenge NJA could not
overcome. In a more competitive environment, groups with a narrower focus… found it
easier than NJA to plan programs, attract members and publicity, and raise money.”205 As
early as 1984, it came to the NJA’s attention that a number of chapters had begun to
organize single-issue front groups “because they felt that Agenda’s name was a liability
to their work.”206 One chapter “initiated an ad-hoc committee to oppose [the Jewish
Defense League’s] Meir Kahane… The reasoning behind this was that [Jewish] groups
wouldn’t join a coalition with NJA, but would join an ad-hoc committee in which NJA
wasn’t identifiable.” NJA’s leadership instructed chapters to end this practice, explaining
that it “drains our best activists” and “sets a precedent for the non-inclusion of NJA in
progressive Jewish coalitions, and ultimately undercuts our power as an organization.”
The refusal of even progressive Jewish organizations to associate with NJA speaks to the
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persistence of symbolic exclusion and its material implications. Since NJA’s demise, no
American Jewish organization has adopted a multi-issue platform that includes
counterhegemonic positions on Israel, presumably because doing so would jeopardize
access to Jewish communal resources.
As described above, the peace process of the 1990s legitimized territorial partition
and negotiations with the PLO, granting liberal Zionists entrée into the dominant
coalition. As Israel, the U.S., and the international community moved to institutionalize
what had been regarded as treasonous by successive Likud governments, organizations
like Americans for Peace Now and the Israel Policy Forum secured mainstream
acceptance. Notwithstanding the near total collapse of the peace process, the basic
precepts of liberal Zionism remain part and parcel of the dominant paradigm in today’s
less cohesive, more heterogeneous field. This is evident from the rapid
institutionalization of J Street, the liberal Zionist lobby organization established in 2007
less as a counterhegemonic challenge than as a consolidation of various likeminded
elements of the post-Oslo dominant coalition. According to Dov Waxman,
Within a year of its founding, [J Street] had 115,000 online supporters and 7,000
donors (most of whom were Jewish). By 2013, it had around 180,000 registered
supporters, 20,000 donors, and over forty-five local chapters across the United
States… J Street representatives are now frequently invited to speak in JCCs and
synagogues across the country. J Street chapters have won battles for admission
into some local JCRCs, and J Street U has been accepted as a partner
organization of Hillel, the largest Jewish campus organization in the United
States.207
While right-wing forces mounted the usual attacks on J Street, they proved unable to
successfully marginalize an organization whose mission so neatly conforms to the postOslo nomos of the field. An additional reason for J Street’s relatively speedy
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normalization was the emergence of the Palestinian-led Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions (BDS) movement in 2005, which gifted the field’s increasingly disunited
mainstream actors with a common adversary against which to shore up the boundaries of
the dominant coalition. As Waxman notes, over the last decade support for the BDS
movement and other purported efforts to “delegitimize” the Jewish state have come to
replace public criticism of Israel and support for the PLO as “the red lines… that
currently determine who can be included and who should be excluded from the organized
Jewish community, as well as who can be funded, hosted, and even partnered with.”208
By taking a hard line against BDS, J Street positioned itself squarely within the newly
articulated boundaries of the dominant coalition.
In today’s field, then, the counterhegemonic actor whose structural position most
closely resembles that of Breira and New Jewish Agenda is not J Street but Jewish Voice
for Peace (JVP). Established in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1996, JVP emerged from
obscurity following the 2008-2009 Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip, the first of
three highly destructive military operations against Hamas, the enclave’s de facto
governing authority. Although JVP only formally endorsed the BDS movement in 2015,
it has long supported selective boycott and divestment initiatives, called for the
curtailment of U.S. foreign aid to Israel, and maintained an agnostic stance on the
desirability of a two-state solution.209 As one commentator astutely observed, JVP’s early
reluctance to endorse the full BDS platform “was much more a reflection of the
unfortunate political toxicity of BDS in Jewish American circles than it was of any firm
ideological opposition to the movement.”210 Like NJA, which aimed to be “a Jewish
voice among progressives and a progressive voice among Jews,” JVP operates in
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multiple fields simultaneously and must contend with the demands of sharply divergent
nomoi. In recent decades, U.S. Palestine solidarity has coalesced into a discrete field in its
own right, with JVP occupying a central place in the dominant coalition. As support for
BDS became central to the nomos of the Palestine solidarity field, JVP was expected to
clarify its intentionally ambiguous stance in order to secure its legitimacy as a member of
the dominant coalition. Even before the BDS endorsement, however, JVP’s status as a
Palestine solidarity organization had already made it the object of intense symbolic
exclusion. In 2013, the ADL included JVP on a list of the “top ten anti-Israel groups in
the U.S.,” and it has effectively been “banned from Jewish spaces,” according to
Waxman.211 “JVP activists cannot participate in events sponsored by local Jewish
Federations, nor are they allowed to speak publicly in many JCCs… At universities
across the United States, JVP student groups cannot join their campus Hillel societies
because Hillel’s national guidelines effectively, and deliberately, bar them. On at least
two occasions, JVP members have even been subjected to threats and physical
violence.”212
But in contrast with Breira and NJA, JVP has grown rapidly in the face of
symbolic exclusion. According to IRS 990 filings, JVP’s total revenue amounted to less
than ten thousand dollars in 2001. On the eve of the 2008-2009 Gaza war that number
had reached $270,000 before beginning a sharp ascent, growing to $700,000 by 2010,
$1.1 million by 2013, and $3.3 million by 2017. With only 600 members as recently as
2011, JVP now claims more than 13,000 dues-payers, along with sixty local chapters and
two hundred thousand online supporters.213 It is also considerably less dependent on
foundation grants than its predecessors, deriving around eighty percent of its annual
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revenue from individual donors and membership dues.214 To explain JVP’s extraordinary
success relative to past counterhegemonic challengers, one must look to a confluence of
factors. In the political domain, the collapse of the peace process, the steady rightward
drift of successive Israeli governments, and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements
have eroded confidence in the liberal Zionist paradigm. More acutely, since 2007, Israel’s
blockade and recurrent military operations in Gaza have thrown the enclave into severe
humanitarian crisis, attracting negative media attention. As journalist Peter Beinart
argued in a widely-read 2010 essay, in the face of what liberal Zionists perceive as an
escalating moral emergency, “the leading institutions of American Jewry have refused to
foster—indeed, have actively opposed—a Zionism that challenges Israel’s behavior in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip and toward its own Arab citizens.”215 With no credible
alternatives, liberal Jews may be increasingly attracted to JVP’s human rights paradigm.
Non-Jews, too, may be contributing to the growth of JVP. As one of the more visible,
well-funded, and professionalized Palestine solidarity organizations—and one that does
not premise membership on ethnoreligious identification—JVP likely derives a greater
proportion of its resources from non-Jewish sources than did its more inwardly-oriented
predecessors.
At the same time, technological developments since the demise of NJA have
revolutionized communications, reducing the costs of political organizing and enlarging
access to heterodox perspectives. Consider the following, imperfect comparison. In 1985,
NJA budgeted slightly more than $40,000—or twenty percent of its total budget—on
telephone, postage, and printing costs.216 By contrast, JVP spent only three percent of its
2017 budget on a vastly more expansive array of communications-related services,
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including telephone, Internet, webhosting, postage, all printing and mail house services,
teleconferencing, social media promotion, and mobile website enhancements.217 In the
realm of fundraising, Internet payment utilities now automate the collection and renewal
of membership dues, while online fundraising tools that interface with users’ social
media accounts lower the cost and effort of soliciting donations. For example, in May
2017, JVP utilized the peer-to-peer crowdfunding tool Causevox to recruit 4,150 new or
renewed members donating at least $18 each as part of a month-long member drive.218 In
addition to reducing costs, the Internet has also spawned a host of new venues for Jewish
political debate and identity-formation beyond the control of traditional gatekeepers. On
the left side of the spectrum, online publications like Jewschool, 972 Magazine, and
Mondoweiss specialize in Israel-related news and commentary that contravene communal
norms. Private Facebook groups populated by thousands of users—collectively known as
“Jewbook” or “Jewish Leftbook”—serve as sites of information exchange and
laboratories for constructing new, diasporist Jewish identities.219 The Internet has also
magnified the Palestinian narrative, as news, images, and testimonies from the Occupied
Territories circulate through social media and appear on websites like the Electronic
Intifada. Finally, the perspectives of Jewish Israeli human rights workers and left-wing
journalists are now instantly available to curious readers through NGO websites and
progressive news platforms like Ha’aretz. Whereas breaking news and commentary
about Israel was previously available to Anglophone Jews primarily (though of course
not entirely) through conservative gatekeeper institutions like the establishment media
and the federation-linked Jewish press services, technology has now democratized access
on both the production and consumption ends.
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For several decades, then, the dense organization of American Jewish life coupled
with heavy investment in symbolic capital enabled members of the dominant coalition to
materially impede the institutionalization of counterhegemonic projects, thereby slowing
the destabilization of the post-1967 dominant coalition. Recent developments, however,
have eroded grassroots organization and undermined the economic impacts of symbolic
exclusion. As the number of venues for exposure to counterhegemonic currents has
multiplied, so too has the intensity of the ideological “friction” between those venues and
the federation identity apparatus. In something of a dialectical inversion, continued
efforts to generate pro-Israel habitus under present political and technological conditions
now appear to be fueling, rather than slowing, disequilibrium in the field. According to a
profile of IfNotNow, a fast-growing youth movement established in 2014 to challenge
Jewish communal support for the Israeli occupation, “Much of their [members’]
dissatisfaction toward Jewish institutions, as well as their enthusiasm for speaking up,
stems from a feeling that they were fed propaganda as kids. On the rare occasions when
Palestinians were spoken of at all, it was only so they could be denounced. That onesided education ended up backfiring when they arrived at college.”220 While some Israel
advocates have taken stock of this phenomenon and adjusted their programming
accordingly, symbolic exclusion remains the standard response to insurgent
challengers.221
Today, the effects of symbolic exclusion are complex. On one hand, the
articulation of red lines around Israel and the perception that communal decision-makers
act in the ideological interests of a powerful, right-wing donor class have occasioned new
forms of organized resistance. On the other hand, although symbolic exclusion no longer
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seems capable of fatally undermining counterhegemonic projects, it continues to
fragment membership and resource pools by incentivizing the formation of new
organizations specifically designed to evade the formal prohibitions of the federation
system. Recent initiatives like Open Hillel—a campaign to challenge Hillel
International’s “Standards of Partnership”—and IfNotNow strategically calibrate their
messaging to avoid contravening red lines on BDS, Zionism, and the two-state solution,
even as they signal counterhegemonic intentions. While ensuring greater access to Jewish
communal resources, this strategy precludes formal alliances and resource-sharing with
JVP and other players in the Palestine solidarity field. IfNotNow, for example, targets its
activism at “American Jews, and only Jews: though they wanted to fight for Palestinian
rights and stand as allies with Palestinian groups, IfNotNow also wanted to make sure
Jews would feel wholly comfortable in their movement.”222 As IfNotNow members seem
to acknowledge, the potential for “discomfort” with JVP’s more solidarity-oriented
frame—and therefore the necessity of diverting resources into a separate organization—is
by and large the product of redlining:
“Those three issues [BDS, Zionism, and the two-state solution] are
intentionally divisive and are actively driving wedges in our community,” says
IfNotNow member Becca Kahn Bloch. “What I’ve seen is, by saying there’s
no official stance on this, IfNotNow is saying, ‘We are not going to allow this
to divide us. This is not something that’s going to shut you out at the gate.’”223
Whatever the strategic utility of forging a broad-based, “anti-occupation” front within
existing communal boundaries, the practical effect of the boundary-making enterprise has
been to force a choice between access to the dominant coalition’s symbolic and material
resources and affirmative commitment to Palestine solidarity. Symbolic exclusion thus
continues to modulate counterhegemonic challenges by dividing opponents of the status
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quo into “radicals” and “moderates” and doling out punishments and rewards
accordingly.

Conclusion
Sustained by prodigious financial endowments, federations remain key actors in
the American Jewish ethnopolitical field. At the local and state level, their professional
staffs work to advance pro-Israel legislation, organize overseas delegations for elected
officials, and issue policy declarations in the name of the broader Jewish community.
Federations orchestrate pro-Israel rallies and parades, host trainings and educational
seminars for Israel advocates, and facilitate economic and technological exchange
between U.S. and Israeli business leaders—all in addition to their core functions of
maintaining communal infrastructure, funding an array of educational and identitybuilding programs, and assisting the Jewish poor and elderly. Over the last thirty years,
however, the capacity of federations and their associated JCRCs to facilitate mass
political mobilization has been sharply curtailed. No longer centrally coordinated by
NCRAC or carried out through dense local networks of grassroots Jewish organizations,
pro-Israel advocacy beyond the Washington Beltway is today the domain of a politically
heterogeneous assortment of federation and JCRC professionals, right-leaning pro-Israel
nonprofits, and the local and regional chapters of AIPAC, J Street, the ZOA, the ADL,
and other national organizations. Beyond opposition to the BDS movement, there is little
of a common agenda or ideology that unites today’s dominant coalition. Since 2017, the
alignment of Orthodox and conservative pro-Israel forces with the presidential
administration of Donald Trump has further polarized the field. While the number, size,
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and institutional resilience of counterhegemonic challengers appears to be growing—
driven in part by the effects of the federation identity apparatus itself—long-term
demographic projections forecast an Orthodox majority by the end of the century.224 With
the post-1967 consensus now a distant memory, political dynamics at home and abroad
seem poised to drive the field deeper into conflict with no obvious resolution in sight.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Comparative Implications and Extensions

Overview
This dissertation has provided an historical institutionalist and field-theoretic
analysis of American Jewish politics since the turn of the twentieth century. I have
demonstrated the centrality of Jewish philanthropic federations to the long-term
development of a national Jewish political infrastructure and the emergence of an
institutional pro-Israel “consensus” in the years following the Six-Day War of 1967.
Conceptualizing American Jewish politics on the model of a Bourdieusian “field”—that
is, an economically-structured arena of competition over symbolic claims to
representative legitimacy—I explored the profound consequences of the Jewish
federation as an institutional form for the distribution of economic resources, and thus
power relations, in what I have called the American Jewish ethnopolitical field.
Federations’ monopoly control over Jewish philanthropic resources, combined with their
shared financial-institutional drive for cost-reduction and efficiency, furnished both the
motivation and the coercive apparatus necessary to impose discipline on the major
national Jewish political organizations, forcing ideological adversaries to coordinate their
public affairs activities under unified federation auspices. By the eve of the Six-Day War,
this process had yielded a nationally centralized Jewish political framework—the
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National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC)—capable of orchestrating
mass mobilizations across the country and policing internal dissent through the
coordinated application of economic and symbolic sanctions.
The consolidation of pro-Israel identity at the level of national organizations, I
demonstrated, was less a product of spontaneous emotional exuberance during the SixDay War than the effect of an institutional project constructed through the strategic
deployment of economic coercion. It was, in other words, a “coercive consensus.”
Following the establishment of Israel, pro-Israel forces instrumentalized NCRAC to
delegitimize Jewish anti-Zionists and exclude them from the recently-constituted
“organized Jewish community,” thus cementing the institutional dominance of proIsraelism for decades to come. At the same time, NCRAC emerged as the driving force
behind grassroots pro-Israel mobilization from the mid-1950s through the beginning of
the Reagan era. Until the mid-1980s, NCRAC and its local, federation-funded auxiliaries,
the Jewish Community Relations Councils, commanded economic and human resources
far superior to those of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which at
the time was a minor but centrally-located appendage of the federation system.
Finally, I identified how the recent period of economic neoliberalization catalyzed
a second major redistribution of capital in the American Jewish ethnopolitical field,
diminishing the influence of federations, bolstering the autonomy and resource base of
AIPAC, and empowering a new class of megadonors and private family foundations.
Utilizing the archives of Jewish dissident organizations since the 1970s, I explored how
this redistribution of power intersected with political and technological developments to
heighten intra-Jewish conflict while simultaneously eroding the capacity of the field’s
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dominant institutions to apply economic and symbolic sanctions in a way that jeopardizes
the material survival of heterodox institutional challengers.
By way of conclusion, I explore some of the comparative implications of my
American Jewish case study. I begin by reviewing the dissertation’s findings with an eye
towards identifying a set of more general hypotheses that can inform the study of other
U.S. ethnopolitical fields, beyond the Jewish case. What have been my major dependent
and independent variables of interest, and what meso-level processes link them? By
attending to both the material and symbolic aspects of political life, I offer the rudiments
of a comparative model of U.S. ethnic politics that is more realistic, explanatory, and
predictive than what we currently find in the political science literature. In the second
section, I test my preliminary framework by applying it to a highly schematic shadow
case—the case of the Cuban-American ethnopolitical field. I have selected this case both
because of the historic prominence of the “Cuba lobby”— considered second only to the
pro-Israel lobby in terms of political influence—and for the way it allows us to observe
variation on key outcomes of interest. In the closing section, I return to the Jewish case
and consider how the insights of our comparative exercise might inform predictions about
the future of American Jewish politics.

The Argument Through a Comparative Lens: Variables and Hypotheses
In my introductory chapter, I argued that the ethnopolitical field, rather than the
ethnic group, is the more theoretically coherent unit of analysis for a constructivist
account of U.S. ethnic politics. In this section, I propose a conceptual framework for
comparing ethnopolitical fields to one another. The small existing body of comparative
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scholarship on U.S. ethnic lobbies attempts to explain variation in the ability of different
ethnic lobby groups to influence U.S. policy. By comparing the strategies, structural
features, and environmental challenges and opportunities of lobby groups in light of a
standardized measurement of their political power, it aims to reveal the conditions under
which ethnic lobbies exert decisive causal influence over the policymaking process. Here,
I am interested in a different set of outcomes. While my analysis of the American Jewish
ethnopolitical field identifies the long-term developmental processes and socialinfrastructural characteristics that underwrote pro-Israel advocacy after 1956, it does not
assess the relationship between pro-Israel political activity and U.S. policy outcomes. The
relational ontology of the Bourdieusian method precludes an attribution of causal effects
in the manner of an OLS regression analysis. Rather, the policymaking process itself
must be viewed through a field-theoretic lens. Policy decisions are the negotiated
outcomes of shifting coalitions of high-capital actors forged on the basis of reciprocal
political interest. Assessing the impact of Jewish institutions relative to other institutional
actors on coalitional negotiations in the U.S. Middle East policy field is beyond the scope
of this dissertation.
What I offer instead is a framework for thinking about how the institutional
features of ethnopolitical fields shape the capacity of dominant coalitions to project
influence in external policy fields, regardless of whether their influence is decisive in the
final analysis. This capacity to project influence—to wield Jewish representational capital
as a symbolic promise of Jewish electoral and financial support—is one of two major
outcomes that my Jewish case study is concerned with. The second, whose emergence
and decline I trace in the preceding chapters, is the capacity to enforce internal discipline
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on competing actors in the field. The existing ethnic lobby scholarship construes the
effects of internal disciplinary capacity as an independent variable (“Political Unity”)
conditioning the strength of the external advocacy capacity. In other words, the less
political heterogeneity in the field—that is, the greater the semblance of unanimity—the
more effective the dominant coalition will be in projecting influence. I do not dispute this
basic relationship, which I theorize further below. Yet, the strength of these two
capacities does not always move in the same direction. Although in my Jewish case study
they appear to have coevolved in the shape of the federation system over the first half of
the twentieth century, we observed in the previous chapter how subsequent structural
transformations eroded the dominant coalition’s internal disciplinary capacity while its
external advocacy capacity merely changed form. No appreciable reduction in the
dominant coalition’s capacity to influence U.S. government policy accompanied the
transition from a NCRAC-centered order to an AIPAC-centered order. If anything, the
dominant coalition’s influence has only increased since the late 1970s.
What this suggests is that the two capacities are analytically distinct even if they
might at times interact with one another. In addition, I maintain that the ability of an
ethnic coalition to suppress internal dissent is an outcome of independent political interest
regardless of whether the coalition effectively influences U.S. policy. I thus propose a
comparative model centered on two discrete dependent variables: 1) disciplinary power,
or the capacity of a dominant coalition in an ethnopolitical field to constrain or prevent
the emergence of challengers; and 2) advocacy power, or the capacity of a dominant
coalition to exert influence in external policy fields. For simplicity’s sake, we can assign
“high” or “low” values to these variables at different points in time. Our overarching
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outcome of interest is the particular combination of values that prevails in a given period
(low/low, low/high, high/low, or high/high). In the remainder of this section, I review
relevant aspects of the Jewish case and extrapolate a set of meso-level hypotheses to
explain the changing values of our dependent variables.
Prior to the emergence of the federation system, the dominant coalition in the
American Jewish ethnopolitical field was comprised of the German-Jewish upper and
middle classes as represented by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and B’nai
B’rith/the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). While they engaged in occasional advocacy
activities, the earliest incarnations of these organizations did not operate as mass pressure
groups or professional lobbies, and their field dominance was vigorously contested by
mass organizations representing low-capital actors in the field (Zionists, Yiddishspeaking socialists, etc.). In the language of our dependent variables, the pre-federation
dominant coalition displayed low disciplinary power and—at least relative to what would
come later—low advocacy power. In the 1920s, however, the emerging federation system
began to reshape capital distributions in the field and establish the institutional
groundwork for a new dominant coalition of remarkable strength and durability. I have
attributed that coalition’s high level of disciplinary and advocacy power to the existence
of an extensive, networked, and centrally-managed grassroots infrastructure equipped to
perform both mobilizing and identity-formation functions. As described in the previous
chapter, more recent political, economic, and technological developments have shifted
resource distributions from federations to foundations, diminished the mobilizing
capacities of the federation system, and eroded the dominant coalition’s ability to
materially constrain challengers through symbolic exclusion. At the same time, while
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today’s dominant coalition is more pluralistic, decentralized, and contested than
previously, there are few indications that its influence on U.S. politics has meaningfully
diminished. The field’s dominant coalition thus underwent a transition from high
disciplinary and advocacy power in 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to lower disciplinary power
and steady if not increased advocacy power since the 1980s.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the American Jewish ethnopolitical field
witnessed two major challenges from the dominated polarity. Reviewing these episodes
in light of the above outcomes of interest sheds light on the meso-level mechanisms that
mediate between macro-level processes (economic and political change) and micro-level
outcomes in the field (power distributions and conflict dynamics). In the nineteen-teens
and twenties, low-capital Zionists attempted to establish participatory mechanisms, such
as the original American Jewish Congress and the New York Kehillah, through which
they could democratically legitimize their interpretation of the nomos of the field and
leverage their numerical advantage to seize control of Jewish representational capital.
The prospect of a mass democratic spectacle under Zionist hegemony indeed threatened
the German-Jewish organizations enough to force their participation. But because there
was no mechanism through which these voluntary collectives could requisition the
economic capital of the German-Jewish elite, they were ultimately unsustainable. As
described in Chapter 4, over the next twenty years, as the Eastern European majority
experienced economic mobility, Zionists became increasingly present and influential in
middle class Jewish institutions, from B’nai B’rith to the Union of American Hebrew
Congregations. Then came World War II, which stimulated another eruption of Zionist
mass mobilization and a new democratic spectacle, the American Jewish Conference.
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The Zionist seizure of representational capital caused the dominant coalition to fracture.
An anti-Zionist fraction, the American Council for Judaism, splintered off, while the rest
of the field dominants remained officially non-Zionist.
By the mid-1940s, the coalescence of the federation system had at last furnished a
mechanism through which some semblance of democratic control could be exerted over
the field’s economic capital. In effecting linkages between the finances of the national
Jewish political agencies and the organized grassroots, the federation system created a
transmission belt through which mass pressures could have material effects on the
dominant coalition. As the most ideological and least democratically structured field
dominant, the AJC retained anti-Zionist sympathies even after the Holocaust and the
establishment of Israel had thoroughly discredited anti-Zionism in the eyes of most
American Jews. Owing to the federation system, however, any further public association
with anti-Zionism threatened to jeopardize the AJC’s material reproduction. As a result,
the organization was compelled to denounce the Council and embrace a moderate proIsraelism. Over the same period, the federations wielded threats of economic coercion to
force the AJC and the ADL into the NCRAC-JCRC framework. NCRAC, in turn, became
an important instrument of symbolic exclusion, helping to maintain the disciplinary
power of the dominant coalition for decades to come. Here, I note that while the Zionist
insurgency “succeeded” insofar as its position was embraced by the dominant coalition,
the major Zionist organizations that led the mass mobilizations of the 1930s and 1940s
did not accrue economic or political capital as a result. In fact, the Zionist Organization
of America precipitously declined after 1948. Only in the 1980s did AIPAC, an offshoot
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of the Zionist movement, accrue enough political and economic capital to dominate the
field.
The liberal Zionist challenge that began in the 1970s reached a somewhat
different conclusion. Unlike the earlier Zionist movement, which was an imported
ethnopolitical project with a mass constituency, liberal Zionism was a minority tendency
that emerged under repressive conditions (high disciplinary power). Without raw
numbers, there was never a possibility of seizing Jewish representational capital through
democratic spectacle or mass mobilization. Under such conditions, liberal Zionists could
only pursue what Bourdieu calls a strategy of succession, seeking access to dominant
positions in the field without posing a fundamental challenge to its pro-Israelist nomos.
(Many contemporary Jewish organizations did pursue strategies of subversion—for
instance, the radical, anti-imperialist Jewish student groups associated with the New
Left—but they quickly collapsed.) Despite their self-styled moderation, liberal Zionist
organizations suffered intense symbolic exclusion for two decades. Then, in 1993, they
were suddenly legitimized by the Oslo peace process. By that point, however, the
grassroots liberal Zionism of New Jewish Agenda had disappeared, leaving only the topdown NGO model of Americans for Peace Now (APN). Having been consecrated by the
Israeli government, APN was admitted into the President’s Conference and, tentatively,
to a new dominant coalition whose boundaries were in flux. But it failed to attract much
additional economic capital and, as such, was powerless to defend the peace process from
the renegade elements that had mobilized to thwart it. Among the latter was the renascent
Zionist Organization of American, which emerged as a vehicle for insurgent right-wing
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donors previously aligned with AIPAC but now outraged by the lobby’s formal
acquiescence to the peace process.
When the peace process collapsed in the early 2000s, right-wing forces reemerged
at the center of the dominant coalition. In a context of declining disciplinary power,
liberal Zionist elements managed to leverage their recent consecration to capture a
modest segment of the field’s economic capital, establishing a new lobby organization, J
Street. Far-right elements initially sought to exclude J Street, but its determined
succession strategy and the post-Oslo legitimacy of liberal Zionism earned it a position as
the left flank of a more pluralistic dominant coalition, particularly after the emergence of
the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement. (Israel’s preeminent nationalist
think tank, the Reut Institute, openly advocated a strategy of cooperation with liberal
Zionism in order to thwart BDS.1) While differing from the coalitional mainstream on
certain important policy issues, J Street asserts fidelity to most of the pro-Israelist
principles that have defined the nomos of the field since the 1950s, including an
unqualified commitment to American military aid for Israel and opposition to the use of
punitive measures to enforce Israel’s compliance with U.S. Middle East policy.
Combined with the ever-rightward lurch of Israeli politics, the impression that liberal
Zionism has been successfully neutralized as a counterhegemonic force has fostered the
growth of Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) and other non-Zionist Jewish dissident elements
supportive of BDS and dedicated to a genuine strategy of subversion.
In response, federations and other communal institutions have implemented new
forms of symbolic exclusion aimed at BDS supporters, even as their economic impact is
mitigated by technological advances and ongoing political polarization. The breakdown
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of constraints on counterhegemonic institutionalization has also prompted right-wing
megadonors to establish their own, stopgap coercive mechanisms. The latter includes
Canary Mission, a website of uncertain provenance that compiles extensive personal
dossiers on pro-Palestinian activists (both Jewish and non-Jewish) in an effort to soil their
public reputations and undermine their future employment prospects. Recent reporting by
the Jewish newspaper the Forward revealed that two California Jewish federations had
channeled hundreds of thousands of dollars to the website through supporting
foundations and donor advised funds.2
What hypotheses can we derive from this review? I begin with the question of
disciplinary power. It would seem that the disciplinary power of the early pro-Israelist
coalition derived, in the final analysis, from the coercive capacity of the federation
system—i.e., its coordinated control over a significant proportion of the field’s economic
capital. Federations used that coercive capacity to force recalcitrant national
organizations into a unified framework, which in turn was able to deploy effective
symbolic power against dissenters by virtue of its monopoly on Jewishly-defined
economic, social, and symbolic capital. As the changing U.S. political economy deprived
the federations of their economic monopoly power, and as the local roots of the NCRACJCRC system withered as a result of sociodemographic transformations and the broader
decline of mass membership organizations, so too did the capacity of the dominant
coalition to arrest organized expressions of dissent through symbolic exclusion. We can
thus hypothesize that the disciplinary power of an ethnopolitical coalition is related to the
effective operation of a coercive apparatus that punishes internal dissent and rewards
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conformity with the coalition’s overarching ethnopolitical project, and that the more
social embedded such an apparatus is, the more effective it will be.
Such an apparatus, I should note, need not necessarily be under the direct control
of the dominant coalition; under certain circumstances, an ethnopolitical coalition can
been kept in an internally dominant position through the application of external force. I
am thinking here, for example, of conditions in the Black ethnopolitical field in the wake
of Reconstruction, when opponents of a quiescent line on white supremacy were targeted
for violent elimination by white vigilantes in league with the state. On this note, we
should also consider that distinct forms of coercion exist, have different effects, and in
combination may multiply the disciplinary power of a coalition. For instance, an
apparatus (or multiple, overlapping institutional orders) that exerts symbolic, economic,
and physical coercion simultaneously represents a particularly extreme form of
disciplinary power that, in U.S. history, is almost exclusively associated with racial
domination.
As suggested above, the question of advocacy power is complicated by the fact
that ethnopolitical fields exert only second-order effects on U.S. foreign policy. Actors in
the Jewish field compete for influence in the field of U.S. Middle East policy with a
variety of institutional actors, including Congress, the White House, the military, the
State Department, representatives of Middle Eastern governments, arms manufacturers,
think tanks, and so forth—most of which can also be analyzed as Bourdieusian fields.
Because Congress and the White House are the most powerful actors in any policy field
by virtue of their sovereign authorities, competition within the Middle East policy field
most often takes the form of efforts to forge coalitional relationships with one or both of
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the major political parties (or more precisely, with dominant actors within those parties).
The extent to which an ethnopolitical coalition can ensure specific policy outcomes is
limited by any number of factors that affect the calculations of the major parties, most of
which are beyond its direct control. Thus, when I speak of advocacy power, I do not refer
to an ethnopolitical coalition’s success in securing its preferred policy outcomes, but only
to its ability to influence the calculations of powerful actors in a policy field on the basis
of ethnic representational capital. Even when an ethnopolitical coalition fails to achieve
its immediate objectives, it may nonetheless exhibit a high degree of advocacy power, as
when the AIPAC-centered coalition failed to prevent the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (the “Iran Deal”) in 2015 but nonetheless imposed significant obstacles and
extracted other concessions from its coalition partners in the Middle East policy field.
What, then, are the determinants of advocacy power? It is worth recalling that we
are specifically theorizing organizations that make policy demands in the name of an
ethnic group, and that do so within the parameters of the U.S. political and legal system.
Such organizations leverage their accumulated representational capital—a capital
instantiated in a range of symbolic practices and productions—in order to convey to
lawmakers their legitimacy to speak for the group. But the policy demands of even the
most symbolically well-endowed ethnic coalition will carry political force only when
coupled with credible promises of political reward in the event of compliance and/or
political punishment in the event of non-compliance. Advocacy power thus requires more
than just a reserve of ethnic representational capital: that capital must, in addition, be
politically valorized. Valorization I define as the sociopolitical process through which
association with an ethnic representational capital comes to be understood a source of
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political resources. A necessary (but, as I argue below, not sufficient) condition for the
valorization of ethnic representational capital is the investment of economic and/or
human capital in ongoing political activity. Valorization occurs through an iterated
process of representation, reward, and punishment carried out through a political
infrastructure that mobilizes citizens, organizes campaign contributions, and/or
intermediates with lawmakers.
To draw an example from the Israel lobby literature, in the 1980s AIPAC
strategically targeted a number of politically vulnerable Congressional incumbents on the
basis of their positions on Israel. Representatives Paul Findley (R-IL) and Pete
McCloskey (R-CA), and Senators Charles Percy (R-IL) and Roger Jepsen (R-IA), were
each defeated by challengers who received significant campaign contributions from
AIPAC-aligned political action committees (PACs). Mearsheimer and Walt convincingly
document the way members of Congress took stock of these and other defeats and
institutionalized an expectation of similar retribution should they oppose AIPAC, and
similar reward should they conform to AIPAC’s policy preferences.3 That process,
repeated every so often, continues to valorize the representational capital of the AIPACcentered dominant coalition, making close association with its bearers a political asset.
The history narrated in the preceding chapters underscores the way Jewish
representational capital has become increasingly valorized over time. The Jewish field’s
pre-federation dominant coalition possessed significant economic assets but, fearing antiSemitic backlash, elected not to invest them in modern hardball lobbying activity,
preferring instead a combination of quiet shtadlanus (elite intervention) and investments
in symbolic capital (printed material, radio and television programs, etc.). Because the
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pre-federation coalition did not approach lawmakers with credible promises of political
reward and punishment, its representational capital was not highly valorized and its
advocacy power was comparatively low. That began to change in the 1930s with the rise
of Nazism. Investment in political infrastructure accelerated as a result of the competitive
dynamic described in Chapter 3, ultimately yielding the community relations dynamo.
The dynamo, in turn, valorized Jewish representational capital by mobilizing the Jewish
electorate, directly lobbying Congress, and vanquishing internal competitors. A third
phase began in the 1980s when AIPAC, initially an appendage of the federation system,
increased its autonomy by forging linkages to new concentrations of economic capital in
the field. As it displaced the declining NCRAC-JCRC network, AIPAC took advantage
of new campaign finance laws to (unofficially) cultivate a nationwide network of proIsrael PACs. While mass mobilization has declined, the advent, growth, and continuous
operation of this PAC network—fueled in part by the enormous surge in wealth and
income inequality—further valorized Jewish representational capital by extending the
reach of the dominant coalition’s punishment-and-reward mechanism beyond parts of the
country with organized Jewish populations.
Advocacy power, however, is not solely a function of the volume of strategic
investment. Regardless of the volume of investment, the valorization process is always
conditioned by the degree to which political power actors perceive members of an ethnic
category as both ideologically cohesive and politically significant. Members of Congress
heed AIPAC’s policy prescriptions because they view AIPAC as the legitimate voice of a
strategically located Jewish electorate and pool of major Jewish donors. However, were
lawmakers to come to view the Jewish electorate and donor base as either sufficiently
415

polarized on the major issues at stake, or less significant to their electoral fortunes than
other countervailing constituencies, the field’s Jewish representational capital would devalorize, lawmakers would cease to automatically perceive association with its
institutional bearers as a political asset, and the dominant coalition’s policy prescriptions
would cease to carry the same force.
How might de-valorization occur in the context of a highly valorized ethnic
representational capital, as exists today in the American Jewish field? Like valorization,
de-valorization operates through an iterated process of representation, reward, and
punishment. First, an alternative coalition of ethnic institutions would have to seize
control of representational capital in a symbolic offensive, destabilizing the dominant
coalition’s monopoly and establishing itself as the legitimate voice of a politically
significant ethnic constituency. Second, the alternative coalition would have to
sustainably institutionalize a countervailing set of political punishments and rewards.
Over time, that process would weaken lawmakers’ ascription of political value to ethnic
representational capital per se. As we saw in Chapter 5, a de-valorization of this sort
occurred during the 1930s and 1940s, when the pre-federation dominant coalition,
already poorly valorized and reliant on the personal influence of wealthy elites, was
challenged by an insurgent American Zionism. In that case, the preferences of a moneyed
dominant coalition were successfully opposed by a highly mobilized mass movement,
effectively neutralizing autonomous “Jewish” influence.
As mentioned, the post-1973 liberal Zionist coalition, initially an alliance between
dominated elements (students, New Left activists, younger rabbis) and certain highprofile cultural elites, managed to attract additional social and economic capital following
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the Oslo peace process. When J Street emerged in the late 2000s, its direct lobbying (and
later, campaign contributions) threatened to de-valorize Jewish representational capital in
the manner described above. Much of the initial fury leveled at J Street should be seen in
this light. Explicitly positioning itself as an alternative to AIPAC, the organization staked
its claim to Jewish representational capital on what it alleged was a growing polarization
within the American Jewish community over the dominant coalition’s right-wing policy
positions. Ultimately, however, the feared de-valorization did not occur, first because J
Street lacked sufficient economic capital and grassroots organization, and second because
its policy positions have differed only marginally from those of the post-Oslo communal
mainstream. In the context of the growing BDS movement, the dominant coalition
resolved to conditionally embrace liberal Zionist critics of Israel, conceding their right to
dissent within narrow, “pro-Israel” parameters as a means of further isolating non- and
anti-Zionist Jewish organizations.
This maneuver—what Bourdieu would call a “strategy of conservation”—served
to shore up the dominant coalition’s post-Oslo legitimacy, but not without a cost. During
the 2015 debate over the “Iran deal,” it became clear that internal polarization on
particular issues, even within a more encompassing dominant coalition, can reduce the
contextual value of ethnic representational capital, freeing policymakers to act on the
basis of other considerations. J Street’s strong support for the deal and, perhaps more
importantly, polls showing that American Jews were broadly in favor of it, helped
neutralize the representational capital of the major field dominants (AIPAC, the
federations, the ADL, and the AJC), which almost uniformly opposed the deal. Because
wavering Congressional Democrats were also under immense pressure to support the deal
417

from the White House and other actors in the Middle East policy field, the marginal
effect of an internally divided Jewish ethnopolitical coalition may have had a decisive
impact on the deal’s passage.
To summarize the hypotheses specified above:
H1: In an ethnopolitical field, the disciplinary power of the dominant coalition is
positively associated with the operation of a coercive apparatus that punishes internal
dissent and rewards conformity with the dominant coalition’s ethnopolitical project.
H2: In an ethnopolitical field, the advocacy power of the dominant coalition is
positively associated with the valorization of its representational capital. Valorization
occurs through iterated sociopolitical processes that shape lawmaker perceptions of the
power, preferences, and political significance of an ethnic constituency.

These hypotheses help us make sense of one of the major puzzles of the American
Jewish case study: the continuing advocacy power of the pro-Israelist coalition despite
the erosion of its disciplinary power since the 1970s. Although the federation system’s
coercive capacity has declined and new challengers have succeeded in generating Jewish
representational capital (H1), those challengers have neither seized monopoly control of
the field’s assets nor established a mechanism of political punishment and reward
sufficient to de-valorize the dominant coalition’s majority stock of representational
capital (H2). On the contrary, the advent of PACs and an increased rate of economic
investment in mainstream pro-Israel lobbying activity has only further valorized Jewish
representational capital and, in turn, enhanced perceptions of Jewish political power and
preoccupation with Israel.
In its heyday, the federation system represented a unique fusion of wealth and
participatory localism that enabled the construction of an effective disciplinary
mechanism and a truly grassroots political apparatus. For thirty years, the community
relations dynamo valorized Jewish representational capital in the Middle East policy
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field—a process from which its small, Washington-based lobbying arm benefitted
reputationally. As the main point of articulation between the organized Jewish
community and Congress, it was in AIPAC that the entire system’s political capital
eventually coagulated. When, in the 1980s, the neoliberal turn re-concentrated American
wealth, AIPAC saw an opportunity to convert that political capital into economic capital,
growing in size and power as the substructure to which it was once attached weakened.

Shadow Case: The Cuban-American Ethnopolitical Field
Having established a comparative framework on the basis of my American Jewish
case, I now turn to a second case study—that of the Cuban-American ethnopolitical
field—in order to test the hypotheses fleshed out above. Cuban Americans are regularly
compared to American Jews on the grounds that both have produced strong lobby
organizations with similar structural features and impacts on U.S. foreign policy. Yet
there are important differences between the Cuban and Jewish cases that are left
unexplained by existing comparative models, including the greater durability of the proIsraelist coalition. Moreover, the Cuban case allows us to observe different combinations
of outcomes on our dependent variables (advocacy power/disciplinary power). While the
three historical stages of the Jewish case progressed from low/low to high/high to
high/low, the Cuban case progressed from low/high to high/high to low/low. These
different trajectories, I argue, reflect different patterns of coercion and institutionalization
emerging from the historical particularities of each case. In what follows, I provide a
rough sketch of the principal contenders in the Cuban-American ethnopolitical field, the
shifting values of the dependent and independent variables over time, and the major
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exogenous events and capital redistributions that catalyzed those shifts. I then identify
salient points of comparison with the Jewish case.

History of the Cuban-American Field
The 1960s: State-Backed Refugee Resettlement and Exile Militancy
The Cuban-American ethnopolitical field came into existence following the 1959
Cuban Revolution, prior to which the Cuban-American population was demographically
negligible. Between 1960 and 1976, the U.S. admitted more than 750,000 refugees from
Fidel Castro’s Cuba.4 Because of the political significance of the Cuban exile community
in the context of the Cold War, the American state played an extraordinary role in the
resettlement process. As one scholar writes,
the Cuban Refugee Center, a federally subsidized assistance program, pumped
957 million dollars into the community between the years 1960 and 1975,
providing the emigres with the type of cultural, human, technical, and financial
capital they would later need to succeed in their new country. State managers
subsequently put on display the relatively prosperous emigre community to an
ideologically polarized world as a way of undermining Soviet-backed Cuba.5
The Cuban Refugee Program provided the initial wave of newcomers with English
language education, vocational training, job placement, and financial aid for higher
education. Private corporations, universities, and the Florida state and Dade County
governments offered additional assistance. As the principal “losers” from the island’s
Communist revolution, the first wave was already more wealthy, educated, and skilled
than subsequent arrivals, and these generous resettlement programs helped white collar
Cubans “translate” their educational credentials into U.S. professional certifications.6 In
addition to material benefits, Cuban political refugees received permanent residency and
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an expedited path to citizenship. Though funded largely by the federal government,
implementation of the resettlement effort was outsourced to existing voluntary agencies
(“volags”), including the United States Catholic Conference, the Church World Service,
the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, and the International Rescue Committee.7 Efforts
were made to distribute the refugee population across the country, but the majority
remained in South Florida and up to 22 percent of those who were settled elsewhere
eventually relocated to Miami.8
A noteworthy characteristic of the Cuban lobby that emerged in the 1980s was its
receipt of funds from U.S. government agencies. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the
existence of professional volags precluded the capture of the federal government’s far
more substantial investments in refugee resettlement by indigenous Cuban-American
organizations in a manner that might have enhanced their institutional power. Similar to
the Jewish landsmanshaftn of the early twentieth century, working class Cubans in
Miami formed more than 100 hometown societies, or municipios, that offered small
amounts of mutual aid but served principally as vehicles for the preservation and
transmission of Cuban cultural traditions in exile. As the overwhelming majority of early
Cuban refugees were victims of the Castro government, the municipios and their central
federation (the Municipios de Cuba en El Exilio) were strongly anti-Communist and
formed an integral part of the Junta Patriotica Cubana, a coalition of over 200 antiCastro organizations.9 While economically impotent, these confederations were important
sources of grassroots support for the dominant coalition that eventually emerged.
The inaugural decade of Cuban exile politics revolved around clandestine efforts
to overthrow the Castro government with paramilitary force. For the first several years,
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the Cuban-American ethnopolitical field was fragmented into dozens of competing
militant factions of various ideological stripes jockeying for financial support and
training from the CIA and other U.S. government agencies. According to one account, by
1962, the CIA “had become one of Miami’s largest employers.”10 Another scholar notes
that “the CIA and other intelligence agencies employed some twelve thousand Exiles in
Miami as case officers and agents” in the 1960s.11 Exiles blamed the U.S. for fomenting
divisions by funding certain groups and not others. In 1964, Bacardi rum millionaire Jose
Bosch attempted to overcome exile fragmentation by financing a referendum that
reportedly polled some seventy-five thousand emigres, leading to a united front known as
the Representación Cubana del Exilio (RECE). Among its elected leaders was Jorge Mas
Canosa, the Bay of Pigs veteran who would later establish the Cuban American National
Foundation. RECE garnered significant support within the exile community, raised
money in the U.S. and across Latin America, and sponsored a number of paramilitary
raids on Cuba. If there was a dominant coalition in this period, it was comprised of RECE
and the grassroots federations.12 But because none of its activities or investments were
directed at influencing U.S. government policy, its advocacy power was negligible. On
the question of disciplinary power, while different factions may have competed with one
another for ethnic representational capital and resources, the anti-Castro militancy of the
1960s was intense and widespread enough to prevent the emergence of any truly
counterhegemonic challengers. For this reason, I rank the disciplinary power of the
dominant coalition during this period as extraordinarily high. The entirety of exile
politics was a coercive apparatus, combining the ever-looming threat of physical violence

422

with symbolic and economic sanctioning of anyone considered a Communist
sympathizer—all reinforced by the power of the American state.

The 1970s: The Development of Field Challengers and the Maturation of an Economic
Base
By the early 1970s, as U.S. policy shifted towards détente with the Soviet Union,
the government began to crack down on exile paramilitary organizations. RECE was
infiltrated by the FBI and its missions were increasingly interdicted by the Coast Guard.
It gradually lost legitimacy, and the dominant coalition again became more diffuse. In
addition, many exile raids on Cuban targets resulted in heavy losses for the attackers or
capture and imprisonment by the Castro government. While most of the Miami-based
armed groups eventually disintegrated, a small number of them radicalized and turned to
terrorist activity. The combination of momentarily declining internal strength (as a result
of government repression) and improving U.S.-Cuba relations opened up new
possibilities in the field. In 1975, the U.S. supported a decision by the Organization of
American States to lift its twelve-year embargo on Cuba. The Carter administration went
even further, allowing commercial airline flights and exchanging diplomatic “interest
sections.” With military tensions in abatement, Cuban-American organizations promoting
improved relations with Cuba emerged for the first time. This fragile counterhegemonic
coalition consisted of both dominated elements—countercultural youth, e.g.—as well as
actors from the “dominated fraction of the dominant class,” namely intellectuals and
clergy with high levels of cultural capital. Left-wing student activists were granted visas
to visit Cuba, and the Cuban American Committee, a small nonprofit organization
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supported mainly by liberal academics from outside Miami, became the first CubanAmerican group to formally lobby Congress. To establish its claim on representational
capital, it presented the Carter administration with a petition calling for improved U.S.Cuba relations that was signed by 10,000 Cuban Americans. In 1978, the Castro
government initiated a formal dialogue in Havana with 140 members of the exile
community, which resulted in agreements to release political prisoners and allow exiles
to travel to Cuba.13
But these steps toward ideological pluralization occasioned a violent backlash.
Terrorist groups attacked dialogue participants and others accused of appeasing the
Castro government or facilitating commerce with the island. “They bombed Little
Havana travel agencies, shipping companies, and pharmacies that conducted commercial
transactions with Cuba,” writes one scholar. “They harassed and threatened all who
favored political coexistence… From 1973 to 1976, more than one hundred bombs
exploded in the Miami area alone, and the FBI nicknamed Miami ‘the terrorist capital of
the United States.’”14 In 1979, the terrorist group Omega 7 carried out more than twenty
bombings targeting the homes and businesses of “dialogueros.” The assassination of
activists caused internal disarray in some organizations. Former militants who
condemned the bombings were themselves targeted for murder, as were journalists. The
violent wave was funded largely through extortion of wealthier community members,
though a not insignificant segment of the Miami enclave provided voluntary support,
moral and financial. Some raised money to fund the legal defense of apprehended
terrorists. When federal law enforcement agencies eventually dismantled the clandestine
network, it came to light that many of its members had been protégés of the CIA in the
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1960s. Thus was the internal strength of the anti-Castro dominant coalition reasserted
with a violence that had only been potential in the previous decade. By the end of the
1970s, the government crackdown and popular revulsion against the terrorists had
discredited paramilitary tactics, creating an opening for the enclave’s emerging economic
elite to try a more conventional political approach.15
It was in the 1970s that the preconditions for advocacy power came into
existence. First, a critical mass of Cuban refugees became naturalized citizens. The
percentage of all Cuban residents who held citizenship increased from 39% at the time of
the 1970 census to 60% in 1980, notwithstanding the continued influx of refugees.16 In
Dade County, Cubans comprised 20% of the registered voters by the early 1980s, up
from only 8% as late as 1976.17 The growth of Cuban voting power at least potentially
valorized Cuban-American representational capital (H2), practically calling out for
investment in ethnopolitical infrastructure to leverage it. That type of investment, as it
turned out, was made possible by economic developments over the same period. As one
scholar notes,
An important source of capital was the estimated $4 billion of aid that the U.S.
government provided to Cuban exiles. After locating in Miami, the Cuban
middle class developed an elaborate network of successful small enterprises.
These small and middle-size enterprises served as a source of employment for
ensuring waves of Cuban immigrants.18
According to Susan Eckstein, the initial refugee cohort, with its imported capital and
preferential treatment by the federal government, “dominated certain fields of selfemployment, some of which are very lucrative.”
They have prospered especially in the construction trades. By 1971, Cuban
Americans owned roughly half of the main construction companies in MiamiDade County, and soon thereafter 60 percent. The first post-Castro arrivals took
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advantage of the construction boom that Miami’s economic and demographic
growth at the time fueled… Jorge Mas Canosa, who became the most influential
Cuban American leader, was one of the early emigres to amass a fortune in the
building trades.19
Furthermore, as the oil crisis and the Cold War destabilized parts of South America, firms
in Venezuela, Ecuador, and elsewhere sought a more placid business climate in Miami.
“South American flight capital plus Cuban management thus became a formula for the
creation and growth of many banks and construction companies.”20 Finally, there was a
synergy between political incorporation and capital accumulation. As more Cuban
Americans were elected to local office in South Florida, Cuban American businesses
increasingly benefitted from government contracts. Alejandro Portes notes that “Church
and Tower, the company founded by Jorge Mas Canosa, became one of the most
important Dade County contractors.”21 By the end of the decade, an economic power
base comprised of first-generation political hardliners had fully matured.

The 1980s and 1990s: CANF and the Apex of the Dominant Coalition
Shortly after the 1980 presidential election, Richard Allen, Ronald Reagan’s
soon-to-be National Security Advisor, suggested to Jorge Mas Canosa that he form a
lobby group in the mold of AIPAC. The incoming administration, Allen said, stood to
benefit from the exile community’s assistance in generating Congressional support for its
new hardline Latin America policies.22 Soon thereafter, Mas Canosa and a group of
wealthy Cuban-American businessmen, many of whom were veterans of the Bay of Pigs
invasion, formed the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Until Mas Canosa’s
death, CANF served as the dominant institution in the Cuban-American ethnopolitical
field and the national mouthpiece for the grassroots anti-Communism of the Junta
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Patriotica Cubana and the municipios. Like AIPAC, CANF was a sophisticated political
organization consisting of three separate legal entities for fundraising, research, and
lobbying. Its annual budget increased from around $200,000 in the early 1980s to $3.5
million in 1993 and then to around $10 million by 2000. Although reliable estimates
place the organization’s peak rank-and-file membership at around 55,000 small donors of
between one and 500 dollars a year, the overwhelming majority of its budget was derived
from just 120 individuals. The sixty members of CANF’s policymaking Board of
Directors each contributed at least $10,000 a year, while its sixty Trustees gave a
minimum of $5,000.23Mas Canosa himself was among the organization’s largest donors.
After the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) by Congress in
1983, CANF’s ties to the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations netted it a
series of NED grants to carry out informational and human rights monitoring projects
abroad. Between 1984 and 1990, it received a total of $780,000 from the NED.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, CANF was also granted the authority to vet and resettle
Cuban refugees in the U.S. through its Cuban Exodus Relief Fund, to which Congress
allocated $1.7 million in 1991.24
By all accounts, these resources were effectively utilized to influence U.S. Cuba
policy in a right-wing direction for close to twenty years. (Though it is illegal to utilize
government funds to lobby Congress, many critics, including the Miami Herald,
suspected CANF of breaking the rules.) CANF’s political action committee, the Free
Cuba PAC, contributed more than $1.2 million to Congressional candidates from both
parties between 1983 and 2000.25 The top recipients of CANF’s largess were legislators
from the Cuban-American strongholds of South Florida and New Jersey, including
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Congressmen Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), and Robert
Torricelli (D-NJ)—all reliable advocates of the lobby’s anti-Castro radicalism.26 CANF
also played an active role in the 1989 election campaign of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL),
the first Cuban-American member of Congress and one of its most hardline when it
comes to Cuba.27 Beyond campaign contributions, the organization employed full-time
lobbyists and generated glossy research and information materials for legislators and the
general public. These investments in political infrastructure yielded impressive legislative
achievements, in addition to maintaining consistent pressure against normalization with
Cuba.
Perhaps the most significant of CANF’s achievements was the Radio
Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983, which created a new Voice of America radio station,
Radio Marti, dedicated to broadcasting Spanish-language “pro-democracy” content into
Cuba. CANF was granted control over the station’s programing and budget, which over
the years totaled more than $200 million. A second major achievement was the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA), also known as the Torricelli Bill after its sponsor, CANF
ally Robert Torricelli. The CDA tightened U.S. sanctions on Cuba, reversing some of the
liberalizing measures implemented in the 1970s. Both bills were passed over significant
political opposition, including—in the case of the CDA—the initial opposition of
President Bush himself. Bush eventually endorsed the Torricelli Bill after his challenger
in the 1992 presidential election, Bill Clinton, met with CANF and expressed strong
support for tightening the embargo.28 Clearly, then, both CANF’s lobbying investments
and the perceived voting power and preferences of the Cuban-American electorate (H2)
were responsible for the dominant coalition’s advocacy power in this period.
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One of the most important coercive mechanisms maintaining the coalition’s
disciplinary power throughout the 1960s and 1970s—namely, the presence of an armed
population of anti-Communist militants backed by the CIA and other U.S. government
agencies—all but disappeared by the 1980s. Yet the maturation of the Miami enclave
economy, combined with the rise of CANF, strengthened economic and symbolic
mechanisms of internal coercion. According to Portes, “[t]he simultaneous growth of
Cuban-American economic and political power created a mass of resources and
opportunities available to friends and allies,” but “only on condition that they adhered
strictly to the ideological outlook of the enclave.”29 He describes the early meetings of
the Cuban Committee for Democracy, a fledgling centrist organization that emerged in
the early 1990s to oppose the CANF agenda:
several prominent Miami professionals and entrepreneurs participated
enthusiastically, but they eventually dropped out. Their reasons were invariably
the same: fear for their jobs and pressure from families afraid of the
consequences or opposed to their joining a “communist” organization… The
existence and operation of social capital within the Cuban enclave is thus an
important factor explaining the resilience of its political machine: year after year
there have been rewards, material and symbolic, for those who toe the line and
significant disincentives for those who dare to express a different opinion.30
Through the 1980s, Spanish-language media in Miami, particularly radio, was tightly
controlled by hardliners. As one scholar notes, talk radio programs “came to be known as
the ‘firing squads of el exilio,’ as anyone with a point of view that departed from the
official exile ideology became the target of virulent radio personalities.”31 Mas Canosa
regularly launched vitriolic attacks on his perceived enemies, sometimes leading to
spontaneous campaigns of harassment by grassroots extremists. Though much less
frequently than in the 1970s, dissenters were sometimes physically assaulted. In 1992, the
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Inter-American Press Association and the human rights organization Americas Watch
condemned CANF for “us[ing] its political and financial clout to intimidate more liberal
voices.”32 Finally, on the symbolic level, the grassroots confederations staged regular
political rituals—rallies, protests, and celebrations—that “help[ed] keep the mass of the
exile population in a state of heightened emotional tension.” According to Portes, “While
supporting and benefiting from these rituals, the top leadership of the Cuban machine
seldom takes part in these street actions.”33

From the Death of Mas Canosa to the Present: Fragmentation and Decline
Jorge Mas Canosa died in 1997. By all accounts, Mas Canosa had run CANF as
his personal fiefdom, exerting autocratic control over every aspect of the organization’s
decision-making and creating the conditions for an estimated staff turnover rate of
twenty-five percent annually.34 After his death, CANF’s chairmanship was assumed by
his 34-year-old son, Jorge Mas Santos. Like many Cuban Americans of his generation,
Mas Santos had grown up in the U.S. and advocated a less hardline ideological
perspective than the older generation that comprised most of CANF’s Board of Directors.
His personal approach to U.S.-Cuba relations was more in line with the preferences of
native-born Cuban Americans and refugees who had arrived during and after the Mariel
boatlift of 1980. Having grown up in post-revolutionary Cuba, this latter group was both
less negatively disposed towards the Cuban government and more in touch with relatives
on the island, whom U.S. sanctions prevented them from visiting or aiding with
remittances and other forms of material support.35 According to Mas Santos, by 2001,
roughly 40% of CANF’s Board supported his conciliatory approach.36 While it is not
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entirely clear how Mas Santos managed to wrest control of the organization with only
minority support, evidence suggests that Mas Canosa created the conditions for
hereditary succession shortly before his death by transferring $2.6 million of his
company’s (MasTec’s) stock into an endowment fund dedicated to sustaining CANF’s
operations, but which would be personally controlled by the Mas family. As part of a
settlement that followed a 2001 IRS investigation, CANF’s official fundraising arm
(previously called the Cuban American National Foundation) was renamed the Jorge Mas
Canosa Freedom Foundation, and the CANF name was transposed to the organization’s
lobbying arm. Under the guise of IRS compliance, Mas Santos then removed all Freedom
Foundation trustees who represented CANF’s Board of Directors and replaced them
entirely with members of the Mas family. The endowment fund created on Mas Canosa’s
death bed was then transferred to the Freedom Foundation, now firmly under hereditary
control.37
Although CANF’s hardline Directors had taken issue with Mas Santos’s political
moderation from the beginning, it was the seizure of the organization’s assets that
prompted the mass resignation of many of its largest donors. As a result, CANF’s income
took a major hit. Shortly thereafter, the value of its financial endowment was devastated
by the bursting of the late-1990s dot-com bubble, which sent MasTec’s stock into
freefall. All this forced CANF to close its Washington lobbying office, downsize its staff,
and shut down its Miami radio station. In 2004, its once-dominant PAC (the Free Cuba
PAC) received only $5,000 in contributions.38 While CANF still exists, it no longer
engages in active lobbying on Capitol Hill and now represents the moderate and
essentially humanitarian line favored by Mas Santos and the younger generation.39
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Meanwhile, the donors who resigned from CANF en masse in 2001 created a new
organization, the Cuban Liberty Council (CLC), and an associated PAC, the U.S.-Cuba
Democracy PAC. Although it never engaged in the systematic, D.C.-based lobbying and
information production activity that CANF undertook in the 1980s and 1990s, for a time
the CLC represented the hardline position in media debates and offered a venue for allied
politicians to communicate their views to an audience of right-wing Cuban donors. But
by 2015, the CLC’s representatives disappeared from the media, its website registration
lapsed, and it ceased to file an annual IRS 990 form. Today, all that remains
institutionally of the anti-Castro lobby is the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which
continues to provide a substantial amount of campaign funding to politicians who support
the maintenance of the embargo.40
Over the last twenty years, a number of Cuban-American nonprofits have
emerged to advocate a more liberal U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. In the 2016
election cycle, the New Cuba PAC, which supports the normalization of U.S.-Cuba
relations, raised almost as much money as the hardline U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC.41
Scholars have noted the decline of Cuban-American political influence since 2000, when
CANF, then undergoing factional turmoil, failed to prevent the passage of the embargoloosening Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act.42 Most notably, in
2015, President Barack Obama was able to implement a historic series of measures
normalizing relations with Cuba, for which he faced little political backlash and even
received the support of Jorge Mas Santos and CANF.43 While the Trump administration
has since reversed some of those measure, the majority of them remain in place and
Trump himself has voiced support for the general principle of normalization, claiming
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only to want a “better deal” than Obama had secured.44 Thus, since the end of the 1990s,
the dominant sector of the Cuban-American ethnopolitical field has fractured into
competing blocs of roughly similar institutionalized power—a fact that has de-valorized
its representational capital and accordingly reduced the right-wing coalition’s advocacy
power (H2). The rapid pluralization of Cuban-American political-institutional life
suggests that disciplinary power has also lapsed, perhaps because CANF no longer plays
the ringleader role in attacking dissidents the way it did under Mas Canosa. In addition,
first-generation exile control over the Miami-based, Spanish-language media has
weakened in recent decades as the Mariel refugees have entered the journalism field and
Cuban Americans in general have benefitted from the same technological advancements
that helped pluralize the American Jewish field during the same period.

Discussion of Comparative Implications
The following table summarizes key attributes of the Cuban and Jewish cases:
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Table 7.1: Advocacy Power and Disciplinary Power
Important points of variation appear when the Cuban and Jewish cases are viewed
side-by-side. The most striking difference is the rapid decline of the Cuban coalition’s
advocacy power over the last twenty years as Jewish advocacy power has remained stable
or increased. One potential explanation for CANF’s rupture and subsequent financial
decline was its personalistic governance structure. During the 1980s and 1990s, Mas
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Canosa’s authoritarian behavior was tolerated by CANF Board members due to his
unwavering commitment to the most extreme version of anti-Castro exile politics.
However, when a similar authoritarianism was displayed by Mas Santos, whose political
perspective was rejected by the majority of Board members, the latter quickly defected,
crashing the organization. Had CANF been governed more formally from the outset, with
legal authorities vested in the Board of Directors, the defection would have been far less
likely to have occurred, and the hardliners might still be in control of the formidable
apparatus Mas Canosa had built. One can speculate (as many commentators have) that
CANF’s personalistic leadership pattern was the product of the militarism and
“caudillismo” (strongman-ism) of early Cuban exile politics. The U.S. government, as we
have seen, encouraged the community’s militarization as part of its Cold War strategy.
By contrast, AIPAC is governed by a self-selecting board of major donors, minimizing
the likelihood of organizational behaviors that would fracture its donor base. The more
legalistic-bureaucratic character of American Jewish institutions is likewise a product of
the milieu in which they developed.
A second difference is the more prominent role of symbolic power in the Jewish
case. The Cuban exile population, as we have seen, established a resilient network of
grassroots cultural institutions aimed at reproducing cubanidad (Cuban cultural identity):
the municipios, which continue to operate today. But the municipios have never been
well-funded. In 2008, the total budget of their central federation, the Municipios de Cuba
en El Exilio, amounted to only $87,000.45 While the political elite of the Miami enclave
have benefitted from the symbolizing activities of the municipios, which reinforce an
identity between cubanidad and anti-Castroism through periodic community spectacles,
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there has never existed a mechanism through which the economic capital of the CubanAmerican upper class could be systematically channeled into ethnopolitical identityformation. Disciplinary power was maintained primarily through the cultivation of an
atmosphere of threat in which dissenters were likely to incur material loss or violence.
This fact may explain why wealthier second- and third-generation Cuban Americans—
e.g., Mas Santos and his minority of supporters on CANF’s Board of Directors—so easily
pivoted to a counterhegemonic position. Insulated from economic and physical retaliation
by their class position, and detached from grassroots, working class institutions like the
municipios, they were exposed to few of the social mechanisms that might have
reproduced a hardline anti-Castro habitus. In addition, the overreliance on threats of
economic and physical coercion can explain why the decline of CANF immediately
opened space for new, counterhegemonic organizations. Without an authoritative
“ringleader” to identify “enemies” for physical and economic coercion, and no
institutional substructure providing symbolic-ideological reinforcement (aside from the
poorly funded municipios), disciplinary power had no vehicle. According to Alejandro
Portes, the failure of first-generation economic elites to invest in mechanisms of symbolic
power was a product of their exilic belief system—namely, that Cuba would soon be
liberated, that the exiles would return home, and therefore that spending money to
reproduce anti-Castro cubanidad transgenerationally was a needless expense.46
In the Jewish case, by contrast, the coevolution of Jewish social and political
infrastructure in the form of the federation system ensured the social embeddedness of
the dominant coalition’s ethnopolitical project. This occurred through two mechanisms.
First, the NCRAC-JCRC network politicized social life by mobilizing dense networks of
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local membership organizations that were not otherwise politically engaged, such as
fraternal lodges, synagogue auxiliaries, and mutual aid societies. Second, since the late
1960s, federations have channeled hundreds of millions of dollars into an Israel-centric
Jewish identity apparatus that represents itself as “non-political” but reinforces the
ethnopolitical project of the dominant coalition. The breakdown of the first mechanism
since the 1980s has been the primary cause of waning disciplinary power. Outside of the
Orthodox sector, Jewish social life is less densely organized than it once was. The
resulting patterns of de-identification (and, consequently, depoliticization) trumpeted by
communal demographers have motivated increased investment in the second mechanism.
Today, the federation identity apparatus constitutes the dominant coalition’s last pillar of
disciplinary power among non-Orthodox Jews. While Table 6.1 identifies contemporary
Jewish disciplinary power as “low,” we should understand that as a relative assessment—
one that makes sense only in light of the immense symbolic power of Jewish institutions
in the 1960s and 1970s. The decline has been slow-going, and the fact that the federation
identity apparatus has now become the target of counterhegemonic mobilization—
precisely on the grounds that it politicizes the social while claiming an apolitical status—
is suggestive of its continued power to shape Jewish ethnopolitical habitus.
What general conclusions can we draw from this comparative exercise? First, that
socially-embedded mechanisms of symbolic coercion provide a more resilient vehicle of
disciplinary power than mechanisms of economic or physical coercion. As we observed
in the Cuban case, the use of physical coercion by non-state actors tends to provoke state
repression, thereby undermining the apparatus of disciplinary power. While legally
permissible, economic coercion requires ongoing vigilance to identify and target specific
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threats. Symbolic violence, on the other hand, operates impersonally through educative
institutions to prevent threats from arising in the first place. (One important caveat is that
this assessment does not apply in the case of racialized ethnopolitical fields, in which the
state itself is a vehicle of physical and economic coercion.) Second, the comparison
confirms something I have argued throughout this dissertation—namely, that historical
context shapes institutional design and development, which in turn has important
consequences for a dominant coalition’s power and resilience. Finally, while the existing
ethnic lobby scholarship identifies “political unity” (i.e., disciplinary power) as a
determinant of political influence (i.e., advocacy power), the Jewish and Cuban
experiences support my decision to conceive both forms of power as dependent variables.
The presence of cases in the top-right and bottom-left quadrants of Table 7.1 suggests
that, while certain institutional arrangements engender both forms of power
simultaneously, it is entirely possible for one to exist without the other, and vice versa.

Conclusion: Whither American Jewish Politics?
The American Jewish ethnopolitical field looks very different today than it did
just twenty years ago. In 1980, AIPAC lobbied Congress with a budget of $1 million. By
the end of the Reagan era, that figure had increased to $15 million under the influence of
a wealthier and more conservative donor base. From there, AIPAC’s revenue remained
more or less stable for a decade and a half. Then came the September 11th attacks and the
outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. Not since the emergence of the federation
system has a sequence of events so enlarged the pool of resources available to American
Jewish ethnopolitical organizations. Estimated at $17 million in 2000, AIPAC’s operating
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budget leapt to $40 million by 2004 and continued to climb, hitting $70 million in 2011.47
According to IRS filings, the lobby’s total revenue in 2016 was an astonishing $100
million.
And AIPAC is not the only growing concentration of capital in the field. In 2007,
California real estate millionaire Adam Milstein established the Israeli-American Council
(IAC), the first country-wide effort to organize Israeli Americans as a distinct political
demographic. According to its website, since launching, the IAC has “mobilized tens of
thousands of Israeli and Jewish Americans in support of the state of Israel" and built “a
network of off- and online communities who are committed to combatting BDS and [the]
new anti-Semitism.”48 In 2009, the organization’s reported revenue was just over
$500,000. By 2016, that figure had steadily risen to $19.1 million.49 Similarly, the rightleaning Israel education outfit StandWithUs, founded in 2001, saw its income increase
from $1.9 million in 2006 to more than $11 million in 2015.50 StandWithUs and the IAC
are only two of a growing number of national, Jewish, pro-Israel organizations that have
emerged since 2000 with the support of foundations and pro-Israel megadonors. (Sheldon
Adelson, for instance, has given the IAC more than $14 million.) Alongside AIPAC and
the federation system, these organizations now comprise the broad center of the field’s
dominant coalition.
As described in the previous chapter, this extraordinary capital expansion has
coincided with a surge of counterhegemonic activity by dominated elements located at
the intersection of the federation identity apparatus and left-progressive political circles,
particularly on college campuses. Waning disciplinary power and institutional friction
have created an environment in which relatively low-capital insurgents can multiply,
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generating new patterns of institutionalization as technological advancement facilitates
resource pooling and low-cost communications. Today’s insurgents are better equipped
and more financially sustainable than the organized challengers of the 1970s and 1980s,
even as they pursue a strategy of subversion and an interpretation of the nomos far more
heterodox than their liberal Zionist predecessors. Yet, notwithstanding these gains, the
combined economic capital of all counterhegemonic challengers remains comparatively
miniscule, particularly in light of the post-2000 investment patterns described above.
Groups like Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow command nowhere near the mass
constituency it would take to successfully challenge the valorization of Jewish
representational capital through iterated democratic spectacle. What, then, is the likely
trajectory of American Jewish politics?
To approach this question, we need consider developments in three domains: the
Jewish field itself, and the superordinate U.S. political and economic fields. Although
these fields are interactive and can only be artificially distinguished, I consider them
separately for analytic purposes. For each, I describe relevant conditions in the field and
imagine a more or less plausible scenario, considering how it might impact American
Jewish politics over time. I begin with the Jewish field, where the universe of extrafamilial institutions responsible for transmitting American Jewish ethnopolitical identity
appear to be reproducing four political-demographic categories at differential rates: 1)
conservative pro-Israelist; 2) liberal pro-Israelist; 3) non-Zionist counterhegemonic; and
4) politically disengaged. Categories 1, 3, and 4 appear to be growing, while category 2
appears to be shrinking. The 2013 Pew Research Center survey of American Jews
revealed that political and religious-denominational attributes cluster together, with
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Orthodox Jews trending heavily conservative and pro-Israelist; Conservative Jews more
politically liberal and less pro-Israelist; and Reform and non-denominational Jews most
liberal and least pro-Israelist.51
Although Orthodox Jews currently comprise only ten percent of the total
American Jewish population, Orthodox birthrates are two and a half times higher than
Reform birthrates (which are below replacement); the Orthodox are the youngest Jewish
sub-population; and the denominational retention rate for Orthodox Jews under thirty is
83%. As alluded to in the previous chapter, the more liberal denominations display
significantly higher rates of denominational switching (towards the more liberal polarity)
and religious intermarriage. Intermarriage is in turn associated with de-identification and
disengagement from Jewish institutions. Thus, if current trends hold, the conservative
pro-Israelist tendency can be expected to grow as the other three tendencies collectively
shrink. Within the shrinking camp, which today represents the overwhelming majority of
American Jews, the institutional friction described in Chapter 6 can be expected—again,
assuming the continuation of existing trends—to redistribute membership from the liberal
pro-Israelist category to the non-Zionist counterhegemonic and politically disengaged
categories. Given the operation of symbolic exclusion and other punitive mechanisms
targeting counterhegemonic activity, we might expect the ranks of the disengaged
(already the largest contingent) to grow most rapidly. This scenario would see the longterm strengthening of conservative pro-Israelism within the most heavily capitalized
American Jewish institutions, coupled with the slow decline of liberal Zionism and the
even slower growth of a comparatively diminutive counterhegemonic camp.
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Of course, we cannot predict the political future on the basis of the internal
dynamics of the Jewish field alone. In reality, and as we have seen throughout this
dissertation, the Jewish field is impinged upon by superordinate fields, which reshape the
incentives, opportunities, and ideologies of Jewish institutional actors. That brings me to
the field of power, with its interpenetrating economic and political dimensions. I limit
myself to two additional scenarios, beginning with the economic field. As we have seen,
economic transformations critically reshaped power relationships in the American Jewish
ethnopolitical field at different points in history. Most of the organizations that comprise
today’s dominant coalition depend on self-reproducing concentrations of economic
capital made possible by the neoliberal policy regime of the previous half-century and the
concurrent financialization of the U.S. economy.52 At the same time, the gaping
inequalities, endemic financial crises, and global instability associated with these changes
have begun to provoke political backlash. In the U.S. and around the world, technocratic
liberalism has come under attack from both nativist and left-populist movements.
While it is impossible to foresee the outcome of current political struggles,
consider a scenario in which a left-populist counterforce restores welfare state institutions
and disciplines free-wheeling finance capital. Such an outcome would carry important
consequences for the American Jewish ethnopolitical field, particularly if it followed on
the heels of an economic collapse. The decimation of capital concentrations in the field
would lead to a scaled-down Jewish nonprofit economy based on broader pools of
smaller contributors. New tax policies aimed at preventing the accumulation of wealth
would incentivize a weakened federation system to once again expand its donor base,
prompting a reevaluation of the political exclusions that currently estrange a growing
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number of American Jews. The elimination of top-down plutocratic domination via
economic crisis and redistributive policy would rejuvenate democratic localism and
restore some of the grassroots, participatory character of the earlier NCRAC-JCRC
system, albeit at the expense of today’s supercharged advocacy power.
Needless to say, this is a remote scenario, but it illustrates a set of conditions
under which the dominant coalition would weaken and pluralize rather than strengthen
and homogenize. Now let us consider a more realistic scenario, focusing on the political
dimension of the field of power—one that takes into consideration the recent pattern of
partisan polarization around Israel. In 2018, according to the Pew Research Center, only
27% of Democrats sympathized with Israel over the Palestinians, down from 43% in
2016. Meanwhile, the proportion of Republicans professing greater sympathy for Israel
increased from 50% to 79% between 2001 and 2018. Within the Democratic Party,
liberal Democrats—particularly younger, Black, and Latino Democrats—now
sympathize more with Palestinians than Israelis, while moderate and conservative
Democrats continue to back Israel at higher rates.53 Much of this recent partisan
polarization has been driven by the conspicuous alignment of Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu (and the broader Israeli right) with Donald Trump’s administration.
Perhaps foreshadowing the future trajectory of the party, the 2018 midterms saw the
election of several left-leaning Democratic candidates openly critical of Israel.54
Let us assume the continuation of these trends, the further empowerment of leftpopulism within the Democratic Party, and the replacement of the old pro-Israel party
leadership with leaders who seek to challenge Israeli human rights violations. Given the
liberal and Democratic leanings of the Jewish electorate, open antagonism between a far443

right ethnonationalist Israel and the Democratic Party leadership would place AIPAC in a
double-bind. Abandoning bipartisanship in favor of alignment with the Republican Party,
particularly in defense of hardline Israeli policies that most American Jews oppose,
would risk splitting the dominant coalition and de-valorizing Jewish ethnopolitical
capital. On the other hand, reluctance to challenge an openly Israel-critical Democratic
leadership would likely have a similar effect, stimulating an outflow of right-wing donor
capital into competing organizations. This scenario, more continuous with existing trends
than the previous one, would bring about lasting polarization and conflict between
competing liberal and conservative blocs of field dominants. To the extent that the blocs
counteracted one another politically, the valorization of Jewish ethnopolitical capital
would fall.
The three scenarios sketched above represent three potential developments in the
American Jewish ethnopolitical field, each reflecting a single dimension of a
multidimensional interaction. The first scenario, in which demographic drift engenders a
more homogeneously conservative dominant coalition over time, represents the effects of
existing dynamics in the Jewish field in isolation of the field of power. The second
scenario, in which a radical redistribution of capital in the economic field produces a
weaker but more pluralistic dominant coalition, represents the effects of the economic in
isolation of the political. And the third scenario, in which partisan polarization brings
about a split coalition, represents the effects of the political in isolation of the economic.
In reality, however, developments in all three fields occur simultaneously, producing
interaction effects whose precise consequences cannot be determined in advance. While
this indeterminacy precludes any hard and fast predictions as to the overall future
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trajectory of American Jewish politics, these separate field scenarios—to the extent that
they are plausible—highlight a range of possible worlds.
What this analysis suggests is that the fate of the American Jewish ethnopolitical
field is, in fact, the fate of America itself. As economic inequality has distorted the
country and its political institutions, so too has it distorted the institutions of American
Jewry, sparking parallel uprisings against oligarchic domination. While the Jewish field
is not democratically structured, Jews have demanded communal democracy since the
earliest days of the twentieth century. The fight of today’s Jewish insurgents and the
broader left-populist rebellion against neoliberalism are, if not one and the same, then at
least, as Bourdieu would say, “homologous.” That we cannot foresee the future direction
of things, either in American or American Jewish politics, speaks to the possibilities and
deep uncertainties of our historical moment—a moment in which institutional friction has
reached a flashpoint, and desiccated political structures are primed to go up in flames.
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